Peacekeeping in West Africa: A Regional Report

By
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RI's interest in UN peacekeeping operations

There are an estimated 35.5 million displaced people worldwide—11.9 million refugees and asylum seekers, and an additional 23.6 million internally displaced people who have been uprooted from their homes and communities. The leading cause of the displacement is armed conflict. Since early in 2000, Refugees International has been promoting effective peacekeeping operations as a means of preventing or shortening military conflicts. In 2001, RI co-founded the Partnership for Effective Peace Operations, which is a working group of NGOs that supports improvement of United Nations peace operations. In 2002, we began a series of studies on UN peacekeeping operations.

The report builds on RI’s experience in each of the countries visited, as well as the West Africa region, and on our expertise in peacekeeping operations. This is our fifth report on peacekeeping operations in the past two years. The other reports, available at www.refugeesinternational.org, are:

1. “UNAMSIL—A Peacekeeping Success: Lessons Learned” (October 2002)
2. “MONUC: Flawed Mandate Limits Success” (May 2003)
4. “MONUC: Mandate to Succeed” (September 2003)

The purpose of these studies is to help develop a list of factors that enhance the effectiveness of UN peace operations, and also a list of factors, based on lessons learned, that are not conducive to effective peace operations.

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Displacement remains a huge problem in West Africa where an estimated 1-1.5 million refugees and displaced people have fled their homes and countries. In Côte d'Ivoire, there are an estimated 500,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) and 69,000 refugees, mostly from Liberia. In Liberia, there are more than 350,000 IDPs and thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees waiting to be repatriated. In Sierra Leone, there are about 13,000 Liberian refugees in camps near the border. In Guinea, there are still 6,000 Sierra Leonean refugees and about 89,000 Liberian refugees.

For those who flee and those who stay behind, death is only one of many consequences. War has destroyed the structure of society and created an environment in which poverty, human rights violations and disease are the norm.

The conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire have their roots in regional political and economic instability. The effects of those conflicts have spilled over their individual borders to regional neighbors as people have sought refuge also in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea.

The fates of these countries are linked to each other because their individual conflicts are the result of regional tensions and factors. Their porous borders have allowed wars to spill over into neighboring countries for more than a decade, as Liberian fighters, for example, entered Sierra Leone in support of rebels there. Those same borders allow arms smuggling and theft of resources to support regional conflict. And as conflicts rage, they drive civilian populations—from their homes and frequently across borders to neighboring states, which are in turn impacted economically as they provide for the needs of refugees and also protect themselves from possible armed soldiers crossing borders with legitimate refugees. There are Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, Guinea and other states. Liberian refugees sought refuge in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire. Liberians are returning from Sierra Leone to crowded IDP camps in Liberia, where they await disarmament and demobilization of combatants so they can return in safety to their homes. Even the nature of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants into society is regional as combatants of all nationalities are among those who must be demobilized in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, looming large in the regional uncertainty of West Africa is Guinea, which does not have
a UN military mission, but which faces political and military challenges as its aging president nears his end with no apparent successor. Conflict in Guinea could have a devastating effect on the countries that share its southern and eastern borders: Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions have been mandated in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. All are in different stages of operations.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is drawing to a close. The main questions center around the ability of the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and its military (RSLAF) and police (SLP) forces to maintain the peace and security required for good governance and economic growth. As this report is being written, the United Nations has approved a 6-month extension of the UNAMSIL mandate until September 30, 2004; and it has also approved an additional 6-month deployment of a “residual UNAMSIL presence” consisting of 3,250 troops, 141 military observers (MILOBS) and 80 UN civilian police personnel (CIVPOL).

In Liberia, the UN peacekeeping mission—UNMIL—was authorized in September 2003. Almost all of its authorized 15,000 personnel are on the ground, and UNMIL has re-launched its Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program (DDRR) after a disastrous failed attempt in December 2003. Final deployment should also include 250 MILOBS and 1,115 CIVPOL.

And in Côte d’Ivoire, the first members of a newly mandated UNOCI force authorized at 6,250 peacekeepers (plus 200 MILOBS and 350 CIVPOL) arrived in country on April 1, 2004—on the heels of a political demonstration that left 120 people dead and hundreds more injured in its capital of Abidjan on March 25, 2004.

It is against this background that Refugees International launched a mission to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire from March 5 to March 26, 2004.

Our goals were threefold:

- Examine these three UN peacekeeping operations from a regional perspective to assess regional responses to these crises.
- Examine each UN military mission in terms of its current phase of operations and help determine unique challenges, solutions and lessons learned.
- Concurrently, examine each mission in terms of the impacts of conflict and peacekeeping responses to conflict as they pertain to protection of civilians. (Most of the findings and recommendations pertaining to these subjects are being published in a separate report.)

This report is based primarily on dozens of individual interviews with key members of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), senior representatives from a variety of UN member states (UN Missions in New York), civilian and military leaders in each country, representatives from UNHCR, OCHA, USAID, and local and international NGOs in each country, as well as representatives from the US Departments of State and Defense.

Major Findings:

Regionalization is a relatively new opportunity for UN peacekeeping. As used
in this report, “regionalization” refers to the degree of cooperation and coordination among individual UN peacekeeping operations in a specified region. Specifically in this report, we are referring to the West African peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. We are also applying the term to military aspects of the operations as well as to other mandated aspects, such as humanitarian support and policing.

Regionalization is not a panacea—although there are surely gains to be had through increased cooperation and sharing of assets. Specific aspects of regional cooperation must be weighed against the missions and circumstances in the individual countries within the region.

As a senior UN official in Sierra Leone pointed out, “There is a regional dimension to the conflict. You can’t just deal with individual states.” The regional dimensions of the problems in West Africa demand a commensurate regional approach to UN peacekeeping operations, to UN and NGO relief and aid work, and to longer term national and community development programs.

While RI found that leaders in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN and in the individual missions acknowledged the regional aspects of conflict in West Africa, and had implemented some procedures for sharing information among the individual peacekeeping operations, there appeared to be little enthusiasm and effort for pursuing initiatives that could actually codify and implement truly regional peacekeeping operations and solutions. While SRSGs (Special Representative to the Secretary-General) and mission commanders meet periodically to discuss regional issues, and a West Africa SRSG has been appointed to oversee non-peacekeeping regional matters, the decisions about the degree of cooperation and coordination remain with each operational SRSG.

No one at the UN Security Council or the DPKO has been assigned or has assumed a leadership role in developing, sponsoring and imposing regional initiatives in West Africa.

Although this report focuses on peacekeeping operations, we also found the same lack of commitment to regional solutions and opportunities among other UN agencies that deal with refugee and IDP issues, and among NGOs that operate in all three countries.

A second set of major findings deals with implementation of DDR programs. These programs are not new and there is a body of literature and lessons learned on how they should be conducted. DPKO published an excellent report on the DDR program in Sierra Leone last September.

But each DDR program in recent times has had to fail once before it could launch more successfully.

The latest example is the DDRR failure in Liberia last December. Had the lessons learned from Sierra Leone been applied,

1 DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration) programs have different components in different countries. In Sierra Leone, the program was DDR. It is DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement) in Liberia. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement). For consistency in this report, we use the acronym “DDR,” unless we are referring to a specific program.
that failure could have been avoided. Although circumstances vary from country to country, there are some constants, as we outline in this report.

A second point of concern related to DDR is the gap between the short-term urgency of disarming and demobilizing combatants, and the longer-term requirements for successfully reintegrating them into their societies. There is, rightfully, a great deal of emphasis on the “DD” part of the program. All else depends on getting guns out of the hands of combatants.

Lastly regarding DDR, we found inadequate planning for regional considerations.

For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, ex-combatants were offered $970 for disarming. In Liberia, they were offered $300. This disparity raises the danger of combatants from Liberia crossing into Côte d’Ivoire to get a better deal. In Liberia, child soldiers were being offered cash, but not in Côte d’Ivoire. Although combatants in Liberia were demobilizing, many were not turning in weapons. Experts theorize that the weapons may be crossing borders, particularly into Côte d’Ivoire—thus increasing the need for increased surveillance at the borders. There are also issues of third country combatants who need to be returned to their home countries for demobilization. These returns must be coordinated.

Community-based programs must also be established to build economies and social programs so jobs and support mechanisms are in place. These programs must be phased. Some must be available as soon as ex-combatants leave the demobilization camps. Others must be developed over a period of months and years. These programs are also key to stability and peace. If these ex-combatants cannot find jobs and legal means to support their families, the danger of their re-arming is imminent.

There is inadequate planning and funding for those programs.

In addition to the regional focus of this study, RI also reviewed each of the West Africa peacekeeping operations individually to study what can be learned as one operation nears its end, another is underway, and a third is just beginning. Specific findings and recommendations are included for each mission. A complete list of recommendations, by subject matter, is at Annex D.
Section I: Regional Issues

“It’s like the metaphor of cockroaches—if you bring in the exterminator to one part, they all move to another part of the house. That’s the way it is in the region. You can’t just treat one country.” --UN Official

One can argue that West Africa is unique in terms of having simultaneous peacekeeping operations in neighboring countries; and therefore, few lessons-learned can be applied to other peacekeeping operations. This would be a shortsighted approach. First of all, with the likelihood of a Burundi mission being approved in the summer of 2004, talk of deployment in the Darfur region of Sudan, a possible northern Uganda mission and an existing mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes region may also need to address regional issues.

The fact that the UN now has three concurrent peacekeeping operations in the same region of Africa, and shared borders in their areas of operations, gives the West Africa peacekeeping missions a unique opportunity for some degree of regional military cooperation. The same opportunities exist for other UN and international aid and developmental activities, and for NGOs that operate in all three countries. This report, however, deals only with the UN military operations.

