Monitoring Policy Making at the United Nations |
| ||||||||||||
Annex XXVI
Conference room paper submitted by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group: summary of proposals made on the periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, dated 25 June 1998
A. General proposals
1. On earlier occasions the Open-ended Working Group had discussed the possibility of a periodic review of the composition, size and decision-making procedures of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. In the opinion of some delegations, such a periodic review could be an important element in facilitating efforts towards reaching general agreement on the issues within the mandate of the Working Group. A number of delegations further pointed out that the concept of review had been an integral part of the United Nations from its establishment and could be activated by invoking Article 109 of the Charter. Some delegations declared that a periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council was necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security.
2. It has been suggested that in the event that any rotational arrangements were adopted, the lists of rotating countries could be reviewed during the periodic review process. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country has managed to honour its obligations and met the increased responsibilities stemming from the rotational arrangement.
3. Another view was expressed that a review process would be unnecessary and argued that such a review would be tantamount to an admission of failure in the reform process. Furthermore, it would also bring about a situation in which some Member States would be perpetually conducting electoral campaigns.
B. Proposals on the periodicity of the review process
4. Various proposals have been made about the periodicity of the review. There were suggestions that the first review should take place 10 to 20 years after the conclusion of the present reform exercise. There should be subsequent periodic reviews thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. One solution would be to undertake the periodic review at a time to coincide with the expiration of the tenure of members of those regions opting for regional rotational arrangements.
5. Furthermore, the periodic review should automatically be included on the agenda of the General Assembly. The review process should be concluded within two years.
C. Proposals on the scope of the review
6. Proposals were made that the scope of the review process should be comprehensive in order to address all aspects of reform, including the status of new permanent members as well as the question of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation as well as over-representation of any region on the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories.
7. With regard to the status of new permanent members of the Security Council during the review process, two proposals were made. One proposal was that, in order to retain their status, countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would need to secure, at the review process, the support of at least a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. The other was that such countries would continue as permanent members unless otherwise decided by a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations.
8. A proposal has been made that the periodic review should not cover the rights and obligations held by the original five permanent members.
9. Proposals have also been made to the effect that, in order to facilitate the solution of the present reform process, the veto should be discussed only during the periodic review. In this respect, two aspects have been mentioned. Firstly, if the veto were to be extended to the new permanent members they would agree not to exercise their right until the review takes place. Secondly, the time leading up to the first review could be used to prepare for a more consolidated arrangement which should include recommendations on the veto rights of the original permanent members and that of the new permanent members with a view to bridging the gap between them.
D. Proposals on decision-making in the review process
10. Proposals were made that the review process should not be subject to the use of the veto by the original permanent members and/or the new permanent members.
