



Squaring the Circle

A Regional/Economic Proposal for Reform of the United Nations Security Council

Richard Hartwig

UN Security Council Reform will not be taken up until the Council's membership is so at odds with the modern world that the point is reached where this dysfunction undermines the legitimacy of the Council's decisions.

Peter Wilenski, Australia's Permanent Representative to the UN, 1991

Some problems appear to have no solution. One cannot square a circle. Yet, some insoluble problems, like reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), are crucially important. This article does not claim to solve the UNSC puzzle today. It argues that a solution may be possible in the future, when the world has changed. We do not need a perfect solution; an approximate square will do.

The League of Nations, the predecessor to the UN, was created to prevent a repetition of the senseless slaughter of World War I. It failed, in part because the United States of America refused to join the organisa-



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Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addresses the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) in the General Assembly Hall, 14 May 2008. Unlike the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Security Council can pass binding decisions and legally has the power to enforce them.

UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras

tion. Then came World War II, which resulted in the deaths of 60 million people. The United Nations was formed to prevent another world war. The Security Council was to be the key organ of the UN system. Under the UN Charter, the UNSC attempts to settle disputes peacefully and to meet threats to peace (Chapters VI and VII). The five permanent members of the Council – the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China – were the main victors in the fight against the Axis powers. It made political sense at the time for each of the permanent UNSC members to have a veto over Council decisions. The US would not have joined the organisation without having the veto. But not including provisions for subsequent modifications of permanent membership was a fatal mistake. The Security Council could not – or would not – adapt to a changing world.¹

In the post-war period, Germany and Japan re-established themselves as important powers and became stable democracies. France and Great Britain lost their empires and declined in relative terms. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia declined dramatically, although it has become stronger under Presi-

dent Putin. Developing nations like India and Brazil became large and powerful in their own right. The world changed, but the Security Council did not fundamentally change – aside from increasing the number of non-permanent (temporary) members in 1965.

The process of international conflict resolution *has* changed, however, in part because of the structural limitations of the UNSC, which still reflects the power relationships of 1945. Jochen Prantl has written that ‘... all too often, the UN Security Council plays only a marginal role in the management of conflicts’. Prantl has described how informal groups (Groups of Friends or Contact Groups) played key roles in conflict resolution in Namibia, El Salvador and Kosovo. But even where the UNSC is not the key player, ‘the Security Council is sought as legitimiser of state action, which is one of its most important functions’.²

The Economist has summarised the case for formal Security Council reform as follows:

Why, for example, should Britain, with its 60 million people, have a permanent seat and not India, with more than a billion? Why should Russia with a GDP the size of Belgium’s have one and not Japan, [with] the world’s second biggest economy? Why doesn’t a single African, Latin American or Muslim country have permanent status?³

Daniel Drezner makes the point more abstractly:

¹ See Bardo Fassbender, *UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998; Fassbender’s ‘An Illusion Shattered? Looking Back at a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform the UN Security Council’, in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 7, 2003, pp. 183-218; and Neil Fenton, *Understanding the UN Security Council: Coercion or Consent?*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004. Not all analysts believe that UNSC reform is essential. See Ian Hurd, ‘Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice’, in Bruce Russett, ed., *The Once and Future Security Council*. New York: St. Martins, 1997, pp. 135-152. For earlier analyses, see Davidson Nicol, ed., *Paths to Peace: the UN Security Council and Its Presidency*, New York: Pergamon, 1981.

² Jochen Prantl, *The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States: Complementing or Competing for Governance?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 8-9.

³ *The Economist*, 30 November 2004, p. 26.

Global institutions cease to be appropriate when the allocation of decision-making authority within them no longer corresponds to the distribution of power – and that is precisely the situation today. The UN Security Council is one obvious example...⁴

As presently constituted, the UN Security Council is unrepresentative, illegitimate, and increasingly ineffective in dealing with crises such as the war in Iraq, the genocide in Darfur and the alleged threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. However, a good solution is currently unreachable. The five permanent members (P-5) are selfish and will not give up their veto powers. Nor is there agreement among the other UN members. Adding more members with the veto power would render the organisation ineffective and would reduce the influence of the US, Russia, China, France and Great Britain. Adding permanent members without the veto power would make the new Council members second-class citizens and would alienate their regional rivals. Increasing the number of UNSC members per se would make the Council unwieldy when faced with crucial decisions. Jerzy Ciecanski summarises the problem as follows:

The UN security mechanism is at the mercy of the ambivalent relationship between power and legitimacy. The UN Charter recognizes that security cannot be achieved without the power necessary to enforce peace. The power to secure peace cannot be sufficiently effective if

it is not regarded as legitimate. To be effective, the UN has to institutionalize the concert of the Big Powers and the hegemonic relationship between them and the rest of the membership. To be legitimate, it has to be ‘democratic’, that is, representative of the totality of its mostly powerless membership.⁵

Satisfactory Council reform may become possible by 2020, if not before. This is the year a High-level Panel commissioned by the Secretary-General has suggested for a review of the composition of the UNSC. In a unipolar world, the leaders of a hegemonic power like the US may not feel that they need a strong and independent United Nations. However, as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, and international problems become less easy to manage, this may change. The Middle East has certainly become harder for the US to handle in recent years. A major world economic or political crisis may also be required to stimulate UNSC reform.⁶ At some point, given capable leadership in key countries, it may become possible to approximately square our circle by amending the UN Charter

4 ‘The New World Order’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2, March/April 2007, p. 39.

5 ‘Restructuring of the UN Security Council’, *International Peacekeeping*, 1:4, Winter 1994, p. 416, cited in Justin Morris, ‘UN Security Council Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century’, *Security Dialogue*, 31:3, 2000, p.268.

6 Possible crises might include accidental or intentional nuclear war between China and the US over Taiwan; nuclear war involving North Korea, Iran, Israel, or India/Pakistan; a world-wide bird flu pandemic (or other variety of flu); a variety of disasters relating to global warming and the environment; increased problems relating to terrorism and criminality; or a world-wide economic meltdown. There might also be a slow-motion crisis of UN and UNSC legitimacy or attempts to create a rival organisation like a ‘League of Democracies’.

through a General Conference of the Members, as described in Article 109.⁷

Here we advocate radical UNSC reform through what we call the Regional/Economic Proposal (REP). It is an exercise in constitution-building or political architecture. This proposal suggests that representation in the Security Council may be determined by objectively balancing the three claims of legitimacy, power/wealth and mutual advantage. It envisions a UNSC composed of 10 geographic Regions. Each Region would be headed by an *anchor* country, or by *co-anchor* countries. A Region's UN representative could only vote on a particular issue if supported by countries representing 60 per cent of its population and 60 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product at purchasing power parity – GDP(PPP). This is the 60/60 rule. In emergency situations, only *anchor* and *co-anchor* countries would have the vote. There would be no veto power. Regions with at least 18 per cent of the combined GDP(PPP) of all Regions would receive two UNSC votes each on a permanent basis. This would currently give both *Northern America* and *Europe* two votes, with the other Regions having one vote each. *East Asia* (China, including Hong

Kong, and North Korea⁸) will probably qualify for two votes by 2020, if not before. According to the *World Factbook*, East Asia currently has 16 per cent of the GDP(PPP) of all 10 world Regions.⁹ The composition of the Regions would be subject to revision by the UNSC, with General Assembly approval, every 20 years.

The Council currently consists of the P-5, plus 10 non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly on a regional basis for two-year, staggered terms with no immediate re-election.¹⁰ Decisions of the Council on matters other than procedural ones require an affirmative vote of nine members – including those of the permanent five.¹¹ This provision gives some influence to the non-permanent members as well. The Presidency of the Council rotates on a monthly basis.

Repeated attempts to reform the Security Council have failed. One failure took place at meetings prior to the UN's 60th anniversary.

7 Article 109 of the Charter stipulates that a 'General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing' the Charter may be called by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly plus 'a vote of any nine members of the Security Council'. Changes in the Charter require a two-thirds majority of the conference and ratification by two thirds of the UN membership, 'including all the permanent members of the Security Council'.

8 For ease of reference, we always use 'North Korea' when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is meant, and 'South Korea' when the Republic of Korea is meant.

9 Extrapolations from figures published by the Asian Development Bank indicate that China's GDP(PPP) may be substantially less than this. See Eduardo Porter, 'China Shrinks', *New York Times*, 9 December 2007.

10 For the process by which temporary members are chosen, see the Security Council Special Research Report 'Security Council Elections 2007', 12 September 2007, and the Report 'Security Council Elections 2007', October 2007. www.securitycouncilreport.org/

11 Article 27(3) of the Charter laid down the requirement of the 'concurring votes of the permanent members' in order to pass a resolution. Since the early days of the UNSC, in practice an abstention of a permanent member has not been considered an obstacle to the adoption of a resolution.

sary celebrations in New York in September 2005.¹² The efforts of an open-ended working group are still continuing in the General Assembly. These endeavours provide a useful backdrop to the long-term restructuring proposed here.

Reform plans A and B

In late 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a 16-member High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Anand Panyarachun, a former prime minister of Thailand, was designated Chairman. About a year later, the panel submitted its report, entitled 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility'.¹³ The High-level Panel proposed the most drastic changes in the history of the United Nations, including a restructuring of the Security Council.¹⁴ The Panel members wrote:

Since the end of the cold war, the effectiveness of the Council has improved, as has its willingness to act; but it has not always been equitable in its actions, nor has it acted consistently or effectively in the face of genocide or other atrocities. This has gravely damaged its credibility. The financial and military contributions

to the United Nations of some of the five permanent members are modest compared to their special status, and often the Council's non-permanent members have been unable to make the necessary contribution to the work of the Organization envisaged by the Charter. Even outside the use of a formal veto, the ability of the five permanent members to keep critical issues of peace and security off the Security Council's agenda has further undermined confidence in the body's work. (para. 246)

The Panel proposed two alternative plans for UNSC reform, both of which would enlarge the Security Council to 24 members.¹⁵ The goals of both plans are:

- (1) to ensure that the Council broadly represents the membership of the UN as a whole;
- (2) to include those nations which contribute the most to the organisation financially, militarily and diplomatically; and
- (3) not to expand the veto, since this would further complicate decision making.¹⁶

¹² See James Traub, *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006.

¹³ UN document A/59/565, 2 December 2004; www.un.org/secureworld

¹⁴ For reforms already implemented, see 'Reference Reports and Materials: Reform at the United Nations', www.un.org/reform/; and Lawrence Ziring, Robert Riggs and Jack Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*, 4th edition, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2005. For earlier UN reform proposals, see Joachim Müller, ed., *Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts*, Vols. 1-3, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997.

¹⁵ Most of the High-level Panel proposals were formally accepted by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. See his report 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all', UN doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. Edward Luck has noted that this report makes no mention of the High-level Panel's proposal to review the composition of the UNSC in 2020; 'The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?', in Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff, eds, *Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier, 2005, p. 149.