Currently, only the UNOCI mandate in Côte d’Ivoire directs regional coordination—related to its DDR program: “As stipulated by resolution 1528, the mandate of UNOCI . . . shall be required to do the following:

(f) To coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement program for foreign ex-combatants . . .

(g) To ensure that the programs mentioned in paragraphs (e) [implementation of DDR] and (f) take into account the need for a regional approach.”

In November 2003, UNAMSIL hosted a regional meeting for the three SRSGs from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. The SRSG for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, also attended. This meeting included detailed discussions on issues like the cross-border movement of combatants, the flow of small arms and the movement of natural resources. The SRSGs agreed to set up a mechanism to facilitate a free flow of information among the missions and also to improve operational coordination, such as running joint border patrols and screening persons and goods in cooperation with legitimate national security forces in the host countries where they are working.

“The regional approach is particularly important because the crises [in West Africa] are increasingly interconnected,” Ould-Abdallah said at a November 2003 meeting in Accra. “They are all fuelled by arms trafficking and are characterized by the use and recruitment of mercenaries and child soldiers and by cross-border movements of armed groups. Following the recent Security Council mission, the United Nations Office for West Africa was asked to prepare a report on practical ways of addressing these problems. Disarmament and demobilization programs,
for example, would need to be carried out simultaneously in the countries of the region.”

“The UN is gradually coming to terms with regionalization at the operational level,” according to a senior UNAMSIL officer.

Although there is support for regional approaches to some problems, the architecture for regional cooperation is somewhat tenuous. The West African SRSG reports to the Department of Political Affairs, not the DPKO, according to a UN official. “Initially, it was a role without a responsibility,” the official said. “The [military] missions are independent. The SRSG-West Africa focuses on broader regional implications, broader trends and areas not covered by UN missions.”

Essentially, each mission SRSG is an independent operator and each decides the degree to which they share information and resources, and the degree to which they cooperate regionally on military plans and operations—including DDR.

To be sure, some progress is being made in sharing information and assets among the UN missions in West Africa:

- UNAMSIL has been dubbed the “mother of UNMIL,” in that some military troops being drawn down from Sierra Leone have been assigned to Liberia and much of the civilian staff of UNMIL came from UNAMSIL. This cross-fertilization has also resulted in a sharing of lessons learned from UNAMSIL.
- At a senior level, liaison officers from each mission have been assigned to the other missions.
- There are periodic meetings among the SRSGs and the military force commanders.
- An SRSG for West Africa reviews regional issues that go beyond the individual mandates of the operational SRSGs.
- In considering mission continuation in Sierra Leone, and in determining troop strengths in the other missions, consideration was given to the regional issues and threats. A senior UNAMSIL official said, “There are UN forces in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. So what do we need here? A small force, but large enough to be effective.”

Regional Issues for Consideration:

Leadership and Direction: There are many barriers to regionalization. Some come from SRSGs who may be reluctant to give up individual power and flexibility. Others come from individual donor nations. One UN Mission representative in New York pointed out that, “We support regionalization, in principle. But everyone has national interests. We don’t want regional partisans taking sides.” Regarding cross-border operations, the official said, “We have issues with moving troops from one country to another. We treat borders as sacrosanct.”

To be successful, there must be a driving force, innovative ideas, and a willingness to tackle barriers to change. In short, there must be leadership. When R discussed regional issues at DPKO, we were told that DPKO supported regional initiatives. We were also told that there were many problems, such as international law, sovereignty issues, and agreements with
individual member nations. To the extent that regionalization initiatives could be implemented, DPKO was supportive. But there appeared to be little enthusiasm for championing the tough issues and driving change.

At the operational level in the countries we visited, there was, again, a willingness to do the things that could be done relatively easily, but it was not within their authorities to tackle the larger issues. “We have looked at an operational SRSG for West Africa and a standby force for the region,” a senior UNAMSIL officer said. “There are policy and operational problems.”

“One element [of regional cooperation] is a fantasy,” one SRSG told RI. “There are high-level meetings, sharing of information. But that’s not how peacekeeping is done. You have contributing countries and they sign MOUs [Memoranda of Understanding] to cooperate in country X—not country Y and Z. Plus member states have interests. So my troops are here in this geographic region. [Regional initiatives have] to happen at the Security Council. It remains to be seen how issues that are discussed will turn out.

**Recommendations:**

- **Secretary-General establish a high-level commission to study and report on initiatives, challenges and solutions to regional peacekeeping opportunities.**
- **The Secretary-General give DPKO the lead for aggressively pursuing regionalization initiatives and enhancements and reporting on them to the Security Council.**
- **The Secretary-General consider giving the SRSG for West Africa the mandate to directly regionalize initiatives in West Africa, resolve issues that can be resolved within the region, and submit higher level regional initiatives and requests to the Security Council for resolution.**

**Cross-Border Operations:** One of the most obvious, and most legally and politically difficult, areas of regional cooperation is the possibility of conducting cross-border operations. This would give UN forces greater capacity and flexibility to cut off smuggling and gunrunning across the borders. It would allow a force in one country to come to the aid of a force in another country quickly and effectively.

On May 20, 2004, Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), urged the Security Council to develop a "cross-border peacekeeping" formula for UN missions operating in war zones. He cited the humanitarian crises in Darfur, Sudan, and parts of West Africa as examples of how lines of conflict frequently run across state boundaries.

Given the nature of conflicts today, he said, greater attention must be devoted to finding a formula for peacekeeping missions that operated in cross-border situations, where appropriate and where endorsed by the affected governments.

One senior military officer said, “We are developing the concept of cross border operations. It’s incredibly inefficient to have these stovepipe organizations. We’re willing to think the unthinkable.” But, as a UNAMSIL leader pointed out, “Troop contributors probably would not authorize cross-border operations without their troops...
seeking their permission first. Contributors, especially the United States, wouldn’t want to authorize a standing quick reaction force.”

Cross-border cooperation among the three missions in West Africa is one way to work around actual cross-border operations. For example, force commanders in Sierra Leone and Liberia are attempting to assign military units from the same countries (or at least with the same language) on both sides of a common border to enhance communications. There are also attempts to coordinate missions on two sides of a border—such as an anti-smuggling operation—without actually having troops cross borders. Unfortunately, in Liberia, the attempt to assign Pakistani units across the border from Sierra Leone near the Bo Waterside bridge did not happen due to a delay in availability of troops from Pakistan. However, the UNMIL force commander was making an effort to ensure that Pakistani troops would be deployed across the border in Côte d'Ivoire.

Related to cross-border operations is the possibility of sharing military equipment across the borders. For example, if a military commander in one country needs bridging equipment or attack helicopters that are available in a neighboring operation, it would make sense to have a procedure for allowing that to happen. “We’re looking at ways of using assets from one mission if needed in another mission. Right now, there’s little sharing—but it makes sense to do it,” an officer said.

Surely, there are issues that member states must resolve in order to allow such sharing, but it is in the interests of the states to capitalize on these new opportunities. What is lacking is a forum for discussing and resolving these issues at the Security Council.

**Recommendation:**

- **Secretary-General establish a high-level commission to explore the legal and political barriers to cross-border operations and sharing of assets and make recommendations on how to overcome those barriers.**
- **Troop Contributing Countries work closely with DPKO to expedite availability and movement of troops to facilitate regional cooperation.**

Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation: DDR in West Africa has many important regional implications. With foreign combatants in various countries, and with demobilization efforts in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, issues of timing, payments, definitions of “child-soldier” and “combatants,” and the longer term programs of reintegration and rehabilitation must be coordinated. Specific elements of coordination include:

- A regional approach to DDR to make sure there isn’t DDR shopping for the best deals among fighters in different countries. According to one senior mission officer, “In Côte d’Ivoire they gave soldiers $970. In Liberia, only $300. These are areas of potential conflict.” A UNHCR official pointed out that even though the DDR program is complete in Sierra Leone, former combatants could become disgruntled if their

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**The ability to share resources could reduce the costs of peacekeeping operations and make them more efficient and effective.**
counterparts in other countries are treated significantly more generously.

- A master list of fighters that have registered for DDRR in the various countries so that combatants don’t get benefits in more than one country. This list should take advantage of existing technology to use either photos linked to names or fingerprint technology.
- A way to bring Guinea into the process. Even though it does not have a specific program of its own, it does have foreign combatants from the other countries.
- Reintegration and Rehabilitation programs must be coordinated to ensure that ex-combatants in all countries have equitable programs and opportunities, because failure in any one country could result in a return to hostilities that could reignite the regional conflict.

**Recommendation:**

- **DDR plans of each country should be reviewed by the SRSG for West Africa for potential conflicts and inequities. Conflicts and inequities among the individual SRSGs should be resolved at regional SRSG meetings or appealed to DPKO/Secretary-General for resolution.**

Sharing of Information Assets at Lower Levels: Although there are periodic meetings with the three SRSGs and Force Commanders in the region, sharing of information, assets and lessons-learned at lower levels is ad hoc and left to the initiative of individual staff directors. In some cases, there has been a lot of exchange: “My officers and recommendations helped set up the UNMIL CIVPOL. They used lessons learned from here,” according to a UNAMSIL CIVPOL officer. However, a senior UNMIL CIVPOL officer said, “We’re not satisfied with our attempts at regionalization. However, we are so over our heads with this that it’s something we can’t look at. We have a road map from CIVPOL NY. It’s a good idea. We don’t want to say I wish I had learned that lesson before we had to learn it the hard way.”

But, a gender advisor said, “There is no regional meeting planned for gender advisors. This would be good as they are all coming in at different levels with different levels of experience.”

