As part of plans to promote "small government and big society", to accelerate towards a market economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has let certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) become involved in some government functions, such as disaster relief, social work, welfare and legal aid.
But most observers agree the Chinese government is still omnipotent, as apparently most officials do not want their "power" to be shared with NGOs. In such an environment, NGOs in China still have to proceed on tiptoes.
In July, the closing down of an NGO offering pro bono legal assistance, the Open Constitution Initiative, known as Gongmeng in Putonghua (Mandarin), reminded the public that NGOs in China need to stay out of politics if they want to survive. Gongmeng was
closed on the grounds of tax evasion, but it was widely believed that hostility towards the government was the real reason.
It could be argued that Gongmeng was an isolated case of government interference in China's NGOs, but a report on disaster relief fund management by Deng Guosheng, associate professor of Tsinghua University's School of Public Management and Policy, tells a different story
According to Deng's study, by November 2008, public donations to help disaster relief in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake in May last year, many made through NGOs, totaled some 65.252 billion yuan (US$9.5 billion) - excluding donations in kind. However, about 58% of the total (37.9 billion yuan) went to various government agencies, 36% went to government-designated Red Cross organizations, charities and foundations and only 5.9% ended up with local foundations less affiliated to the government
Deng found that part of the 36% that went to government-designated organizations in fact eventually went to government departments. Some specifically-designated donations were even ultimately channeled to government units for "the purpose of overall planning". Altogether, according to the report, more than 80% of total relief donations ultimately ended up in government accounts.
Thus, ironically, while Beijing encourages NGOs to play a bigger role in disaster relief (which is non-political), government departments and officials have found ways to keep NGO hands off relief funds donated by the public.
In 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao vowed to turn over more public administration responsibility to enterprises, NGOs and intermediary organizations in his annual government work report to the National People's Congress (NPC). Five years later, however, and Deng's research proves this has not has taken place.
Deng's study does not imply that the government has pocketed or embezzled the funds, but it does argue that such government involvement is an unwise move, since it undermines the efficiency of relief efforts.
For example, NGOs are more cost-efficient that government agencies. For the same project, the operation costs of an NGO is about 10% of that of a government agency, if not less. Secondly, NGOs are more likely to deliver more differentiated and customized services than bulky government units.
Moreover, as many commentaries in Chinese media point out, the government taking away public donations for disaster relief affects people's enthusiasm to make charity donations. It is obvious that people donate money to help disaster-affect compatriots - not to help boost government revenues.
So, why did the government take over over Sichuan? Its response may be that NGOs in China are too weak and fragile for such an overwhelming mission. As the data suggest, at the beginning of the relief work, there were over 300 NGOs involving 3 million-plus people to deliver services. However, less than a year later, by April 2009, only some 30 NGOs survived with no more than 50,000 volunteers. Therefore, the real question to be addressed should be: why are NGOs in China so weak?
The term NGO was first introduced in China with the "Non-Governmental Forum" at the Fourth World Women's Conference held in Beijing in 1995. Since then, NGO has officially been included in the Chinese political glossary. Although the term has become more popular in recent years, it usually refers to international NGOs. Many Chinese NGOs prefer the term "non-profit organizations", "private organizations" or "social organizations", as the term fei zhengfu (Chinese version of non-governmental) is easily to be perceived as anti-government, which is of course a taboo in this country, especially after the Tiananmen incident in 1989.
In China, according to the "Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations" promulgated in 1998, in order to acquire full legal recognition, an NGO has to register itself both with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (or its local branches), and with a relevant government or party department to oversee its business and operation. According to statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, there were 230,000 such registered "social organizations" across the country at the end of 2008. In fact some scholars suggest the term "government organized non-governmental organization (GONGO)" would be more appropriate to describe the real nature of such Chinese NGOs.
It is understandable that close affiliation to government and party agencies is likely to hamper the flexibility and creativity of NGOs, let alone their independence. As pointed out by Dou Ruigang, the secretary-general of Tencent Charity Foundation, those GONGOs are actually extensions of government; therefore, donation and disbursement are operated within the government system. Moreover, there is no way for GONGOs to assess the performance of the government.
In reality, the registration of most organizations, due to their small size or other reasons, is rejected by relevant supervising departments. Unable to acquire a legal identity, such organizations have to then register as a company or simply start work without registering at all. Some studies show that formally registered NGOs account for only 10% of the total in operation and that the other 90% are either registered as companies or have no registration. For those registered as companies, taxes and fees are very likely to put the already cash-strapped organizations out of business. As regards the latter, without any official label, they have great difficulty in attracting serious funds. Even worse, they could be busted at any time.
Without doubt, from the very beginning, NGOs in China have been crippled by policy and legal restrictions. The ruling party is determined to keep tight control on NGOs in the country over political concerns, regardless of their nature or cause. At operational level, government departments and officials are not willing to give their "power" or "authority" away to NGOs.
However, "a can of worms", so to speak, has already been opened, as the government obviously does not have sufficient resources to deal with a myriad of social problems entailed by its massive economic reform.
Analysts believe Beijing is gradually developing a better understanding of a future role for NGOs. The Ministry of Civil Affairs expressed willingness to "make friends" with grass-roots charity organizations at the end of 2008 and Beijing is currently working on revising 1998 civil society regulations.
According to the Hong Kong daily newspaper Wen Wei Po, the following reforms may be considered by Beijing. Firstly, Charities engaging in social welfare and relief work will not have to register twice any more, meaning, registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (or its local branches) will suffice. Secondly, the ministry will introduce a record and registration system for rural charities without a judicial person and registration procedures will be simplified. Finally, access restrictions on foreign charities will be relaxed to some degree and they will be allowed to set up offices in China.
More encouraging news comes from Shenzhen city, a poster child for reform, which has signed an agreement with the Ministry of Civil Affairs on a trial run of a comprehensive set of reforms in the management of civil affairs. A major goal of the reform is to scrap the double registration mechanism. Liu Runhua, director of Shenzhen Department of Civil Affairs believed that with the reform, the number of "social organizations" in Shenzhen will increase significantly. Liu also declared that the city is committed to giving full play to social organizations and making them major providers for public services so as to materialize the strategy of "small government and big society".
In ancient days, Chinese emperors were told that popular grievances were like a flood, and the key to flood control was to divert rather than block it. Leaders of today, aiming at "advancing with the times" should know better.
Stephanie Wang is a freelance contributor based in Changsha, China.