¹⁶ Kofi Annan, 'Courage to Fulfil our Responsibilities', *The Economist*, 4 December 2004, p. 25. See also Morris, 'UN Security Council Reform', pp. 265-277; and Thomas Weiss and Karen Young, 'Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?', *Security Dialogue*, 36 (2), June 2005, pp. 141-144.

One plan, called *Model B*, would create a three-tier Security Council. The first tier would consist of the current P-5 with their veto powers intact. The second tier would consist of eight four-year-term renewable seats, without vetoes. Two new members would come from each of four geographic areas: Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe and the Americas. The third tier would consist of 11 regional members elected for non-renewable two-year terms.¹⁷ This plan was reportedly attacked by Japan, Brazil, Germany and India. These countries, called the ‘Aspirant Four’, all believed they should have permanent, first-class status on the Council and worked together to this end. They pointed out that Japan and Germany respectively are the second and third largest contributors to the UN budget. The goal of wide geographical representation would favour the inclusion of Brazil and India.¹⁸

The counterattack of the Aspirant Four led to *Model A*. This plan would create six new permanent Security Council seats without the veto power: two each in Africa and Asia/Pacific and one each in Europe and the Americas. No countries are specified, but the Aspirant Four would most likely get their seats and for Africa there would probably be one permanent member from the Arab north (possibly Egypt) and one from the sub-Saharan south (Nigeria or South Africa). There would also be 13 two-year,

non-consecutive-term seats on the Council, divided among the major geographic regions. This plan had its detractors as well, however. Pakistan, and possibly China, questioned the idea of India having a permanent seat. Other Latin American countries resented the ascendancy of Brazil. Italy favoured a single European seat rather than an additional European seat for Germany.

Figure 1
Current Composition of UN Security Council compared to Proposals for Reform of the Security Council by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL:

1. Five permanent members with the veto: US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China.
2. Ten countries elected by the General Assembly on a regional basis for two-year, non-renewable seats.

MODEL B:

1. The US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China keep their permanent seats and their veto power on the Security Council.
2. Eight new, four-year, renewable seats without vetoes: two each from Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe and the Americas.
3. Eleven regional members elected for non-renewable, two-year terms.

MODEL A:

1. Existing permanent members keep their seats and their vetoes.
2. Six new permanent members without the veto power: probably Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, South Africa and Nigeria or Egypt.
3. Thirteen two-year, non-renewable seats, divided by geographic areas.

¹⁷ UN doc. A/59/565 para. 253. The 1997 Razali Proposal, developed by former General Assembly President Razali Ismail of Malaysia, in consultation with 165 countries, was the predecessor of Model B.

¹⁸ ‘Special Report United Nations: Fighting for Survival’, *The Economist*, 20 November, 2004, p. 27.

Canada and Spain did not support the idea of any new permanent members. China and both Korean states opposed a permanent seat for Japan. The Africans could not decide which countries should get their two seats. Finally, the US administration of George W. Bush favoured only a single new permanent member: Japan.¹⁹

Neither Model A nor Model B would resolve the basic problems of the Security Council. One of these problems is that Great Britain and France (and perhaps Russia) do not deserve their current veto powers on the Security Council. These are countries with great imperial histories, but today they are simply mid-level powers on the world stage.²⁰ Unfortunately, criteria for continued permanent, veto-wielding membership on the UNSC were never established and these countries can veto any reforms they disapprove of. Reform plans A or B would make matters worse in some respects. A 24-member Council would be harder to manage than the current 15-member body. There is also little justification for the European Union (EU) having three of the 11 permanent members of the UNSC. The combined 2006 GDP(PPP) of Great Britain, France and Germany is only half of that of the US. These three countries

together have only 18 per cent of the population of India. The new UNSC members might gain symbolic rewards, but without the veto, they would have relatively little real power.²¹ Edward Luck adds some additional criticism of Models A&B, writing that:

...simply adding seats to a flawed enterprise does nothing to improve the way it relates to other organs or reaches out to the larger UN membership. A few more countries are to be pulled into the charmed circle, but nothing is to be done to make it any more representative of the concerns and interests of the rest of the membership.²²

Neither the High-level Panel Report nor that of former Secretary-General Annan specifies how many votes would be required for procedural or non-procedural decisions on the proposed 24-member Council. Nor do the reports provide a UNSC role for smaller or middle-level countries.²³ Finally, neither Model A nor Model B is likely to be adopted any time soon, given the opposition of the US and China.²⁴

19 Ibid. See also Weiss and Young, pp. 146-147, and Traub, pp. 369-70.

20 In 2007, Russia had 141 million people and had an estimated 2006 GDP(PPP) of USD 1,746 billion. Brazil had 190 million people and a GDP(PPP) of USD 1,655 billion. The respective figures for France were 64 million people and USD 1,902 billion GDP(PPP), compared to India's 1,130 million people and USD 4,164 billion GDP(PPP). *World Factbook*, updated 15 November 2007.

21 In 'Power and Satisfaction in the Security Council', Barry O'Neill demonstrates empirically that membership without a veto gives very little voting power. In Russett, ed., *The Once and Future Security Council*, pp. 13-28.

22 'The UN Security Council ...', p. 148.

23 Ibid., p. 149.

24 The Chinese position on UNSC reform emphasises the principle of state sovereignty. See James Traub, 'The World According to China', *New York Times*, 3 September 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/magazine/03ambassador.html, and *The Best Intentions...*, op. cit.

In November 2007, nearly 40 delegations to the 62nd General Assembly plenary session participated in a debate on Security Council reform. A large majority agreed that overall United Nations reform was incomplete without reform of the Council. The current body, they argued, had a political structure favouring the balance of power of a bygone era. The Japanese representative complained that UNSC reform had been under discussion for 14 years. If the matter were to be deferred again, the Council's effectiveness would be compromised and its credibility would be questioned.

The major developments at this point were growing support for an intermediary solution and support for regional representation. According to Argentina, the intermediary approach could last 10 to 20 years. The African states reaffirmed their support for the Ezulwini Consensus, at which they had arrived in 2005. This would give Africa two permanent seats with the veto power and five non-permanent seats. The United Arab Emirates requested one permanent and two non-permanent seats for the Arab Group, to be filled on a rotating basis. There was some movement, but probably too little, on the part of the crucial P-5. China said it was open to beginning an intergovernmental negotiation process, noting specifically that it would not back any formula that did not address Africa's concerns.

The authors of the High-level Panel Report wrote: 'We see no practical way of changing the existing members' veto powers' (para. 256). Without major concessions by the P-5, it is impossible to solve the problem of Security Council reform. Here we will ignore

the current stalemate and try to imagine what the best possible UNSC would look like. With such a model, and a substantial time horizon to work with, we propose a solution that may be both better and more acceptable than those currently under consideration. Our objective is to formulate a realistic UNSC reform plan that will be acceptable both to the self-interested P-5 countries and to two-thirds of the (equally self-interested) members of the UN General Assembly. This organ would have to ratify the required changes in the Charter. There is no solution which all countries will consider ideal. However, it may be sufficient to design a Council structure which is most countries' second choice.

The 2020 date for our reform proposal was chosen because of Recommendation No. 78 of the High-level Panel:

There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including ... a review of the contribution ... of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council's effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security.

There are many other proposals for UNSC reform in addition to Models A and B: Model C, Model X, Model Duo, the Blue and Green Models, the Italian Regional Proposal, the African Union Proposal (Ezulwini Consensus), the Razali Proposal, and the Uniting for Consensus Resolution, to name but

a few.²⁵ They contain many thoughtful and ingenious suggestions, and the competition between the different plans has many advantages. To date, however, these advantages have remained largely theoretical. Some reform proposals accept the veto power of the P-5 countries in the interest of acceptability. Others would gradually phase out the veto or try to persuade the P-5 not to use it often. For a third group, UNSC reform is part of a larger project to democratise and improve the world. Unfortunately, most of the latter's proposals are either utopian, and could never be implemented, or would not solve the fundamental problems of effectiveness and legitimacy.

It would be both tedious and unnecessary to discuss each reform proposal in detail. We will limit ourselves to comparing the quali-

ties of our Regional/Economic Proposal with those of High-level Panel Models A and B – in various permutations – and, briefly, with more abstract UN reform models proposed by academic Joseph Schwartzberg (2004) and Turkish UN official Kemal Derviş (2005).

Schwartzberg's best elaborated proposal is found in *Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting*, although he has since suggested variations on the theme.²⁶ Derviş's book (with Ceren Özer) is *A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance, and Reform*.²⁷ The writer's REP and the Schwartzberg and Derviş models were developed independently; however, they share some important features: (1) eliminating the veto power; (2) a regional orientation; (3) a single seat for the EU (Derviş only); and (4) weighted voting. For Schwartzberg, Derviş, Richard Falk, Robert Sheppard, James Juncker and others, UNSC reform is part of a larger reform process extending, in some cases, to recommendations for a world parliament. The current proposal is limited to UNSC membership and voting; it does not deal with the General Assembly, the weak Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or other UN organs in any sustained fashion.

25 For summaries of UNSC reform efforts, see Thomas G. Weiss, 'Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse: The Implausible versus the Plausible', Occasional Paper No. 14, January 2005, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fig. 3.1, p. 24, library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50099.pdf; Bardo Fassbender, 'Pressure for Security Council Reform', in David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, pp. 341–355; Osita G. Afoaku and Okechukwe Ukaga, 'United Nations Security Council Reform: A Critical Analysis of Enlargement Options', *Journal of Third World Studies*, XVIII/2, 2001, pp. 149–169; and Global Policy Forum, 'Security Council Reform', www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/index.htm Models X, C, and Duo were created by Walter Hoffman of the Center for UN Reform Education, www.centerforunreform.org/ See also the 1995 and 1996 reports of the General Assembly's Open Ended Working Group in Müller, ed., *Reforming the United Nations*, Vol. 3. On the African Ezulwini Consensus, see Volker Weyel, 'Konsens in Ezulwini, Konsensfälle in New York: Afrika und die Reform des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen', *Zeitschrift Entwicklungspolitik*, 11/2005, pp. 50–51. See also C. S. R. Murthy, 'Reforming the UN Security Council: An Asian View', *South Asian Survey*, 5:1 (1998), pp. 113–124.

26 Print edition published by the World Federalist Movement's Institute for Global Policy in New York; available online at www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2004/schwartzberg_weighted_voting.pdf/ Schwartzberg's more recent ideas, which include criteria for defining 'Macro-Regions', are found in a draft entitled 'Regional Representation as a Basis for Security Council Reform', dated November 2004, oldsite.globalsolutions.org/wfi/documents/RegionalRep.pdf In a manuscript dated 10 August 2005, 'United Nations Reform: Can the UN be as effective as Hammarskjöld intended?', Schwartzberg writes that he currently favours a Security Council composed of 12 world regions, with weighted voting for each region.

