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This report was done in partnership with Oxfam G.B. and Action Against Hunger, Spain
The Cost of Occupation

The Burden of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2008 Report
This year Israel celebrates its sixtieth birthday. The State of Israel was founded and recognized on the basis of the 1947 United Nations decision to partition the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea between two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The Zionist leadership agreed to the partition. The Palestinian leadership, which represented the majority of the Arab population and considered itself the only legitimate claimant to the entire land, opposed the partition. Together with neighboring Arab states, it attacked the Jewish settlement in Palestine and lost the war. Following the 1967 war, Israel took control of all of the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, which included a large proportion of the Palestinian people. Following that victory, it was in Israel’s power to implement the United Nations decision to partition the area between Israel and the Palestinians — along the lines of June 4, 1967 rather than those of the 1947 UN resolution. Many people were of the opinion that this would be the right thing to do, including David Ben Gurion, the founder of the state. However, victory bred arrogance and a desire on the part of Israel to maintain exclusive control over the area. Since then, during 40 of the 60 years of Israel’s existence as a sovereign state, it has acted to deny sovereignty to the Palestinians.

In 1987, the Palestinians revolted against Israeli rule. The outcome of the uprising was the Oslo Accords, in which Israeli and Palestinian leaders agreed upon mutual recognition and on the creation of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On both sides there was opposition to the agreement, hostilities never ceased, and the Jewish settlements increased in size and number rather than decreased. In 2000, the second Palestinian uprising or Intifada broke out, to which Israel responded by re-establishing its control over the entire area of the West Bank.

The prolonged conflict has been extremely damaging to both sides, but especially to the Palestinians: they have failed to create stable institutions and to promote economic development; their daily sustenance is dependent upon the good will of donors; they are exposed to violent death, injury, imprisonment and deportation, as well as to land confiscation and property damage; many are prevented from studying; they suffer from high unemployment, broad-ranging poverty, food insecurity and daily humiliations in their homes and streets and at road barriers.

As for Israel, since it is the dominant side whose state institutions, army and economy are stronger, the general impression is that not only does Israel have nothing to lose from the situation but that it actually benefits from it.
However, the truth is that the conflict with the Palestinians is like a millstone around the neck of Israel: it undermines economic growth, burdens the budget, limits social development, sullies its vision, hangs heavy on its conscience, harms its international standing, exhausts its army, divides it politically, and threatens the future of its existence as a Jewish nation-state. It also kills and injures thousands of Israelis. In short, Israel is paying a heavy price for the continuation of the conflict and for the absence of a fair and agreed-upon partition.

This document aims to present the social, economic, military and political price that Israel has been paying for its continuing occupation of Palestinian territories. Many Israelis have difficulty thinking in terms of cost; in other words, in terms of a policy that has alternatives. The majority of Israelis were born or arrived in Israel after 1967. The Green Line holds little meaning for them, and they are accustomed to viewing the opposition of the Palestinians as an expression of blind hostility, rather than as an expression of the desire to end the occupation and live in an independent state of their own.

Moreover, there are Israelis for whom the occupation does not exact any personal cost but rather constitutes a definite benefit, even though the benefit may not be direct. Examples: Israelis who purchased homes at bargain prices in neighborhoods and settlements built on Palestinian lands; industrial entrepreneurs and workers in plants that export to the occupied territories without paying customs duties and without having to incur heavy transport costs; land-owners, garage owners, building contractors and others who employ Palestinian workers for low wages.

Even when it is clear that costs are involved, it is not always easy to discern them, especially in cases in which the cost is not personal but macro-economic or macro-social. At the time of writing, Israel finds itself in the fifth straight year of economic growth. At such a time, it is easy to believe that the good times will go on forever; it is easy to forget that only a few years ago, the conflict led to the longest recession that Israel had ever known. At such a time, it is also easy to ignore the fact that economic prosperity is to be found only on the Israeli side of the Green Line.

At a time like this, it should be remembered that without a political solution that allows the Palestinians an honorable, independent existence as well as an opportunity for economic development, Israel is liable to be called upon – time and time again – to pay the price it paid following the first and second Intifadas.
The Economy in the Shadow of the Conflict
Since 1967, the Israeli economy has experienced significant growth. However, without the conflict, it is quite possible that the economy might have undergone much higher growth.

The biggest jump occurred during the first five years after the 1967 war, 1968-1972, during which the GDP increased by 75%.

After the Yom Kippur war in 1973, there was an unprecedented increase in the defense budget. This increase, together with the world oil crisis, led to what economists call the "lost decade," – 1973-1984 – years of high inflation and low growth rates.

In 1985, the economy began to recover, but the first Intifada, in 1987, once again led to a decrease in economic activity. The large wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union, beginning in 1989, had the opposite effect, giving Israel seven good years, 1990-1996. However, the growth during those seven years – 58% – was lower than the growth rate that came on the heels of the 1967 war – 75%.

The ups and downs that have characterized economic activity in Israel, which stem from, among others, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and since 1987, the Palestinian uprisings, have created a disparity between the growth rates in Israel and those in other developed and emerging economies.

The disparity is evident in comparative figures for 1997-2006, a period during which Israel experienced high growth – 9% in 2000 and 5.2% in 2004 and 2005 – but also negative growth, following the second Intifada – (-)0.4% in 2001 and (-)0.6 in 2002.

