

106TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 4453

To encourage the establishment of a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 15, 2000

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. PORTER, and Mrs. MORELLA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To encourage the establishment of a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “United Nations Rapid
5 Deployment Police and Security Force Act of 2000”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 The Congress finds the following:

8 (1) United States Presidential Decision Direc-
9 tive 71 calls for a stronger United States response
10 to maintaining order in societies recovering from

1 conflict. It aims to improve coordination of United
2 States efforts and to enhance the ability of other
3 countries, the United Nations, and regional organi-
4 zations to plan, mount, and sustain operations in
5 support of the rule of law.

6 (2) In a press briefing on February 24, 2000,
7 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated the fol-
8 lowing: “The recent slowness in deploying des-
9 perately needed civilian police to Kosovo provides
10 only the latest evidence that present international
11 capabilities are not adequate. And the ongoing de-
12 ployment of CIVPOL teams to East Timor and Si-
13 erra Leone show that the need will not soon dimin-
14 ish. In response, we must recognize that old models
15 of peacekeeping don’t always meet current chal-
16 lenges. Peace operations today often require skills
17 that are neither strictly military nor strictly police
18 but, rather, a combination of the two. The inter-
19 national community needs to identify and train units
20 that are able to control crowds, deter vigilante ac-
21 tions, prevent looting and disarm civilian agitators
22 while, at the same time, winning the trust of the
23 communities in which they are deployed.”.

24 (3) In his April 2000 report, “We the Peoples,
25 The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Cen-

1 tury”, United Nations Secretary General Kofi
2 Annan states that only member nations of the
3 United Nations can fix the “structural weakness of
4 United Nations peace operations . . . Our system for
5 launching operations has sometimes been compared
6 to a volunteer fire department, but that description
7 is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must
8 first find fire engines and the funds to run them be-
9 fore we can start dousing any flames. The present
10 system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc
11 arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to
12 the provision of civilian personnel even more so than
13 military. Although we have understandings for mili-
14 tary standby arrangements with Member States, the
15 availability of the designated forces is unpredictable
16 and very few are in a state of high readiness. Re-
17 source constraints preclude us even from being able
18 to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.”.

19 (4) The December 1999 United Nations “Re-
20 port on the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of
21 the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in
22 Rwanda” indicates that in April 1994, the United
23 Nations Security Council failed to deploy 5,500
24 United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda within two
25 weeks of the initial violence, thereby allowing the

1 conflict to escalate. The 6-month estimated cost of
2 the deployment would have been \$115,000,000. In-
3 stead, the genocide consumed 800,000 lives along
4 with \$2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.

5 (5) In Srebrenica, Bosnia, on July 11, 1995,
6 Bosnian Serb troops forced the retreat of Dutch
7 United Nations peacekeepers who were part of the
8 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 (UNMIBH) from a “safe haven”, resulting in the
10 massacre of 7,000 Bosnian civilians and expulsion of
11 40,000 Bosnian civilians.

12 (6) The United Nations peacekeeping budget
13 estimate for the United Nations Mission in Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina from July 1, 1997, to June 30,
15 1998, was \$165,600,000, while the North Atlantic
16 Treaty Organization (NATO)-sponsored intervention
17 in the Serbian province of Kosovo cost \$37,000,000
18 per day.

19 (7) In July 1999, 4,700 civilian police officers
20 were requested to be deployed to the Serbian prov-
21 ince of Kosovo but, as of April 17, 2000, the United
22 Nations has deployed only 2,901 of the requested
23 police officers, resulting in the breakdown of law and
24 order and the escalation of unrest in Kosovo.

1 (8) In May 2000, Revolutionary United Front
2 rebels in Sierra Leone, in violation of the ceasefire
3 and peace accords, captured and held prisoner ap-
4 proximately 500 United Nations Mission in Sierra
5 Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers. The weapons,
6 equipment, and vehicles of the peacekeepers were
7 also seized. The UNAMSIL force had been deployed
8 too slowly and was undertrained and understaffed,
9 consisting of only 8,700 peacekeepers of the 11,000
10 peacekeepers requested by the United Nations Secu-
11 rity Council.

12 (9) On February 24, 2000, the United Nations
13 Security Council approved a United States-spon-
14 sored proposal to send 5,537 troops on an observer
15 mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (to
16 be known as the United Nations Organization Mis-
17 sion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
18 (MONUC)), a Republic $\frac{1}{3}$ the size of the United
19 States, to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka
20 accords. However, it will take at least three months
21 to deploy the required forces. On April 25, 2000,
22 South African Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma
23 urged rapid deployment of the troops and stated
24 “[i]f deployment is very slow [the accords] can fall

1 apart . . . The troops should have been deployed a
2 long time ago.”.

3 (10) The United States has the power in the
4 United Nations Security Council to veto decisions
5 that are not within the national interests of the
6 United States.

7 **SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DE-**
8 **PLOYMENT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCE.**

9 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall direct the
10 United States representative to the United Nations to use
11 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge
12 the United Nations—

13 (1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deploy-
14 ment Police and Security Force that is rapidly
15 deployable, under the authority of the United Na-
16 tions Security Council, and trained to standardized
17 objectives;

18 (2) to recruit personnel to serve in this Force;
19 and

20 (3) to provide equitable and reliable funding for
21 the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and
22 Security Force.

23 (b) MISSION STATEMENT.—The United Nations
24 Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force should have
25 a mission statement that provides for the following:

1 (1) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Po-
2 lice and Security Force will engage in operations
3 when—

4 (A) the United Nations Security Council
5 determines that an imminent threat to the
6 peace requires a preventive deployment of forces
7 and the Security Council deems it as an appro-
8 priate response;

9 (B) the United Nations Security Council
10 determines ongoing gross violations of human
11 rights or breaches of the peace require rapid
12 intervention by the international community
13 and the Security Council deems it as an appro-
14 priate response;

15 (C) peace has been restored to a region but
16 the rule of law has not yet been reestablished
17 and when national civilian police or United Na-
18 tions member nations personnel are not avail-
19 able and the Security Council deems it as an
20 appropriate response; or

21 (D) the United Nations Rapid Deployment
22 Police and Security Force can utilize its per-
23 sonnel to help train the military and civilian po-
24 lice of member nations of the United Nations to

1 better participate in international peace oper-
2 ations.

3 (2) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Po-
4 lice and Security Force will consist of not more than
5 6000 personnel who are—

6 (A) placed under the authority of the
7 United Nations Security Council;

8 (B) under the direction of the Secretary
9 General of the United Nations;

10 (C) deployed only by United Nations Secu-
11 rity Council resolution;

12 (D) volunteers from United Nations mem-
13 ber nations employed directly by the United
14 Nations;

15 (E) trained as a single unit, appropriately
16 equipped, expressly for international peace op-
17 erations including civilian policing; and

18 (F) rapidly deployable.

19 (3) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Po-
20 lice and Security Force will be organized as a sub-
21 department within the United Nations Department
22 of Peacekeeping Operations or under the control of
23 the United Nations's Military Staff Committee and
24 will contain personnel trained as military staff offi-

1 (A) any such operation carried out under
2 chapter VI or chapter VII of the Charter of the
3 United Nations; and

4 (B) any such United Nations operation
5 that includes civilian policing.

6 (2) The term “rapidly deployable” refers to the
7 capacity to deploy military or civilian personnel to a
8 region undergoing conflict within 15 days of the en-
9 actment of a United Nations Security Council reso-
10 lution authorizing a deployment.

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