27 Brookings Press, 2005; available online at www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2834/

This is not to say that other types of reforms are not advisable. For example, Paul Kennedy has made the sensible suggestion that the President of the General Assembly should be authorised to sit in meetings of the Security Council.²⁸ Derviş argues for a United Nations Economic and Social Security Council (UNESC), at the same level as the Security Council. The UNESC would appoint the heads of the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, thus increasing the legitimacy of the latter three organisations. This proposal might be more acceptable politically if representation on the UNESC were based upon the formula proposed here.²⁹

The Regional/Economic Proposal (REP)

By 2020, the economic and military balance of power in the world will have shifted towards Asian countries, especially China and India. In terms of PPP, China was already the world's second largest economy in 2005. The Economist Intelligence Unit projects that China's GDP(PPP) will slightly exceed that

of the US by the year 2020.³⁰ China surpassed Japan as the world's leader in foreign exchange holdings in February 2006. As of March 2007, it had USD 1.2 trillion in reserves:

The National Intelligence Council, a U.S. government think tank, projects that by 2025, China and India will have the world's second and fourth largest economies, respectively. Such growth is opening the way for a multipolar era in world politics.³¹

Fiscal deficits; the unsustainable current account deficit; a declining dollar; the subprime mortgage crisis; social problems related to health care, retirement and growing inequality; an overextended military; and reduced international prestige (soft power) are likely to take their toll on the United States.³² As its relative power and autonomy decline, and the world becomes increasingly multipolar, the US may become more appreciative of the United Nations. This has already happened to some extent as a result of the Second Iraq War, which has become

28 *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations*, New York: Random House, 2006, p. 276.

29 See Derviş, *A Better Globalization*, pp. 96-104. Derviş notes that the Rasmussen Report (2003) and *Our Global Neighborhood* (1995), the final report of the Commission on Global Governance, have proposed something similar to his UNESC. The only difference between Derviş's proposal for representation on the Security Council and representation on the UNESC is that military capability would not be considered in the latter. This would further disadvantage Russia, which would have only 1.5 per cent of the total weighted vote (Table 4.1, year not specified, p. 97), compared to 25.7 per cent for the 'EU and official candidates'.

30 *The Economist*, 1 April 2006, p. 84. At the end of the 20th Century, the jury was not in as to the rise of Asia and the relative decline of the US. See Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, 'Whatever Happened to the Pacific Century?' (1999), *Review of International Studies*, 25 (5), pp. 245-269. The evidence seems stronger today. See for instance Jonathan Friedman and Christopher Chase-Dunn, eds, *Hegemonic Declines: Present and Past*, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press, 2005, Ch. 6, and Earl H. Fry, 'The Decline of the American Superpower', *The Forum*, Vol. 5:2, 2007, Article 3. www.bepress.com/forum/vol5/iss2/art3

31 Drezner, 'The New World Order', p. 34.

32 An IMF report edited by Martin Mühleisen and Christopher Towe, 'US Fiscal Policies and Priorities for Long-Run Sustainability', dated 7 January 2004, argued that America's huge budget deficit and ballooning trade imbalances threatened the financial stability of the global economy. www.imf.org/external/Pubs/NFT/Op/227/index.htm

very difficult and expensive for the US. Leadership changes in the wake of the 2006 midterm and 2008 presidential elections may accelerate the process.

The original countries of the European Union may also experience economic decline and political strain in the coming decade and a half. Their aging populations will not be able to sustain their current welfare systems and their economies will strain to compete with those of China, India and other Asian countries. Great Britain and France may be persuaded by their EU colleagues that it is in their own interest, as well as in the general interest, to give up permanent status and the veto power in the UN in exchange for a permanent Security Council seat for the EU. This is more likely in the context of UNSC reform such as that proposed here, which eliminates the veto power entirely. Finally, it is in the interest of nearly all countries in the world to have a functional UN.

As of late August 2006, the US government was attempting to increase the voting power of China – as well as South Korea, Turkey and Mexico – in the IMF. According to Timothy Adams, US Under-Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, giving China a greater voice in the IMF will increase its sense of responsibility for the institution's mission.³³ We believe the US will take a comparable position on UNSC

reform at some point – as long as its own interests are not threatened.

Conditions for satisfactory reform of the Council may or may not materialise. However, we should be prepared for the day when a window of opportunity for reform may open. As Edward Luck has argued, '... reform follows political convergence, not the other way around'.³⁴ The proposed changes are radical and would require revising the Charter of the United Nations.

Ideally, *no* country should have veto power in the Security Council. The veto severely damaged the UN during the Cold War, although it can be argued that the Soviet Union would have left the organisation without that power.³⁵ However, it is clear that the veto by the P-5 countries prevents reform today. Countries are selfish; they rarely give up power in the interest of a greater good. Nor should there be an unwieldy, 24-member UNSC, as proposed in the A and B Models described above.³⁶

Geographic regions

Our suggestion is that geographic Regions, rather than countries, be represented on the Security Council. Representation by regions has been proposed before, but not

33 Steven R. Weisman, 'US Seeks Bigger China Role in I.M.F.', *New York Times*, 30 August 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/08/30/washington/30trade.html Many Europeans fear that adopting the US proposal would decrease the influence of Europe in the IMF. It would not affect the voting power of the US. See Drezner, 'The New World Order', p. 35, for the argument that the Bush administration has already attempted to 'reconfigure US foreign policy and international institutions in order to account for shifts in the global distribution of power'.

34 Luck, 'The UN Security Council ...?', p. 146.

35 Volker Weyel writes this about the Soviet Union in 'Yes, But... Germany's Desire for a Permanent Seat in the Security Council', in Hans d'Orville, ed., *Beyond Freedom: Letters to Olusegun Obasanjo*, New York: Collage Press, 1996, pp. 555-559.


36 Thomas Weiss, David Malone and W. Michael Reisman all make this point in separate articles in the September 2005 issue of *Security Dialogue* (Vol. 36 [3]).

Figure 2

Proposed Regions in UN Security Council

Sub-Saharan Africa / Northern America / Eastern Asia / Southeastern Asia

Southern Asia / Middle East / Northern Eurasia / Europe / Latin America / The Pacific



in this form.³⁷ In the REP, representation would be based on 10 geographic Regions (with a capital ‘R’): *Northern America, Latin America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle*

East, Northern Eurasia, Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia and *The Pacific*.³⁸ The UNSC would thus have 10 permanent members. There would be no veto power.

37 In 1997, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) argued that permanent UNSC members should be periodically nominated by their respective regions and should be elected by the General Assembly (‘Harare Declaration’, UN doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11, 27 June, 1997). In ‘UNSC Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century,’ *Security Dialogue*, 3:3, 2000, pp. 273–72, Justin Morris argues against the OAU proposal on the grounds that (1) it would be difficult to formulate prompt and effective regional positions on security issues, and (2) the regional delegate state or states might act in their own interest(s) rather than in the interest of their region. Our proposal would meet these objections. Winston Churchill proposed a system of regional UNSC representation in 1953. Afoaku and Ukaga’s ‘Democratic Enlargement Model’ includes ‘proportional representation of regional groupings of UN member countries on the basis of population and land mass’.

Only countries with a minimum of 4 million people or a GDP(PPP) of at least 40 billion constant US dollars would be allowed to participate in the UNSC Regions. The role of the smaller countries in the General Assembly would continue as it is. The legal principle of the sovereign equality of nations would not be affected in this sense. The 4 Million People/40 Billion Dollar GDP(PPP) Rule is designed to include small but in-

38 *Northern America* would not include Canada or Mexico. Professor Schwartzberg suggested the name ‘Eurasia’. The ultimate criterion for the name of a Region is acceptability to the countries involved.

fluent countries such as Costa Rica and Norway. It would exclude the micro-states, to keep the operation of the UNSC from becoming excessively complex and slow. However, countries reaching and maintaining the thresholds of 4 million people or USD 40 billion GDP(PPP) for two consecutive decades – in constant dollars – could be added to the Regions.

The REP uses the concept of *anchor* and *co-anchor countries*.³⁹ The *anchor* countries would correspond to the permanent members of the current Security Council. *Anchor* countries would be inextricably linked to a particular Region. An *anchor country* (or federation-like organisation) would be one that has more than half of the total *size points* of all participating countries in its Region. *Size points*, as described below, are determined by a formula weighting a country's population and GDP – measured in terms of PPP. The *anchor* countries (one of them a regional supranational organisation) would be the United States, the European Union, China, India, Russia, and Japan. There would be *co-anchor* countries in Regions that do not have a dominant country, again chosen by a combination of population and GDP(PPP). *Sub-Saharan Africa*, *Latin America*, *Southeastern Asia*, and *Middle East* Regions would all have *co-anchor* or rotating *co-anchor* countries.

39 The term 'anchor country' is also used by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). There it refers to those countries 'that have a vitally important political and economic status within their regions, which gives them a crucially important part to play in the development and security of their region and in resolving global issues'. These countries are identified as those that account for more than 20 per cent of the GDP of their region. See on-line dictionary *World of Words of GTZ*, www.gtz.de/de/publikationen/begriffswelt-gtz/en/include.asp

The determination of *co-anchor* and rotating *co-anchor* countries is somewhat more complicated. Population and GDP may be compared by arbitrarily assigning one point for each 10 million people and one point for each US\$40 billion GDP(PPP) in constant 2006 dollars.⁴⁰ We will call this the Egyptian Standard, since this ratio weights population and gross domestic product approximately equally in Egypt – with GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity. By this measure, Egypt would receive 8.0 points for population and 8.4 points for GDP(PPP).⁴¹ Measured in these terms, Pakistan is the largest country in *Middle East* Region with 27 *size points* – a size point being a combination of the points for population and GDP(PPP).⁴² Turkey⁴³, Iran and Egypt would follow with 23, 21.5, and 16 points respectively. Only countries with a minimum of 15 size points would be eligible for *co-anchor* status.⁴⁴

As noted above, there would be one large *anchor country* (a regional supranational organisation, in the case of *Europe*) in six of the Regions. The Permanent Representatives of the US, the EU, China, India, Japan and Russia, would preside as UNSC Chairs of their Regions most – or all – of the time (see Table

40 It might be desirable to leave the decision as to the number of points allocated for population and GDP(PPP) for the members of each Region to determine, since GDP varies so much by Region.

41 The statistics are from the *World Factbook*, updated on 15 November 2007.

42 $S = P/10 + G/40$ where S = number of size points; P = number of millions of people in the population of a country; and G = number of billions of constant dollars of GDP(PPP).