During this decade, Israel's economy grew by 43%; however, the world economy grew by 67%, the United States by 68%, the European Union states of Western Europe by 68%, India by 139%, the European Union states of Eastern Europe by 167%, the Persian Gulf states by 174% and China by 193%.
Tourism is a good example of the limitations that the conflict puts on economic development. Israel and the Palestinian Authority have tourist attractions that compare favorably with those of neighboring countries, but conflict areas deter tourists. Thus the number of tourists visiting Israel in 2005 – 1.9 million – was significantly lower than the number of tourists visiting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Emirates and even Jordan. Turkey was far ahead of all the rest. When it comes to tourism, Israel is like Lebanon and Algeria, which suffer from prolonged domestic conflicts.
Economic Stability

From the day that the Palestinians acquired the collective ability to contest Israeli domination, they have constituted a threat to Israel's economic stability. Each of the Palestinian uprisings, the first during 1987-1993 and the second during 2000-2003, caused a contraction in economic activity: a decrease in tourism, contraction of investments, increase in unemployment, a reduction in the purchasing power of Israelis.

In 1987, the year at whose end the first Intifada broke out, economic growth was 6.1% – a very respectable figure. However, the next year, the first full year of the uprising, economic growth declined to 3.6%, and in 1989 – to 1.4%. It was the good fortune of the Israeli economy that 1989 marked the beginning of the immigration wave from the former Soviet Union, which had the effect of stimulating economic activity.

The Oslo Accords (1993-1994) and the peace agreement with Jordan (1994) were good for the Israeli economy, as they opened up new markets. The improvement was less dramatic on the Palestinian side. The massacre of Moslem worshippers in the Hebron Machpela Cave, committed by Baruch Goldstein in protest over the Oslo Accords, ignited a chain reaction of Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel that undermined public safety and put a damper on economic activity.

The second Intifada broke out towards the end of 2000, a year of unusually high economic growth – 8.9% – due, among other things, to the international hi-tech bubble. The following three years were characterized by a heavy recession, described by the Bank of Israel as the longest in the history of Israel. It was only in the second half of 2003 that the economy began to resume economic growth. Since then, the Israeli economy has experienced a continuous wave of growth.

However, this growth is occurring only on the Israeli side of the Green Line. On the Palestinian side, subject to heavy Israeli military pressure, not only is there no economic growth but there is continuing retrenchment of economic activity, and as a result, heavy unemployment and high poverty. The experience of the last two decades has taught us that in the last analysis the economic stability of Israel depends, to a large extent, on what happens on the Palestinian side of the Green Line.
The per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – calculated by dividing the GDP by the number of inhabitants of the state – is an indicator of the standard of living that allows comparison among different countries and periods of time. During the two Intifadas, which led to a decrease in economic activity, there was also a decrease in the per capita GDP in Israel.

In 1987, at the end of which the first Intifada erupted, there was a significant increase in GDP per capita – 4.4%. The next year, the first full year of hostilities, GDP per capita increased by only 1.9%, and the year after, 1989, it actually decreased.

The first half of the 1990s saw the immigration to Israel of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. While the GDP increased, the rate of growth did not always keep pace with population growth, and thus there were years in which GDP per capita actually decreased. The year 2000 was one of usually high economic growth – increase in per capita GDP. Against the background of this increase, the decrease in per capita GDP following the outbreak of the second Intifidah at the end of 2000 stands out in sharp relief. During the following two years, not only did per capita GDP fail to increase, it actually decreased (by 2.7% in 2001 and by 2.6% in 2002). In 2003 GDP per capita grew by a negligible amount – 0.4%.

Since 2004, GDP per capita has been growing by 3.4% to 3.5% per year.

What we said about GDP is relevant for GDP per capita; as long as the calm and economic growth occur solely on the Israeli side of the Green Line, while Israel’s military activity in the Palestinian territories continues and the Palestinian economy goes from bad to worse, there is no certainty that GDP will continue to increase on the Israeli side of the Green Line.
International Economic Status

According to the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program, Israel is in 23\textsuperscript{rd} place among 177 countries – a very respectable position. The Human Development Index is calculated by a number of criteria, among them life expectancy at birth, the literacy rate among adults, GDP, GDP per capita and the percentage enrolled in school at different levels of the educational system. Israel’s public health system and its high attendance rates in elementary and high schools contribute to its high position.

In contrast, if we look at Israel’s credit rating, calculated by the three largest international rating firms, we find Israel in a much lower place – in 2007 – 37\textsuperscript{th}. Country credit ratings are meant to indicate economic stability and reliability. They reflect, on the one hand, economic strength, and on the other, political and military stability. It should be mentioned that many people have cast doubt on the reliability and validity of credit ratings. Nevertheless, credit ratings are relied upon when making economic decisions; for example, the interest rate that a country is expected to pay on loans.

It turns out that Israel’s credit rating is significantly lower than that of the 22 countries that are ahead of Israel on Human Development: most of these countries have the highest possible credit ratings – AAA, while in 2008 Israel’s credit rating was A.

The main reason for Israel’s lower rating is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A lower credit rating means higher interest on government loans as well as on loans taken out by the Israeli business community.

In 2003, during the second Intifada, when the state needed to raise capital, Israel asked the United States for loan guarantees in the amount of nine billion dollars. The loan guarantees allowed Israel to raise capital at an interest rate similar to that charged the United States government, which has the highest possible credit rating, instead of paying higher interest rates stemming from Israel’s relatively low credit rating.

