Bridging the Commitment – Capacity Gap:
Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment

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The Center for United Nations’ Reform Education
All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities...  
*The United Nations’ Charter, Article 43 (1) 1945*

There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peacekeeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.  
*U.S. State Department, "Freedom From War", 1961*

Where the will is not there and the resources are not available, the UN peacekeepers will arrive late. It takes us on the average 4-5 months to put troops on the ground because we have no troops. The UN doesn't have an army. We borrow from our governments. So we can put on the ground the troops the governments offer. And as fast as they come, and not always with the equipment they promised. If those with the capacity were to cooperate, the UN can do the job, we would arrive on time, not late.  
*UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, 2000*

Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted into entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and effectively’ within the timelines suggested.  

This three-month delay cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Rwandans, and countless scars and disfigurement for those who lived through the horrors. Like the crisis at the time, the need for a response mechanism and the consequences of not looking for solutions are guaranteeing the recurrence of other humanitarian catastrophes now and into the future. Is this a lesson we need to have taught us a second time? Do we, the members of the international community, really require that more innocent women and children be slaughtered by the thousands to cause a change in our priorities and level of concern?  
*Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, Commander UNAMIR (Rwanda), 1998*

An alternative would be the establishment of a small standing, highly-trained volunteer rapid response group as part of the UN itself...A rapid response group, whatever its basis and nature, should be seen as a vital investment for the future, and one, which by its very nature, is designed to act at the point where action can be most effective, thus eliminating or reducing the necessity for later, larger, less effective, more costly options.  
*Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General, 1995*
Forward
Preface

The Center for UN Reform Education is very proud to publish Monograph #19 in its UN Reform series written by Dr. H. Peter Langille.

Dr. Langille has an MA in conflict analysis from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University and a PhD from the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, U.K., where he focused on initiatives to enhance training, defense specialization and rapid deployment for UN peace operations. He was a former member of the Canadian Government’s Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament, a former defense analyst and a co-director of the Canadian Peace Research and Education Association.

As a partner in Common Security Consultants, he co-authored the initial proposals and blueprints for the establishment of a dedicated Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis, which was later developed as The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

In 1994-95, Dr. Langille was on the Core Working Group of the Canadian Government’s study, “Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations.”

Dr. Langille is the author of two books, as well as related articles in International Peacekeeping, Human Security, Peace Magazine, Mondial, Ploughshares Monitor, Policy Options, Multinational Policy Towards Peace, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects, and Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. In 2001-2002, he was an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario, teaching courses in International Conflict Prevention and Management, Advanced International Relations, and a graduate seminar in International Relations.

The purpose of the Center for UN Reform Education in publishing this monograph and all of its other publications is to encourage and stimulate a thorough discussion of various ways to improve and strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations System. The Center itself does not endorse particular UN reform proposals. Accordingly, the opinions expressed in this study, as well as all other Center publications, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center or of any of its affiliated organizations.

The Center for UN Reform Education was founded in 1978 following a Conference on UN Reform at Villanova University. Subsequent conferences were held, inter alia, at the University of Chicago and New York University. The Center is funded by dues from member organizations, by grants from private foundations and by tax-deductible contributions and legacies from individual donors.

In recognition of Dr. Langille’s extensive writing in the field of peacekeeping and in view of the high regard that Dr. Langille is held in many circles, we strongly urge every recipient of this monograph to read carefully the author’s analysis and to debate and discuss the concepts put forth herein with their colleagues.

Walter Hoffmann
Executive Director
Center for UN Reform Education
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Glossary of Terms

UN DPKO               Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNSAS               United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UN ECPS             Executive Committee on Peace and Security
UN EISAS           Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat of the ECPS
UN IMTF           Integrated Mission Task Force
UN MILAD        Military Advisor
UN SRSG          Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN CIVPOL         Civilian Police

UN ‘On Call’ Lists     A registrar of identified military, police and civilian expertise that is to receive prior training, but remain on stand-by in diverse locations until notified and authorized for deployment to UN peace operations.

UN Mission HQ       A multidimensional field headquarters to be composed of 154 persons drawn from on-call lists of military officers and civilian experts for rapid deployment.

UN Strategic Reserve A stockpile of sufficient material and equipment, including mission start-up kits, to launch and maintain a UN mission for at least one month. These Assets are to be pre-positioned and maintained at the UN base in Brindisi, Italy.

SHIRBRIG       Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Peace Operations
SEEBRIG       Multinational Standby Peace Brigade from South-Eastern Europe
FORD            Friends of Rapid Deployment
               A multinational coalition of twenty-seven member states who formerly cooperated to enhance UN rapid deployment.

Response time     The time that elapses between the moment a formal request from the Secretariat is forwarded to the Permanent Mission of the Member State concerned, and the time when the resources are ready to be picked up for deployment at specified points of embarkation.

Standby         Personnel and equipment that remain in their home country, under national command and control, and where national authorization is required prior to participation in any UN operation.

Earmarked       An arrangement whereby Nations agree to identify and specifically designate individuals, units and equipment for assignment to a particular task or organization.

Standing        A coherent formation, maintained in readiness with pre-trained and well-equipped personnel, available for immediate deployment once authorized.
“Commitment – Capacity Gap”

A system-wide problem where the member state’s allocation of capabilities, including personnel, resources and support for UN peace operations, has fallen far below the minimum level of capacity necessary to meet their shared commitments and obligations. The net effect limits the rapid, reliable and effective responses required in contemporary UN Peace Operations. Aside from the detrimental effects on the Organization, its missions and people in desperate circumstances, it has exposed related gaps at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels – within Member States, civil society and the UN.

**Proposed UN mechanisms**

UN RDMHQ          Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarter
A permanent core of eight individuals within DPKO supported by others on standby to deploy and assist with the rapid establishment and management of a UN Mission Headquarters

UN RDMU           Rapid Deployment Management Unit
A static planning element of four civilian personnel to identify required skills and develop a roster of individual expertise to call upon for headquarter functions.

UN PSF            UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force
A UN force of approximately 6000 volunteers recruited globally and directly employed by the UN, with appropriate training and equipment for rapid deployment to international peace operations, including civilian policing.

UN ES             UN Emergency Service
A dedicated UN capability of 13,200 personnel, composed of military, police and civilian professionals, volunteering for UN service. This capability and its standing elements would be designed in a modular structure and prepared for rapid deployment to diverse peace operations. They would be co-located at a UN base under a static operational headquarters and two mobile field headquarters.

UN Professional Volunteers
Individuals volunteering to participate in a new UN capability on a paid, full-time basis, similar to that of UN civil servants. These individuals would be recruited and selected on the basis of specific expertise and skills, as well as dedication to the principles of the UN. To ensure universal representation, applicants would be encouraged from all Member States.

Composite UN ES   Standing National and UN Volunteer Emergency Service
National and UN personnel co-located in a composite formation at a UN base. To facilitate start-up, enhance training, standards and readiness, each would remain distinct under one mission headquarters while retaining sufficient strength for deployment to various emergencies. National elements would remain under national command and with deployment subject to national authorization. UN elements would remain under UN command with deployment subject to the authorization of the UN Security Council.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With new challenges and risks, the United Nations will be frequently called upon to serve as an international police and global emergency service. Complex conflicts will continue to generate demands for additional operations and assistance. Such diverse emergencies often require rapid deployments, but in this respect, the UN has struggled – without its own mechanisms or adequate support from its member states – the results are quite predictable. Rather than rapid deployment, routine delays of four-to-six months remain the norm, with responses that are frequently ‘too little’, ‘too late’ and ‘too lame’. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan conceded in the summer of 2000:

Our system for launching United Nations peace operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military.

Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.¹

Clearly, the current system is untenable. There is a need for substantive change at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. Yet, recent efforts have focused primarily on implementing the technical and administrative reforms identified by the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) and the subsequent Comprehensive Review. For example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is undergoing a sweeping overhaul and a much-needed expansion of personnel and offices to facilitate planning, management and support. By April 2002, seventy-three member states had renewed their support for the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS). To ensure the system can be used in a more active manner for rapid deployment, the Secretariat is attempting to clarify the conditional commitments and verify the quality and quantity of personnel and equipment that might be made available. A multinational standby high readiness brigade for UN operations (SHIRBRIG) has been declared ‘available’ and it has already been deployed to one mission. As well, there are reports that coalitions in other regions will consider similar partnerships. Such reforms are undoubtedly steps in the right direction.
Combined, these arrangements may hold wider promise. Eventually, they may generate additional confidence and commitment from the member states. Gradually, the UN is acquiring a core foundation for peace operations. Of equal importance, it will soon be a foundation upon which to establish more ambitious ‘building blocks.’ They will be needed!

There are inherent limitations in the current arrangements. They depend upon political will, prompt national approval and funding, as well as appropriately trained, well-equipped national units – conditions that have frequently stymied and slowed responses. *Ad hoc* improvisations of multinational contingents for peace operations are neither rapid nor reliable. Moreover, while the recent reforms are necessary, they are insufficient as they cannot provide effective structures for rapid deployment or close the critical gaps at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. In short, it is evident that the prevailing approach and the present system provides little, if any, assurance of prompt or effective responses. As a result, there is an alarming gap between the avowed objectives of the ‘international community’ and the UN’s actual capacity for preventing armed conflict, stopping genocide and protecting civilians. But, this need not and should not be the case. There are promising alternatives!

Overall, this study makes 24 recommendations to bridge the *Commitment-Capacity Gap*. It also tackles two critical, albeit frequently overlooked questions. First, it addresses how to revitalize and accelerate the process of adaptation, calling for a more inclusive “soft power” approach to educate and inform interested parties; to generate new partnerships and a broad-based, supportive constituency. Second, it focuses on how it may be possible to build on and beyond current arrangements both to enhance rapid deployment and to initiate a UN Emergency Service.