It is admittedly costly—in terms of time and money—to have extensive regional meetings for every function under the responsibility of the UN country missions. However, DPKO has said they have no objections to supporting this kind of interaction.

**Recommendations:**

- **SRSG for West Africa work with the mission SRSGs to develop a comprehensive plan for identifying and coordinating regional issues throughout West Africa.**
- **DPKO encourage other positions with counterparts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire to establish formal lines of communication for coordinating activities and sharing information.**
Section II: Start-Up Stage of Peacekeeping Missions

Given the unique circumstances in West Africa with three peacekeeping operations—each in a different stage of operation—we have an opportunity to study each phase as it is unfolding. The remainder of this report will examine mission start-up from initial planning to deployment; the operational stage from deployment to drawdown; and the drawdown phase leading to mission completion.

(Before anyone can understand how a UN peacekeeping mission begins, and assess strengths and weaknesses in the process, there has to be an appreciation of the complexity of the UN system itself. See Annex A.)

Planning at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) plays a critical role in assessing conflict situations to determine if a UN peacekeeping operation is an appropriate response; and, if so, in recommending mission mandates, deployment strengths, and assisting in developing military concepts of operation. Aside from obvious military objectives, peacekeeping missions have many other aspects—political, security, humanitarian, economic, and educational. This means that DPKO responsibilities must also include coordinating with NGOs, ensuring that gender issues are “mainstreamed”—integrated into mission planning—and other areas that ultimately will determine the success or failure, perceived or real, of UN peacekeeping operations.

It is not within the purview of this report to assess DPKO as an entity itself. Many of the recommendations of the Brahimi report dealt with specific shortcomings and made a series of recommendations to improve DPKO capacity and operations. A recent study by the Henry L. Stimson Center provides an in-depth analysis of the status of implementation of recommendations from the Brahimi Report.

DPKO’s mission is to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so they can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the Secretary-General.

According to the DPKO website, “DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. DPKO strives to provide the best possible and most cost-efficient administrative and logistical support to missions in the field through the timely deployment of quality equipment and services, adequate financial resources and well-trained personnel. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance


and support on military, police, mine action, and logistical and administrative issues to other UN political and peace-building missions."

One of the findings of the Brahimi report was that DPKO was understaffed. “DPKO is just 10 years old,” a senior DPKO official told RI in February 2004. “In 2000, at the time the Brahimi report was coming out, we had 402 people in DPKO. Now we have 614. We have a lot on our plate. There are currently 13 peacekeeping operations in the field. We have 15 special political missions. We’re discussing nine more: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Cameroon, Iraq, Cyprus, Uganda, Somalia and now Haiti.”

In carrying out its mission, DPKO must overcome an almost impossible barrier—bridging the gap between what “should” be and what “can” be. It’s the gap between the military situation on the ground and the political will of the Security Council’s Permanent Five members (P-5) (see Annex A), the Security Council and the 189 member states of the United Nations in terms of how much manpower and resources they will allocate to any given mission. In the end, “each member state decides whether its position is strengthened or weakened by UN cooperation,” a UN DPKO official said.

Every mission, by definition, is a compromise between what is needed and what will realistically be provided. As RI offers recommendations for improving DPKO operations and procedures, we are mindful of DPKO’s substantive success in brokering competing interests to deploy peacekeeping missions that have saved lives and helped bring stability—or at least helped constrain the spread of conflict—over the years.

Application of Lessons Learned

The UN has conducted 57 peacekeeping operations since 1948. It has 15 missions currently underway. In 2002, the Brahimi report stated, “All are agreed on the need to exploit cumulating field experience but not enough has been done to improve the system’s ability to tap that experience or to feed it back into the development of operational doctrine, plans, procedures or mandates. The work of DPKO’s existing Lessons Learned Unit does not seem to have had a great impact on peace operations practice.”

In response to Brahimi, the Lessons Learned unit was recast as the DPKO Best Practices Unit (BPU) in 2003. The unit reports directly to the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Marie Guéhénno, and is currently staffed with nine professionals and a few interns. The unit has recently produced two excellent reports:

- “Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone” (September 2003)

It has also launched a website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/.

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4 Missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti have since been mandated, bringing the total to 15 current missions.

5 Brahimi Report, paragraph 229.
The BPU is moving in a direction to provide valuable information for use at DPKO and within the various UN peacekeeping operations.

There is significant effort to develop and distribute lessons-learned information to the field, including appointing Best Practices Focal Points within the missions.

However, there appears to be little emphasis or guidance at the senior DPKO level in ensuring that lessons-learned are incorporated at the operational level.

Repeatedly during our interviews with senior people in each country, we were reminded that each mission is unique. One leader put it this way: “We get all sorts of gratuitous advice. In Sierra Leone, we did it one way. In Guinea we did it this way. This isn’t Sierra Leone. The nature of the conflict is different.” While it is true that each case must be assessed in terms of unique circumstances, it is also true that lessons learned from one operation can help avoid repeating mistakes made in another operation.

**Recommendations:**

- **The Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General (DPKO) incorporate applicable best practices into UN policies and directives by requiring in his instructions to Special Representatives (SRSG), that the SRSG and his senior staff read and apply existing lessons-learned and best practices to current operations unless exceptions are justified to the Secretary-General.**
- **The Secretary-General should require SRSGs to develop lessons-learned in their areas of operation on a continuing basis (rather than at end of mission) and forward them to the BPU for analysis, inclusion in the BPU database, and dissemination to other operations.**
- **Best practices focal points should be assigned with sufficient seniority and positioned organizationally to raise the visibility of best practices in the field missions. The hiring of best practices focal persons should be expedited from the beginning of the mission in order to assist with planning.**

**Training:** When peacekeepers are deployed to an area of conflict, the local, national and international expectations are that the impact of peacekeepers in these countries will be positive, not negative. That means that soldiers must be trained to carry out their military duties, which include training in military subjects such as tactics, rules of engagement and marksmanship.

Peacekeepers must also be given the training they need to become effective peacekeepers who can win the confidence and trust of the civilian population.

Military and civilian components must comply with the guidelines on “International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking UN Peacekeeping Operations” and all applicable portions of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

As troops come from a variety of different countries, it is necessary to make sure all troops have a standardized background of information to draw upon. To aid in that training, DPKO has developed a series of Standardized Generic Training Modules.
(SGTM). A sample listing of SGTM subjects can be found in Annex B.

Peacekeeping troops arrive in country with different levels of readiness. Most pre-deployment training focuses on military skills, but, according to the trainers we spoke to in West Africa, there has usually been very little pre-deployment training on non-military issues—such as Code of Conduct, health, culture, gender and human rights issues. A UN official in charge of providing training for new peacekeepers said that the concept of gender equity, for example, “is new to them. They see these concepts as a UN thing and foreign to their own experience. It is something that they have to do while in the employ of the UN but they do not see it as relevant to their own cultures. If we want to make them accept and practice it, it would be better to do this training in their own countries with their own trainers to make it not seem as a western idea.” In addition, although all troops are supposed to receive training in these issues, due to language problems, this training is usually left to bilingual unit officers to give to their troops. It is therefore hard to assess the quality of that training or to confirm the training was conducted.

UNAMSIL tried sending a trainer to donor countries to train soldiers but the practice was discontinued. DPKO says that if the missions want to send trainers to troop contributing countries, they would be supported. This is not a sustainable plan, however. The trainers in charge of sensitizing the staff in these peacekeeping missions are already short-handed and over-extended. Neither the personnel nor the budgets exist for sending trainers to troop contributing countries.

Training on UN universal mandates such as gender equity and enforcement of human rights should not be optional or left to the discretion of commanders who may or may not support it.

While this training should focus on conditions and behaviors appropriate to the theater of operations, it should begin in the troop contributing country as soon as deployment dates are established.

Effective training can promote positive changes in troop behavior and help the UN fulfill its mandate to protect vulnerable populations. For example, charges of sexual exploitation and HIV transmission by peacekeepers—whether confirmed or not—have dogged UN missions around the world. By giving the peacekeepers and UN civilian staff the tools and abilities to avoid engaging in this behavior, the UN can contribute to positive social change both in the country in which the peacekeepers are operating and in their home countries. As one interviewee told us, “Peacekeepers bring their attitude with them from their home countries when they come here, and [they] will bring new attitudes back home with them.”

Recommendations:
- That all troop-contributing countries adopt the DPKO training materials for pre-deployment training of all personnel involved in UN peacekeeping operations.
- That DPKO assist pre-deployment training by sending experienced trainers to countries that do not have the resources to manage this training themselves.
- The United States, France and United Kingdom have major training initiatives with many African states and regional
military organizations. Where appropriate, code of conduct training, including gender issues, should be included in those training curricula and programs. More information about HIV transmission should also be included.

- Female instructors should also be mainstreamed as trainers—not just for gender-related issues.

**Hiring of Civilian Staff:** At the time of our mission, the UNOCI deployment in Côte d’Ivoire had not begun. The UNMIL mission, however, began on September 19, 2003 and was about six months old. At that time, most of the key civilian staff with whom we met—humanitarian affairs, human rights staff, gender officer, NGO liaison, among others—had only arrived in the past days and weeks. Most had no staff yet. Senior personnel in UNMIL blame the delays on DPKO’s requirement that all hiring be approved by DPKO. The SRSG can provide names of candidates to DPKO, but the names have to be vetted by DPKO. For human rights positions, DPKO must also involve the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in Geneva. DPKO then provides vetted lists to the SRSG and his staff for selection.

