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Author Looks at Civil War and its Aftermath- NGOs - Global policy Forum Author Looks at Civil War and its Aftermath
By Crespo Sebunya
Daily Star
September 11, 2002
Wars are nasty business, and some are nastier than others. “Uncivil wars,” marked by reckless and random killing, leave a trail of destruction that extends well beyond the conflict itself.
Samir Khalaf’s Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon a History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict in Lebanon has much to say that is new and valuable about this country’s descent into civil war.
A leading scholar in the sociology of postwar societies, Khalaf argues (against various crude stereotypes) that the Lebanese Republic was not unusually or “naturally” prone to violence, but that it had been a peaceful and vibrant society with an impressive history of viable pluralism. He explains how easily collective strife can degenerate into random and reckless violence with a logic of its own.
He also points out how difficult it is to define and master the arts of social pacification once “uncivil war” has broken out.
Khalaf’s work is more than an examination of the many complexities and ironies of Lebanon’s current experiment in social pacification. It invites us to think of the Lebanese case in universal terms. Khalaf reminds us that the power to force others into submission does not necessarily translate into stable governments and civil societies of law and order.
Some in the victors’ camp are indifferent to this distinction, but things look different to the survivors. In the aftermath of “uncivil war,” it is as if the power of all action outside military intervention ceases.
People feel numbed as the content of their world disintegrates. They suffer muted anguish and pain: “Reckless, indiscriminate and random killing” (as Khalaf puts it) saps people’s trust in themselves and others; it mutilates their capacity for self-organization; it frustrates their ability to make short-term decisions and long-term plans.
The difficulties entailed in rebuilding civil society from the ruins of war start from this point. The crafting of peaceful social relations is an essential antidote to the residues of “uncivil war.” Yet talk of the need for a civil society is itself no panacea.
Khalaf quotes Ralf Dahrendorf’s sober warning: “It takes six months to create new political institutions, to write a constitution and electoral laws. It may take six years to create a half-way viable economy. It will probably take 60 years to create a civil society. Autonomous institutions are the hardest things to bring about.”
Why are the institutions of civil society so difficult to build or rebuild? Businesses, Khalaf shows, are often reluctant to invest in social and economic infrastructure wrecked by uncivil war. When they do invest, quick profits often result in kitsch and its “easy catharsis.”
The Hard Rock Cafe and Pizza Hut move in on rutted public monuments and shell-damaged mosques. The resulting bourgeois decadence, mediocrity and conspicuous consumption, Khalaf is no fan of “rampant globalism,” have no genuine socializing effects; they reinforce the public mood of lethargy and disengagement.
Business investment often also tears at the shreds of social fabric that have somehow survived “uncivil war.” Fashionable hotels come to stand side-by-side with squalid backyards and dilapidated homes. Awaiting gentrification, poor squatters are forced to defend their ground against rich speculators and squads of police.
Khalaf gives a mixed review of the civilizing effects of nongovernmental organizations. Compared to governments, NGOs are often flexible and innovative, low-cost, and responsive to grassroots pressure. Again, though, he reminds us that their “civilizing” effects are not spontaneous or automatic.
The task of rebuilding a civil society is no substitute for the parallel task of building effective and legitimate governmental structures, which is why relief and development work is frequently scuppered by local warlords and armed gangs, private armies and occupying forces.
Then there are the socially distorting effects of NGO behavior. To the extent that the sustained development of civil society relies upon NGOs as conduits for aid money and technical support, it often turns them into hostages of fortune, with mixed dividends. It tends to create local organizations that are self-centered and unaccountable partly because they are so dependent on their donors, partly because the staff of these NGOs enjoy privileges denied those living in misery around them.
Khalaf also enriches our understanding of the contingency of a social life battered by violence. Drawing upon intellectual traditions as different as cultural anthropology and social psychology, Khalaf argues that social life is “unnatural.” The institutional rules and organizations of any society, including a civil society, presuppose the emotional willingness of actors to get involved with others.
In an effort to conjure up a hopeful image, Khalaf points to the importance of the traditional Lebanese makari, the wandering peddler known for the tales and tidbits he brings back from the wider world.
The pacification of the “uncivil war,” Khalaf says, requires that encouragement be given to any group or project capable of engendering the spirit of the makari. Pluralism and voluntary association can never spring from movements and parties driven by nationalism or xenophobia, racism or retribalization.
The trouble is that pluralism cannot be agreed to by means of round-table meetings, constitutional conventions, truth commissions or covenants such as the Taif Accord. Civility can neither be planned nor legislated from above, nor produced through rational agreement.
This is why, Khalaf concludes, civil sentiments best hatch and grow in compact milieux like urban areas. Here, “the transformation of the geography of fear into a culture of tolerance” can take place through a variety of apparently “nonpolitical” strategies architectural design and landscaping schemes; local health and environmental and archaeological programs.
Civil society can also take root in cultural initiatives the performing arts, sports and university seminars and civic initiatives like the campaigns against speeding and reckless driving spearheaded by groups like the Youth Association for Social Awareness.
At the end of the day civil society can’t be produced like pizzas and fast foods. It takes time to grow.
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