**The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)**

In 1992, the office responsible for peacekeeping was reorganized as the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage operations by coordinating within one department all aspects of peacekeeping operations. The DPKO is now the operational arm of the Secretariat.

**Limitations of DPKO**

Since its inception the DPKO has been treated as a temporary creation –one that is continually forced to justify its practices and personnel. Even with the inspiring leadership of the
new Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean Marie Guéhenno, these demands have not diminished. This department is expected to operate numerous missions worldwide, but it continues to lack an appropriate structure, adequate resources and dedicated units for rapid deployment.

The following would serve to improve DPKO’s capacity in this respect:

1. Aside from the immediate benefits associated with a more cohesive department, there are likely to be wider political, strategic and operational advantages derived from co-locating the DPKO’s various units and personnel into a dedicated central office.

2. Regional and national peacekeeping training centers should be encouraged to help the DPKO develop appropriate doctrine and comprehensive prior training programs for the rapid deployment of military, police and civilian personnel.

3. Additional efforts within the UN Secretariat and within Member States are needed to restore the collegial cooperation and partnerships necessary for rapid deployment to complex political emergencies worldwide.

4. As the UN Secretariat has yet to designate a departmental focal point and office of primary responsibility for coordinating rapid deployment, a new office assigned to this task should be established within DPKO. A small unit of military, police and civilian personnel could be placed under the Director of Strategic Planning and Management with a representative in the office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs.

5. Given that the combined staffing of the RDMU and the RDMHQ would only entail an additional 12 personnel, and that these arrangements are relatively cost-effective and complementary to the proposed ‘on-call’ lists for developing mission headquarters, they deserve the support of all parties.

**UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)**

The UN Standby Arrangement System was specifically intended to improve the UN’s capability for rapid deployment. This system is based on conditional commitments from Member States, indicating specific resources that might be provided within agreed response times.

UNSAS serves several objectives. **First**, it provides the UN with an understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available at an agreed state of readiness. **Second**, it facilitates planning, training and preparation for both participating Member States and the UN. **Third**, it provides the UN not only with foreknowledge of a range of national assets, but also with a list of potential options if a member or members refrain from participating in an operation. UN planners now have the option of developing contingency and 'fall-back' strategies when they anticipate delays.
Limitations of the UNSAS

The UNSAS is one step in a promising direction. However, as the numbers indicate, this system has yet to attract the majority of UN Member States: only 73 participants have provided detailed information, and only 38 have signed the requested MOU for Level 3. Many of those who have the capabilities, including some of the wealthier Member States, as well as several of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, have done little, if anything, to improve this system.

Moreover, standby arrangements for nationally based units are based on conditional agreements and as such, all participating Governments retain a veto over any use of their personnel and equipment. Thus, there is no guarantee that troops or resources will be provided for a specific operation. To address these problems:

6. All Member States need to be encouraged to participate in the UNSAS. Participants should strive to provide a commitment to the higher levels of the UNSAS, with special recognition accorded to those that finalize the commitment by signing the appropriate Memorandum of Understanding.

7. It is imperative that Member States earmark well-trained forces, personnel and appropriate resources for the UNSAS. Pre-identified military, police and civilian elements, as well as equipment must be prepared and retained on short-notice specifically for rapid deployment to UN Operations.

8. Given the unprecedented demand for civilian police, consideration and personnel should be accorded to the development of national CIVPOL companies and partnership agreements among supportive members to form multinational standby high readiness CIVPOL battalions for UN operations (SHIRPOL) within the framework provided by the UNSAS.

9. The UNSAS needs to be promptly re-negotiated to facilitate rapid deployment to UN operations that include a Chapter VII mandate. This might be accommodated by the addition of a fifth level within the arrangement that specifies the personnel and resources that Governments are willing to commit to more demanding Chapter VII operations.

10. The UNSAS must be addressed both as an urgent requirement for generating prompt responses to contemporary armed conflict and as an important transitional measure facilitating a renewed commitment to Article 43. It is time to explore the prospects of resurrecting Article 43 as the sixth and highest level of obligation within the UNSAS.

Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)

The Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN operations complements the UNSAS with a complete, integrated unit that has a projected response time of 15-30 days. There are now ten full participants in the SHIRBRIG: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Each has conditionally
agreed, albeit on their own specific terms, to provide the equivalent of an infantry battalion and several officers for the headquarters and planning of the SHIRBRIG.

**Limitations of the SHIRBRIG**

Although designed as a high readiness brigade, specifically for UN rapid deployment, the SHIRBRIG has yet to demonstrate its potential. It may be delayed by a combination of slow political decision-making, an inadequate force pool, a lack of pre-assigned, earmarked units, as well as insufficient prior training. These recommendations are intended to enhance the SHIRBRIG:

11. **Participating Member States must attempt to streamline or ‘fast-track’ national decision-making to ensure that the SHIRBRIG, and their potential contribution to the brigade, is not delayed by unduly slow political and legislative procedures.**

12. **Partnerships should be encouraged to facilitate political and military support, as well as training assistance for additional SHIRBRIG-type arrangements in other regions.**

13. **Given the evolving nature of UN peace support operations, SHIRBRIG participants will have to re-negotiate the terms under which they may accept more demanding, ‘robust’ operations, including those that entail Chapter VII mandates and the potential use of force.**

14. **To help ensure the availability of national contingents, Governments participating in the SHIRBRIG must be encouraged to earmark units specifically for this commitment. Combat readiness must also be supplemented with comprehensive prior training for diverse UN Peace Operations.**

15. **While the initial planning of the brigade has focused on the development of a multinational force, it is time to consider the development of national CIVPOL companies and partnership agreements to form multinational standby high readiness, SHIRPOL battalions. Similarly, plans should now be expanded to include civilian peace building elements that address ‘human needs.’**

16. **SHIRBRIG members should be encouraged to pursue functional role specialization in several of the areas that require additional resources. For example, rather than have each carry a long independent national logistics train, such a task can be either shared or selected by one or two participants as their contribution. Similarly, one country might provide modern communications while another provided air or sealift.**

17. **To ensure legitimacy, impartiality and consent, political efforts should be devoted to attracting broad regional representation and additional SHIRBRIG participants. While a further measure of redundancy may not be a prerequisite to deployment, additional participants could facilitate rapidity and effectiveness.**

18. **Within the next three years, it would be beneficial to co-locate military, police and civilian elements at a dedicated SHIRBRIG base.**

**Moving beyond the pragmatic, incremental approach to accelerate the process**

The period since the Millennium has been characterized by a surge of official efforts to improve UN peace operations, particularly peacekeeping. However, the focus has been primarily upon securing the ‘minimum threshold of change’ through pragmatic, incremental reforms negotiated in UN committees that require broad consensus. As a result, progress tends to be
achieved at the level of the lowest common denominator. There are alternatives to fast-track further developments:

19. Supportive parties must work to coordinate a comprehensive political approach to accelerate the process of adaptation and modernization. This should be directed not only to focus the Security Council and revitalize the Member States, but also to empower a transnational coalition and constituency of support among citizens, Non-Governmental Organizations, related agencies and academic communities.

20. Reliable information will be required to generate a broader public and professional understanding of current UN Rapid Deployment initiatives and the various options available for enhancing these efforts. Government, institutional or foundation assistance for developing a focused research program and a series of conferences addressing the issues of rapid deployment would be a tangible commitment to the process.

21. It is time to plan for a new parallel forum on UN Rapid Deployment; one that can help launch and sustain a supportive transnational initiative. It will be important to ensure that this is an inclusive, open forum that encourages broad participation, as well as the identification of options and impediments.

22. As a zero-growth budget limits the UN’s capacity to fulfill assigned tasks and impedes any prospect of the Organization developing a reliable rapid deployment capability, serious consideration must be accorded to new innovative methods for generating additional funding. It may be appropriate to revise the scale of assessments to reflect a percentage of national military expenditure or a tax on exports of military equipment.

Potential future roles and tasks of a UN Rapid Deployment Capability

The potential future missions of a UN rapid deployment capability can be divided into the following categories:
- Advisory
- Preventive Action and Protection of Civilians
- Peacekeeping
- Policing
- Peace Building
- Humanitarian Assistance

A survey of the potential roles and missions suggests a need for military, police and civilian elements. With a broader composition, there is the potential to deliver a wider array of emergency services at the earliest stage of a mission. Rapid deployment presents an array of demanding requirements:

- All deployable personnel, equipment and supplies must stand at a high degree of readiness for deployment at very short notice.
- All deployable elements will require a unique degree of self-sufficiency—a capacity to operate on their own for up to 90 days.
- Prompt transportation to the mission area is essential.
- A high degree of mobility will be needed to respond rapidly over a large area.
- As deployments are to be of a strictly limited duration, there will be a need to ensure replacements or rotations.
• Flexibility is required at various levels given the relatively broad range of potential tasks and contingencies.
• Doctrine and training must ensure a higher degree of flexibility at the operational and tactical level.

**A UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force**

One of the more promising initiatives in recent years is outlined in United States’ H.R. 938. Introduced by Congressmen James McGovern (D-MA) and Amo Houghton (R-NY), this legislation is referred to as the United Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001. It calls on the U.S. to work with the UN Secretary-General and other Member States to establish a UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (PSF).

As proposed, this PSF would consist of at least 6,000 volunteers recruited globally and directly employed by the UN. These volunteers would train together and be appropriately equipped for rapid deployment to international peace operations, including civilian policing. The general objective is to address the *time gap*, the *training gap* and the *political will gap* with well-trained, professional military and police units that can respond to a crisis within 15 days of a Security Council resolution.

H.R. 938 is a courageous initiative that is revitalizing interest and diverse efforts in the United States and abroad. But, it is still a work in progress. The design, composition and preparation of a UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will require further elaboration and detailed study.