Israel is very sensitive to any development that is liable to have an adverse effect on its credit rating. During the second Intifada, Israeli Ministers of Finance lobbied credit-rating corporations in New York and London so that these would not lower Israel’s rating. Another example: during the second Lebanon war, the government avoided proclaiming a state of emergency – a proclamation that would have helped families and businesses harmed by the war – out of fear that such a proclamation would have an adverse effect on Israel’s credit rating.

Credit Ratings
Countries High on the Human Development Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Human Development Index (UNDP), in descending order, 2005</th>
<th>Fitch credit rating, 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>AAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>AAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>AAA</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>AAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>AAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AA +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>AA +</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>AA +</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>AA –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>A +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>A</td>
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</table>
Investments

Investments are the oxygen of economic growth. For this reason, Israeli governments do everything in their power to promote investments of both Israeli and foreign investors. They do this by increasing credit opportunities, lowering corporate taxes and awarding additional incentives. Since the waning of the second Intifada, there has been a steady increase in investments in the Israeli economy – of Israelis and foreigners alike. However, at the same time, there has been a steady increase in the investments of Israelis in other countries, especially direct investments, to such an extent that in the course of the present period of economic growth, the investments of Israelis abroad surpassed the investments of foreigners in Israel. Moreover, in 2006, the investments of Israelis abroad surpassed total investments in Israel. Economists attribute the new trend to globalization, that is, to the liberalization of financial flows among countries. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that one of the factors behind the new trend of investing abroad is the desire of Israeli businesspersons to cut risks in case the Israeli economy takes another dive due to developments in the conflict with the Palestinians.

Fixed Capital Formation
Investments of Israelis Abroad and Investments of Foreign Nationals in Israel 2001-2007 In billions of dollars

- Fixed capital formation in Israel
- Total investments of Israelis abroad
- Total investments of foreign nationals in Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fixed Capital Formation in Israel</th>
<th>Total Investments of Israelis Abroad</th>
<th>Total Investments of Foreign Nationals in Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Budgeting in the Shadow of the Conflict
The military victory in 1967 transformed Israel into a regional military power. This new status imposed a heavy burden on defense spending. Unlike the situation following the previous wars, not only did the defense budget fail to decrease after 1967, but it grew. Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the defense budget grew even more, until it reached such proportions that it constituted about a third of the total state budget. The large defense budget was one of the factors behind the economic crisis that arose in the middle of the 1980s.

At first, the conflict with the Palestinians did not constitute a central factor in the economic burden of defense spending. In budgetary terms, the cost of holding the Palestinian territories was low, both because Israel did not invest in economic development in the territories and because opposition on the part of the Palestinians, which was limited in those years to border crossings and attacks on Israeli targets abroad, did not require a large military force. Most of the military activity was done by a few elite units.

At that time, the conflict with Egypt took center stage (the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War). Peace with Egypt, signed in 1979, allowed Israel to reduce its defense budget.

A short time after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict entered the scene. The Palestinian military organizations, which after 1967 were based in Jordan, were driven into Lebanon in 1970 ("Black September"). In 1982, shortly after the Israeli-Egypt peace accord, the Israel Defense Forces invaded Lebanon to fight Palestinian military forces there and remained until 2000. The first Lebanon war also led to the growth of the Hizballah – and, subsequently, to the second Lebanon war in 2006.

In 1987, five years after Israel invaded Lebanon, Palestinians in the occupied territories began their first uprising against Israeli rule. The Intifada immediately raised the economic cost of maintaining military control of the territories. The Israel Defense Forces set up special units for control of the Palestinian territories – the Gaza Strip and West Bank divisions. It also created special units to deal with participants in the uprising. Not only that: most of the field reserve units found themselves serving in the territories. Military protection for the Jewish settlements also required considerable resources.

The signing of the Oslo Accords did not lead to a diminishing of Israeli military presence in the Palestinian territories. Firstly, the division of the territories into three categories – Area A under full Palestinian responsibility, Area C under full Israeli responsibility and Area B under joint responsibility – led to the permanent stationing of IDF forces in Area C and at numerous roadblocks at meeting points between the different areas of responsibility. In addition, the wave of suicide bombings that followed the massacre of Moslem worshippers at the Hebron Cave of Machpela by Baruch Goldstein led to increased activities on the part of the Israel Defense Forces and the secret services in the territories.

While the first Intifada had been an unarmed civilian uprising, the second Intifada involved armed resistance. The Israeli Defense Forces reacted with full force: a large part of the regular and reserve forces were employed to suppress the uprising. In the course of the hostilities, the Israeli Defense Forces reoccupied all of the Palestinian territories. With the waning of the Intifada, military presence in the territories was reduced, but many more forces than in the past are still to be found throughout the West Bank and along the entire perimeter of the Gaza Strip.
Additional Appropriations to the Defense Budget
Earmarked Explicitly for Military Actions in the Palestinian Territories 1989-2008
In NIS billions 2007 prices

Additional Appropriations to the Defense Budget for the Explicit Purpose of Suppressing Palestinian Opposition

There is no way we can calculate the full budgetary cost of Israel's military control of the Palestinian territories – the cost of command centers, special forces, the extensive use of reserve units, etc. This is because most of the budget books about defense expenditures are secret. An inkling of the extent of the military expenditure can be obtained from a figure that is published annually: additions to the defense budget appropriated especially to pay for increased military activity in the Palestinian territories. Between 1989 and 2008, the Ministry of Defense received such additions totaling NIS 36.6 billion (2007 prices).