43 This assumes that Turkey will join *Middle East* Region rather than *Europe*.

44 Colombia, which currently has 13.8 size points, is included here because it will soon reach the 15 point level.

1).⁴⁵ There would be rotating ‘A’ and ‘B’ seats on the UNSC for *co-anchor* countries in the other Regions. Brazil and Mexico would *co-anchor* the *Latin America* Region most of the time, with Argentina and Colombia filling in for shorter periods. South Africa and Nigeria would *co-anchor* the *Sub-Saharan Africa* Region. Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt would alternate for specified numbers of years as *co-anchors* of the *Middle East* Region. Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam would alternate in the two *co-anchor* positions in *Southeastern Asia*. Japan would be the *anchor* country in *The Pacific* as long as it has over 50 per cent of the *size points* of this Region. Japan currently has 57 per cent of the *size points* of participating countries in its Region. Should it fall below 50 per cent in two consecutive census periods, a decade apart, it would become permanent *co-anchor* in the A seat. South Korea, Canada and Australia would then alternate as *co-anchors* in the B seat.

A specific example of how the above would work is as follows: *Middle East* Region countries with at least 15 *size points* would be divided into ‘A’ and ‘B’ groups. Each group would have approximately the same number of *size points*. Pakistan (27 points) and Egypt (16 points) would alternate in the A seat. This grouping has a total of 43 *size points*. Iran (21.5 points) and Turkey (23 points) would alternate in the B seat. These countries have a total of 44.5 *size points*. The total numbers of *size points* in each grouping should be as similar as possible. Years as *co-anchor* countries would be allocated in

proportion to the percentage of *size points* a country has in its group.

Pakistan and Egypt respectively have 63 per cent and 37 per cent of the *size points* in group A. This is approximately a five to three ratio. Consequently, Pakistan would serve as *co-anchor* for five years in the A seat, followed by Egypt for three years. In the B seat, Iran and Turkey would serve identical three-year terms because their *size point* scores are similar (21.5 and 23.1 respectively). Table 1 includes the results of applying this procedure in the four (possibly five) Regions without a dominant *anchor* country.⁴⁶

It would seem preferable for the existing organisations in Regions with *co-anchor* countries to determine the precise rotations, that is to say which countries would be on the UNSC in a particular year. (In the case of *The Pacific*, a regional organisation would need to be created.)

Under normal conditions, UNSC *co-anchor* positions would confer more status than real power. The voting power of countries within Regions would be based upon their populations and GDP(PPP) – consistent with the 60/60 rule. *Co-anchor* status would not confer additional voting power. *Anchor* and *co-anchor* countries would be designated at the time of the UN Charter reform. Every decade thereafter, a country could present a claim for *co-anchor* status based upon an objective formula such as that described above.

45 Having a UNSC seat for the European Union would require a specific provision in a revised UN Charter. Though the EU is a supranational organisation, it is important for member states to preserve central elements of their sovereignty, including (at least for the foreseeable future) their separate membership in the world organisation.

46 Figures in the *World Factbook* (updated to 15 November 2007) yield *size points* for the remaining rotating *anchor* and *co-anchor* countries as follows: *Latin America*: Brazil, 60.4; Mexico, 39.5; Argentina, 19.5; Colombia, 13.8; *Southeastern Asia*: Indonesia, 47.1; Bangladesh, 23.4; Thailand, 21.4; Philippines, 20.4; Vietnam, 14.1; *The Pacific*: Japan, 118.2; South Korea, 34.8; Canada, 32.8, Australia, 18.9; *Sub-Saharan Africa*: South Africa, 19.1; Nigeria: 18.3.

Table 1

Proposed Regions in UN Security Council with Permanent Chairs and Rotations of Countries Co-Chairing Regions

Region	Permanent Chair	'A' Seat Co-Chair/s	'B' Seat Co-Chair/s
Sub-Saharan Africa		South Africa	Nigeria
Latin America		Brazil	Mexico (5 yrs) Argentina (3 yrs) Colombia (2 yrs)
Northern America	United States		
Eastern Asia	China		
Southeastern Asia		Indonesia (6 yrs) Thailand (2 yrs)	Bangladesh (3 yrs) Philippines (3 yrs) Vietnam (3 yrs)
Southern Asia	India		
Middle East		Pakistan (5 yrs) Egypt (3 yrs)	Iran (3 yrs) Turkey* (3 yrs)
Europe	European Union		
Northern Eurasia	Russia		
The Pacific	Japan	(Japan)**	(South Korea [4 yrs])** (Canada [4 yrs])** (Australia [2 yrs])**

* Assuming that Turkey joins *Middle East* Region. Should Turkey join *Europe* Region, Pakistan, Iran and Egypt would serve as rotating *anchors* of *Middle East* Region for four, three, and two and a half years respectively.

** If Japan's size points should drop below half of the total of its Region, it would become permanent *co-anchor* of *The Pacific* in the A seat. South Korea, Canada and Australia would rotate as *co-anchors* in the B seat. Japan currently has 57 per cent of the total size points of its Region.

Operations of the Security Council might be disrupted if an *anchor* or *co-anchor* country – Nigeria, Pakistan, or Indonesia, for example – were to disintegrate politically. A mechanism would need to be established whereby the next largest country in a Region could temporarily take the place of the failed state. This might be accomplished by means of an 80 per cent UNSC vote, ratified by a two-thirds majority of the UN General Assembly.⁴⁷

Composition of geographic Regions

For practical reasons, the Security Council Regions should correspond as closely as possible to geographic forms and pre-existing organisational units. However, exceptions will sometimes be necessary for political reasons.

Northern America Region consists only of the United States and Puerto Rico, which has Commonwealth status with the former. Canada and Mexico are not included.⁴⁸

47 Such a transition was effected without Charter revision when Russia took over the membership rights (including the Council seat) of the Soviet Union end of 1991. Twenty years earlier, the Beijing government assumed the seat previously occupied by the Taipei government in the UN organs in the name of China as a whole.

48 One might argue that Mexico should be included in the *Northern America* Region because it is part of the continent, because it is a founding member of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and because it would increase the relatively small population of *Northern America* Region. However, Mexico is historically and culturally part of Latin America and Mexican nationalism has largely been generated in opposition to the US. It seems preferable for Mexico to join the *Latin America* Region for political reasons. This would help to balance the influence of Brazil in the Region and it would increase *Latin America's* population and economic weight. It would also make the decision-making process within *Northern America* less contentious. Canada would presumably not be happy in *Northern America* Region because it could always be outvoted by the United States, given its comparatively small population and GDP(PPP).

Other English-speaking areas of the Americas may be incorporated if they achieve the minimum size at some point. *Latin America* Region includes Mexico, Central America and the non-English-speaking countries of the Caribbean and South America. The most comprehensive international organisation in the Americas is the Organization of American States (OAS).⁴⁹ The countries of *Sub-Saharan Africa* Region would generally be those nations of the African Union located south of the Sahara desert.⁵⁰ *Europe* Region would include all the 27 members of the European Union, plus Norway, Switzerland and countries surrounded by the EU: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.⁵¹ Turkey's Regional affiliation is currently indeterminate. *Europe* Region could be represented in the UNSC by a future EU ambassador to the UN;⁵² alternatively, *Europe* could be represented by the Permanent Representative of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency at a given time.

Northern Eurasia would consist largely of the countries of the former Soviet Union, minus those that have chosen to affiliate themselves with the EU or may wish to join *Middle East*

49 A South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) is still in the planning stage.

50 The regional affiliations of the Sudan and Eritrea are currently indeterminate.

51 Kosovo will be included if it becomes a UN member.

52 The European Community presently has observer status in the General Assembly, like other intergovernmental organisations. A single legal personality for the EU will be achieved only with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007. This would greatly enhance the role of the EU as an actor on the global stage, but it would not create a new state. A specific modality for the representation of the EU (or comparable regional, supranational organisation) will be required.

Region. Russia would be the *anchor* country and dominant power. *Southeastern Asia* would include the larger countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, plus Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Southern Asia would probably include only India and Nepal. *Eastern Asia* would consist of China and North Korea, Mongolia being too small in population and GDP(PPP) to participate at the present time. *The Pacific* would include Japan, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The Regional affiliation of Taiwan, which is not currently a member of the UN, is indeterminate.⁵³ Finally, the *Middle East* would encompass the Muslim countries from Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east to Algeria and Morocco in the west. It would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia – and possibly Sudan and Eritrea. (Turkey might join the *Middle East* or *Europe*. Israel might join *Europe* or even

53 Taiwan, despite a number of attempts to attain membership, remains outside the UN. The vast majority of the international community accepts the ‘One China, Two Systems’ formula in which Taiwan is considered part of China. Since 1 January 2002, Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization as the ‘Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)’. The WTO membership register puts the entity at a rather unusual place in the alphabet: ‘... Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Tanzania...’. One might find a similarly creative solution when placing the territory in the REP system.

Northern America.) Many of the countries in *Middle East* Region are presently members of the League of Arab States.⁵⁴

The estimated 2007 population of each of the proposed Regions is indicated in Table 2. This Table also lists the estimated 2006 GDP of the Regions, measured in terms of PPP.⁵⁵ We believe that PPP is a more useful measure of wealth than real exchange rates. Real exchange rates are volatile in the short run and may be affected by portfolio preferences, price bubbles and monetary shocks.⁵⁶ They also underestimate the economic level of people in subsistence economies and of countries without fully convertible currencies. For example, in January 2006, *The Economist* magazine’s Big Mac Index indicated that the Chinese Yuan was 59 per cent undervalued.⁵⁷ Measuring wealth in terms of real exchange rates would thus have undervalued the size of the Chinese economy. US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton adopted this position in March 2006 when he proposed

54 All of the members of the League of Arab States that meet the minimum size requirement except Mauritania and possibly Sudan, would likely affiliate with *Middle East* Region. Schwartzberg suggests that the formerly Soviet Islamic republics of Central Asia, and Azerbaijan, might also wish to affiliate with *Middle East*.

55 *The Economist* magazine’s Big Mac Index is a simple example of PPP. The Index measures the price of a standard good – in this case a hamburger – in a wide variety of countries.

56 Kenneth Rogoff, ‘The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle’, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34 (June 1996): p. 647. Rogoff writes that ‘real exchange rates (nominal exchange rates adjusted for differences in national price levels) tend toward purchasing power parity ... at a rate of roughly 15 percent per year.’ *Ibid.*

57 14 January 2006, p. 102.

that the dues of UN member states be based upon PPP calculations.⁵⁸

Ideally, the size of Regional populations would be roughly equivalent. Regional populations do not differ greatly between *Europe*, *Latin America*, *Sub-Saharan Africa* and the *Middle East*. *Southeastern Asia* is somewhat larger. *Eastern Asia* and *Southern Asia* are necessarily much larger, given the enormous populations of China and India. *Northern Asia*, comprised primarily of member countries of the former Soviet Union, has the second smallest population size of any Region. This also seems unavoidable. In spite of their relatively small populations, the countries formerly comprising the Soviet Union constitute a huge, distinct, geopolitical area with an impressive natural resource base. Russia is recovering economically from its disastrous decline in the 1990s. It remains an important country with a large supply of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia is currently a permanent member of the UNSC and it is unlikely to agree to any reform that would seriously diminish its status.