**A UN Emergency Service**

A multidimensional UN Emergency Service – a UN ‘911’, composed of military, police and civilian volunteers – would correspond to the diverse operational requirements of contemporary, as well as future UN peace operations. This is compatible with H.R. 938 and intended to address the critical gaps identified, although within an expanded composition and structure.

A number of the general requirements for such a capability have already been identified in related studies conducted by governments, organizations and individuals. A UN *Base* – a facility, dedicated to preparing, mounting and managing future operations – is frequently at the forefront of the requirements. Coinciding with the development of the UN base is the *establishment of an expanded, static, operational-level headquarters*. Together, the headquarters and base could serve
as a focal point for recruitment, contingency planning, doctrinal development and the training of military, police and civilian elements. The recruitment of volunteers for the various military, police and civilian positions could commence after a decision to establish a base and an operational headquarters. New doctrine must be developed for a new multidimensional structure, missions, and personnel. Prior training for various rapid deployment tasks and contingencies will be essential, as it provides a crucial link in the process of understanding doctrine and its implications for day-to-day activities, as well as field operations. Appropriate, modern equipment must be prepared for immediate deployment. Immediate access to strategic and tactical airlift, as well as sealift is necessary for rapid deployment (and for rapid extraction).

The model proposed in this study projects a requirement for approximately 13,200 personnel stationed at a UN base under an operational headquarters and two mission headquarters. Among the deployable elements assigned to each mission headquarters are: a military brigade group, three companies of civilian police and civilian teams with diverse expertise in areas such as peace building, conflict resolution, medical, disaster relief and environmental crisis response. This is a modular capability that can be tailored to the specific demands of diverse assignments. As such, each deployment package could carry a credible military presence, provide unique support and services, and potentially fulfill a wide array of operational tasks. Start-up might also commence with 7,500 personnel although this would constrain the service to one mission headquarters, limiting the size and frequency of deployments, as well as the potential tasks.

The option of training and equipping dedicated UN volunteers within a sound organizational structure is likely to be far more rapid, reliable and cost-effective. A UN Emergency Service would be a complementary, parallel development to existing arrangements and multinational contingents. It would allow the UN to mount a prompt and sophisticated response to assigned tasks; one that also allowed time for member states to organize, prepare and train for rotation into missions that are likely to be more stable than the high-risk, volatile environments, which often arise from delayed responses. This is viewed as an optimal mechanism for UN rapid deployment with the potential to provide advanced levels of sophistication, credibility, assistance and legitimacy.

23. There is an urgent need for a UN Emergency Service – a dedicated, multidimensional ‘UN 911’ that can address human needs, including protection, security, health and hope. This service should be composed of military, police and civilian volunteers that are recruited globally, selected for high standards of professionalism and commitment, and then directly employed by the UN.
Expanding On and Beyond the Foundation

Irrespective of immediate needs, the development of a UN Emergency Service will likely take time, vision and a coherent, goal-oriented plan. There are several cost-effective options that merit consideration by the United Nations, its Member States, and interested parties. The following sequential proposals are intended to stimulate further discussion and analysis:

Stage One: Reinforce Existing Arrangements
Stage Two: Consolidate Capability in a Sound Operational Environment
Stage Three: Co-locate National Contingents
Stage Four: Initiate A Composite Emergency Service

This four-stage process may help to initiate a composite rapid deployment capability of co-located multinational units (similar to the SHIRBRIG) and dedicated UN volunteers. There are numerous blueprints, but few that correspond to the existing foundation. Detailed plans for immediate start-up, as well as a cumulative development process, would help to construct a better system. The final recommendation of this report addresses the need for further research:

24. It is time for an in-depth, independent, transnational study to identify the general and specific requirements for starting, maintaining and operating a UN Emergency Service. This study should provide a review of diverse options and assess their potential for addressing probable tasks and contingencies. It should also offer guidance into appropriate composition, structure and organization.

Inevitably, developing a UN rapid deployment capability will be a challenging, but essential endeavour, as the UN will also remain the only legitimate Organization that can serve as an international police and global emergency service. In his seminal 1957 study, A United Nations Peace Force, William R. Frye provided an insight that is worth recalling:

Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one could be the first step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next.

We have yet to achieve Frye’s objective but there are promising new options. With further cooperation, here and abroad, we can do better.
INTRODUCTION

There is a growing gap between the avowed commitments of the international community and the United Nations’ actual capacity for the prevention of armed conflict and the protection of civilians. The Organization is still denied sufficient means, mechanisms and support to fulfill tasks assigned by its Member States. Particularly troubling is the lack of a UN rapid deployment capability for diverse emergencies.

This gap is revealing: frequent delays, vast human suffering and death, diminished credibility, opportunities lost, escalating costs – just some of the tragic consequences of slow and inappropriate responses. Genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, mass murder in East Timor, gross violations of human rights in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan – just a sample of the armed conflicts that have led to more than 20 million refugees, 24 million displaced people, and the violent deaths of approximately one million people each year over the past decade.

The Organization’s responsibilities and commitments are evident, if not fulfilled, even as new and higher standards are introduced. The UN Charter specifies the obligations of Member States to maintain international peace and security. In addition, countries agreed upon the Genocide Convention, which entailed an explicit commitment to intervene to stop mass murder. Similarly, under both international humanitarian law and human rights law, States are obliged to prevent gross violations of human rights. The acceptance of a Permanent International Criminal Court in 1998 was a commitment to uphold and, where necessary, enforce international law. Numerous governments and organizations have since expressed a commitment to prevent armed conflict, to advance human security and to protect civilians. The recent report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect, also places considerable onus on the UN for more effective and timely intervention for human protection purposes.

People worldwide recall former U.S. President George Bush’s earlier call for a new world order, “a world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders.” In the latter stages of World War II, those who founded the UN strove to create an Organization that might give us a second, and perhaps final chance to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Their collective vision was that of an empowered UN; one that might help transform a war-prone international system through collective security,
committing all Member States to assist in war prevention, with the provision of adequate forces, if necessary. That vision was premised on the assumption that the international community had learned a critical lesson: that security, if not survival, in the future would require a far more cooperative system supported by a legitimate, universal institution. Both were viewed as prerequisites for a wider disarmament process that would gradually free up resources for other pressing problems. Clearly, the vision waned in official circles and these developments did not transpire as hoped.

Instead, the combination of longstanding and new commitments, complex conflicts, as well as the wider awareness of suffering and injustice, generated greater expectations for peacekeeping, preventive action, humanitarian intervention and assistance. Renewed interest in a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability arose largely in response to these related demands, but also from a mixed record, that included several serious failures. The latter highlighted the gap between the alleged commitments of the Member States (which reflect the aspirations of civil society) and the UN’s actual capacity. This commitment – capacity gap has gradually exposed system wide problems – gaps at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels – within Member States, civil society and the UN.

Increasingly, the existing arrangements for UN Peace Operations are viewed as necessary, but insufficient – reflective of a system that is in need of prompt adaptation, new mechanisms and additional resources. And, while efforts are ongoing to address several evident gaps within the context of current arrangements and available resources, there has not been a corresponding commitment of political will to initiate a UN rapid deployment capability. As a result, the UN still lacks the one mechanism that could respond promptly to diverse emergencies and address the laudable aspiration to protect civilians, prevent armed conflict, stop genocide, and enforce international law. Regrettably, moreover, a few Governments continue to waiver between demands that the UN do more with less or not do anything.

Despite the prevailing cynicism, it is noteworthy that there have been occasions when much of the necessary support, if not the required consensus, for establishing such a UN capacity was close at hand. In the early 1990s there were promising high-level indications of assistance for some form of UN Rapid Reaction Force. Four leaders of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council actually declared their support for implementing some form of a rapid reaction force. Regrettably, when confronted by the combination of costs, institutional intransigence and mixed
results in an unprecedented number of new missions, the major powers quickly lost the will to back their rhetoric with meaningful reforms. Prior commitments tended to be followed by carefully nuanced retractions.10

In 1992, An Agenda for Peace prompted a wide-ranging discussion of the UN’s options for responding to violent conflict, for early preventive action, for new peacekeeping and peacemaking mechanisms.11 Among the various catalysts for the debate were then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s calls for peace enforcement units and Article 43-type arrangements, as well as Sir Brian Urquhart’s efforts to revive Trygvie Lie's proposal for a UN Legion.12 Even former U.S. President Ronald Reagan raised the issue of a UN Rapid Deployment Force in a seminal 1992 speech at Oxford, stating: “we must work toward a standing UN force – an army of conscience – that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force if necessary.”13 As these ideas began to attract a constituency, they also generated apprehension and a search for less ambitious options in many national capitals. Rapid reaction was also a prominent theme in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.14 Although he scaled back on his earlier proposals, the former Secretary-General proposed a UN Rapid Reaction Force, and cautioned that problems had become steadily more serious with respect to the availability of troops and equipment.15

Prior to the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in 1995, a number of supportive Member States conducted detailed studies and launched concerted diplomatic efforts through the Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD) – a multinational initiative to prompt supportive reforms. The intent was threefold: first, to ensure the Organization and the Members were better prepared for peacekeeping; second, to enhance the wider capacity for rapid deployment; and third, to establish a process and an institutional foundation capable of supporting additional mechanisms for the prevention and management of armed conflict. In cooperation with the DPKO, the ‘FORD’ initially concentrated on developing a UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters and strengthening the UN Standby Arrangements System. When confronted with opposition and modest results, the initiative lost momentum, as well as the coalition and political champions necessary to sustain further efforts. By 1997, official support to provide a UN rapid deployment capability for diverse emergencies had largely dissipated.