DPKO points out that mission funding affects staffing levels because they cannot hire people until member states fulfill their pledges. They also say that hiring is going at an acceptable level given the constraints they have. At a meeting with DPKO on April 14, we were told that including people being “actively recruited,” the vacancies in UNMIL were down to 33%.

To be sure, DPKO faces significant challenges in the hiring process, as detailed in the Brahimi report⁶, and some progress has been made as noted in the Stimson Center report⁷. But the lack of sufficient civilian staff at UNMIL is negatively impacting the ability of the SRSG to carry out significant portions of his duties (as will be described in the next section).

Gender equity in hiring is also essential to the UN’s larger goal of mainstreaming gender within peacekeeping missions⁸. Although there is some recent improvement in the hiring of women in senior positions, there is still a shortage of women at the staff director level in the various missions. Member states must also bear the responsibility of putting forward the names of female members.

**Recommendations:**

RI endorses these following recommendations from DPKO’s Best Practices Unit report on “Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone,” regarding civilian personnel:

- It is essential to select and appoint international staff with the necessary professional skills and experiences for key positions from the start of a mission. (The report, published in September 2003, notes that even after DPKO recruitment reforms, “it still takes an average

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⁶ Paragraphs 127-145
of six to eight months to fill a vacant post.

- An effort should be made to integrate the three existing databases for personnel information or to ensure that they are compatible and updated on a regular basis. The information in the databases must be accessible to the missions and the mission staff must receive appropriate training in using the databases.

- To better understand the needs of the mission, the recruitment officer responsible for a mission should be encouraged to visit the mission area regularly or be assigned to the mission for a short period.

In addition, RI recommends:

- UN requirement for gender balance, especially at senior levels, must be met and managers held accountable.
For the purposes of this report, the operational phase of a UN peacekeeping operation begins when military troops arrive in the country of conflict. As we noted in the previous section, troops and civilian staff do not all arrive on the start date of the mission, but rather over a period of months.

The slow pace of deployment has been discussed in the Brahimi Report, previous *RI* publications and a host of UN and UN-related studies. Therefore, we will not go into the causes of the delays, but rather focus on some of the impacts we witnessed in Liberia with UNMIL.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation & Reintegration Program in Liberia**

One of the first major challenges of most peacekeeping missions is to disarm and demobilize the combatants as a first step toward restoring peace and stability. In Liberia, it’s also a key to the return of Liberian refugees from Sierra Leone, and the return to their homes of IDPs currently living in camps outside Monrovia.

After a failed start last December, UNMIL commenced DDRR again on April 15, 2004. As of May 11, 2004, UNMIL reports that 26,000 combatants have been demobilized (12,385 since April 15—the rest during the first attempt in December). One major problem, however, is the fact that many fewer weapons had been turned in than combatants demobilized. According to an IRIN news release on April 21, 2004, “There have recently been reports of MODEL (Movement for Democracy for Liberia) disarming many of its own fighters in order to send their weapons over the border to Côte d’Ivoire’s own civil war. Earlier this year, diplomats and UN officials in Monrovia expressed fears that LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) was trying to withdraw much of its heavy weaponry into Sierra Leone and Guinea.”

**Unfortunately, the DDRR program in Liberia has been a case study of how to do DDRR wrong. It is also the backdrop for other fundamental problems with the UNMIL leadership.**

**DDRR Failure of December 7, 2003:** On December 6, 2003, UNMIL issued a press release announcing, “The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of over 40,000 combatants will begin on Sunday, 7 December, with the opening of the first cantonment site at Camp Schieffelin, 35 miles east of Monrovia. Approximately 1,200 former Government of Liberia armed forces and militias are expected to be disarmed and demobilized at the site on Sunday.” December 7 was a disaster. According to an IRIN news account on January 7, 2004, “UNMIL started to disarm fighters loyal to former president Charles Taylor at a barracks near Monrovia on 7 December, but was forced to abandon the exercise 10 days later after former fighters previously fought with pro-government militia groups in Côte d’Ivoire’s own civil war. Earlier this year, diplomats and UN officials in Monrovia expressed fears that LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) was trying to withdraw much of its heavy weaponry into Sierra Leone and Guinea.”

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9 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), part of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
combatants rioted in the city to demand cash for handing in their guns. At least nine people were killed during three days of disorder and looting. UNMIL subsequently agreed to pay all former fighters a $75 advance [including child soldiers] on their $300 rehabilitation allowance as they surrendered their weapons, but the demobilization camp then found it overwhelmed by people rushing to hand in guns and claim the cash.

The failure was predictable. Many NGOs in Liberia urged caution. On December 3, 2003, RI published a bulletin entitled “DDRR in Liberia—Do It Quickly, But Do It Right.” Among other cautions, RI advocates advised, “The DDRR program calls for establishment of three cantonment sites—one for each of the fighting forces—in Tubmanburg, Buchanan, and Monrovia to begin receiving combatants by December 7. Former combatants are expected to spend up to three weeks in cantonment sites before they will be able to participate in reintegration activities such as vocational training, income generation, and education. But with less than one third of its authorized strength, UNMIL is unable to deploy to these contested areas to induce combatants to demobilize. And if some combatants do want to voluntarily demobilize, it is questionable if UNMIL has the capability to provide adequate security at each of these cantonment sites.”

“We started the process with good intent,” a UNDP official said. “People wanted to disarm. We had to decide: Should we wait until everything was in place? If we start now, there might be a flood. We planned around a number of 1,000. We would start with taking away guns in Monrovia. The level of program preparation was there.

We knew fully well that the support structure was not there, but we plunged in hoping we had enough. No one envisioned 4,000 the first day, 2,000 the next and a total of 7,000. It crashed our operational capability of the mission. The military said we don’t have enough capacity. There was a need to define the critical mass; but there were only 5,000 troops.”

Why did the December 2003 disarmament and demobilization effort in Liberia fail? There is no dearth of opinions. But one clear starting point is the failure of UNMIL leaders to heed the lessons learned from initial failures in other missions, such as in neighboring Sierra Leone and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). “A lot of DDR lessons learned in Sierra Leone were not implemented in UNMIL,” said a DPKO official. “We tried to do DDR too early.”

Although circumstances in Liberia were, indeed, different from those in Sierra Leone, some things were similar. The DPKO Best Practices Unit’s lessons-learned from Sierra Leone, which was distributed more than two months before, lists 19 lessons learned. Heeding a few of them could have avoided this mis-start:

• The deployment of a neutral military force with credible deterrent capabilities is necessary to provide security and build confidence in the DDR process.
• Reliable data on numbers of combatants is essential for good planning; therefore, there should be an emphasis on early data collection capacity to avoid potentially disastrous demands on the program at a later stage.
• Security for disarmament sites and disarmed ex-combatants is essential.
to build confidence and encourage disarmament to take place.

- A precise timetable specifying sites and dates needs to be developed to ensure an appropriate balance between logistical and political/security considerations.
- Eligibility criteria for disarmament must balance operational realities with the need to collect as many weapons as possible.

The question has to be asked: Who at the UN is, or should be, overseeing the implementation of major programs that directly impact the success or failure of a mission?

According to a senior military commander from a neighboring UN mission, “We should never template these [DDR] operations, but there are standards. [The SRSG] went in with a blank sheet of paper. The SRSG should have clear guidance from the Secretary-General on how this is to operate.”

“I’m not sure that New York DPKO is on top of things,” a U.S. government official said. “They need to take leadership. There’s a lot of frustration with the New York office. Everyone needs to understand this is an extraordinary opportunity in Liberia. The problem is in implementing the programs. We need leadership. The UN should get on board and lead!”

**Planning for DDRR 2004:** Following the initial failure, UNMIL established a number of benchmarks that should be met before restarting the program:

- Complete construction of cantonment sites to make them habitable.
- Adequate security to drive the process and to provide a robust deterrent to justify confidence.
- Factions provide lists of all fighting forces: locations, weapons, and composition (men, women, children).
- Sensitization. Information must be dense enough to have reached the target population so they have an understanding of the DDRR process.

The UNMIL leadership made the decision that the benchmarks had been “essentially” met and disarmament and demobilization began on April 15, 2004.

While DDRR is apparently going well, military commanders and NGOs voiced some concerns during RI’s visit. Military leaders pointed out that the camps are near villages and are difficult to defend. With food in the camps and food in short supply outside the camps, control of civilian populations could be a problem. Problems could also arise if, as happened previously, groups of combatants larger than the 250 per day show up at the disarmament sites. Unforeseen delays in processing (either at the registration sites, the disarmament sites or the cantonment sites) could cause capacity—and security—problems and delay the program. NGOs tasked with running the cantonment sites also had concerns, particularly with the design and layout of the camps (over which they had little control). In addition to problems with the location of kitchen and eating areas, an NGO pointed out that “the location and viability of the toilet and ablution facilities for the female section of the camp are inappropriate. This could become a contentious point quite quickly.” UNMIL officials were confident they have planned for all eventualities. However, NGOs have
reported to RI that up to two weeks after the DDRR started, essential tasks such as deciding who should provide security at the cantonment sites were still being discussed. In addition, there are also reports that civilians and NGOs have been threatened by combatants who are trying to hijack vehicles and rides to cantonment sites.

**Payments to Child Combatants:** Another example of a failure by DPKO to establish standards for all peacekeeping operations relates to cash payments to child combatants. To its credit, UNMIL agreed that priority processing be given to children and adolescents in the demobilization program. These youths will not spend longer than 72 hours in the demobilization camps and they will be separated from adult combatants. They will then transfer to Interim Care Centers and from there they will begin the road home to their families and communities. To ensure that child and adolescent ex-combatants can reintegrate into their communities, the DDRR process is supposed to provide access to interim care, family tracing services, education and skills training, as well as providing for a safe return without risk of further recruitment. These programs -- not cash -- are needed for youthful ex-combatants.