This figure is larger than the total budgetary outlay for elementary, secondary and tertiary education in Israel in 2008.

The Disengagement and the Separation Wall

The additions to the regular budget of the Ministry of Defense include not only expenditures for military actions against Palestinians, but also two other heavy expenditures: for the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and for building the separation wall.

In 2005, Israel dismantled the Israeli settlements and army camps in the Gaza Strip, in a unilateral move without an agreement with the Palestinians. The disengagement has involved high costs: a recent estimate put the total at NIS 9 billion.

This sum is larger than the budgetary outlay for all the ministries dealing with the economy: Agriculture, National Infrastructures, Industry Trade and Employment, Tourism, Communications, Transport and more.

As mentioned above, the disengagement from the Gaza Strip was unilateral, without an agreement with
the Palestinians. Moreover, Israel (in coordination with the United States and with the Palestinian Authority) refused to recognize the Hamas victory in the elections to the Palestinian Authority. This policy led to an internal Palestinian conflict, the Hamas seizure of the Gaza Strip, and the shelling of Israeli localities adjacent to the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip continues to require the deployment of large numbers of troops, which surround it from the land, the sea and the air. Moreover, the shelling obliges the government to finance the reinforcement of houses and schools in the areas within shelling distance.

To the expenditures of the disengagement one needs to add the budgetary expenses of the separation wall. In 2003, following the second Intifada, Israel began to build a separation wall around the Palestinian territories in the West Bank. Here, too, the action was one-sided and did not involve any agreement with the Palestinian side. At any rate, the only legitimate placement of the wall is the border recognized by the major international bodies – the Green Line. Had the wall been constructed along the Green Line, it would have been 313 kilometers long. However, the wall was built so as to place a good many of the Israeli settlements on the Israeli side of the wall, which involved including areas populated by Palestinians as well. This move will make the wall more than twice as long – 790 kilometers.

The cost of the separation wall was estimated by the Brodet Commission at NIS 13 billion.

This figure approximates the budget of the Ministry of Health for 2008.

**What the Future Has in Store**

If there is no political solution, the budgetary cost of the conflict will continue to constitute a heavy burden. This is the conclusion that arises from the recommendations of the Brodet Commission, charged in 2006 with examining the defense budget:

"... The Palestinian front requires huge resources that take up a significant part of the regular outlays for routine defense as well as intelligence.

"It appears that neither the political nor the military officials have internalized the high alternative cost of a permanent diverting of resources to this arena ... an up-to-date defense perception is that this arena will continue to be central and carry even greater weight in the future ... and the IDF will continue to invest numerous resources in the area in the coming years.

"Moreover, it appears that there is a steady process of increasing these costs, because the terrorist elements are determined to continue in a sort of a-symmetrical arms race (or balance of terror). For example, the terror of suicide bombers required the construction of a separation wall, whose cost is estimated at over NIS 13 billion. This is a huge sum by itself and surely relative to the Palestinian arena. The wall is proving effective, but in the Gaza Strip its effectiveness is being neutralized to a certain degree by the use of tunnels and rocket fire. The defense system is developing answers to those threats, but the cost of defensive and offensive measures is very high. As for ground attack options, these, too are becoming more and more expensive, due to the availability of advanced anti-rocket arms to terrorist organizations. The important point is that the conflict with the Palestinians is becoming "expensive," mainly from the standpoint of the diversion of limited military resources, like manpower and command attention, all that on an ongoing basis and without much change on the horizon. This is one of the most important developments that has taken place ... a development that has not been properly internalized, among other things because a considerable proportion of the costs is not fully reflected in the defense budget ... "
The occupation is a burden for the state budget not only because of defense expenditures. During the second Intifada, the Israeli economy slipped into a deep recession (caused also by the bursting of the hi-tech bubble in 2000). Economic activity contracted, resulting in lower tax revenues. Faced with a decline in revenues and, at the same time, a demand to increase the defense budget, the government chose to cut the civilian parts of the budget. In the course of the four years between 2001 and 2005, cuts were made amounting to approximately NIS 65 billion – the largest budget cuts ever made.

This sum was equivalent to one-third of the regular state budget in 2005.

There were those who justified the budget cuts with the usual contention of the neo-liberal economists, that the state budget should be reduced in order to put as many resources as possible at the disposal of the business sector. However, if there had been no Intifada to create a feeling of crisis, it is doubtful whether such large budget cuts would have been approved. It was not for nothing that the then Minister of Finance, Silvan Shalom, gave the budget cutting program the name of "Economic Defensive Shield," exploiting the sensation of emergency conveyed by the name given to the military campaign "Defensive Shield" earlier the same year, which led to the re-occupation of West Bank cities by the Israel Defense Forces.

The budget cuts affected all the social services in Israel – health, social welfare, education, higher education, housing, and above all, the social security system. The negative effect is still with us. The budget cuts were behind the prolonged strikes that have taken place over the years: workers in local authorities, elementary school teachers, high school teachers, and lecturers in institutes of higher learning. They were also behind the demonstrations at the time of the cuts, by solo mothers, led by Vicki Knafo, as well as the gradual increase in private payments for services that were formerly free of charge or carried a nominal charge, like those for health and education services.
Society in the Shadow of the Conflict
The internal social cost of the occupation has been very high. Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense during the Six Day War and in the period immediately following it, stated during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition with Egypt that Israel could not fly two flags at one and the same time – the defense flag and the social flag. Israel of 2007 is different from Israel of 1967, but the veracity of Moshe Dayan’s statement still holds. Social groups that did not manage to prosper prior to the Six Day War had a hard time doing so in its aftermath – for example, residents of Jewish development towns and of Arab localities. The disparity between the center and the periphery increased and became a permanent feature of life in Israel. In the years that elapsed since 1967, the bargaining power of workers declined, and the elementary, high school and higher education systems left most of Israel’s youth outside of the hard core of economic growth. One out of every five Israeli families is poor, compared with one out of every ten in the 1970s. Israeli society looks at these developments and does not find the strength to change them. Its powers are absorbed by the conflict.