Opinion on the subject of any UN capability tends to be mixed. The debates over the past decade followed two perspectives: the majority of Member States favored strengthening current arrangements, and the visionaries desired a dedicated UN Standing Force or UN Emergency
Group.\textsuperscript{16} With notable exceptions, the official preference focused on pragmatic, incremental reform within the structure of the UN Secretariat and available resources.\textsuperscript{17} Such an approach was deemed to entail fewer risks, fewer obligations and more control. As the rapid deployment initiatives of 1994-97 demonstrated, even supportive governments were worried about moving ahead of public opinion, fellow Member States, the international defense community and their own capacity to secure more ambitious reforms. By 1996, a third opposing perspective arose among several sovereignty-sensitive governments within the larger Non-Aligned Movement. Four Member States mobilized wider resistance to the rapid deployment process, further intervention and the use of \textit{gratis} personnel provided by wealthier States. Demands followed for equitable representation within related arrangements.

But, there have also been a number of encouraging, preliminary steps. Since 1994, a DPKO team has organized the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) to expand the quality and quantity of resources that Member States might provide. The responses, to date, indicate relatively broad, albeit conditional support. To complement this arrangement, the Danish government, in cooperation with eleven regular troop contributors, organized a Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN Operations. SHIRBRIG is now operational. It improved the tactical foundation by promoting further cooperation in multilateral planning, establishing training and readiness standards, and furthering the pursuit of inter-operability. Although it has yet to demonstrate its potential in rapid deployment, it succeeded in its first traditional mission –the UN Mission to Eritrea-Ethiopia (UNMEE), and coalitions in other regions are exploring partnerships to emulate this model of cooperation. At the strategic level, the Security Council is now under considerable pressure to provide a forum for further consultation with troop contributors. The recent Panel on UN Peace Operations and the Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Review have helped to generate wider support for consolidating sufficient military, police and civilian expertise within the DPKO, as well as mechanisms for improved coordination within the Secretariat and the larger UN System. While delays can be anticipated, the implementation of their recommendations is part of a critical, ongoing process.

Thus, as the tactical, operational, and strategic foundation is strengthened, participants are still hoping for a corresponding response at the political level. These arrangements may combine to inspire a higher degree of confidence and commitment among Member States that should gradually lead to more stable, if not greater, funding. In short, these various building blocks are gradually
forming the institutional foundation for future peace operations in response to complex political emergencies.\footnote{18}

How are we to assess such initiatives? Within the Secretariat, one focus is on reducing response times.\footnote{19} Other considerations must address whether these measures, when combined, help to:

- provide a widely-valued service;
- increase confidence in the UN's capacity to plan, deploy, manage and support at short notice;
- alleviate the primary worries of potential troop contributors and other Member States;
- generate wider political will and adequate financing;
- encourage broad participation;
- ensure sufficient multidimensional and multifunctional elements for the prevention and management of armed conflict and the protection of civilians;
- enhance the training, preparation, and overall competence of potential participants;
- instil a unity of purpose and effort among the various participants;
- consolidate effective structures; and
- develop a reliable UN Emergency Service.\footnote{20}

We must also ask whether these efforts are likely to build a solid foundation with the capacity for modernization and expansion. Alternatively, is there a risk of being locked into another ad hoc, conditional system requiring last-minute political approval of each participating Government and hasty improvisation prior to each mission? Can we identify national defense reforms that would complement UN rapid deployment? Further, what additional measures will be necessary to institutionalize and consolidate a dedicated UN Emergency Service? Could related efforts help to introduce a new security system? Clearly, a number of issues warrant further effort and scrutiny.

Moreover, the rationale for improving rapid deployment and for more ambitious reforms remains compelling. The failure to stem genocide in Rwanda prompted concern and supportive change, but little assurance that such a catastrophe would not be repeated. Five years later, an inappropriate response to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo revealed the limitations of relying on the advanced air power of a regional military alliance. Similarly, the belated response to organized mass murder in East Timor demonstrated the inadequacy of hastily improvised State-led coalitions. The inability to counter savage violence in Sierra Leone exposed the problems of poorly trained and insufficiently equipped troops, the double standards of many Member States, as well as the limitations of another regional arrangement. Further delays and inadequate support characterize the
efforts of the multinational force in Kabul, with an interim Government pleading for a five-fold increase in the number of personnel deployed to help stem the cycle of violence and avoid a return to warlord control. In the vast Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN struggles to disarm and demobilize the dangerous militias, albeit with a little more than half the personnel stipulated as necessary for the success of the operation. From the slaughter in Srebrenica to the atrocities in Sierra Leone, there arise legitimate fears that the international community will exhaust every dubious option before Member States return to their obligations as set forth in the UN Charter.

In summary, the international community remains unprepared for complex armed conflicts and the UN, despite modest reforms, remains without a capacity for rapid deployment to diverse emergencies. This need not and should not be the case. Demands for prompt UN assistance continue to highlight the deficiencies of existing arrangements, challenging the Organization, as well as Member States.

Once again, governments and people face two paths to two different futures: the current trajectory leading to an increasingly divided, heavily armed and risky world or a civilized alternative, with a common vision and commitment to strengthen the UN and its capacity to prevent armed conflict and protect civilians.

Ironically, improving UN rapid deployment has proven to be quite a slow process. Delays and difficulties accompany nearly every effort to secure a consensus for modest change within official forums. It is already evident that the slate of pragmatic, incremental reforms now being considered is necessary, but insufficient to address future challenges. There is a need for new approaches, expanded partnerships and forward-thinking options, as well as adaptation at a far faster rate. Yet identifying the strengths and limitations of existing arrangements, as well as potential improvements, is a relatively simple exercise. A more challenging question pertains to how supportive parties might stimulate further developments, particularly in effecting a transition from national standby arrangements to a dedicated UN Emergency Service.

There appear to be five approaches with at least some potential for generating wider support and more reliable and effective measures. First, officials could pursue further incremental changes and improvisations to existing arrangements. Gradually, as noted, this might inspire wider confidence and political will. Second, the development and circulation of a promising proposal could attract international interest, as well as a constituency of diverse organizations. Third, more conducive conditions would also stem from public diplomacy and civil society working through
partnerships and transnational coalitions. Information, education and advocacy are key to mobilizing broad based support. Fourth, a vision-oriented, cumulative development process that builds on and beyond existing arrangements might attract even wider assistance. Finally, although regrettable, ‘favorable’ conditions for developing a dedicated UN rapid deployment capability may ensue in the immediate aftermath of another global tragedy. Over the past century, there have been at least five occasions when deadly conflict generated what might be described as ripe moments. But rather than await another tragedy and the next ripe moment, this is an appropriate time to elaborate on the options and requirements for a UN Emergency Service (UNEMS). Prior planning is essential for dealing with future emergencies.

If pursued independently, each of the approaches outlined might generate modest progress. If pursued simultaneously, as part of a coordinated and integrated plan, the UN’s prospects might improve substantively. Therefore, this paper provides a preliminary blueprint of options corresponding to each approach. Success in this rather elusive endeavor will necessitate a more comprehensive approach. Given the stakes involved, supportive parties must be prepared to consider and refine the options.

SECTION I: The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report)

On March 7, 2000 Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited a high-level panel to undertake a review of United Nations Peace Operations. Working in cooperation with the UN Secretariat and numerous Member States, they outlined an array of pragmatic reforms. By drawing on recent experience and lessons derived from previous efforts to modify existing arrangements, as well as a subsequent comprehensive review, the agenda for enhancing UN rapid deployment capabilities has been established. It will be the focus of official efforts for at least two years.21

In August 2000, the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) identified an array of related problems, as well as fifty-seven recommendations, ranging from an overhaul of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to robust doctrine and realistic mandates permitting the use of force when warranted.22 Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war remains the principal contemporary challenge – the most important function of the Organization – and, as noted, the standard by which the UN is judged worldwide. At the forefront, the Panel conceded
that, “over the past decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today.”23 Their report was timed appropriately: following two scathing assessments of the Organization’s disastrous efforts in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and coinciding with the Millennium Summit where officials hoped it might re-focus the attention of Member States, the public and the media. Secretary-General Kofi Annan endorsed it immediately, as did numerous heads of state. Most, if not all, Governments had advance notice of what to expect and, this time around, there were no major surprises or ambitious departures from existing arrangements.

Four key conditions to success in future complex operations were identified: (1) political support, (2) rapid deployment, (3) a robust force posture and (4) a sound peace building strategy.24 A solid case was made for respecting the UN’s limits and exercising self-restraint, both in the Security Council and the Secretariat; for conflict prevention and early action; for bigger, better-trained and more well-equipped forces coupled to more comprehensive peace and peace building strategies. Aside from warning against ‘best-case planning’ when frequently confronted with ‘worst-case behavior’, the report stressed the importance of units capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate.25 UN forces for complex operations would, henceforth, require a size and configuration to pose a credible, deterrent threat.

Included were several innovative ideas for improving mission guidance and leadership, as well as the capacity of Headquarters to plan and support peace operations. To complement the inter-departmental, Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), the Panel proposed an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS).26 Aside from maintaining integrated databases on critical issues, it would serve as an internal focal point for information, early warning and initial development of strategic plans and policy options.

To address what is an all too often weak link between field operations and the wider expertise within the Secretariat, the Panel also recommended the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs).27 As proposed, personnel with diverse responsibilities would be seconded from throughout the UN System to formalize coordination in the planning and support of a peace operation. Rather than have commanders in the field rely on a dispersed network of contacts for each requirement that arises, the task force would assume the responsibility for coordinating all Headquarters’ assistance. While task forces might begin as ‘virtual’ bodies, teams would be formed under a specified leader and co-located together at an early stage in a size and composition that reflected the nature and the phase of their assigned operation. The primary
advantage of an IMTF is that it helps to provide integrated management of a mission, involving the key personnel in UN Headquarters, N.Y., and in the field. In the words of the Panel, “IMTFs offer a flexible approach to dealing with time-critical, resource intensive but ultimately temporary requirements to support mission planning, start-up and initial sustainment.”