UNMIL and the Liberian National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation (NCDDRR) have decided, however, to make cash payments of US$300 to all youths being demobilized from the various armed forces. The payment of cash allowances to children and adolescents is against their best interests.

Cash allowances to combatants under the age of 18 will undermine this system. The cash is unlikely to be used for productive investments in education or economic opportunity. Many of these children are still in thrall to the commanders who abducted them or hooked them on drugs. Recent reports from the field have noted that faction commanders wait outside of Interim Care Centers for the children to emerge and then take all or part of their cash. There is no way to prevent the cash from being turned back over to commanders, in effect encouraging them to recruit more children. Further, providing cash, in essence, rewards children who took part in the conflict and the parents who allowed them to do so.

The cash allowances may also put these children at risk. One humanitarian organization that works with child combatants in Liberia told Refugees International that when these adolescents received the initial $75 payment in December during the first failed DDRR attempt, they used it for marijuana and other drugs that are plentiful in Liberia. In addition, representatives of a local organization that has been working since September to identify and “rescue” female child soldiers told RI of the difficulties they had breaking the bonds between these adolescent girls--many of whom were mothers but with the maturity of girls--and their commanders, who abused them and commanded their loyalties. Rather than cash, these former combatants need increased access to trauma counseling, educational services, and help reintegrating back into society.

**RI is concerned about the precedent that paying child soldiers will establish in West Africa, where children are easily "recycled" from one conflict to another. Will DDRR in Côte d’Ivoire, for example, inevitably involve cash payments to children?**
RR: Rehabilitation and Reintegration:
There is one major issue, however, that is not resolved. That is the focus on the “DD” part of DDRR, and the apparent lack of focus on the “RR.” “Jacques Klein [SRSG-Liberia] places a lot of emphasis on the DD but not much on the RR,” an NGO member said. “What’s the plan? There’s no push. They [ex-combatants] spend 2-3 weeks in the DD program and then where will the fighters go? Where will they integrate to?”

According to a UNDP report,11 “The months immediately following discharge will be the most challenging for ex-combatants. Most Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) ex-combatants have not received income for a long period while most, in general, have resorted to renting and as a result will need immediate support to establish new households. MODEL and LURD combatants will find themselves in an even more uprooted position as most were mobile fighters recruited from all parts of the country.”

In many ways, the DD part of the program is easy because it’s largely a matter of planning and logistics. The RR part is vastly more difficult because it involves long- and short-term skills training, education for younger ex-combatants, psychosocial assistance for traumatized ex-combatants and civilian populations, and meeting the special needs of traumatized women and children. It also involves sensitizing civilian populations to accept these ex-combatants in their communities and capacity building for communities in terms of jobs, health facilities, schools, and governments. While there are some bridging projects possible to help ex-combatants immediately after they leave the cantonment camps, most of these projects are long-term. And while money is available for some of these initiatives, according to UNHCR officials, part of that money has had to be redirected to meet immediate needs in the IDP and refugee returnee camps in Liberia, due to the delays in implementing the DDRR program.

NGOs are concerned because, short of an initial payment to ex-combatants when they leave the camps, there are no programs to assist them in finding jobs and reintegrating them into communities. An NGO member in Liberia told RI that of the 180 combatants who left the Tubmanburg cantonment site, 80 went directly to Monrovia even though they should have been re-integrated into another community. Since most are young men who for much of their lives have lived by the gun, looting what they need to survive, they are likely to return to that life if other alternatives are not available.

On April 12, according to an IRIN news release, the combatants had the same concerns: “General Roland Duo a senior commander of the armed forces loyal to former president Charles Taylor, said: ‘While we welcome the disarmament on Thursday, the UN and others must ensure that our fighters are well-taken care of and registered for vocational and skills training. With this, they would not focus their minds on returning to war.’ Duo and his counterparts in the LURD and MODEL rebel movements claimed that under current plans, disarmed fighters would be discharged from the four cantonment centres after just seven days. This was not enough time to provide basic vocational skills training so that former gunmen could work as carpenters, electricians or mechanics, they stressed.”

On April 27, UNMIL announced the establishment of the Liberia Community Infrastructure Program (LCIP) – a project to help reintegrate 10,000 ex-combatants and 10,000 non-combatants into stable and productive communities. According to an UNMIL press release, “The LCIP, which will begin 3 May, will provide support for the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as other affected communities, through training, employment creation, enterprise development and rehabilitation of community infrastructure. The project will help in promoting community reconciliation and social reintegration of all war-affected groups.”

While the LCIP is a welcome initiative, it is too early to assess its short-term and long-term effectiveness.

Recommendations:

- **DPKO, on behalf of the Secretary-General, must take a leadership role in overseeing key elements of UN peacekeeping operations. While the SRSGs must have the latitude to exercise initiative in carrying out their mandates, they must be held accountable.**

- **In a related issue, SRSGs and subordinate staffs and commands must be familiar with DPKO written policies, best practices, and lessons learned; and be held responsible for implementing DPKO issuances as they apply to their areas of responsibility. DPKO should not assume that just because it has published a policy that its job is done or that the policy is being implemented.**

- **DPKO should stop accepting as the norm that DDR programs seem to fail upon initial implementation.**

Although each country has unique elements for which adjustments should be made, certain elements of DDR are constant. When the constants are ignored and implementation fails as a result, people should be held accountable.

- **Donors and UNMIL should build on the LCIP by identifying short- and long-term reintegration and rehabilitation programs based on the needs of the ex-combatants to transition successfully from combat to productive and peaceful civilian lives. Projects that address the short-term needs must be started immediately so that there are “RR” programs available for ex-combatants immediately upon release from the cantonment sites.**

UNMIL’s Relationship with the Humanitarian Community

The relationship between the SRSG and the NGO community in Liberia is often acrimonious.

Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein is a dynamic, colorful, larger than life personality. He is a retired Air Force general and with a long career in the Senior Foreign Service of the State Department. He served as chief of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He receives a great deal of credit from his staff, some NGOs and counterparts in other UN missions for providing strong leadership and direction with the transitional government of Liberia. He is a man who makes things happen.

But, as with many strong personalities, he has the ability to rankle. And he has certainly rankled the NGO community. While the relationship between military
operations and NGOs is always somewhat adversarial—given their different missions and focuses—this relationship goes well beyond adversarial. From Klein’s perspective, “NGOs are a problem.”

A senior UNMIL officer describes the problem as a clash of cultures. “At UNMIL, we have a culture of the military—it’s a military bureaucracy, even the so-called civilian component. Then you have the anarchy, idealism, self-righteousness and creativity of the NGO world.”

“Klein doesn’t seem to realize it is his responsibility to get the UN to work with everyone to make specific plans and programs work,” said a USAID official.

“The SRSG here is a character,” one NGO representative said. “He’s atypical. His strengths can be exploited, but his weaknesses need to be controlled. That’s not happening here. There’s a lot of baggage—bad feelings linger.”

One factor in the poor relationship between UNMIL and the NGOs may be the slow rate of filling key positions. Klein has a deputy SRSG who has overall responsibility for NGO relations. That deputy is supposed to have a staff of 30 people; however, at the time of our visit, none were assigned.

Another factor affecting NGO relations is the UNMIL headquarters staff organization. While there is a designated NGO Advisor, most of the other UNMIL directorates also have NGO advisors who deal with NGOs in their specific areas of operation. Rather than easing the communication with NGOs, this duplication of effort may complicate it. There is no coordinated effort to bring all of these liaison officers together. Many have little power within their own units but are sent to attend NGO meetings and report back. Their lack of decision-making authority makes them of little use to NGOs and the multiplicity of actors makes it difficult for NGOs to know where to go for answers or decisions on specific problems.

Many NGOs pointed to the failure of the first DDRR attempt at least in part due to a failure of UNMIL to coordinate adequately with and listen to the NGO community that must support various DDRR programs. They cite problems of coordination with implementing short- and long-term rehabilitation and reintegration programs due to UNMIL’s unwillingness to share its plans with them. UNMIL’s decision to pay youthful demobilized soldiers, as a departure from normal DDRR practice, surprised many NGOs who implement programs for these young people. The lack of trust on both sides has a deleterious effect on programs that depend on confidence and cooperation among all parties in Liberia.

Recommendations:

• DPKO should facilitate a meeting between the SRSG and his key staff and the humanitarian community in Liberia to lay the groundwork for improved relations.
• DPKO should give priority to filling the vacant staff positions under the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation and UN
Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia.

- **UNMIL should review its organizational structure for working with the humanitarian community to ensure clear and effective communications are established.**

**Training and Accountability:** As noted in Section II, UN peacekeepers and all UN employees assigned to a mission area must be held to a professional standard of duty and conduct that earns the respect and confidence of the civilian population. The UN’s Charter requires that all peacekeeping personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct.

As addressed earlier, there is some pre-deployment training regarding how to implement the UN code of conduct, legal issues, interactions with the community, and rape and sexual exploitation; however, this training must be repeated and reinforced throughout the period of their deployment. The civilian and military chains of command must demonstrate, by their own conduct and by their aggressive enforcement of policies, that actions contrary to good order and discipline will not be tolerated and that perpetrators will be held accountable.

That’s the ideal, but the reality is more difficult. There are a variety of issues that leaders, troops and UN civilian employees face that cannot be dealt with in generic pre-deployment training. To deal with them, each mission’s leadership has to develop clear written guidelines and policies—based on UN and DPKO policies—that deal with the issues from a country-specific perspective. Two major issues include Code of Conduct violations and Gender-Based Violence and Sexual Exploitation.