A large part of the above developments stem from a neo-liberal economic outlook, influential in Israeli policy-making since the middle of the 1980s. Some of them may have come to pass even without the conflict and the economic burden of defense accompanying it. At the same time, in several cases the influence of the conflict was both direct and decisive.

Firstly, some of the disparities developed as a result of economic development policy. Having become a regional military power, post-1967 Israel invested in the expansion of defense industries rather than in the continuation of developing and upgrading the industries established prior to the war, many in Jewish development towns. The new industries were set up in the center of the country and were based on educated manpower receiving high remuneration. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the class-ethnic-geographic disparities widened, when the civilian hi-tech industry developed as a spin-off of the defense industry. Secondly, the bargaining power of Israeli workers declined as a result of the entrance into the labor market of Palestinian workers who were employed without the protections of Israeli labor laws or the Israeli federation of labor unions, the Histadrut. Later, when closures were imposed on the Palestinian territories, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers were brought to Israel, further weakening the bargaining power of Israeli blue-collar workers.

Thirdly, the large state investment in the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories lowered the priority of the pre-1967 development towns and was incomparably larger than the investment in the former, through Project Urban Renewal.

Fourthly, the prolonged conflict with the Palestinian national movement interfered with the process of integration of the Palestinian minority on the Israeli side of the Green Line, as well as with their social and economic advancement. The economic burden of the occupation weighs heavily when it comes to helping broad sectors of the population to join the part of the economy that has been growing and prospering. For this to happen, Israel would need to make large investments in the economic development of peripheral areas, as well as in schools and in higher education.
Inequality in Israel has been increasing since the middle of the 1970s. The graph above, based on the Gini Coefficient, clearly demonstrates this trend. The Gini is an accepted measure of inequality: when the coefficient is 0, there is absolute equality – everyone has the same income; when the coefficient is 1, there is absolute inequality – all the income is concentrated in the hands of one person.

The top line in the graph shows inequality among families with regard to income from work. It demonstrates that inequality in the labor market is high and that it has increased over the years.

The lower line shows inequality after taxes and transfer payments. It demonstrates that inequality contracts after taxes and transfer payments: transfer payments increase the income of low-income families while taxes lower the income of high-income families. Still, the figures show a trend of long-term growth in inequality.

Inequality does not stem only from the occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, of course. It derives, among other things, from the increase in the economic and political power of the business sector and from the weakening of the bargaining power of workers. It reflects the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of families and conglomerates as well as the unprecedented increase in the salaries and benefits awarded to plant and enterprise managers.

The main significance of this growing inequality is the erosion of social cohesion: the wealthy interpret their distance from the rest of society, in terms of income, as a sign that they deserve their position of privilege; they cease to believe that all people are deserving of advancement and instead of investing in improving the general welfare, they prefer to focus on improving their own situations. Low-income persons pin their hopes for improvement on labor unions and on the state.

As we have seen, the Histadrut is much weaker than it was in the past, and for this reason, people look mainly to the state for salvation.

However, the state is busy flying the defense flag.
The social safety net, as embodied mainly in the payments of the National Insurance Institute, aims to supplement the labor market, by assisting people who do not manage to make a living from their work income (for example, persons with disabilities), people who are temporarily outside of the labor market (for example, unemployed persons and women on birth leave), or people who have left the labor market (retirees).

The Israeli social safety net was built over a long period of time, beginning in 1954, when the first old-age and survivors’ pensions were instituted. During the same period work accident compensation, birth leave and child allowances were also established.

The social safety net continued to develop after 1967. Disability pensions were established in 1970 and home nursing care and income maintenance payments were legislated in 1980.

The Israeli social safety net is similar in many ways to those in European states, with one important difference: the low level of most of the payments in Israel.

Even so, the safety net has played an important role in decreasing inequalities created by the labor market. It also played an important role in the absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came to Israel from the former Soviet Union and from Ethiopia, all of whom were defined as entitled to the major benefits despite the fact that they had not accumulated much social insurance. Social transfers allowed many of them a relatively smooth transition into the Israeli labor market.

Following the second Intifada, during which governments made cuts in the state budget totaling some NIS 65 billion, safety net payments were severely damaged. In the course of five years – 2001 through 2005 – child allowances were cut by 45%, unemployment compensation by 47%, and income maintenance by 25%.

Moreover, in 2003, safety net transfers were frozen, later to be indexed to the consumer price index rather than the average wage, to which they had always been connected.

As over the long run, the average wage increases more than the consumer price index, safety net transfers are expected to further erode in the future.

Thus, increasing expenditures for military security had the effect of reducing the payments that were to increase the economic security of Israelis.
Over half of Israeli youth – 54% – do not receive high school matriculation certificates (bagrut), required for college admission. At a time when economic growth is becoming more and more concentrated in knowledge-intensive industries, a large proportion of Israeli youth have nothing better to look forward to than a future on the margins of the Israeli economy.