The third section of the report, as well as nine of the Panel’s recommendations, were specifically addressed at UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively. In response to the frequent question of why it takes so long to fully deploy operations, their report acknowledged:

The United Nations does not have a standing army, and it does not have a standing police force designed for field operations. There is no reserve corps of mission leadership; special representatives of the Secretary-General and heads of mission, force commanders, police commissioners, directors of administration and other leadership components are not sought until urgently needed. The Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) currently in place for potential government-provided military, police and civilian expertise has yet to become a dependable supply of resources…And finally, the Secretary-General lacks most of the authority to acquire, hire and preposition the goods and people needed to deploy an operation rapidly before the Security Council adopts the resolution to establish it, however likely such an operation may seem.

As noted, “few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace operation in the future.” Rather than launch a bold departure, however, the Panel placed renewed emphasis on deployment standards and ‘on-call’ expertise, particularly through the further development of the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS).

Acknowledging the critical importance of the first four to six weeks after a cease fire or peace accord, the report established new response standards, defining “rapid and effective deployment capacity as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within thirty days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.” To meet these timelines, it was suggested that the Secretariat would require one or a combination of the following, “(a) standing reserves of military, civilian police and civilian expertise, material and financing; (b) extremely reliable standby capacities to be called upon at short notice; or (c) sufficient lead-time to acquire these resources, which would require the ability to foresee, plan for and initiate spending for new missions several months ahead of time.” Given the political impediments to the first two options, the panel directed a number of recommendations to strengthen the Secretariat’s analytical
capacities and align them with the mission planning process.\textsuperscript{33} To prepare for unforeseen demands, they also suggested, “the Secretariat must be able to maintain a certain generic level of preparedness, through the establishment of new standing capacities and enhancement of existing standby capacities.”\textsuperscript{34}

Pointing to the difficulties of pulling together a collection of battalions that tend to be unfamiliar with one another, the Panel encouraged Member States to enter into partnerships to establish several coherent brigade-size forces (approximately 5,000 troops), within the context of the UNSAS. By working together in an arrangement similar to the SHIRBRIG, a group of countries could improve readiness and effectiveness through common doctrine, training and equipment standards, as well as common arrangements for the control of the force.\textsuperscript{35} Such cooperation would also improve the UN’s prospect of acquiring a complete formation, which would not only be more suitable, but also more prepared and inclined to rapid deployment. To this end, it was suggested the UN could help by establishing the minimum standards required for forces to participate in peacekeeping. Participants from the wealthier Member States could also help by sharing equipment, training and assistance with less developed countries to enhance overall quality.\textsuperscript{36}

To address the evident void at the operational level, the Panel also called for the creation of a revolving ‘on-call list’ of about one hundred qualified military officers within the UNSAS. These would be developed into standby teams capable of translating “broad, strategic-level mission concepts developed at UN Headquarters into concrete operational and tactical plans in advance of the deployment of troop contingents, and would augment a core element from DPKO to serve as part of a mission start-up team.”\textsuperscript{37}

Diverse civilian expertise, including police, would also be developed into pre-trained quick response teams ‘on call’ in a parallel list within the standby arrangements. To address the high demand for civilian police and related legal expertise, the Panel encouraged Member States to establish national ‘pools’ of police officers, earmarked and available on short notice for UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{38} It also proposed regional training partnerships for civilian police (CIVPOL), higher common levels of preparedness, pre-designated points of contact in governments and the creation of a revolving list of approximately one hundred police officers available through UNSAS with teams trained to assist in creating the police component of new missions.
Additional measures were proposed to facilitate the budgeting of operations within DPKO, the prompt procurement of essential equipment and supplies both by Headquarters and in the field, as well as new public information resources for effective communication. A global logistics support strategy was also called for to enable rapid and effective mission deployment, including funds to maintain five mission start-up kits at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy.\(^{39}\)

Regrettably, after fifty-two years of UN Operations, peacekeeping was still being treated as though it were a temporary responsibility of the Organization. That would have to change as history, particularly recent experience, demonstrates the need for continuing preparedness, new mechanisms and additional resources. Notably, the panel viewed its own package of reforms as “the minimum threshold of change needed to give the UN System the opportunity to be an effective, operational, twenty-first century institution.”\(^{40}\)

As previously noted, the Panel’s report was initially welcomed. The UN General Assembly provided a prompt endorsement. After establishing a Working Group to review its recommendations, the Security Council met on November 13, 2000 and unanimously commended the report, agreeing to strengthen UN peace operations. In resolution 1327 (2000), the Council stressed “the importance of the United Nations being able to respond and deploy a peacekeeping operation rapidly.” They asserted that, “rapid deployment is a comprehensive concept that will require improvement in a number of areas.” The Secretary-General was also encouraged, to take all possible measures at his disposal to facilitate rapid deployment during the planning and preparation of a peacekeeping operation.\(^{41}\)

The “Comprehensive Review”

Secretary-General Annan moved quickly to launch a follow-up, Comprehensive Review to assist with the implementation of both the Panel’s recommendations, as well as those of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping, and to determine areas where the UN Secretariat would require further changes. This subsequent report was described as the “first in-depth and comprehensive managerial examination of the ways in which the Organization plans, deploys, conducts and supports peacekeeping operations.” The primary focus was on the Secretariat, particularly the structure, management, staffing and funding requirements of DPKO.\(^{42}\)

One important section assessed rapid and effective deployment capacities and the implications of the Panel’s proposal for deployment of peacekeeping operations within 30 to 90
days. Effective deployment was defined “as the minimum operational capability required for a mission to begin implementing its mandate.” Notably, the Secretary-General had earlier conveyed his concern that “the Secretariat is simply not able to meet those timelines within our existing logistics support systems.” In his assessment, “the entire system would need to be redesigned,” requiring “a thorough review of a variety of areas, including the procurement and financial procedures now in place.”

In short, the baseline requirements included enhanced UN material reserves, financial authority, ‘surge-staffing’ capacity and the prompt provision of troops and police from Member States. This report of the Secretary-General claimed that, “significant work has already been done in all these areas.” It also acknowledged that considerable challenges remained.

Among the prerequisites identified to meet the proposed response times were the following: “a one-time expenditure budget to enhance the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, as well as to cater for annual recurring costs; entry into pre-arranged contracts and letters of assist for key services; increased reliability of standby arrangements with Member States, especially for support units; and improved personnel surge capacity, particularly for staff in areas of administrative support.” The Secretary-General expressed his preference for a medium strategic reserve option. This would entail purchasing and maintaining only critical items that required a long procurement lead-time and pre-arranged services (no fee) for the acquisition of other materials and equipment as needed. In a familiar caveat, the report warned that none of its recommended options would guarantee 30 to 90 day deployment time-frames, as “this can only be achieved by the provision of fully self-sustaining and completely self-sufficient troops provided by Member States with the means to do so.”

The Comprehensive Review confirmed the ongoing concern that “the consequences of trying to make do with too little for too long” are troubling and that, “the overall peacekeeping capacities of the Secretariat have not developed at the pace they should have because sufficient time, energy and resources have not been dedicated to planning for the future.” The gaps at the operational level are numerous, but at least, a concerted effort is well underway to address what can be done within the context of prevailing and anticipated support.

The early indications are relatively promising. This was the fifth official report produced within the space of 12 months on strengthening the UN’s capacity for peacekeeping. As the four previous reports contained over 300 related, occasionally overlapping recommendations – many of
which pertained to rapid deployment – compromises were inevitable. Each key recommendation would have to be studied and endorsed by most, if not all, governments prior to being implemented. Moreover, within the wider UN System, there would have to be approval and support from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the Fifth Committee, as well as the Member States. Those participating in each forum would effectively have the capacity to delay and impede progress on the proposed agenda. Yet the Secretariat and the majority of Member States expected substantive cooperation. There were incentives and the bar was not set too high.

SECTION II: Existing Arrangements

While efforts to enhance UN rapid deployment capabilities are system-wide, three particularly noteworthy arrangements: the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) constitute the core foundation of the current system.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

Over the past decade, the UN Secretariat worked hard to organize the military and civilian contributions of Member States and to establish basic functions within UN Headquarters. It was also a key partner in the wider Rapid Deployment Initiative.

In 1992, the office responsible for peacekeeping was reorganized as the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage operations. This restructuring served to co-locate and coordinate within one department, the political, operational, logistics, civilian police, de-mining, training, personnel and administrative aspects of peacekeeping operations.\(^5\) The DPKO was created in response to the exponential growth in the volume, complexity and scope of new operations.

A Situation Center was established in the DPKO in May 1993, to maintain round-the-clock communications with the field and to provide information necessary to missions and troop contributors. At the same time, a Civilian Police Unit was developed in the DPKO's Office of
Planning and Support, assuming responsibility for all matters affecting civilian police in peacekeeping operations.