Northern America is the third smallest Region in terms of population – in part because Mexico has been placed in *Latin America* and Canada in *The Pacific*. However, as of 2006 *Northern America* was the second richest Region and the US had the world's strongest military forces. *The Pacific* has the fewest people of any Region. However, since it includes Japan, its

economy is the fourth largest of any Region. It is also geographically extensive, given the huge land areas of Canada and Australia.

It would be preferable for the Regions to be equivalent in terms of wealth as well as population. But this is not the nature of the modern world. *Sub-Saharan Africa*, the poorest Region, should be represented on the UNSC because of its population of over 680 million people, because the large number of states makes it powerful in the General Assembly (which has to ratify any Charter changes), and because of its special needs. Africa can cause the world a great deal of trouble if its needs are not addressed.

Finally, the composition of the Regions is necessarily affected by political considerations, both outside and inside the UN. Externally, it is desirable to place countries with histories of conflict with each other in different Regions. Consequently, India and Pakistan are separated – as are China and Japan; Japan and most of the countries of Southeastern Asia; Somalia and Ethiopia; and the United States and Mexico. In some cases, however, this does not seem possible – for example, Japan and South Korea. Within the UNSC, it seems desirable to separate the US from Canada and Mexico, and India from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, because the smaller countries in each pairing would always be outvoted by the larger countries of their Region. If the smaller countries were not separated from the dominant countries in these Regions, they would not be likely to support the reform proposal, and for good reasons.

As of now, Canada, Australia and South Korea would not have the opportunity to serve as *co-anchors* of *The Pacific* Region. They would only be able to serve as *co-anchors* if Japan's total size points (currently 57 per cent) were to fall to less than half of that of the Region as

⁵⁸ According to Bolton: 'The point about purchasing power parity is that it's not an effort to put the US in a better position or to put somebody else in a worse position. It's an effort to say, "How do we really capture the strength of economies in the real world, how do we find a better way to reflect that reality in setting the UN assessment rate?"' Warren Hoge, 'Bolton Presses for New Method of Calculating Dues at the U.N.', *New York Times*, 29 March 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/international/29nations.html

Table 2
Population and GDP(PPP)
of Proposed Regions in the UN Security Council

Region	Chairs/Co-Chairs	Population	GDP (USD billions, PPP)
Sub-Saharan Africa	Nigeria South Africa	680,000,000	1,453
Latin America	Brazil Mexico Argentina Colombia	551,000,000	4,808
Northern America	United States	305,000,000	13,136
Eastern Asia	China	1,329,000,000	10,519
Southeastern Asia	Indonesia Bangladesh Thailand Philippines Vietnam	746,000,000	3,282
Southern Asia	India	1,159,000,000	4,205
Middle East	Turkey Iran Pakistan Egypt	661,000,000	3,525*
Europe	European Union	520,000,000	13,836
Northern Eurasia	Russia	274,000,000	2,543
The Pacific	Japan	239,000,000	7,392
Total of Regions:		6,464,000,000	64,700
World Total:		6,602,000,000	65,960

Source: *World Factbook*, updated 15 November 2007. Estimated population figures for July 2007; 2006 GDP(PPP) estimates. Only countries or entities with populations of over 4 million or GDPs (PPP) of over USD 40 billion are included. Taiwan (not a UN member) is not included. Turkey is provisionally included with the *Middle East*. Puerto Rico is counted with *Northern America*. Hong Kong is included in *China/East Asia*.

* With Turkey, Sudan and Eritrea included in the Region.

a whole. If this were to happen, Japan would become permanent *co-anchor* of *The Pacific* in seat A, while South Korea, Canada and Australia would alternate as *co-anchors* in seat B.⁵⁹

It should be noted that *co-anchor* status in the Security Council would be a mixed blessing, which South Korea, Canada and Australia would not necessarily aspire to. They might not want to be directly involved in a potential conflict between China and Japan. It should be noted that for many years, Mexico did not attempt to claim one of the two-year Latin American seats on the current UNSC because it wanted to avoid a conflict with the US. Such a conflict did materialise when Mexico and Chile served on the Council immediately prior to the latest Iraq War.⁶⁰ If Canada, Australia and South Korea did not have *co-anchor* status in *The Pacific*, they would be free to apply for membership in another Region in the future.

In theory, Russia could lose its anchor status in *Northern Eurasia* at some point. Like Japan, its population is declining relative to that of other countries in its Region. In practice, however, this will not happen. Some Northern Eurasian countries with Islamic identities may decide to join the *Middle East*, thus increasing Russia's percentage

of the Regional population. A country such as Georgia, currently in conflict with Russia, might ask to join *Europe*. The Regional location of the Ukraine might also change. Finally, Russia has a high percentage of the GDP(PPP) of its Region (currently 69 per cent), which will keep its size points up relative to the other countries.

Voting in the Security Council

In all but emergency situations, a Region could only vote in the Security Council if its representative could meet the 60/60 requirement on a given issue. A Region would be required to demonstrate that its position was supported by the UN ambassadors of countries representing 60 per cent of its population and 60 per cent of its GDP (see Table 3 and Figure 3). The mechanics would be simple. The Chair of a Region would announce the countries in his/her Region that support a particular motion and a computer would instantly calculate the percentages.⁶¹ GDP would be measured for each country at the beginning of each decade in terms of PPP.⁶² In practical terms, this would mean that the US, China, the EU and India would always be guaranteed an independent vote. Russia, which had only 51 per cent of the population of its Region as of 2007, would require a coalition partner or two to reach the required 60 per cent. Japan, which had 53 per cent of the population and 57 per

59 An earlier, unpublished draft of this article recommended the creation of a Coalition of Temporary Members (CTM), to function alongside the Regions. Countries that were unhappy with their Regions, for whatever reason, could join the CTM for periods of five or 10 years. The CTM would also include 10 countries chosen by the UN General Assembly, as at present. *Anchor* or *co-anchor* countries would not be eligible. This might be a way to deal with the Taiwan problem, since CTM membership would not imply full membership in the UN. The CTM would not have a vote under emergency conditions.

60 Both Mexico and Chile declined to support the US position on the invasion of Iraq.

61 Although independently developed, the 60/60 rule is similar to James Yunker's proposal for voting in a world parliament, to be called a Union Chamber of Representatives. See *Rethinking World Government*, New York: University Press of America, 2005, pp. 160–166. Richard Hudson's 'Binding Triad' scheme is also similar in some respects. *Ibid.*, pp. 184–185.

62 PPP figures from the *World Factbook* are used here. However, the sources for recent PPP data, including the World Bank tables, may vary substantially.

cent of the GDP(PPP) of its Region, would likewise need a coalition partner or two in order to cast a vote.⁶³

The form of the decision-making process would be that of a mini-UNSC in each Region, with the UN representatives of *anchor* or *co-anchor* countries conferring with their colleagues prior to a vote. Brazil, for example, would need to form a coalition on a particular issue with Mexico and Argentina (or several other countries) in order to reach the 60 per cent level for both population and GDP in its Region. Japan would also need to negotiate on many matters. Similarly, there are no dominant countries in *Sub-Saharan Africa* or *Middle East* Regions (see Table 3). In five Regions, the 60/60 rule would provide a powerful incentive for countries to negotiate and compromise. Otherwise, these Regions would be unable to cast a UNSC vote on many issues.

Article 24(1) of the Charter requires that the Security Council be able to take ‘prompt and effective’ action to maintain international peace and security. In emergency situations, the 60/60 rule/requirement might unduly delay UNSC action. We thus propose that the Council be authorised to declare an emergency by procedural vote.⁶⁴ In an emergency, each *anchor country* of a Region could cast one vote. Each *co-anchor country* of a Region could cast half a vote. Under Article 27(2) of the Charter, nine of 15 votes (60 per cent) are required for a decision on procedural matters. The REP would similarly require a 60 per cent UNSC vote to declare an emergency

63 If the Ukraine were to join *Europe* Region, Russia would satisfy the 60/60 requirement by itself and would thus have an automatic vote.

64 The author is indebted to Professor Frank Klingberg for this suggestion.

under procedural rules.⁶⁵ Seventy per cent of the total votes by *anchor* and *co-anchor* countries would be required for the UNSC to take action in an emergency situation.

At first glance, the 60/60 rule may seem onerous and complicated. In fact, however, it would probably improve the normal functioning of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. The 60/60 rule would serve the function of interest aggregation between states – particularly in the four Regions without a single, dominant country. It would also make the Council more representative of the UN membership as a whole. China would be more likely to accept an *anchor* seat on the Council for Japan, its historical enemy, because the independent influence of Japan on the UNSC would be limited by its need to negotiate its normal-condition votes with South Korea, Australia, Canada or Papua New Guinea. However, Japan might also accept the plan because it would gain a key UNSC role in the large and important *Pacific* Region, which is a major improvement over its current UNSC status. Finally, the 60/60 rule would strengthen the affiliated regional organisations (OAS, League of Arab States, African Union, ASEAN, etc.) and link them more firmly to the world organisation.⁶⁶

65 Only *anchor* and *co-anchor* countries would be eligible to vote under procedural rules.

66 Msayuki Tadokoro advocates a weighted voting system in ‘A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council’, in Russett, ed., *The Once and Future Security Council*, pp. 119–134. He writes: ‘A big advantage of a weighted voting system is that it would transform the all-or-nothing kind of voting power (one vote or no representation, regular vote or veto) of member states into a continuous value. It therefore would enlarge a scope of bargaining among member states.’ (p. 128)

Table 3
Population and GDP(PPP) of Anchor and Co-Anchor Countries as % of Regions*;
Regions as % of World Population and GDP(PPP)

Anchors & Regions	Population		GDP(PPP)	
Nigeria	20%	of Region	13%	of Region
South Africa	7%		40%	
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>	11%	<i>of all Regions</i>	2%	<i>of all Regions</i>
Brazil	35%	of Region	34%	of Region
Mexico	20%		24%	
Argentina	7%		13%	
Colombia	8%		8%	
<i>Latin America</i>	9%	<i>of all Regions</i>	7.5%	<i>of all Regions</i>
United States	99%	of Region	99.5%	of Region
<i>Northern America</i>	5%	<i>of all Regions</i>	20.5%	<i>of all Regions</i>
China	98%	of Region	99.5%	of Region
<i>Eastern Asia</i>	21%	<i>of all Regions</i>	16%	<i>of all Regions</i>
Indonesia	31.5%	of Region	29%	of Region
Bangladesh	20%		10%	
Philippines	12%		14%	
Vietnam	11%		8%	
Thailand	9%		18%	
<i>Southeastern Asia</i>	12%	<i>of all Regions</i>	5%	<i>of all Regions</i>
India	97.5%	of Region	99%	of Region
<i>Southern Asia</i>	18%	<i>of all Regions</i>	6.5%	<i>of all Regions</i>
Turkey**	11%	of Region	18%	of Region
Pakistan	25%		12%	
Iran	10%		17%	
Egypt	12%		9.5%	
<i>Middle East</i>	9%	<i>of all Regions</i>	5.5%	<i>of all Regions</i>
European Union	95%	of Region	94.5%	of Region
<i>Europe</i>	8%	<i>of all Regions</i>	22%	<i>of all Regions</i>
Russia	51%	of Region	69%	of Region
<i>Northern Eurasia</i>	4%	<i>of all Regions</i>	4%	<i>of all Regions</i>
Japan	53%	of Region	57%	of Region
<i>The Pacific</i>	4%	<i>of all Regions</i>	11.5%	<i>of all Regions</i>

* Taiwan has been omitted as a non-member of the UN and as regionally indeterminate.