**UN Code of Conduct:** The Code of Conduct (See Annex C) deals with the personal behavior of mission personnel. It covers a wide variety of behaviors, but the subjects can be difficult to understand and apply, as well as difficult for managers to enforce.

In discussions with military commanders, **RI** learned that most post-deployment training in theater deals with military operational matters. Many young troops are un-educated or have low levels of education. They know little or nothing about the cultures, religions, and practices of the host nations in which they serve; therefore, it’s difficult to envision how they can be sensitive to them. Each contributing country has its own culture and mores—its own attitudes toward alcohol, women, sex and what constitutes “proper behavior.”

This is not to say that the Code of Conduct is unnecessary. Indeed, written and clear codes of conduct are a necessary starting point for defining expected behavior. But they are not ends in themselves.

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**When RI asked military and civilian leaders about troop conduct, they all stated that troops were issued Code of Conduct cards which they carried them with them at all times. But when we asked leaders and troops at UNAMSIL and UNMIL whom we encountered if we could see their cards, not a single person could produce one.**

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Even if a card is carried, however, it doesn’t mean the person really understands what is expected. One UN official said, “Who reads and digests codes of conduct? We have to make sure UNMIL takes it...”
seriously. It’s one thing to have a code of conduct. It’s another to have someone sit down and talk you through it regularly.”

**Sexual Exploitation:** Sexual exploitation is one topic that can’t be reduced to a one-liner on a Code of Conduct card. One of the problems is defining and understanding exactly what is exploitation and what is legal sex.

According to the Secretary General's bulletin on “Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,” dated October 9, 2003, “The term ‘sexual exploitation’ means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term ‘sexual abuse’ means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”

Some people interpret this to mean that sex with any woman in a war-torn country is prohibited because women in these conditions are, by definition, vulnerable—especially to people in power, like UN peacekeepers. While this may be a valid interpretation, the fact that the UN issues five condoms per week to each peacekeeper indicates that the UN expects some sex to occur that is not exploitive. (Note: This ambiguity does not apply to children or other illegal categories of sexual relationships.)

To further add to this problem, NGOs say that commercial sex workers and other women who have no money and no other way, in their minds, to earn money aggressively seek out peacekeepers and UN workers. According to a humanitarian worker in Liberia, “Everyone here has to have a sugar daddy. You’re expected to give your girlfriend(s) money. Liberians have a different view of exploitation than we do.”

Sexual exploitation is a complex subject that requires training, explaining, and the constant supervision and diligence of every member of the chain of command.

“**Sexual Exploitation**” requires clear definitions, procedures for identifying violators and holding them accountable, and a system for victims to report violations and receive feedback on investigations and actions taken.

**Recommendations:**
- SRSGs, building upon generic DPKO lesson plans, should direct their training staffs to produce training modules that explain the various Code requirements specifically as they pertain to the host country.
- Subordinate commanders should be tasked to train their troops using the country-specific training modules and verify completion of training in writing to the Force Commander.
- Code of Conduct Cards should be produced in the native languages of the contributing countries and be carried by all personnel.
- There should be follow-up training and informal guidance given on a regular basis to all personnel to explain the intent behind and the consequences of failure to follow the codes of conduct.
- The United Nations must clarify its Code of Conduct for UN employees in terms of acceptable and non-
acceptable sexual contacts and behavior—specifically under what conditions does sexual contact become sexual exploitation? That policy should be disseminated to all UN employees, including all peacekeeping personnel. Pre-deployment and post-deployment training should be developed and conducted. Behavior deemed inappropriate should be punished.
Section IV: Drawdown Phase of Military Operations

Just four years ago, Sierra Leone was on the brink of disaster. For the previous 10 years, as a consequence of a brutal war, the population had suffered killings, mutilations, human rights violations, rapes, and kidnapping. In May 2000, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had taken UN peacekeepers hostage and was close to capturing the capital of Freetown. Only the quick and forceful military intervention by the United Kingdom, followed by an expansion of UNAMSIL forces from about 6,000 to 17,500, stopped them and paved the way for peace in Sierra Leone.

Once the largest UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL is downsizing. In August 2003, UNAMSIL’s strength was reduced from 17,500 to 12,311. By re-deploying a battalion to Liberia, the number came down again to about 11,500. In June 2004, the UNAMSIL force is slated to fall to 5,000, and total withdrawal was scheduled for December 2004. However, on March 30, 2004, the UN Security Council approved a “residual UNAMSIL presence” consisting of 3,250 troops, 141 military observers (MILOBS) and 80 UN civilian police personnel. The force, which will remain until June 2005, will consist of three battalions:

- One in Freetown to provide protection for the Special Court in the event that its rulings next year may provoke demonstrations and violence;
- One on the border area in Kenema to provide back-up to the RSLAF if needed on the border with Liberia;
- One to remain in Bo to act as a reaction force if needed in the event of a special emergency, like a threat to MILOBS or other UN personnel.

RI applauds the UN decision to extend the UNAMSIL mission.

As in the case of UNAMSIL, exit strategies should be tied to specific circumstances and progress in a specific country.

The debate leading to the decision in Sierra Leone is enlightening.

“Sierra Leone went through ten years of senseless—almost barbaric—war. It traumatized the society,” a senior UNAMSIL official told us. “Generally, now, we’ve had two years of peace. You have to balance two years against 10 years when considering the drawdown. Peace here is the result of the overwhelming presence of UNAMSIL. The question is: Will we have addressed all the problems arising from 10 years of war? The answer is: No. The whole philosophy of the drawdown is to calibrate that as we draw down, the national forces will take over.”

Key to the decision-making process was a DPKO assessment mission to the region to assess not only the impact on Sierra Leone, but also the regional aspects of completely withdrawing forces. A set of benchmarks was established to determine if the mission should be extended.
Those benchmarks include:
1. Government capacity to provide protection to their population
2. Strengthening of State services outside Freetown
3. Ex-combatant reintegration
4. Government control of the diamond area
5. Security conditions in Liberia

**Government capacity to provide protection to their population:** This benchmark deals primarily with the ability of the Sierra Leone army (RSLAF) and police (SLP) to provide security for people throughout the country. The general consensus is that neither force is ready to assume full responsibility for the security of the country and its people. Most also agree that the army is better prepared than the police.

There are about 7,500 police officers trained and deployed throughout Sierra Leone—9,500 is the goal. According to a senior CIVPOL officer, “They have some level of professionalism—there has been a big change in quality. There’s also a system of refresher courses. About 4,000 per month go through mentoring and refresher training on social problems, like violence against women, designed to help their interaction with society.”

**But there are also problems. Corruption remains a huge issue.**

A humanitarian worker said, “Police are very corrupt. They have moved very far from where they were before and have done a tremendous job, but are they still following their old procedures. UNAMSIL did a good job with vital areas, however, the police will not be able to perform when UNAMSIL leaves. There should be a clampdown from the government of Sierra Leone itself. Sierra Leone policy makers need to incorporate the changes. There is a very low level of education in the police force. The government needs to focus on recruitment in police and military to have at least a secondary level of education. Although there is overall police improvement, there is no respect for the authority of female police officers.”

Although police are deployed throughout the country, they have no offices, transportation, equipment or supplies. But even if the police were well trained and well disciplined and equipped, they would still not be able to function well. “We will be able to present a professional police force. But will that be enough?” the CIVPOL officer asked. “It won’t solve all the other problems. The number of magistrate courts is very few. There are few prisons. Police are just one point in the rule of law. What do they do if they arrest someone?”

A UNAMSIL human rights officer said, “There are too many cases of adjournment due to prosecutorial ineptness. There is prolonged pre-trial detention. Detainees are expected to defend themselves. If the prosecution is not ready, detainees are sent back to jail—some as many as 35 times. Most cases brought to court are not properly documented or investigated. There are no public defenders for anything.”

It is extremely difficult for the poor to access the legal system. Rape victims are expected to pay to have rapes verified by doctors. Between the difficulty of reporting a violation to the police and getting the case to the magistrate, the entire system conspires to make rape survivors drop the case or negotiate “justice” outside of the
legal system with the perpetrator. The situation is even worse outside of Freetown, the capital. There are very few lawyers in the districts and, despite some efforts by NGOs to train paralegals, there are few working courts in the provinces.

The situation is only a little better with the army. Again, they are almost at their authorized strength and are deployed in most areas of the country. A senior RSLAF commander told RI, “We’re trying to build trust by civil activities, building roads, helping clean town. We retrained the entire army with the British. All were trained in rules of engagement and the role of the military in civil society. Now we have better equipment; they know their role. We are taught that we are not the boss of the people. Before, there was no civil support for the military. Now there is accountability. Military crimes are handled in court-martial. For civil crimes, we hand them over to the police.”

A UNHCR officer also told us that the RSLAF “are deployed and are no problem for the incoming refugees. At the border there used to be many cases of refugees having to pay money, but UNHCR has been able to have some influence on the bridge.”

However, when RI went to the Mano River Bridge at the Liberian border, in addition to the presence of a UNHCR officer, we found RSLAF soldiers trying to collect taxes from us. The SLP who were also present did nothing to stop this.

RI also witnessed the army collecting taxes from the refugees. “Every time we cross the bridge, they make us pay,” one family said. When questioned about tax collecting, the soldiers denied it and refused to have their pictures taken. There were no similar instances on the UNMIL – patrolled Liberian side of the bridge.

Recommendations:

- DPKO should consider the total readiness of the legal system when assessing benchmarks for downsizing or ending a UN peacekeeping mission—not just the readiness of the army and the police.
- UNHCR, UNAMSIL and the GoSL should monitor border crossings to ensure RSLAF and SLP are maintaining high standards of conduct and are not taxing or otherwise harassing the civilian population.
- Donors such as UNDP, the World Bank and DFID should actively support continued police and legal reform programs within Sierra Leone.