A Training Unit was established within the DPKO in June 1993 to increase the availability of trained military and civilian personnel for timely deployment.\(^{55}\) The DPKO also established the Mission Planning Service (MPS) for the detailed planning and coordination of complex operations.\(^{56}\) A small Policy and Analysis Unit was created in 1993 to serve as a think tank and to conduct research. To enhance analysis, evaluation and institutional memory, the Lessons Learned Unit was instituted in early 1995. The DPKO's work was increasingly integrated with that of the Secretariat's political, humanitarian and administrative offices. To improve logistics, especially in the start-up phase of an operation, the Field Administrative and Logistics Division was incorporated into the DPKO. Approval was given to utilize the Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy as a center for the management of peacekeeping assets. Aside from maintaining an inventory of UN material, it oversees the stockpiling and delivery of supplies and equipment for missions. Mission Start-up Kits are assembled at the Logistics Base. In 1997, Brigadier General Mono Bhagat wrote that, “the Department has managed a structured, prudent, and gradual expansion in order to meet these demands in a concerted and coherent manner. It began by establishing a sound skeletal structure to which, bit by bit, flesh has been added.”\(^{57}\)

The DPKO is now the operational arm of the Secretariat responsible for the conduct, management, direction, planning and preparation of peacekeeping. While this Department is in the midst of an ongoing review and reform process, its current composition reflects the five core elements common to all operations:

(a) The Office of the Under-Secretary General, containing policy analysis and ‘lessons learned’ capacities, as well as an Executive Office;
(b) The Office of Operations, consisting of the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, three regional divisions and the Situation Center;
(c) The Military Division, consisting of the Office of the Military Adviser and four separate Services for Military Planning; Force Generation and Military Personnel; Current Military Operations; and Training and Evaluation;
(d) The Civilian Police Division consisting of the Office of the Civilian Police Adviser, the Mission Management Unit, and the Policy and Planning Unit;
(e) The Office of Logistics, Management and Mine Action, consisting of the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, The Field Administration and Logistics Division which is divided into three services, for Personnel Management and Support, Finance Management and Support, Logistics and Communication and the Mine Action Service.\(^{58}\)
The DPKO manages hundreds of functions and demanding tasks. As noted, “these activities range from *inter alia*, conducting political analysis to preparing aviation safety manuals; delivering civilian police training to deploying water purification systems; managing military force generation to managing hostage-taking incidents; coordinating de-mining activities to recruiting thousands of civilian staff for service in the field.”\(^5^9\)

At present, this department is in the process of simultaneously adjusting to new missions, a revised structure, new offices and reviewing thousands of applications for the additional posts. With a budget of approximately (US) $50 billion, the DPKO provides UN Headquarters support for 15 operations worldwide – an operational tempo that has been the average over the course of the past ten years. In 2001, it was employing over 27,000 military personnel and 8,600 civilian police, which cost UN Member States more than $2 billion. While the ratio of funding for headquarters support to field operations was a nearing a disturbing level of 2%, the ratio of Headquarters’ staff personnel to military and civilian police in the field was an alarming 0.1%.\(^6^0\) As a result, the demands on the DPKO’s staff were both onerous and unrelenting. In fact, it is a credit to their professionalism and dedication that they have been able to accomplish so much with so few.

Finally, after repeatedly reviewing the issue, a consensus emerged among the Member States that the DPKO’s funding and staff levels were insufficient. The Panel on UN Peace Operations was correct in calling for a substantial increase in resources allocated and more stable funding of headquarters support for peacekeeping as a core activity through the regular program budget, rather than reliance on the supplementary budget.\(^6^1\) While the funding of the DPKO has yet to be finalized, the Panel indicated a historical review “…could suggest a near doubling of the resources allocated for Headquarters support to peacekeeping, in light of the current level of activity, with roughly $70 million representing the baseline resource level and up to an additional $24 million accounting for a ‘surge’ in activity.”\(^6^2\) The external consultants who participated in the Comprehensive Review concluded that given the current level of peacekeeping activity, the DPKO should have roughly 650 staff.\(^6^3\)

In 2000, this Department consisted of 231 military, civilian and police professionals and 173 general service staff. An additional 92 posts were allocated to the DPKO on an emergency basis in early 2001 and the General Assembly recently authorized a further 91 posts, which should soon provide DPKO with a total of 587 personnel. Despite the fact that staffing is complicated by the need to follow rigorous, transparent and due processes in selection, as well as diverse political
demands –particularly for national and regional representation, it is encouraging that the DPKO managed to fill the initial 92 posts within one year.

Efforts are underway to improve the organizational structure of the DPKO with numerous adjustments and new offices. The following are among an array of official priorities: a new Director for Strategic Planning and Management; a new and expanded Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit combining the strengths of the Lessons Learned and Best Practices Units; the tasking of a third Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs to head the Military Division, the Civilian Police Division and the Mine Action Division; and the splitting of the large Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) into two separate Divisions for Administrative Support (personnel and finance) and Logistics Support.

Moreover, to ensure sufficient attention is devoted to policy and capacity development a number of existing elements will be strengthened. Overall coordination and collaboration within the Secretariat is being addressed with additional measures, including the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), a small multidisciplinary policy and analysis unit (replacing the proposed EISAS), as well as the new Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) to improve operational planning. Thus, as a result of concerted efforts over the past two years, the DPKO has started to attract the funding, personnel and structure necessary to fulfill assigned tasks. Its potential capacity for rapid and effective deployment will be determined by the extent to which supportive reforms are consolidated and augmented.

Notably by 2002, the DPKO had set the following five strategic goals:

- Enhancing the rapid deployment capability for peacekeeping operations;
- Strengthening the relationship with Member States and legislative bodies;
- Reforming the Department’s management culture;
- Reorienting the Department’s relationship with field missions; and
- Strengthening relationships with other parts of the UN System.

**Limitations of DPKO**

Since its inception the DPKO has been treated as a temporary creation –one that is continually forced to justify its practices and personnel. These demands have not diminished. Disagreement continues as some Member States express concern for prompt staffing with available expertise, while others demand greater regional representation, gender balance and preference to
major troop-contributing nations. Even with the inspiring leadership of the new Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean Marie Guéhenno, the UN Secretariat, particularly the DPKO, faces an up-hill struggle to meet incessant demands for a thorough justification of each position, every new office and any additional allocation of funding.\textsuperscript{65}

Translating ‘lessons learned’ into appropriate practices is neither a quick nor easy endeavor for the DPKO. Suspicion and controversy are frequently raised as a means to obstruct the DPKO’s attempts to address critical issues such as early warning, intelligence and development of appropriate doctrine. The wider implications can be quite damaging. For example, it is widely apparent that the UN’s capacity for conflict prevention will be partially dependent upon fact-finding, reliable information and rigorous analysis. Yet several States opposed the proposed unit for such tasks, the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, on the grounds that it might amount to unwarranted intelligence gathering on their national territory. Thus a critical information gap lingers, leaving those in both the Secretariat and the field scrambling to corroborate information and conduct analysis that might prevent dangerous situations from arising.

To cite another example, the absence of pre-agreed doctrine can frustrate further efforts to achieve effective training. However, the DPKO unit initially assigned to develop such doctrine attracted opposition and was restricted to peacekeeping ‘best practices.’ In turn, many Member States relied on the doctrine developed within a few prominent defense departments, which were not particularly enthusiastic about introducing appropriate new training systems.

Yet to its credit, the DPKO’s training unit initially made considerable headway in developing training assistance teams, courses, guidelines, and mission-specific training manuals. This was a critical endeavor for the Organization given the number of new troop contributors, the complexity of multidimensional operations and the unprecedented demand for well-trained military, police and civilian personnel.

Comprehensive prior training is also a prerequisite for rapid deployment as there is far less time available for an extensive period of mission-specific training. Regrettably, when the DPKO was denied further use of gratis personnel in 1997-98, the training unit was reduced from 15 to 2 officers. The training gap actually grew despite confirmation that many peacekeepers, if not the majority, were simply unprepared for their demanding new tasks and missions. In turn, the response gap also grew as many Member States increasingly delayed or denied contributing
because of their assessment of the risks in participating alongside those who were perceived to be poorly trained and equipped.

In 2001, there were 5 individuals within the unit attempting to fill the void with new training programs, manuals and guidelines for current and future operations. While the DPKO’s training unit is to be strengthened, there is an urgent requirement for further cooperation with regional and national peacekeeping training centers. Very few Member States have actually commenced comprehensive prior training for rapid deployment of their military, police and civilian personnel to diverse UN Operations.

Another direct effect of the former cutbacks and downsizing has been that as the capacity of UN officials diminished, the officials of formerly supportive Member States lost faith in the Secretariat, particularly in the DPKO. In turn, the level of cooperation between these parties began to unravel, as neither was inclined to make the effort to provide the other with the requisite assistance. Greater efforts must be made to restore unity of purpose and effort between the Member States and DPKO. A cooperative and collegial working relationship is imperative.

While substantive efforts have been made to modify the organizational structure of the DPKO, it may still suffer from a lingering perception that it is scattered and loosely organized. Rather than being co-located in a central office, the DPKO’s units are dispersed in numerous buildings near UN Headquarters. Irrespective of the dedication and expertise of those within, the DPKO appears to be far from representative of the optimum, professional management structure that is needed to inspire the confidence of Member States. It is not a department that the latter might emulate for their national security planning. In the current phase of restructuring, this sprawl of personnel and offices imposes additional difficulties for inter-departmental planning and coordination. It does not facilitate the cohesion required to effect rapid deployment. It is also likely to incur political costs. Regrettably, for those providing the majority of funding, image matters, and the DPKO’s current image does not help to dispel the undue notion that it is a temporal creation. It is time for the Secretariat and Member States to provide the DPKO with a dedicated, central office that can accommodate all its units and newly assigned personnel.

Despite the avowed emphasis accorded to rapid deployment, there remains no office of primary responsibility with individuals specifically tasked to coordinate related efforts. Long-term planning is largely relegated to one individual on a part-time basis. The management of the UNSAS is now co-assigned to two military officers in the DPKO, but it is one among several of
their other responsibilities. An institutionalized focal point for coordinating rapid deployment is essential.

In attempting to offset one of the most evident gaps at the operational level – the lack of a rapidly deployable mission headquarters – the DPKO created a Model UN Mission Field Headquarters, which would require the immediate support of 154 personnel. It also asked Member States to contribute to a revolving list of ‘on-call’ officers available for deployment on seven and fourteen days notice. By February 2002, twenty-five Member States had responded with conditional offers that amounted to 134 personnel. The UN Military Advisor cautioned, however, that “at present, the nominations are not widely representative and to restrict the formation of the future FHQ (Field Headquarters) to the current nominations would not provide a balanced structure, or flexibility to respond to missions in particular areas.” To date, this on-call list has not attracted sufficient support from a broad spectrum of Member States or the level of redundancy in personnel necessary to function rapidly and effectively.