** Assuming that Turkey joins the *Middle East* Region.

World Factbook, updated 15 November 2007. 2007 population and 2006 GDP(PPP) estimates.

Changing Regional membership

One of the keys to our proposal lies in the membership of the 10 Regions. The basic rule is that *anchor countries* must remain in their original geographic groupings. The same rule should apply to *co-anchor* countries as well, although an exception might be made in the case of Turkey, which might shift between *Europe* and the *Middle East*. As indicated earlier, however, some countries may not wish to participate in the organisation of their geographic Region. Israel, for example, might not wish to participate in the representative organisation of the *Middle East* Region, which would be largely defined by its Muslim identity. Having been admitted to the General Assembly's Western European and Others Group (WEOG), though on a temporary basis, Israel may wish to join *Europe* Region. The UNSC and the General Assembly would have to agree to such requests and should do so only in exceptional cases.

Historical enemies with continuing animosities should affiliate with different Regions. This is necessary to facilitate the internal negotiation process in the Regions prior to votes in the Security Council. Japan and China have thus been placed in different UNSC Regions, although they are in close geographical proximity. The same is true for India and Pakistan or Somalia and Ethiopia. Eritrea might join either the *Middle East* or the *Sub-Saharan Africa* Region. However, given its longstanding conflict with Ethiopia, the former might be the better choice.

It might be argued that the world's largest Muslim country would want to affiliate with its co-religionists in the *Middle East* Region. We cannot speak for the Indonesians them-

Figure 3
Security Council Voting in the
Regional/Economic Proposal

1. Regions which initially have 18 per cent or more of the total GDP(PPP) of all world Regions permanently have two votes each. All other Regions have one vote each.
2. The distribution of UNSC votes will be revisited at the beginning of each decade. A Region will be granted two votes one decade after it achieves and then maintains the 18 per cent GDP(PPP) level.
3. Under normal procedures, a Region may cast a vote only if constituent countries with 60 per cent of the Region's population and 60 per cent of the Region's GDP(PPP) support a particular position on an issue.
4. Sixty per cent of the Regions may declare an emergency by procedural vote with only *anchor* and *co-anchor* countries participating.
5. In an emergency, the 60/60 rule will no longer apply. *Anchor* countries will cast their Region's vote or votes. *Co-anchor* countries will divide the vote or votes of their Regions.
6. A 70 per cent vote will be required for the Council to approve military action.

selves, but several factors point to a preference for *Southeastern Asia*. These include geographic location, current membership in ASEAN, and the fact that a permanent or semi-permanent *co-anchor* position in the latter Region would seem preferable to sharing power with many other countries in the *Middle East*. Finally, the integrity of the reform proposal itself would be threatened if Indonesia were to refuse to affiliate with *Southeastern Asia*.

One Region, one vote?

Some countries might advocate what could be called an 'ideal proposal', saying that each of the 10 geographic Regions should have a single vote in Security Council deliberations. Each Region would vote under non-emergency conditions if it could form a 60/60 population/GDP coalition on a particular issue. (It would lose its vote if a voting coalition could not be formed within a reasonable time.) In this model, voting would proceed as follows: *Northern America, Europe, Northern Asia* and *Eastern Asia* vote 'yes'. *Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, Southern Asia, Southeastern Asia* and *The Pacific* vote 'no'. The motion fails, 4-6. There would be no vetoes, although a 70 per cent vote would be required in matters of war and peace. The Presidency of the Council would rotate between the Regions every three months rather than every month, as at present, to provide greater stability and continuity.

Most of the countries of the world would probably support such a relatively democratic 'ideal proposal' for Security Council reform. We, however, do not support it – not even for the year 2020. It is hopelessly idealistic and there is no chance that it would be accepted by the current permanent (ve-

to-wielding) members of the Council. Nor would it maximise the effectiveness of the body, which is crucial to all UN operations. As Albert Venter has written, 'The United Nations was not created to foster democracy as such, but to foster international peace and to advance the cause of human rights.'⁶⁷

The rationale for Security Council membership

We believe that membership in the Council should be based on the competing claims of (1) legitimacy, (2) power or wealth, and (3) mutual advantage in dealing with global problems. In our proposal, the *population* of the 10 Regions is a proxy for legitimacy. Advocates of liberal democracy claim to believe in the equality of individuals. An idealist might argue that Regions with relatively equal populations should have comparable voting power in the Council.⁶⁸ *GDP(PPP)* is a proxy for power in our proposal. Countries or Regions with high purchasing power are more powerful or influential than countries or Regions with low purchasing power.⁶⁹ To

⁶⁷ 'Reform of the United Nations Security Council,' p. 10.

⁶⁸ Liberal democracy is not the only standard of legitimacy. In the Middle East, Islamic identity may currently be more important. All of the countries in the proposed *Middle East* Region are thus Islamic. Equality or justice, as represented by socialist ideology, is a competing standard of legitimacy. In practice, nationalism may be the most important wellspring of legitimacy, a fact that has made UNSC reform very difficult.

⁶⁹ The Virginia Plan is an interesting historical precedent for the idea of using wealth as a criterion for representation. Presented by Edmund Randolph on 29 May 1787, it proposed that representation in the US national legislature be based either upon 'quotas of contribution' or upon population. John Rutledge of South Carolina supported basing representation upon quotas of contribution, arguing that 'money is power; and that the States ought to have weight in the Govt. in proportion to their wealth.' www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc_o611.htm

be sure, this measure ignores the influence of military forces. However, a rich country like Japan, which is not strong militarily, could become strong very quickly. Japan could quickly acquire nuclear weapons, for example. GDP(PPP) may thus represent current or potential military power as well as wealth.

A realist might argue that the UNSC should mirror the real distribution of influence in the world. Countries or Regions with the highest GDP(PPP) should thus have disproportionate influence in Security Council deliberations.⁷⁰ A pragmatist might argue that the competing claims of legitimacy and power should be combined in some fashion.

⁷⁰ Some would say that real exchange rates provide a better measure of power than PPP. This is important, for example, because the US currently generates 27 per cent of world dollar GDP, compared to 20 per cent of the world GDP(PPP). There are several counterarguments. First, exchange rates may change quickly. The size and capability of a country's military organisation, a traditional measure of power, does not tend to change fast. Real exchange rates overestimate the coercive power of developed countries. How is one to understand the military problems the US is experiencing in Iraq (or earlier in Vietnam) on an exchange rate basis if US military and security expenditures are approximately the same as those of the rest of the world combined? A country such as China may have a significantly undervalued currency, which would understate its power in exchange rate terms. 'Power' is an ambiguous concept (hard vs. soft power?). Joseph Nye has suggested differentiating between: (1) the sphere of military power (currently uni-polar with the US being dominant); (2) the sphere of economic power (currently multipolar); and (3) the sphere occupied by transnational organisations such as Al Qaeda, drug cartels, and multinational legal businesses. *The Paradox of American Power*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 38-39. For present purposes, the most important thing is to have a relatively stable measurement which will be politically acceptable to a wide range of countries.

Legitimacy cannot be ignored, but if idealistic criteria for voting predominate, the strongest countries will ignore the UN and the organisation will be ineffective. Crucial problems like the prevention of war, global warming and the AIDS epidemic will not be addressed in a timely and useful manner.

A pragmatic proposal

Our proposal for reform is a pragmatic one. What it loses in elegance it makes up for in acceptability and practicality. The 'ideal proposal' seriously underrepresents *Northern America* Region with respect to economic and military power. It also underrepresents *Europe*, an economic superpower. It is unlikely that any US administration – now or in 2020 – would accept a demotion from being one of the P-5, with a veto, to having only one of 10 UNSC votes as *anchor* country of *Northern America* Region, without the veto. Our idea is to modify the 'ideal proposal' in one important respect, making it the Regional/Economic Proposal (REP): Regions with 18 per cent or more of global GDP(PPP) would be given an extra vote on a permanent basis. As of 2006, *Northern America* had 20.5 per cent and *Europe* 22 per cent of the world's GDP(PPP). These two Regions would thus have two UNSC votes each (see Figure 3). The other Regions would have a single vote. The total number of votes on the Council would rise from 10 to 12. Eight of 12 votes would be necessary to pass a resolution in normal circumstances if a 60 per cent vote were required. Eight votes would also be necessary to pass a resolution under emergency conditions, when a 70 per cent vote would

be required.⁷¹ In effect, the votes of *Northern America*, *Europe* and one other Region would suffice to block an emergency UNSC resolution. This might be acceptable to the current permanent members of the Council in exchange for giving up their vetoes – at least by the year 2020. The potential benefit would be to make the UNSC more legitimate and more effective in dealing with global issues than it is today.

A crucial advantage of the Regional/Economic Proposal – like the Derviş and Schwartzberg models – is that of being able to adjust to future changes in the world's balance of power. According to the *World Factbook*, *Eastern Asia* (China, including Hong Kong, plus North Korea) generated 16 per cent of the 2006 total Regional GDP(PPP). If *Eastern Asia's* economy generates 18 per cent or more of the total GDP(PPP) of all Regions when (and if) the REP is adopted, it would acquire an additional, permanent UNSC vote.⁷² Ideally,

71 There is no difference between a 60 per cent and a 70 per cent voting requirement here. However, the extra 10 per cent would make a difference in voting if the total number of UNSC votes were to increase from 12 to 14, as we anticipate.

72 Regions currently having at least 18 per cent of the world's GDP(PPP) would not lose their extra vote should their economies drop below 18 per cent. This provision is crucial to ensure political support for the proposal by *Europe* and *Northern America* Regions. Based upon 2006 GDP(PPP) figures, India would have the same vote as China in the Security Council, an outcome which China may not welcome. However, China is famous for taking a long-term perspective. It may be confident that by 2020, when this reform is to be implemented, *East Asia* will have attained the 18 per cent level of total Regional GDP. China would thus qualify for an extra UNSC vote. (A Region would need to reach the 18 per cent level in two consecutive measuring periods, i.e. decades, to attain the extra vote. This should dampen arguments about fairness and statistical validity.)

the REP would be adopted before *Eastern Asia* becomes eligible for a second vote. India, Russia and China could thus enter the reformed Security Council on the basis of equality. Everyone would know, however, that China's superpower status would soon entitle it to a second vote. China would be unlikely to accept the REP without this provision.

