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Striking First - Empire? - Global Policy Forum Striking First
New York Times
June 23, 2002
For the past half-century, American military planning has proceeded from the assumption that the United States would respond quickly to aggression but would not be the first to strike. Now the Bush administration is arguing that such a purely defensive policy has become outdated in an age of international terrorism, rogue states and unconventional weapons. With one eye on Iraq, the White House is preparing a new national security strategy that would justify launching pre-emptive military campaigns against groups or nations that the president believes pose the threat of a future attack against America or its allies.
That is a shift with profound implications. The old policy has served the United States well. During the 1962 missile crisis, it undoubtedly helped John Kennedy resist demands that he simply blow up the offensive weapons being constructed in Cuba. But Kennedy had another restraint ‹ fear of the other superpower, the Soviet Union ‹ that no longer exists. And he had the comfort that comes with knowing that the enemies he was confronting were states that also had a great deal to lose if things got out of control.
As we tell ourselves every day, things are different now. Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda operate outside the control of any functioning government and feed off dysfunctional states. They aim to inflict maximum death and terror in an initial unprovoked attack. With no territory or vulnerable resources of their own ‹ and acting under the nihilistic umbrella of a martyr complex ‹ they appear immune to threats of American retaliation. When groups like that are discovered preparing an attack, it makes sense to strike first.
In doing so, however, the United States must take care not to set a dangerous example that might, say, tempt India to launch its own pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. Successful pre-emption will also require that America's foreign intelligence reporting be more consistently accurate, reliable and timely than it is today.
We should never imagine that having the option of a pre-emptive attack will make things simple. The vision of a quick, clean strike at a remote desert installation for making weapons of mass destruction is seductive. We have to remind ourselves that reality tends to be messier, and recall Bill Clinton's failed and somewhat embarrassing attempts to take out Osama bin Laden's high command or Jimmy Carter's disastrous effort to free American hostages in Iran. And while it's one thing to launch an attack on the territory of an anarchic state like Somalia or Afghanistan, it's another to figure out what to do when a nation like Iraq or Iran or North Korea tries to develop unconventional weapons.
We are uncomfortable with the idea of Mr. Bush's giving himself carte blanche to make any military intervention he thinks necessary without seeking outside approval. Even in these dangerous times, the United States should not regard itself as being in the business of unilaterally invading other countries or toppling other governments. While we cannot expect Mr. Bush to promise never to strike the first blow, we can define the standards to which we intend to hold him.
First, the less immediate and direct the threat against America, the weaker the case for pre-emptive military action. The administration must make it clear that force will be a last resort, not its principal antiproliferation tool.
Second, whether the United States strikes first or retaliates, Congressional leaders of both parties should be consulted and listened to before military action is taken. Ideally, the president should ask for a vote of support from Congress. But if time is very short, he should, at a minimum, consult the Senate majority and minority leaders and the speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives. America's allies should also be consulted before any offensive military action.
Third, the government must be prepared to justify any offensive attack on another country after it occurs. Both the nation and the world will expect this, and they will judge the administration's actions on the quality of the proof it can assemble to show that something deadly was about to happen without immediate intervention.
Finally, it is difficult to think of any circumstance under which the United States could be justified in using any kind of nuclear weapon in a pre-emptive strike. While the administration may find it strategically important not to acknowledge that fact, nuclear weapons should never be regarded as just another bigger, more effective bomb.
In adjusting its military strategy to the new realities of the post-Sept. 11 world, America must be careful to preserve its core values, its alliances and its constitutional system of checks on unrestrained executive war-making.
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