Plans have also been drawn up to secure appropriate civilian specialists for rapid deployment, particularly to provide administrative and support staff of pre-screened and pre-cleared staff members already within the UN System.

Repeatedly, there have been operational difficulties, complications and risks when military contingents and other components arrive in a theatre of operations prior to the establishment of a proper UN Mission Headquarters. These on-call lists are likely to be helpful, but the arrangement for securing national military officers at short notice may be problematic. As proposed, individuals on the list are to receive prior training and remain prepared to be drawn from their national assignments into a Cohesive Headquarters Team once the Security Council has authorized a mission. The authorization for the deployment of each individual will then have to be negotiated with each participating government. If approved, individuals from various locations would then assemble in New York and prepare for prompt departure to set up the critical first phase of a UN mission. While there is an evident need for a new arrangement, this ‘on-call’ list appears simply too conditional on individual availability and readiness, as well as national approval, to remedy the problem of recurring delays. Moreover, cohesive teams are developed by extensive training and by the experience of working together over an extended period. It is questionable whether they can be assembled at short notice on the basis of familiarity. There are better options for addressing this particular gap.
One option, a permanent Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ), was formerly supported by Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the UN General Assembly, as well as the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping. This was also a priority proposal of the “Friends of Rapid Deployment.” It was to entail a multidimensional core headquarters unit of military and civilian personnel tasked to assist rapid deployment and manage the initial phases of a peacekeeping operation. It was designed as an operational unit with a tactical planning function. Eight individuals were to be assigned to the RDMHQ on a full time basis including a Chief of Staff and specialists in fields such as operations, logistics, engineering and civilian police. In effect, this was to be a standing element within DPKO, one that had already received prior approval for deployment into a mission area without requiring further authorization at the national level. This nucleus of a headquarters was to draw on 24 personnel earmarked in their home countries, as well as 29 personnel double-tasked within the UN Secretariat. This team of 61 personnel was to coordinate rapid deployment and manage an operational-level headquarters for three to six months, pending the arrival of and transition to a normal headquarters. While the RDMHQ was a relatively skeletal arrangement, it retains the potential to deliver on an array of tasks and capabilities that are still needed.

Legitimate concerns arose, however, over the initial plans for the RDMHQ – whether it might be a ‘silver bullet’ – a single mission mechanism that once deployed could leave the DPKO with insufficient personnel to manage ongoing departmental and mission requirements. Some recognized the need to adapt the initial plans and ensure a steady state, as well as a surge capacity for periods of intense activity. In response to internal fears of over-tasking and the opposition of a few Member States, the DPKO released a compromise plan for a smaller, non-deployable Rapid Deployment Management Unit (RDMU). As proposed this was to be a static planning element of 4 civilians to identify required skills and develop a roster of individual expertise, which might be called upon short notice to fill diverse headquarter functions.

The optimum compromise in the short term would be to pursue both the RDMHQ and the RDMU as complementary mechanisms, providing a rapid operational and planning capacity, as well as the steady state and surge capacity, with only an additional 12 personnel. It is evident that an RDMU will likely be needed to coordinate and maintain the revolving mission headquarters ‘on-call’ lists. It is also apparent that a permanent RDMHQ could provide immediate technical reconnaissance and a reliable mission start-up team for effectively integrating those on the list into
their Headquarters’ assignments. Moreover, this could represent a *win-win* solution, addressing the Non-Aligned Movement’s insistence on broader representation and the ‘Friends’ desire for an effective operational headquarters. The importance of satisfying both these requirements and objectives is evident.

**Recommendation 1**

*Aside from the immediate benefits associated with a more cohesive department, there are likely to be wider political, strategic and operational advantages derived from co-locating the DPKO’s various units and personnel into a dedicated central office.*

**Recommendation 2**

*Regional and national peacekeeping training centers should be encouraged to help the DPKO develop appropriate doctrine and comprehensive prior training programs for the rapid deployment of military, police and civilian personnel.*

**Recommendation 3**

*Additional efforts within the UN Secretariat and within Member States are needed to restore the collegial cooperation and partnerships necessary for rapid deployment to complex political emergencies worldwide.*

**Recommendation 4**

*As the UN Secretariat has yet to designate a departmental focal point and office of primary responsibility for coordinating rapid deployment, a new office assigned to this task should be established within DPKO. A small unit of military, police and civilian personnel could be placed under the Director of Strategic Planning and Management with a representative in the office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs.*

**Recommendation 5**

*Given that the combined staffing of the RDMU and the RDMHQ would only entail an additional 12 personnel, and that these arrangements are relatively cost-effective and complementary to the proposed ‘on-call’ lists for developing mission headquarters, they deserve the support of all parties.*

**UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)**

In 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified the need for a system of standby arrangements to secure the personnel and material resources required for peacekeeping. This system was specifically intended to improve the UN’s rapid deployment capability. The Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) is based on conditional commitments from Member States of specified resources that could be made available within agreed response times. The resources range from military units, individual civilian, military and police personnel to specialized services, equipment and other capabilities.
A Standby Arrangements Management Team was established within DPKO in 1994 to identify UN requirements in peacekeeping operations, establish readiness standards, negotiate with potential participants, establish a database of resources and assist in mission planning. Procedures for determining reimbursement of Member's contingent-owned equipment were also developed. The UNSAS has since been refined to assign responsibility for military units to the Military Division of DPKO, CIVPOL personnel to the Civilian Police Unit, and civilian personnel to the Field Administration and Logistics Division of DPKO. As recently noted,

The system consists of arrangements negotiated between the United Nations and individual Member States. The resources agreed upon remain on ‘standby’ in their home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. When necessary, the resources are requested by the Secretary-General, and, if approved by the Member States, are rapidly deployed.76

UNSAS serves several objectives. First, it provides the UN with an understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available at an agreed state of readiness. Second, it facilitates planning, training and preparation for both participating Member States and the UN. Third, it provides the UN not only with foreknowledge of a range of national assets, but also with a list of potential options if a member or members refrain from participating in an operation. UN planners now have the option of developing contingency and ‘fall-back’ strategies when they anticipate delays. Finally, although the arrangements are only conditional, it is hoped that those members that have confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources will be more forthcoming and committed than might otherwise be the case. Member States are acquiring familiarity with the system and with what they are expected to contribute.

In short, UNSAS provides an initial commitment to service, and a better advance understanding of the requirements, but is in no way a binding obligation. This is the explicit preference of the majority of UN Member States. By 1997, it was the opinion of one senior DPKO official that, “this is now the maximum feasible option.”

All Member States have the option to participate at four levels of the UNSAS, with each level providing a more precise indication of commitment. The initial level is reached by providing the UN with a list of potential national capabilities, including the tasks they are capable of performing, their response times and restrictions. Twenty-three Member States are presently within this category. Level 2 is achieved when participants provide the UN with precise ‘volumetrics,’ a
planning data sheet outlining the details of particular units, personnel and equipment, including their level of self-sufficiency, transportation data and state of organization. Twelve countries are currently at this stage. Level 3 includes those Member States that have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UN to formalize participation and ensures that the Organization is provided with the information necessary to plan accordingly. Thirty-eight members have signed the requested MOU’s for military and civilian police contributions. Finally, Level 4, which was introduced in 2001, requires an MOU that contains agreement on contingent owned equipment. As this is a relatively new development, it has not yet attracted participation. In April 2002, it was reported that seventy-three Member States were currently participating in the system.

Formerly, the progress, in terms of representation and numbers assigned, appeared considerably more encouraging. By July 2001, ninety Member States had officially expressed their willingness to participate in the standby arrangements. Seventy-six percent of those identified were assumed to be actively committed, representing a total of 104,643 personnel, which could, in principle, be called upon. The previous year, it was assumed that the total number was closer to 147,000 personnel. Response times were registered according to the declared national capabilities. At the time, there were indications that a substantial proportion of those listed were at least capable of rapid deployment.

However, in 2001, the UN asked participating Member States to also provide a monthly status report on the availability of the resources listed. This simply entailed a quick review and electronic response to notify the Organization of assets that might be accessible. The early results were less than impressive. In February 2002, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping cautioned that the responses to the new system indicated the availability of only 44,000 troops, a significant reduction from the theoretical scale of assets available. While the new reporting system may have induced some reservations, DPKO has informed the Member States that it plans to utilize UNSAS in a far more active manner and that the recent responses were less than satisfactory.

Official efforts are also underway to expand the UNSAS with additional ‘on-call’ lists. As previously noted, a revolving roster of one hundred military officers will be assigned to one list, specifically to assist in mission planning and the prompt establishment of a mission headquarters. A similar list is being created to identify one hundred civilian police officers that will form into teams for establishing and training the police component of a new mission. Civilian experts are
being added to a parallel list that is to help ensure access to pre-trained ‘quick response’ teams for diverse requirements. As well, new partnerships are being encouraged as a means to ensure common levels of preparedness, to enhance standards, to facilitate training and to provide wider access to equipment. Acknowledging the difficulties of pulling together a collection of battalions that tend to be unfamiliar with one another, the Panel on UN Peace Operations also urged Member States to enter partnerships to establish coherent brigade-size forces of approximately 5,000 troops for the UNSAS.