The REP compared to Models A and B and variations thereon

How does the Regional/Economic Proposal for reform of the Security Council compare to reform Models A and B proposed by the High-level Panel in November 2004? The REP does not directly address the first reform principle proposed by the High-level Panel, which is that involvement in Security Council decisions should be linked to financial, military and diplomatic contributions to UN operations. This principle stems from Article 23(1) of the Charter, but it applies only to the election of *temporary members* to the UNSC by the General Assembly. We believe that representation on the Security Council by geographic Regions should be based primarily on the importance of the countries in question, as opposed to their good behaviour at a particular time. The UN is not a tea party to which one invites only polite and agreeable guests. However, the logic of the first principle of the High-level Panel parallels our own in that financial contributions to the UN are linked to the economic strength of the member countries. It could be incorporated into the REP if financial contributions to the UN are measured in terms of PPP – something that the US delegation recently proposed. The non-payment of dues has been a serious problem for the world organisation. Consequently, while

representation in the Security Council should not be limited to countries that contribute financially and in other ways to UN operations, the right to vote at a particular time might be made conditional on a country's meeting its financial obligations to the organisation. This can be accomplished very simply by applying Article 19 of the Charter to voting in the REP Security Council, as well as to voting in the General Assembly.

The High-level Panel's second principle is that reforms should make the decision-making process more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world. The premise is that the decisions of a more representative Security Council would be more legitimate than is currently the case. In this regard, the REP is superior to Models A and B, which over-represent Europe. UNSC representation in the REP is also more congruent with population size in the different areas of the world than it would be under Models A and B (see Table 2). Finally, interest aggregation between states is built into the REP. Models A and B would make the UNSC more representative than it is now, but the Council would reflect primarily the interests of its 24 members. In the REP under non-emergency conditions, the Council would represent the entire world, with the exception of the smallest countries. A Security Council on the REP model would also address what Maurice Bertrand has called 'the unsatisfied need for an institutional framework suited to a more and more interdependent world'.⁷³

73 'Can the United Nations be Reformed?', in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, *United Nations, Divided World: The U.N.'s Roles in International Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 204.

The third High-level Panel principle is that reforms should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council. Models A and B *would* impair UNSC effectiveness because both plans would increase membership from 15 to 24 countries. When a comparable UNSC expansion was being considered in 1991, former Australian Permanent Representative Peter Wilenski wrote:

Perhaps the greatest drawback in making the Council more representative is the practical risk that a significantly enlarged Council would make decision-making more difficult. P5 co-operation, while at times frustrating to the rest of the membership, has brought great benefit in the resolution of regional conflict.

... An unwieldy three tiered structure could inhibit quick Council action. The behind-the-scenes negotiation of the texts of resolutions would become even more complex and tedious.

This unwieldiness would carry with it the risk not merely that responses would be too late, but also that the major powers would become less willing to devote the time and effort needed to work through the Council and would be readier to adopt unilateral action.⁷⁴

The dramatically increased workload of the UNSC adds force to Wilenski's argument. In 2006, the body held 272 formal meetings and 193 informal consultations, an increase of 21 per cent over 2004. The number of resolutions and presidential statements in-

74 Cited in Joachim Müller, ed., *Reforming the United Nations*, Vol. 2, pp. III.26/4-5.

creased by 36 per cent in the same period.⁷⁵ Though ‘output fell significantly’ in 2007, with the number of resolutions and statements receding by 27 per cent, this did not indicate ‘a reduction in activity’. ‘To the contrary, the Council remained very busy ... although some of the more intense activity did not result in agreed outcomes.’⁷⁶

The REP would reduce UNSC membership to 10 Regions under normal conditions. In emergencies, five *anchor* countries plus the EU would cast one vote each. The 10 *co-anchor* countries would divide the votes of their Regions. The total number of countries would thus be 14, one less than at present. But unlike today, 14 of the *most important* countries in their Regions would vote. In 2006, eight of the 10 non-permanent members had less than 10 size points. (Fifteen size points are required for *co-anchor* status under the REP.) Small countries are more susceptible to vote-buying.⁷⁷ The REP is thus superior to Models A and B in terms of likely effectiveness.⁷⁸

The REP would eliminate the veto and the threat of the veto. This should dramatically improve the functioning of the UNSC.⁷⁹ The High-level Panel authors wrote:

We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the United Nations most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. ... Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age... (para. 256)

This speaks to the final principle by which the High-level Panel writers say they have evaluated proposed reforms: ‘They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.’⁸⁰ We believe that the REP represents a way of making the Council more democratic and accountable while safeguarding the interests of its most powerful members.

There is little doubt that the REP would dramatically improve the global legitimacy of UNSC decisions.⁸¹ In 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeatedly attacked the Council as an illegitimate body. He is at least partially right because, as presently constituted, the UNSC is not a representative organ. The ultimate test of reform, however, is whether the body would be better equipped to deal with the six clusters of threats to the world that were identified by the High-level Panel:

75 ‘Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to Reform Council Working Methods, 1993-2007’. *Security Council Report*, 2007, No. 3, 18 October 2007, p. 1.
www.securitycouncilreport.org/

76 *Annual Statistics on the Security Council*, February 2008. www.securitycouncilreport.org/

77 Harvard economists Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker find that aid from the US to developing countries on the UNSC increases by 59 per cent and aid from the UN by 8 per cent when they enter the Council, an effect which increases during years in which key diplomatic events occur. ‘How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations’, *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, Vol. 114, No. 5.

78 It might be difficult today for the EU to formulate a foreign policy position quickly. This should be less of a problem if the Treaty of Lisbon comes into effect. Among other things, the Treaty creates the office of the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; he or she will simultaneously serve as the Vice-President of the European Commission.

79 See Céline Nahory, ‘The Hidden Veto’, Global Policy Forum, May 2004. www.globalpolicy.org/security/veto/2004/0519hiddenveto.htm

80 Para. 73 and para. 249.

81 For an extended discussion of the legitimacy issue, see Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007.

- economic and social threats (including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation);
- inter-state conflict and rivalry;
- internal violence;
- nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
- terrorism; and
- transnational organised crime.

Most of these threats either come from, or are more severe in, the poorest areas of the world. The poorer countries would have more influence on a REP Security Council than is the case today, and more influence than they would have if Model A or Model B were to be adopted. In theory, increased representation on the UNSC should lead to increased awareness of the many threats to global security and to increased commitment to solutions that are jointly decided upon. The REP-model UNSC should also be more effective in creating the formal and informal coalitions required to deal with a wide variety of issues. However, there is no guarantee that a reformed Security Council will be an improvement over what we have today. Success or failure will still depend upon the leadership of the countries on the Council. If the relevant countries have little interest in halting genocide in a country like Sudan, for example, the slaughter will continue. Equitable representation on this organ does not guarantee positive outcomes. Legitimacy is substantially a psychological phenomenon, which is more easily destroyed than created.

The REP represents a more drastic change in the UNSC than the High-level Panel has recommended. It would require rewriting the UN Charter. This is not necessarily bad, however. Bertrand writes:

If there is any possibility of genuine reform, it will not originate within the U.N. In fact, only a constitutional reform could reinstate the organization in its legitimate and natural role. Although the majority of specialists believe that this is impossible, it is in fact only the serious reform which has any chance of success.⁸²

The relatively modest UNSC reform proposals of the High-level Panel were ignored in the prestigious September 2005 UN meetings. The 2007 General Assembly debate over reform proposals was destined to fail as well. Even if a ‘transitional’ (permanent?) reform were to be adopted, it would not solve the problems of Models A and B, noted above. These outcomes support both Bertrand’s argument and our own.

It might be helpful to take a closer look at the interests of some of the actors. On 8 May 2006, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 60/260 on the Secretary-General’s report *Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide*⁸³ by a vote of 121 in favour to 50 against. The report dealt with Kofi Annan’s wide-ranging proposals to reinvigorate the UN management structure. Earlier, on 28 April 2006, a similar vote broke the tradition of consensus decision-making in the General Assembly’s Fifth (Budget) Committee. In the resolution the Assembly reaffirmed ‘its oversight role and the role of the Fifth Committee in administrative and budgetary matters’ and made the point ‘that setting the priorities of the United Nations is the prerogative of the Member States’. This defeat was inflicted

⁸² ‘Can The U.N. be Reformed?’, p. 10.

⁸³ UN doc. A/60/692 and Corr.1.

upon the Secretary-General by the Group of 77 (G-77), which represents 130 developing countries.⁸⁴ In the view of the G-77 the proposal for UN administrative reform represented a US-led effort to take away power from the General Assembly. The G-77 at that time was headed by South Africa's ambassador Dumisani Kumalo. Such objections would presumably vanish if the REP were to be adopted. South Africa would be *co-anchor* of one of the world's 10 UNSC Regions and every developing nation with a population of at least 4 million people or a GDP(PPP) of 40 billion constant dollars would have voting rights in the UNSC. Countries with significant power in the Security Council would not be likely to complain about it.

The REP would probably be backed by an overwhelming majority of countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Russia has no reason to oppose the proposal, since it would retain a strong position in the Council in spite of its relatively small population and modest economic base. China might acquiesce in the REP because of the restraints on Japan, its East Asian rival.⁸⁵ Japan might be pleased with its prospective status as a UNSC *anchor* country of *The Pacific*. Many Latin American, African, North Asian and Middle Eastern countries would oppose the idea of granting two UNSC votes to Regions with 18 per cent or more of the world's GDP(PPP). However, pragmatism should

win out here. The REP would substantially improve the status and influence of Third World countries in the Security Council. Once they understand the alternatives – or their absence – the major countries of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East are likely to support the REP or something very much like it. Most countries in the world have an interest in legally and institutionally restraining the naked use of military power and economic dominance by the strongest countries.⁸⁶

The Schwartzberg and Derviş Models

How do the Schwartzberg and Derviş UNSC reform proposals compare to the REP with respect to the High-level Panel's reform criteria of (1) inducing members to contribute to the work of the organisation, (2) increasing the representativeness of the body, and (3) not decreasing its effectiveness?

Both Schwartzberg and Derviş propose weighted voting (WV) schemes in the UNSC, based partially upon countries' contributions to the UN budget, which the REP does not do. In the Schwartzberg proposal, a country's WV score would consist of: (1) its percentage share of the total population of all UN members, (2) its percentage contribution to the total budget (roughly GDP), and (3) its share of the total UN membership (1/191), divided by three. If such a scheme had been in place as of 2004, the weighted votes of the major countries, in percentages, would have been: US, 9.1; China, 7.7; Ja-

84 The G-77's membership list includes China. Statements in international fora are made 'on behalf of the Group of 77 and China'.

85 For an analysis of China's position on Security Council reform and/or enlargement, see J. Mohan Malik, 'Security Council Reform: China Signals its Veto', *World Policy Journal*, Spring 2005, pp. 19-29.