The large budget cuts made in the wake of the second Intifada were detrimental to education budgets. Within the six years between 2001 and 2006, the allocation for teaching hours declined by 15% on a per pupil basis. In order to increase the proportion of students earning matriculation certificates, schools in many areas of the country need to be upgraded. In affluent communities, the proportion of students earning matriculation certificates was in 2006 66.3%, but in Jewish development towns, it was 50%, in Arab communities, 35.7% and in Bedouin settlements in the Negev, 27.9%.

When the government education budget is insufficient, schools try to raise money from other sources, mainly from parents. Today affluent Israeli parents pay large out-of-pocket sums to the schools so that they do not have to reduce teaching hours and so that they can purchase enrichment programs. The majority of parents in Israel are not able to afford such payments.

The last major reform in the elementary and high school systems took place forty years ago, in 1968, a year after the 1967 war. That reform set up middle schools in order to allow six years of preparation for higher learning, by employing college-trained teachers in middle schools and in high schools. The establishment of middle schools required the construction of new schools throughout the country. Parallel to this reform, the network of vocational schools was also expanded. Middle school graduates were then channeled to either an academic or a vocational track. These two steps rapidly led to the universalization of secondary education in Israel. The next step needed is the universalization of matriculation certificates (over the years, and to this very day, the proportion of students earning matriculation certificates is lower in vocational schools). This will pave the way to the next step – universalization of higher education. There are a number of countries that have already taken these two steps.

However, Israel is still far away from universalization of matriculation certificates, among other reasons because it invests much less than other countries in education. Between 1995 and 2003, the per pupil national expenditure on education in OECD countries increased, on average, by 33%, while in Israel it increased by no more than 2%.
The majority of young people educated in Israel – 70% in 2006 – do not go on to higher education: only 30% of those who graduated from high school in 1998 enrolled in academic institutions by 2006.

At a time when the greatest obstacle standing in the way of a good salary is the absence of higher learning, the majority of young people still find themselves outside college gates.

The large budget cuts made following the second Intifada had a detrimental effect on higher education budgets. In the six years between 2000 and 2005, the government budget for higher education, per student, declined by 19%.

In July 2007, the Shohat Commission, appointed to examine the system of higher education in Israel, recommended, among other things, not to increase the government budget for higher education beyond what it had been in 2001, but to gradually increase allocations until in 2013 they return to their per-student 2001 level. Instead, it recommended that institutions of higher learning augment their budgets by increasing tuition and private donations. Another recommendation was not to expand higher education until 2013.

These recommendations do not augur well for Israeli universities and colleges, or for young people. Unless a significant change occurs in the direction of public policy, the education gap between Israel and Western countries is liable to increase. According to figures published by the OECD, the average years of schooling anticipated for Israeli children who in 2004 were less than five years old is 15.7, compared with the average of 17.4 for OECD countries.
Guns or College Grads?

The budget cuts in elementary schools, high school education and colleges were no doubt the products of the financial crisis of the period of the second Intifada. At the same time, they reflect a general policy of inflexible budgetary restraint, whose purpose is to encourage economic growth by increasing the amount of credit at the disposal of the Israeli business sector.

Supposedly, when the government decides upon a general policy of budgetary restraint, that policy is to cover all expenditures, including defense. However, the prolonged conflict casts a long shadow here as well: the Brodet Commission that examined defense expenditures recommended (in May 2007) increasing government outlays for defense by NIS 47 billion over the next ten years (and that increase does not include an anticipated increase in US military aid). In other words, defense spending is to grow by an average of NIS 4.6 billion per year.

When one puts the recommendations of the Brodet Commission and those of the Shohat Commission (which examined the situation of higher education in Israel) side by side, the following picture emerges:

While the Shohat Commission recommended not to increase the higher education budget, the Brodet Commission recommended to increase the defense budget by NIS 4.6 billion, on average, for the subsequent ten years. The total government budget for higher education was in 2007 NIS 6 billion. Thus, in the coming decade, the defense budget will increase each year by a figure that is similar to the annual budget for higher education.

The prolonged conflict with the Palestinians, which lies at the heart of Israel's other regional confrontations, forced the government of Israel to choose between guns and college grads. It felt it had no choice but to choose guns.
Since the 1980s, poverty in Israel has been on the increase. In the 1980s, the average poverty rate for families was 13.5%. In the 1990s, the average poverty rate for families increased to 16.7%. In 2006, the average poverty rate for families was 20%.

The increase in poverty is not the product of the conflict alone. The increase in poverty is the result of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the former Soviet Union and from Ethiopia, who experienced unemployment or employment at low wages. The increase in poverty is also the result of a labor market that excludes many Israelis; of a labor market characterized by years of high unemployment; of a policy that aims to lower the cost of labor by weakening labor unions and by employing workers through contract agencies.

The increase in poverty is also the result of the financial burden of the continued occupation of the Palestinian territories: during the period of the second Intifada, the government increased the defense budget, in large part at the expense of transfer payments. And the cuts in transfer payments led to an immediate rise in the poverty rate. As a result of the foregoing, the state is finding it harder and harder to cope with poverty. It does not invest enough in economic development in peripheral areas, or in upgrading the vocational skills of the labor force, or in expanding day care in order to increase employment among mothers.