Strengthening of State Services Outside Freetown: The government must be able to extend services and governance outside the capital of Freetown and throughout the countryside. This has happened, according to UNAMSIL officials, but very little in the outlying areas. The people are there but there is limited capacity: staff, mobility, and offices.

According to a humanitarian worker, “Sierra Leoneans will never be satisfied with a UNAMSIL draw down – it is a ‘psychological security blanket.’ There is a complete lack of trust in state institutions—this existed before the war. The state is not trying to forge social cohesion. The government is not doing a good job of earning the populations’ trust.”

This lack of trust is a potential security problem. A UNAMSIL military officer
said, “Communities that aren’t satisfied with governance can go wrong. There are so many problems. Nothing concrete has been done by this government to solve the problems. There is bad water, no jobs, people are going after diamonds in the fields. They need to change the mindset at the national level. If people have nothing to do, they say ‘Let’s fight.’ Corruption comes from shortages. If you have more available, you can concentrate on other matters. Everything now is centralized in Freetown.”

**Recommendations:**

- **GoSL and International Community** must give high priority to extending government services outside Freetown. Until this done to a greater degree, some form of UN military presence will be required.
- **GoSL actively support an anti-corruption commission to root out corruption and regain the trust of its citizens.**
- **The transition force maintain or increase the size of the human rights and gender components of UNAMSIL and continue capacity building and training of key Sierra Leone institutions such as the SLP and the judicial system.**

**Ex-Combatant Reintegration:** DDRR is essentially over in Sierra Leone. Despite some complaints, it has been reasonably successful in terms of disarming and demobilizing combatants, according to UNAMSIL sources. But there is still a concern over the poor economy and the number of ex-combatants who still do not have jobs or other means to support themselves and their families. As most Africa experts agree, there are always guns available in Africa to those who want them. These unemployed ex-combatants remain a security threat to the rest of the country. DDRR has started in Liberia but there are concerns that many of the weapons used in Liberia are being hidden or spirited away across the border into neighboring countries such as Sierra Leone.

*As in the case of Liberia, more attention needs to be paid to the longer-term reintegration projects that help ex-combatants support themselves and their families—programs that provide durable alternatives to re-arming and re-mobilizing.*

Failure of the UN, the International Community, NGOs and the civil society to plan for, fund and implement these programs threatens the gains made since 2002.

**Recommendations:**

- **That reintegration/rehabilitation programs in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia provide for the short- and long-term needs of ex-combatants to successfully become contributing members of society.**
- **That the UN continue to assist the GoSL in protecting Sierra Leone’s border with Liberia, with special emphasis on eliminating the flow of arms from Liberia.**
- **Donors continue to invest in reintegration opportunities**

**Government control of the diamond area:** Diamonds are important to the GoSL as a source of taxes and other revenues to support the armed forces and government activities and services to the people. The
diamond area in Kono District is still not totally under government control. However, exports are up to $75 million.

An NGO representative told RI, “[Our] team is still afraid to go to some areas of Sierra Leone because there is still fighting in the diamond areas despite UNAMSIL presence. There are still a lot of weapons and problems near the diamond fields.” All in all, the GoSL is making progress in this area—but the benchmark has only minimally been met.

**Recommendation:**
- **UNAMSIL and GoSL consider deploying a joint UN-RSLAF force to contested diamond areas to secure the areas—and their assets—for the GoSL.**

**Security Conditions in Liberia:** Liberia has been the focal point for the instability in West Africa. Even with a large UN peacekeeping force on the ground, it remains a wild card. The DDRR process has started and, as of this writing, has gone without incident. The fact that weapons are being exported to neighboring countries rather than turned in for destruction is troubling. Also troubling is the “RR” portion of the program. If the demobilized combatants cannot find work and acceptance in their communities, they remain a threat if they rearm and resume violence.

**Recommendation:**
- **That the UN continue to link the security of Sierra Leone with peace and stability in Liberia—and Guinea—and assist the GoSL in protecting Sierra Leone’s border with Liberia.**

### Transition to Civilian Control

**The DPKO assessment team rightly concluded that more time was needed in Sierra Leone.**

“Critical reforms are underway, like elections and public management,” a UNAMSIL official said. “But, there needs to be time for stability and entrenchment of the reforms. The window of opportunity for transformation is small. I recognize we won’t be here forever. But there has been a substantial and reasonable investment here, and we can’t waste it.”

“We had to find the right balance between not perpetuating a dependency [and not throwing away the gains over the past few years]. The benchmarks have been achieved qualitatively. This solution breaks the dependency. We’re handing over primacy for security—putting the police in the front scene—backed up by the RSLAF if needed. Primacy is being transmitted to the government,” a senior military officer said. He cautioned, however, that in finding a balance, the UN should not lose the momentum in ongoing programs and initiatives.

One of the keys to UNAMSIL’s exit strategy is the plan to hand over its non-military activities to its counterparts in the GoSL and civil sector.

**While the transition plan for the military seems to be on track, RI is concerned about the needed transition in the civil sector.**

“The international community should try to influence governance as a primary mission,” a UNAMSIL official said. “The issues that led to the war must be addressed if peace is to take hold. There are basic
things wrong in Sierra Leone: corruption, a weak economy, and a weak media. UNAMSIL’s exit strategy calls for handing over duties and tasks to Sierra Leone. But they can’t hand them over in a vacuum.”

“Hand over activities to whom?” another UNAMSIL staff member asked. “There’s no accountability, no framework for this.”

“The problems of Sierra Leone were not created overnight. It would be narrow-minded of anyone to think all that could be put right in four years,” a senior UNAMSIL officer said. “Our thought is that enough has been solved to keep from going back. But Sierra Leone still needs a godfather to take it through the various steps. We must get away from short-term fixes. There is a need for advisors to help think through crisis management.”

It is unclear who that “godfather” might be. While the composition and missions of the military transitional force have been fairly well defined, the structure and functions of the civil staff of the SRSG have not. There is still a tremendous need in UNAMSIL to monitor and advise on issues such as gender, gender-based violence, human rights, and protection. But it is not clear whether, or in what strength, these functions will continue to exist.

“Some aspects will be taken over by the country team,” he said. [He explained that the country team includes UNAMSIL, International NGOs, and Sierra Leonean civil society.] I’m uneasy with the country team though. The [DPKO] assessment team put a whole lot of faith in them. But there is no country team in terms of structure. There’s no office. No decision-making. So much faith in the country team, but who are they talking about? Who is the country team?”

A senior UNAMSIL officer told RI that the transition force would include an enhanced office of the SRSG. “It includes human rights, GBV [gender-based violence], and associated offices,” he said. “I can’t answer about the field offices [whether the field offices would continue]. The Security Council will determine the structure. We will then work out the details of the enhanced office.

UNAMSIL has been hailed by the UN, member states, and organizations like Refugees International as an example of a successful UN peacekeeping mission. But it can also be hailed as a successful “nation building” mission, if the international community continues to recognize—and fund—the longer term projects needed to guide the GoSL in establishing rule of law institutions (courts, magistrates, lawyers, prisons, etc.), extending government services throughout the country, and improving the economy to offer jobs and security, not only to former combatants, but also to the general population.

Recommendations:

• The UN, International Organizations, NGOs and civil society must continue to recognize the long-term requirements for peace and stability in Sierra Leone and fund the programs that support these requirements.
UNMIL and UNOCI begin plans for handover of key activities to local partners at the beginning of the project so as to identify and build the capacity of these partners.

The downsized UNAMSIL force should continue to have a headquarters staffed to provide needed human rights, protection, and gender support to the UN force and to the GoSL and the civil sector.
Section V: Conclusion

This report has focused on the potential gains to be had by fully embracing a regional approach in West Africa to peacekeeping and nation-building.

The potential gains include:

- Reduced costs by sharing information and resources;
- Improved efficiency by sharing lessons-learned and exchanging liaison officers among the UN missions;
- Increased military capacity through the sharing of combat assets (cross-border operations, weapons systems, transport, etc);
- Better protection of civilians in all areas of the region.

The barriers to achieving these potential gains are significant; some could require changes to the UN Charter itself as issues of sovereignty are addressed. Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General, through his Directorate for Peacekeeping Operations must create a forum for regional initiatives to be identified, analyzed and, when warranted, be brought to the attention of the Security Council for action. The DPKO must assume the mantle of leadership and advocacy for generating and promoting regional opportunities and solutions.

The report also looks at the UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI peacekeeping operations. The report is a snapshot in time. Although most of the information in this report is based on field research and first-person interviews during the period of March 4-26, 2004, we have attempted to update our findings up to the date the report is sent to the printer. It’s important to reiterate that our intent is to identify strengths and weaknesses in current peacekeeping operations with a view of improving future operations. To the extent that any of the shortcomings identified in this report have since been rectified, we are gratified. But that does not remove the need to acknowledge those shortcomings and ensure they are not repeated in future operations.
Annex A: The UN System as it Relates to Peacekeeping Operations

Those who criticize the United Nations, and UN peacekeeping in particular, seem to assume that the UN is a monolithic entity. The United Nations is anything but monolithic. It is an organization of 189 countries whose first principle is “the sovereign equality of all its members.” In implementing policies and initiatives, the UN leadership does not direct compliance from member states but rather asks that members fulfill “in good faith their Charter obligations.” The UN Charter describes the Secretary-General not as a CEO or Director but as the “chief administrative officer” who brings “to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”

For peacekeeping operations, the most important elements of the UN are the General Assembly and the Security Council. The General Assembly is the deliberative body of the UN, comprising one representative from each member state—each member having one vote. Decisions on peace and security issues require a two-thirds majority vote. But the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security falls to the Security Council, another anything-but-monolithic entity. The Security Council has 15 members:

- Five permanent members (often referred to as the “P-5”). These members are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
- Ten members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms: Current members include: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, and Spain.

