Global Policy Forum

Bin Laden Lacks a Political Solution

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By Jonathan Feiser

Power and Interest News Report
October 9, 2003


There are several inconsistencies regarding the history that Osama bin Laden has apparently attempted to emulate. Whatever the collective vision that bin Laden and his influential teachers originally hoped to achieve, the movement conceived during the Soviet-Afghani War has now gained its own ideological, emotional, and political momentum. Moreover, the perceived weaknesses of many Middle Eastern states in relation to the global power of the United States remains the product of a selective understanding of history that becomes even more complicated by the emotion of current events. In such an environment, there are many examples of both radicals and sympathetic adherents who pursue bin Laden's general intentions. His message has found an adequate sanctuary in many hearts and minds, and it continues to rejuvenate the momentum and emotionalism of his self-proclaimed cause.

One specific example that is the cause of much of today's political conflict is the present political borders originally orchestrated by the authors of the Mandate System. Following the First World War, this system effectively codified French and British "spheres of influence" throughout the Middle East with no regard for its historical denizens or their cultural patterns. The Americans, even before the decline and fall of the British Empire, proactively schemed and worked to establish Saudi Arabia for both its exceptional oil reserves and as a geostrategic bulwark against the Soviet Union. The issue of domestic legitimacy of the al-Saud family and the presence of non-Muslims on holy ground -- compounded by President Truman's May 14, 1948 recognition of Israel -- created and continues to create rising tensions and regional strife. In addition, present living conditions continue to remain poor as these praetorian regimes carry on weak and intensely corrupt political environments -- with some exceptions -- that are often unpredictable in their political and economic alignment.

In the meantime, the Bush administration's "crusade against evil" surges onward with little foresight about the consequences of its original phraseology. Such rhetorical language does little to portray the United States as the "good guy." In truth, it ultimately contributes to the advertisement of a dangerously compromised and unilateralist-tilting foreign policy. Meanwhile, misperceptions of U.S. policy validate bin Laden's message and thus embolden and serve to legitimize those who follow his example. Bin Laden's "goals" -- the elimination of all infidels and polytheists as well as the resurrection of an Islamic Caliphate -- are far from anything new to the history and writings of Islam. However, such objectives nevertheless exist as conduits of his message and provide an emotional and historical element of legitimacy.

Therefore, with recent history in mind, the questionable vision that bin Laden professed both before and after the attacks of September 11 now demonstrates a phenomenon that separates the man from the message. Bin Laden's message provides radical Islamic groups -- many of whom were once Arab nationalists -- with historical grievances as well as a divine sense of new purpose and conviction. In this context, the existence of a living bin Laden remains negated by the power of his message, as well as by the political ramifications that his death would surely herald.

On a local level, bin Laden's oratory has managed -- once again -- to expose the weaknesses of many Middle Eastern regimes, such as Saudi Arabia in particular. While such disparities are obvious enough, bin Laden's rhetoric focuses on the linkage between the questionable governments at home and the impurities spread by the West. This draws negative implications in the relationship between such regimes and the United States.

In spite of all this, bin Laden's message lacks a political and religious solution. Despite the worthwhile praise many have attributed to his clear demands for the removal of foreign military forces from the Middle East, there is a lack of effort towards a solution. The appraisal of bin Laden's legitimacy is enforced by a very real sense of desperation that is fueled by internal and external forces of social discontentment.

Most critically, when leaders who advertise themselves as "freedom fighters" employ powerful symbols to justify violent means of endless retaliation, no one's interests or security will ever be safe. Bin Laden's plan remains within the context of an anti-Western status quo: perpetual warfare on a global scale that appeals to a number of present issues while offering zero effort -- and thus little hope -- toward a feasible, compromised, and mutually equitable solution. In this design, the continuation of war remains a dominant factor in bin Laden's agenda, troops or no troops in Saudi Arabia.

Pursuant to this premise, bin Laden's themes apply to audiences with few social options from which to chose. In the present age, two developments have become powerful factors in bin Laden's artificial jihad against the West. The first is the reach and depth of the globalized media and its race to cover breaking news at global hot spots. As a result, images from American casualties of war in Iraq to the cyclic violence in Israel and Palestine remain constant reminders of bin Laden's war. Thus, while many Westerners have become desensitized over such events, individuals in the Muslim world find a deep spring of hostility.

The second development is the speed of information as a vehicle of influence. Information in the modern age has no sense of suffering, ideology and prejudice -- and therefore no political allegiance -- making it the perfect weapon of choice for bin Laden's personalized war with the United States. Both of these developments are accelerating quickly, with the United States paying little attention to both the potential and inevitable consequences.

In sum, the strategic design of bin Laden's message seeks to keep the war at home and on his turf while destabilizing regionally based U.S. forces in Iraq and pursuing similar operations throughout Asia. But in no way or form should the United States conclude that the possibility for further attacks on its North American homeland is extinct. The latest round in Osama bin Laden's objectives keeps the House of Islam fused ad infinitum with the House of War -- regardless of where on the planet the infidel resides.


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FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.