The state also finds it difficult to slow down the increase in poverty by means of income transfers:

- In the 1980s, transfer payments succeeded in reducing the overall poverty rate by approximately 60%;
- In the 1990s, transfer payments succeeded in reducing the overall poverty rate by approximately 56%;
- Since the turn of the century, transfer payments succeeded in reducing the overall poverty rate by approximately 53%.
The Military in the Shadow of the Conflict
Reduced Preparedness for War

The military is paying a heavy price for the fact that for years, its major operative role has been the policing of the Palestinian territories. One cost is the need to divert forces to deal with Palestinian armed groups. Concerning the implications of this diversion for the Lebanon front, the Winograd Commission, which investigated the conduct of the 2006 Lebanon war, drew the following conclusions:

"[The diversion caused] a reduction in the forces allocated to the Northern Command and to the [Northern] Division, the closing down of additional outposts along the border (among them the one that overlooked the place where on July 12, 2006 three soldiers were abducted), and to a reduction in the quality of the forces allocated to the division. In the past, the principle had been that routine security along the border fence in the north was carried out by regular army units. With time, regular forces began to be deployed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and they were replaced with reserve units, which were less professional and less well trained."

The Brodet Commission, which examined the defense budget, concluded that coping with the Palestinian uprising caused damage to the fighting preparedness of the Israel Defense Forces:

"Since 2000, when the Palestinian arena became so dominant, the defense system has lacked a sufficient general organization, for the creation of the right balance between the preparedness of the combat units and operations in the framework of routine defense. This defect constitutes a strategic short-sightedness, which contributed to the fact that routine defense lowered the level of [the IDF’s] preparedness and the readiness for war. The absence of expertise in the allocation of manpower damaged the general preparedness and led to both insufficient professionalism in routine defense matters and damage to the level of skills, the level of training and the preparation required to maintain combat units of the quality required by the threats . . . ."

Politicization

Another cost borne by the army is that it has unwillingly been turned into a political actor. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and Israel’s occupation of the territories in particular, constitute the main political issue in Israel, the army, which is the main operational arm of the state in such matters, finds itself cast into the political arena, against its will and against its better interests.

Politicization

Sociologist Moshe Lissak contended back in 1990, in the wake of the first Intifada, that in contrast to a situation of war, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) know how to operate according to military considerations, when it was charged with dealing with the Intifada, it was not able to disengage itself from political and ideological considerations. The IDF finds itself in conflict with central political figures, on the one hand, and with settlers, on the other. Thus, Lissak warned, there is danger of erosion in the basic public support for the top IDF command, both from the right and from the left. Beyond this, Lissak mentioned that the new situation created by the Intifada involved the danger of de-legitimation of military service.

Undermining Confidence in the Justice of Warfare

Political scientist Yoram Peri pointed out the operational implications of having to cope with a national uprising: legal uncertainty arising from confrontations with unarmed civilians; tension between the IDF and the judicial system, as a result of the difficulty of defining norms of conduct; damage to the reporting regime of the IDF; and a feeling
From the moment that the main operational role of the Israel Defense Forces became enforcing Israeli control over the Palestinian territories, breaches began to open in the wide legitimacy enjoyed by the IDF ever since its establishment. Numerous Israelis came to wonder about the morality of the use of the army to enforce the occupation, instead of to defend the state and its citizenry. Immediately after the 1967 war, there were voices that warned against the implications of military control over Palestinians. Best known were the voices of Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Yitzhak Ben Aharon and Pinchas Lavon. They were preceded by Shimon Zabar, who together with another eleven persons published on September 22, 1967 – three months after the war – an advertisement in the Haaretz daily newspaper warning against the serious implications of turning the IDF into an instrument of occupation:

"Our right to defend ourselves against destruction does not give us the right to oppress others. Occupation results in foreign control. Foreign control results in opposition. Opposition results in suppression. Suppression results in terror and terror against terror..."

Ad in Haaretz 9.22.1967

With the passage of time, the IDF found itself again and again up against the phenomenon of soldiers, mainly reservists, who refused to mobilize for the mission imposed on the IDF. It happened at the time of peace talks with Egypt, when the government tried to evade evacuating the settlements; it expanded during the first Lebanon war, whose original purpose was to destroy the institutional infrastructure established there by Palestinians who had been deported from Jordan; and it reached its largest proportions during the two Intifadas, especially the second one.

A strong challenge against the use of the IDF in the occupation came from women in Israel. The largest and most persistent movement was "Women in Black." Another movement that succeeded in directly influencing policy was "Four Mothers," which contributed to the decision to get out of Lebanon after a stay of 18 years.
The Cost of Occupation

The prolonged occupation of the Palestinian territories has placed Israel in the situation of friction or even confrontation with sizeable parts of the international community. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and the occupation in particular, weaken the international status of Israel, cast doubt on the legality of its actions and damage its standing in the world as a democratic state committed to the preservation of human rights.

1. For a long time after the 1967 war, Israel was ostracized by many nations of the world. This was detrimental to, among others, Israeli trade. In the wake of the Oslo Accords and the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, Israel came out of its isolation, but it is still disconnected from many nations in the Middle East, Africa and South East Asia. Due to the prolonged diplomatic isolation, Israel came to depend more and more on the support of the United States and, in fact, became its protégé. The United States is the strongest power in the world, and its patronage has many advantages; however, it also involves disadvantages, for example, severe limitations that the United States imposes on the development of Israel’s defense industries. In contrast, Israel’s relations with the European Union have been characterized by recurring frictions. The European Union is Israel’s second largest trading partner. The European Union has already used its power against Israel, when it removed tax benefits from the products produced in the settlements, benefits that accrue to other items that Israel exports.