Although each member of the Security Council has one vote, each member of the P-5 also has a veto power. Thus, decisions on substantive issues, such as the decision to approve a peacekeeping mission, require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. A negative vote from any one P-5 member can derail a peace initiative.

All Member States share the costs of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of Member States, with P-5 members required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In response to a request from the Secretary-General, countries may volunteer personnel, equipment, supplies or other support for a peacekeeping mission. Countries providing these essential elements are reimbursed from the mission budget at agreed rates. Contributing personnel to peacekeeping is not obligatory; a troop-contributing country retains the right to withdraw its personnel from an operation. In addition, many countries have voluntarily made additional resources available to support UN peacekeeping efforts on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions, above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs.
One of the biggest critics of UN Peacekeeping missions is the United States. A part of that criticism is, understandably, based on the fact that the U.S. pays the largest percentage—currently 27%—of all peacekeeping operations. Japan pays about 20% and the next highest contributor is the United Kingdom at about 6%.

On May 18, 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the U.N. member states to meet the "surging demand" for U.N. peacekeeping troops, which, he said, could add an extra $1 billion to this year's $2.82 billion peacekeeping budget.
Annex B
DPKO Standardized Generic Training Modules

SGTM 01 a The UN System
SGTM 01 b UN Peacekeeping Operations
SGTM 02 Structures of UN Peacekeeping Operations
SGTM 03 Legal framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations
SGTM 04 Stress Management
SGTM 05 Attitudes and Behaviors
SGTM 05a Code of Conduct
SGTM 05b Cultural Awareness
SGTM 05c Gender and Peacekeeping
SGTM 05d Child Protection
SGTM 06 Personal Security Awareness
SGTM 07 Landmines and UXOs
SGTM 08 Human Rights for Peacekeepers
SGTM 09 Humanitarian Assistance
SGTM 10 UN Civil-Military Coordination
SGTM 11 Communication and Negotiation
SGTM 12 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
SGTM 13 Media Relations
SGTM 14 Personnel
SGTM 15 Logistics
SGTM 16 Medical
SGTM 16a HIV/AIDS
SGTM 16b Malaria
SGTM 16c Basic Life Support
SGTM 16d Hygiene
UN Peacekeepers will always:
- Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner
- Support and encourage proper conduct among our fellow peacekeepers
- Treat inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration
- Respect local customs and practices through awareness and respect for the culture, religion, traditions and gender issues
- Be aware of the human rights of women and children and never violate them
- Behave in a way that does not exacerbate violence [sic] of the human rights of women and children in the host country

UN Peacekeepers will never:
- Bring discredit upon the UN or member nations through improper personal conduct, failure to perform duties or abuse of position
- Take any action that might jeopardize the mission
- Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs
- Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children
- Become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect impartiality, or the well-being of others
Annex D

Summary of Recommendations

Regionalization

- Secretary-General establish a high-level commission to study and report on initiatives, challenges and solutions to regional peacekeeping opportunities.
- The Secretary-General give DPKO the lead for aggressively pursuing regionalization initiatives and enhancements and reporting on them to the Security Council.
- The Secretary-General consider giving the SRSG for West Africa the mandate to direct regional initiatives in West Africa, resolve issues that can be resolved within the region, and submit higher level regional initiatives and requests to the Security Council for resolution.
- Secretary-General establish a high-level commission to explore the legal and political barriers to cross-border operations and sharing of assets and make recommendations on how to overcome those barriers.
- DDR plans of each country should be reviewed by the SRSG for West Africa for potential conflicts and inequities. Conflicts and inequities should be resolved at regional SRSG meetings or appealed to DPKO/Secretary-General for resolution.
- SRSG for West Africa work with the mission SRSGs to develop a comprehensive plan for identifying and coordinating regional issues throughout West Africa.

UN/DPKO

- The Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General (DPKO) incorporate applicable best practices into UN policies and directives by requiring in his instructions to Senior Representatives (SRSG), that the SRSG and his senior staff read and apply existing lessons-learned and best practices to current operations unless exceptions are justified to the Secretary-General.
- The Secretary-General should require SRSGs to develop lessons-learned in their areas of operation on a continuing basis (rather than at end of mission) and forward them to the BPU for analysis, inclusion in the BPU database, and dissemination to other operations.
- Best practices focal points should be assigned with sufficient seniority and positioned organizationally to raise the visibility of best practices in the field missions.
- It is essential to select and appoint international staff with the necessary professional skills and experiences for key positions from the start of a mission.
- An effort should be made to integrate the three existing UN databases for personnel information or to ensure that they are compatible and updated on a regular basis. The information in the databases must be accessible to the missions and the mission staff must receive appropriate training in using the databases.
- To better understand the needs of the mission, the recruitment officer responsible for a mission should be encouraged to visit the mission area regularly or be assigned to the mission for a short period.
- DPKO, on behalf of the Secretary-General, must take a leadership role in overseeing key elements of UN peacekeeping operations. While the SRSGs must have the latitude to exercise initiative in carrying out their mandates, they must be accountable.
• SRSGs and subordinate staffs and commands must be familiar with DPKO written policies, best practices, and lessons learned; and be held responsible for implementing DPKO issuances as they apply to their areas of responsibility. DPKO should not assume that just because it has published a policy that its job is done or that the policy is being implemented.
• DPKO should give priority to filling the vacant staff positions under the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation and UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia.
• DPKO should facilitate a meeting between the SRSG-UNMIL and his key staff and the NGO community in Liberia to lay the groundwork for improved relations.

DDR
• DPKO should stop accepting the fact that DDR programs seem to fail upon initial implementation. Although each country has unique elements for which adjustments should be made, certain elements of DDR are constant. When the constants are ignored and implementation fails as a result, people should be held accountable.
• DPKO/SRSG for West Africa should review UNMIL DDRR plans and ensure that exceptions to “normal” DDR practices, like cash payments to child soldiers, are warranted.
• While disarmament and demobilization should be pursued as aggressively as possible, they must be pursued in terms of the longer-term requirements of rehabilitation and reintegration. This requires identifying, funding and implementing “bridging” projects that span the gap between the immediacy of “DD” and the long-term nature of “RR.”

Drawdown in Sierra Leone
• DPKO should consider the total readiness of the legal system when assessing benchmarks for downsizing or ending a UN peacekeeping mission—not just the readiness of the army and the police.
• UNHCR, UNAMSIL and the GoSL should monitor border crossings to ensure RSLAF and SLP are maintaining high standards of conduct and are not taxing or otherwise harassing the civilian population.
• GoSL and International Community must give high priority to extending government services outside Freetown. As a benchmark, until this done to a greater degree, the country can too easily destabilize without some form of UN military presence.
• As in the case of Liberia, more attention needs to be paid to the longer-term reintegration projects that help ex-combatants support themselves and their families—programs that provide durable alternatives to re-arming re-mobilizing. Failure of the UN, the International Community, NGOs and the civil society to plan for, fund and implement these programs threatens the gains made since 2002.
• UNAMSIL and GoSL consider deploying a joint UN-RSLAF force to contested diamond areas to secure the areas—and their assets—for the GoSL.
• That the UN continue to link the security of Sierra Leone with peace and stability in Liberia—and Guinea—and assist the GoSL in protecting Sierra Leone’s border with Liberia.
• That reintegration/rehabilitation programs in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia provide for the short- and long-term needs of ex-combatants to successfully become contributing members of society.
• The UN, International Organizations, NGOs and civil society must continue to recognize the long-term requirements for peace and stability in Sierra Leone and fund the programs that support these requirements.

Gender/Sexual Exploitation
• That DPKO re-write recruiting guidelines for key positions to specifically target women
• The United Nations must clarify its Code of Conduct for UN employees in terms of acceptable and non-acceptable sexual contacts and behavior—specifically under what conditions does sexual contact become sexual exploitation? That policy should be disseminated to all UN employees, including all peacekeeping personnel. Pre-deployment and post-deployment training should be developed and conducted. Behavior deemed inappropriate should be punished.
• NGOs and other aid agencies should develop and implement similar guidance, training and sanctions for their employees.
• SRSG-Liberia should review his headquarters staff organization and eliminate or consolidate duplicative gender functions that distract from clarity of responsibility and clarity of action.

Training
• That all troop-contributing countries adopt the DPKO’s manuals for training on sexual exploitation for pre-deployment training of all staff.
• Because of the disparity in power between the local population and the international community, sexual exploitation can be perpetrated by any rank. All peacekeepers should be trained and the training should be followed up at regular intervals.
• That DPKO assist pre-deployment training by sending experienced trainers to TCC that do not have the resources to manage this training themselves
• The United States, France and United Kingdom have major training initiatives with many African states and regional military organizations. Where appropriate, code of conduct training, including gender issues, should be included in those training curricula and programs.
• Code of Conduct Cards should be produced in the native languages of the contributing countries and be carried by all personnel.
• SRSGs, building upon generic DPKO lesson plans, should direct their training staffs to produce training modules that explain the various Code requirements specifically as they pertain to the host country.
• Subordinate commanders should be tasked to train their troops using the country-specific training modules and verify completion of training in writing to the Force Commander.
About the authors:

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Refugees International is an independent, non-profit, humanitarian advocacy organization. RI generates lifesaving humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced people around the world, and works to end the conditions that create displacement.