Monitoring Policy Making at the United Nations |
| ||||||||||||
Ankara Has Only Itself to Blame for its Lack of Power in Northern Iraq - Nations and States - Global Policy Forum Ankara Has Only Itself to Blame for its
Lack of Power in Northern IraqBy Erich Marquardt
Power and Interest News Report
February 3, 2004
In the lead-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq last March, world opposition to the proposed military action was vociferous and widespread, with protests taking place all across the globe. The opposition to Washington both at home and abroad cast doubt on whether the Bush administration would make the fateful decision to send troops across the borders of Iraq. Many world leaders hoped that the war could be averted, which was the stance in Ankara. With 90 percent of the Turkish population firmly against Washington's Iraq plans, in addition to the possible instability that such an attack could bring to the region, the parliament in Ankara narrowly rejected calls to support the proposed U.S.-led intervention.
Despite Ankara's opposition, Washington invaded Iraq anyway, and instead of relying on Turkish troops for securing the northern part of the country, it relied on Kurdish troops. This decision gave new impetus to Kurdish nationalism and is now working against Turkey's national interests. This avoidable circumstance was forecasted before the March invasion when Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of Turkey's majority Justice and Development Party, warned, "If one is left out of the equation at the start of the operation, it may not be possible to be in a position to control developments at the end of the operation. Turkey's long-term interests and even security could be in jeopardy."
By failing to heed Erdogan's warning, Ankara now finds its long-term interests and security in jeopardy due to its failure to place itself in a position to control political developments in northern Iraq. If Ankara would have participated in the U.S.-led invasion, and allowed its troops to be used in tangent with American soldiers, it could have secured Turkish influence in northern Iraq, influence that could now be used to prevent Kurdish factions from gaining power and political control.
Before the invasion, Washington offered Turkey this lucrative opportunity. Even though the various Kurdish factions were against Washington's proposition to Turkey, there was little that they could do. Faced with threats from Ankara in the north and Baghdad in the south, Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq were dependent on U.S. support, demonstrated through the "no fly zones" that Washington established shortly after the 1991 Gulf War.
Due to Turkish refusal to assist the U.S.-led invasion, Kurdish leaders received an unexpected boon to their interests and a major boost to their power. Shortly after the U.S.-led invasion, Kurdish troops swarmed into the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, reestablishing their control. In the months that followed, Kurdish leaders forcefully retook areas that they once held before Saddam had relocated and cleansed them during the '80s. They are also expanding their political infrastructure in the region, laying claim to a future of either a federal Kurdish state partially governed by Baghdad, or a completely independent state of Kurdistan.
While these actions are certain to evoke political controversy in the region, there is little that can be done immediately to prevent Kurdish aspirations since Washington relies on the Kurds for keeping northern Iraq stable and controlled. Indeed, facing violence and a growing insurgency in central Iraq, Washington's primary concern was, and still is, to prevent other areas of Iraq from falling into chaos, hence its support of Kurdish leaders and its willingness to compromise with Shi'a leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has the power to create violence and turmoil in southern Iraq.
To highlight just how precarious this situation is, over the weekend northern Iraq suffered from a series of attacks; suicide bombers simultaneously attacked the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Erbil, killing over 60 people and bringing the instability further northward.
Now, due to these political developments, Turkey has been excluded from shaping post-Saddam Iraq, a situation that is putting its interests at stake. With the Kurds in northern Iraq keeping the area relatively stable, Washington no longer has any real need for Turkish troops; in fact, their introduction in any significant scale would be certain to destabilize northern Iraq since Turkish and Kurdish troops would probably engage each other.
Erdogan reiterated his concern last week during a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. He said, "There is a demand to establish a federation in the north of Iraq. We approve of neither an ethnic, nor religious-based federation. These developments will cause a difficult situation for Iraq in the future."
In light of this, Ankara is desperately trying to improve its relations with the United States. It has now offered to help the U.S. in Iraq, offering access to Turkish bases for U.S. military operations in the country. Ankara's attempts have helped to moderate Washington's tone, with Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, announcing last week that the U.S.-led coalition considers the Kurdistan Workers' Party to be a terrorist organization.
A broader timeline is useful to discover what the likely conclusion of this clash of interests between the Turks and Kurds will be. Washington's strategic support for the Kurds is a short-term interest, since it is only concerned with preventing northern Iraq from falling into violence. Washington's strategic support for Turkey, however, is a long-term interest, since Turkey straddles Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. A long-time U.S. strategic ally, Washington will not swap its relations with Ankara for Kurdish aspirations of statehood.
More Information on Nations and States
More Information on Emerging States and Unrepresented Peoples
More Information on the Kurds
FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