2. No nation of the world, including the United States, recognizes Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories; No nation of the world, including the United States, recognizes Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem. No nation of the world, including the United States, recognizes the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories; No nation of the world, including the United States, recognizes the border created by the separation wall built by Israel. The International Court of Justice in the Hague declared, in an advisory opinion, that construction of the wall in the West Bank and Jerusalem is illegal and that Israel should dismantle the wall and compensate Palestinians adversely affected by it.

3. Israel’s status in international public opinion, which was quite high immediately after the founding of the state and in the first years after the 1967 War, has decreased significantly with prolongation of the occupation. Public opinion surveys reveal repeatedly that Israel’s image among the world of nations is negative. Various circles in the West, mainly intellectual groups, have tried repeatedly to impose a boycott on Israeli products and even on Israeli universities and Israeli scholars.
In most of the years since 1967, and certainly since the outbreak of the first Intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a central issue in the Israeli political arena, so much so that it has pushed to the margins issues that in other countries are at the center of public debate, like social and economic policy. While in other countries, social and economic issues are those that differentiate between the main political camps – left and right – in Israel, the line of demarcation is policy on the Palestinian issue. The main result of this situation is the poverty of public debate in matters that determine the standard of living and the quality of life for Israelis in the present and future: economic development, wages, schools, higher education, health, the social safety net and the like. For years, Israeli governments have risen or fallen on their stance on the Palestinian issue and not on the above matters. This being the case, political parties do not bother to develop genuine socio-economic agendas.

At least since the 1980s, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has influenced the degree of stability of coalition governments. For example, the agreement signed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu at Wye Plantation led to a shortening of the days of his government; the failure of the Camp David talks with the Palestinians led to the fall of the Ehud Barak government; the government coalition formed by Ariel Sharon came apart against the background of the disengagement plan for the Gaza Strip. Finally, the status of the Ehud Olmert government is liable to be undermined if it turns out that negotiations with the Palestinians include the future of Jerusalem.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict led to the first assassination of a national political figure: Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was murdered because he signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians.
Sources and Footnotes

Page 8, Economic Growth:
Adva Center analysis of United Nations, Human Development Report, various years, and World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years.

Page 9, Tourist Entries:
Note: In 2007 Israel registered 2.3 million tourist entries.
Source: World Bank, 2007 Development Indicators, Table 6.15.
The figure for Israel is from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2007, table 23.1.

Page 10, Economic Stability
In 2007, GDP in Israel was NIS 664.8 billion (in current prices).
Note: Percentage changes for the years 1968-1995 were calculated on the basis of the old series of the ICBS (SNA 1968); Percentage changes for the years 1996-2007 were calculated on the basis of the new series (SNA 1993).

Page 11, Standard of Living:
In 2007, GDP per capita was NIS 92,592.
Note: Percentage changes for the years 1968-1995 were calculated on the basis of the old series of the ICBS (SNA 1968); Percentage changes for the years 1996-2007 were calculated on the basis of the new series (SNA 1993).

Page 12, International Economic Status:

Page 13, Investments:
Note: figures on fixed capital formation were converted to $ US on the basis of the average exchange rate for each year.

Page 17, Additional Appropriations to the Defense Budget:
Note: Defense Budget figures are net figures and they were obtained from the state budgets.
Source: Adva Center analysis of Ministry of Finance, Summary of the State Budget, various years.

Page 18, Disengagement and the Separation Wall:
Source: The figure for the cost of the separation wall is from Shaul Arieli and Michael Sfard, The Wall of Folly, Tel Aviv: Aliyat Gag Books, page 129 (Hebrew).

Page 19, Social Expenditure:
Notes:
1. The social expenditure includes the budgets of the following ministries:
   Education; Science, Sports and Culture;
   Health; Higher Education; National Insurance Institute transfers funded by the State; and Social Affairs.
2. Budget figures for 2001-2006 are from the annual reports of the chief auditor at the Ministry of Finance. Figures for 2007 and 2008 are from the budget proposal.
Sources: Adva Center analysis of Ministry of Finance, Office of the Chief Auditor, Financial Statements, various years;
Page 23, Gini Coefficient:
Note: The graph begins in 1979 due to the fact that before that figures were calculated in a different way.
Sources: National Insurance Institute, *Annual Survey 2005*, Table 22; *Annual Survey 2006*, Table 21.

Page 24, Social Security:

Page 24, Transfer Payments:
Source: Adva Center, *The Economy is Growing, State Revenues are Increasing, But a Tight Lid is Kept on Social Spending*, Presentation made at the Knesset, November 13, 2007.

Page 25, Teaching Hours per Pupil:
Source: Adva Center, *The Economy is Growing, State Revenues are Increasing, But a Tight Lid is Kept on Social Spending*. Presentation made at the Knesset, November 13, 2007.

Page 25, Percentage Change in the Per Pupil National Expenditure on Education:
Note: Includes elementary, middle schools, high schools and pre-academic units.

Page 26, Anticipated Average Years of Schooling for Children:

Page 27, Guns or College Grads:

Page 28, Poverty:
Sources: National Insurance Institute, *Annual Survey 2005*, Table 22 and *Annual Survey 2006*, Table 20.

Page 30, Reduced Preparedness for War:

Page 30, Politicization:

Page 32, International Status:
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.
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