86 'Das Recht ist das Schwert des Schwächeren' (Law is the sword of the weak), Alexander Graf York, *25 Jahre Deutschland in den Vereinten Nationen aus der Sicht eines Beteiligten*, Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, 1998, p. 13.

pan, 7.3; India, 6.0; Germany, 3.8; France, 2.6; and Great Britain, 2.3. Derviş bases his weighting upon four factors: population, GDP, contributions to the UN budget and military capability. The percentages of the total for the most important countries in his scheme were: EU, 26; US, 23.2; Japan, 10.9; China, 7.5; India, 5.2; and Russia, 1.6.⁸⁷ Russia would thus go from being one of the P-5 to a position of relative insignificance. It is hard to imagine why it would accept such a change. (The percentages are subject to change over time and would be revised every five years.)

The Schwartzberg and Derviş plans are superior to the REP with respect to representativeness in the sense that they would include all countries in the work of the Security Council, on a weighted scale, while the REP has a size threshold with respect to population or GDP(PPP). The key differences lie in how member countries are grouped or organised. For Schwartzberg, countries with at least 4 per cent WV scores would have individual seats on the Council. Blocs of self-selected, like-minded – but not necessarily contiguous – nations with aggregate populations of over 1 per cent of the total *and* combined WV scores of 4 per cent or more would also have a seat at the table. A final seat or two would be reserved for nations not otherwise represented, for a total of 18 UNSC seats. Each of the 18 individual states or groupings would cast one vote.

In the Derviş model, the US, the EU, Russia, China, India and Japan might be permanent members. Other countries would

be grouped into ‘constituencies’ with names such as Other Asia (9 per cent), Latin America, Caribbean and Canada (7.45 per cent), Arab League (3.4 per cent), Africa (3.2 per cent) and Other Europe (2.5 per cent). The total size of the UNSC would thus be 14, one less than at present. There would be no veto in either of these reform models. The modest size of the Security Council according to Schwartzberg and Derviş (18 and 14 seats respectively) indicates that they might score well on the effectiveness criterion. However, the REP seems superior in limiting the number of micro-states involved in the decision-making process.

In theory, the Schwartzberg and Derviş models are both improvements over the High-level Panel’s A and B models. However, both could be improved upon. The Schwartzberg model is elegant, but ultimately unsatisfying because of the absence of specified geographical regions. The idea of countries choosing their own regions makes it attractive in one sense, but highly unpredictable. Why would countries choose radical UNSC reform when they cannot predict what the outcome would be? Schwartzberg relies on a long transition period to wean the P-5 countries off the veto power, but it is difficult to see why they would accept this outcome, even after 15 years or so. The Derviş model also founders on the issue of acceptability. Neither the G-77 nor China would accept military capability per se as a criterion for voting power on the UNSC. Second, Derviş has used real exchange rates rather than purchasing power parity as a measure of GDP. This would have the effect of increasing the voting power of the US, the EU and Japan relative to China, India and Russia – in

⁸⁷ Schwartzberg, Executive Summary, p. 1; Derviş, Table 3.1, p. 63.

addition to the problems of using real exchange rates described earlier. This choice increases the likelihood that the US and the European countries would accept the plan. However, it makes the model completely unacceptable to China and Russia, each of which presently has a veto. This problem can easily be fixed by switching to PPP, however. A third problem of the Derviş model in particular is that the criteria for determining the weight of a country's vote are excessively complex – particularly with respect to measuring military capability. A model which is not readily understandable to the layman is not likely to be accepted.

Conclusion

The Regional/Economic Proposal should increase the legitimacy of the Security Council for the developing countries. The REP would be more representative, it would be substantively superior to the major reform alternatives, and it would solve a number of political problems. For example, the High-level Panel's Model A proposal foundered in part because the countries of the African Union could not agree on two of the three strong candidates for permanent membership: South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. This would not be a problem in the REP, since: (1) Egypt would be in Middle East Region, and (2) there would be objective, rather than political, criteria for deciding upon *co-anchor* countries. South Africa and Nigeria would clearly be the *co-anchors* for Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the REP would answer several of the objections Edward Luck has to Reform Models A and B: (1) it would not increase the number of countries in the UNSC during periods of

crisis; (2) it does reflect current power realities; (3) it does specify UNSC voting procedures; (4) it is representative of all but the smallest members of the UN; and (5) it provides an important role for the medium-sized and smaller countries.⁸⁸

At present, the United States would oppose the REP as well as the Schwartzberg and Derviş models for Security Council reform. In November 2007, US Permanent Representative Zalmay Khajizad stated on the floor of the General Assembly that only a modest expansion of the UNSC was needed. The US did not have a specific proposal for Council expansion, but it supported Japan's candidacy and other nations might be considered as well. Great Britain, Russia, France and China would probably oppose these reform models as well. In September 2007, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband rejected the proposal that Great Britain give up its seat on the Council in favour of a seat for the EU – an idea advocated by Lord Malloch Brown in Brussels the previous October before he joined the British Foreign Office.⁸⁹ The High-level Panel authors are correct in saying that the P-5 are

88 Luck's critique, cited above in 'The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?', is elaborated upon in his article, 'Rediscovering the Security Council: The High-level Panel and Beyond', in Ernesto Zedillo, ed., *Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security*, New Haven, CT: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2005, pp. 126–152.

89 Anne Penketh, 'Miliband Backtracks after UN Security Council gaffe', *The Independent*, 28 September 2007. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/miliband-backtracks-after-un-security-council-gaffe-403777.html

unwilling to give up their veto powers.⁹⁰ As of early 2008, the Bush administration in the US is not interested in strengthening the United Nations. However, by 2020 – or earlier – things could be different.

The Democratic Party in the US seems likely to strengthen its hold on the Congress and a Democratic President may be elected in 2008. The balance of economic and military power in the world will change in coming decades. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon favours Security Council reform, as does a large majority of the member states. Finally, the presence of a viable alternative to the current reform plans could make a difference. Derviş writes:

Some claim it is unrealistic to ask France and the United Kingdom to give up their veto, even as part of a medium-term vision. And yet, if one were to ask any reasonable panel of experts or well-informed citizens whether the UK and France are likely to retain their vetoes, say in 2020, the answer would be no. Somehow we have to get from today to 2020!⁹¹

90 In 2007, the Facilitators ‘on the consultations regarding the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council’ had this to report on the issue: ‘The general perception of the permanent members regarding the veto ... is that the veto is at the core and is the sustaining force of the system of collective security. It is considered to be inherently different from other elements discussed in the reform process as it is the result of a political understanding that pre-dates the Charter and thus could not be reformed by the wider membership.’ UN doc. A/61/47, 14 September 2007, p. 16. However, the permanent members might be willing to appease concerns about the veto by means of a voluntary commitment or an oral understanding; *ibid.*

91 *A Better Globalization*, p. 65, footnote 19.

Seen objectively, the US, France and Great Britain would stand to gain from the REP. We believe that this is a win-win model in which all the current (P-5) and aspiring permanent members would gain.⁹² To begin with, the apparent decline in the influence of the P-5 would be less than appears at first glance. One reason is the 60/60 rule, which requires substantial Regional agreement before a vote can be cast. This will be particularly significant under normal conditions in Regions not dominated by a single country. Secondly, the major powers would retain their economic and military muscle and have their own ways of influencing votes. Third, *Northern America* (the US) and *Europe*, with a total of four votes, would be able to block military action, even when *East Asia* (China) acquires two votes. Fourth, since the UN does not have a real army, the major powers have little to fear from Security Council votes that it is unable to enforce. Fifth, emergency procedures give additional influence to the most powerful countries. Finally, it cannot be overemphasised that the biggest threats to the US and Europe are global ones such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, global warming and environmental degradation. These threats can only be met successfully by an institutionalised, global coalition. Ad-hoc ‘Coalitions of the Willing’, Groups of Friends and Contact Groups are not likely

92 It could be argued that European influence in the UNSC would increase if the REP were to be implemented: Europe would speak with one voice rather than many. Under the REP Europe would have two of 12 UNSC votes; the loss of the vetoes of Great Britain and France appears to be less significant since the US, Russia, and China would also lose theirs. The veto power is also overrated; it can only be used to block action rather than to accomplish any positive goal.

to be enough. This is to say that the United Nations, or something very much like it, is indispensable. By 2020, the world will be increasingly multipolar and the severity of environmental and other global problems is likely to have increased. Our arguments should thus gain added force.

If the P-5 countries are not willing to accept change, either the effectiveness of the Security Council will decline or a new United Nations organisation may eventually be created.⁹³ This might be a more workable organisation, one that eliminates the legal fiction of equality between major powers and micro-states in the General Assembly, and/or adopts a form of weighted voting.⁹⁴ It would certainly feature a UNSC more favourable to the interests of countries of the Southern Hemisphere, the Middle East and Asia. Great Britain, France, Russia, China and the US may retain their permanent seats and their veto power in the current UN, but they may ultimately lose the organisation itself. John Bolton, US Permanent Representative to the UN until late 2006, has said:

93 Malik writes: 'Should Beijing and Washington fail to respond to the demand for a more democratic international order, there is a danger of the United Nations becoming irrelevant in security matters, as did its predecessor, the League of Nations.' In 'Security Council Reform: China Signals its Veto', p. 27.

94 We would recommend, for example, that full membership in the UN requires that a country either have a population of at least 1 million people or a GDP(PPP) of over 10 billion constant US dollars. Smaller countries would have associate status until they could meet one of these two criteria.

The U.N is simply one of many competitors in the global marketplace for problem solutions and problem solvers. If it is not good at solving problems, Americans will look to some other institution; some other organisation; some other framework.⁹⁵

Other countries are likely to take the same position as Ambassador Bolton. If the current UN, and the current configuration of the Security Council, does not serve *their* interests, they may wish to create a new organisation – perhaps with its headquarters in Shanghai. There is already talk of moving the UN out of New York City. It seems doubtful that a world organisation located in China, for example, would serve the interests of the US and the EU as well as a reformed, New York-based United Nations.⁹⁶

Dividing the world between rival blocks again would be as detrimental to the interests of the Third World as it would be to the interests of the developed nations. Globalisation means that the world has one, large set of problems. These problems can only be effectively addressed by a single United Nations, linked to the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the OAS, the African Union, ASEAN, civil society and NGOs, and so forth. The Security Council is the centre of

95 Cited in Mark Leon Goldberg, 'The Arsonist', *The American Prospect*, 6 January 2006, p. 27.

96 Drezner writes: 'If China and India are not made to feel welcome inside existing international institutions, they might create new ones – leaving the United States on the outside looking in.' In 'The New World Order', p. 36.

this web of organisations. It is the key world body that can take effective action on matters of war, peace, and international security. We should do what we can about the UNSC at present, although this may not be very much. However, our best hope may be to lay the groundwork for real reform of the Council – at least by the year 2020.



*First Session of the United Nations
Security Council, 17 January 1946.
UN Photo/Marcel Bolomey*