Limitations of the UNSAS

Obviously, standby arrangements for nationally based units do not provide an assurance of their immediate availability. As noted, these are conditional agreements and all participating Member States retain a veto over any use of their personnel and equipment. Each government has independent authority to decide whether its resources can be used in a UN Operation. As the former Secretary-General acknowledged in 1995, “a considerable effort has been made to expand and refine standby arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation.”83 He noted further that, “the value of the arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency.”84 With respect to UNSAS there are few, if any, certainties. The promptness with which national contingents are provided depends on the discretion of participating Member States, the risks perceived and the level of interests at stake.85

Reliability will be a key determinant of rapid deployment. In the case of UNSAS, there is no assurance that the political will exists, as reflected in its mixed record to date. Even the Panel on UN Peace Operations conceded that, “the Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) currently in place for potential government-provided military, police and civilian expertise has yet to become a dependable supply of resources.”86

Critics frequently point to the refusal of Member States to provide adequate forces to avert the 1994 catastrophe in Rwanda. Not one of the nineteen governments that had undertaken to have troops on standby for UN peacekeeping agreed to contribute to the UNAMIR mission under these arrangements.87 Since 1996, some other mission successes have been partially attributed to UNSAS.88 Yet, there have been several prominent violent conflicts such as those in East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which again demonstrated the difficulty
of arranging the necessary assistance. The early indications are that the information listed in the
UNSAS database has proven to be quite helpful in planning, but less helpful in securing
contributions for rapid deployment. Proponents of UNSAS have grounds to argue that the system
has been refined and improved, but commitment to the system will have to be far more
comprehensive and binding if it is to succeed.

Although the UNSAS remains the preferred arrangement of the majority of UN Member
States, it is insufficient to inspire or increase the confidence of those who depend upon it.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has affirmed that UNSAS is a positive step, but not one that is
currently capable of providing the UN with a true rapid reaction capability. Moreover, as he
subsequently stated, “Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with
Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state
of high readiness.” As one who worked on the “Brahimi Report” wrote:

The current UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) gives the Secretariat a
glimmer of what military forces might be made available from what countries to fill
out an operation but actual commitments are made on a case by case basis and
States do not now collaborate within the UNSAS to enhance their readiness or their
interoperability.

Despite repeated efforts to expand and modify this system, there are legitimate concerns that it is
incapable of bridging the preparedness gap or the reliability gap.

The UNSAS entails another constraint that may limit its future viability. It specifies that
personnel and resources will only be used for peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the UN Charter,
foreclosing on any deployment to missions requiring a Chapter VII mandate. Notably, since 1999,
four out of the five new UN Missions required a Chapter VII mandate permitting the limited use of
force. Additional arrangements will need to be promptly negotiated. Alternatively, supportive
Member States may wish to press the UN to create a ‘fifth level’ within the UNSAS specifying
those personnel and resources capable of responding to an operation that entails a Chapter VII
mandate. While this latter option might constitute an improvement on current arrangements, it is
still a far step from the member’s actual Charter obligations. As specified under Article 43 of the
Charter, “all members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call
and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
facilities...” As these are still Charter obligations, there are now a number of sound reasons for establishing Article 43 as the sixth and highest level of the UNSAS.

A number of countries have earmarked specific elements of their armed forces and conducted UN training programs to prepare their contribution. Unfortunately, these Member States remain a supportive minority. Moreover, the former Secretary-General wisely cautioned, while national readiness is a necessary prerequisite, it does not in itself, give the UN a capacity for rapid deployment. Several other limitations remain. For example, many participants lack a capacity to provide their own support functions. The Organization is still confronted with shortages in a number of decisive areas, including multi-role logistics, civilian police, air services, road and sea transport and civilian specialists/experts. In March 2001, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping wrote Member States requesting further support for the UNSAS, particularly in creating the ‘on-call’ lists, updating current UNSAS assets, and providing critical ‘enabling forces’ as specialized units for movement control, communications and terminal or air-traffic control capability, aircraft load/unload, petroleum handling, water processing units, as well as strategic lift assistance to troop contributors.

Once approved for deployment, standby units will have to stage independently and assemble in-theatre. For some, this will be their first experience working together, and it will likely occur under conditions of extreme stress. Some military establishments are reluctant to acknowledge the need for prior training of their personnel beyond a general combat capability. Consequently, high standards of interoperability and cohesiveness will be difficult to assure in advance. Moreover, the UN will continue to confront the complex task of coordinating lift capabilities for participating elements across the world. This slows deployment. Logistics and support arrangements are gradually improving, but the UN is still coming to grips with the challenge of supplying different national contingents with a wide range of equipment.

In addition, the UNSAS provides the primary recruitment pool for Civilian Police (CIVPOL). As of 22 February 2000, the UN was asked to deploy 8,415 civilian police to peace operations, primarily in Kosovo (4,718), Bosnia (2,057) and East Timor (1,640). Member governments, at that point, had contributed a total of 5,122 personnel –leaving a shortfall of just under 3,300. Compounding the problem, some personnel provided for the mission were sent back as unqualified. These figures illustrate two trends. First, the demand for UN Civilian Police is increasing as a wider array of tasks are undertaken; their former role as trainers has expanded to
include criminal investigation (including war crimes), customs and migration, and human rights monitoring. Second, the Organization faces persistent problems in securing enough well trained police even at current levels of activity. Additional CIVPOL elements will be required for rapid deployment.

There is considerable merit in an Argentinean proposal that calls for the organization of CIVPOL units as companies, in order to simplify liaison at the tactical level between civilian police and military forces. Each slightly oversized company of 130 personnel would consist of: 110 lightly armed police with riot control skills; 15 police experts, focusing on criminal investigation and forensics, training, human rights monitoring and international humanitarian law; and 5 members in a planning and command cell.

In order to meet future personnel requirements, those Member States that have the capacity should be encouraged to provide at least one company group to CIVPOL. Moreover, a multinational partnership between five to eight supportive members could facilitate the development of a Standby High Readiness Police Battalion for UN Operations (SHIRPOL). Such cooperation could raise training and readiness standards, while increasing the likelihood that essential CIVPOL personnel were organized into national and multinational formations that would be more readily available.

The UNSAS is one step in a promising direction. However, as the numbers indicate, it has yet to attract the majority of UN Member States; only 69 participants have provided detailed information; and only 36 have signed the requested MOU for Level 3. Many of those who have the capabilities, including some of the wealthier Member States, as well as several of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, have done little, if anything to improve this system. Clearly, the UNSAS needs to attract additional participants with a stronger commitment to the system. If it is to facilitate rapid deployment, it also needs to become a less conditional and more binding arrangement.

**Recommendation 6**

_All Member States need to be encouraged to participate in the UNSAS. Participants should strive to provide a commitment to the higher levels of the UNSAS, with special recognition accorded to those that finalize the commitment by signing the appropriate Memorandum of Understanding._

**Recommendation 7**

_It is imperative that Member States earmark well-trained forces, personnel and appropriate resources for the UNSAS. Pre-identified military, police and civilian elements, as well as equipment must be prepared and retained on short-notice specifically for rapid deployment to UN Operations._
Recommendation 8

*Given the unprecedented demand for civilian police, consideration and personnel should be accorded to the development of national CIVPOL companies and partnership agreements among supportive members to form multinational standby high readiness CIVPOL battalions for UN operations (SHIRPOL) within the framework provided by the UNSAS.*

Recommendation 9

*The UNSAS needs to be promptly re-negotiated to facilitate rapid deployment to UN operations that include a Chapter VII mandate. This might be accommodated by the addition of a fifth level within the arrangement that specifies the personnel and resources that Governments are willing to commit to more demanding Chapter VII operations.*

Recommendation 10

*The UNSAS must be addressed both as an urgent requirement for generating prompt responses to contemporary armed conflict and as an important transitional measure facilitating a renewed commitment to Article 43. It is time to explore the prospects of resurrecting Article 43 as the sixth and highest level of obligation within the UNSAS.*

**Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)**

The Danish-led initiative to develop a Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN operations complements the UNSAS with a complete, integrated unit that has a projected response time of 15-30 days. The objective, and the basis for cooperation, is to provide the UN with a well-trained, cohesive multinational force to be deployed in Chapter VI peacekeeping and humanitarian operations mandated by the Security Council and with the consent of the parties.100

The SHIRBRIG has four primary components. It is directed by a steering committee of senior political and military officials from each participating Member State. They meet on several occasions annually and oversee the brigade’s planning element and staff. The planning element is a permanent unit consisting of 13-15 officers, co-located at a pre-deployment headquarters in Denmark. They work on coordinating the development and preparation of the brigade, and once deployed, they become the nucleus of the SHIRBRIG staff. The staff is a standby headquarters element composed of 59 officers and 10 NCOs from the participating Member States who are responsible for diverse tasks such as command, administration, logistics, communication and civil-military coordination when the brigade is deployed. The brigade pool draws on the national military units of each participating country.101 This pool exceeds the actual requirements of a brigade to ensure sufficient redundancy to compensate for the potential reluctance of one or more participants who may be unwilling to contribute to a specific operation.
When deployed, the SHIRBRIG is to consist of 4,000-5,000 troops, comprising a headquarters company, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, a medical company, a helicopter squadron, as well as engineering and logistical support. This brigade is capable of self-defense and self-sufficiency for a period of sixty days. It is also configured to operate independently at considerable distance from national support bases and prepared for environments where supportive infrastructure may be unavailable. Deployments are to be limited to a maximum six months’ duration.¹⁰²

On December 15, 1996, seven countries signed a letter of intent to cooperate in establishing and maintaining this High Readiness Brigade.¹⁰³ This initial group has expanded, as has the number of members providing a commitment to the actual brigade pool.¹⁰⁴ There are now ten full participants, including Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden.¹⁰⁵ Each has conditionally agreed, albeit on their own specific terms, to provide the equivalent of an infantry battalion and several officers for the headquarters and planning.

The SHIRBRIG arrangement is likely to provide a number of advantages. First, participants have a mutual understanding of their combined capabilities, as well as their specific roles and requirements. This should improve the efficiency of deployment, as well as the safety of troops. Moreover, common procedures have facilitated familiarity, interoperability and joint planning.

Second, SHIRBRIG has the potential to offer the UN relatively prompt access to a pre-established, versatile force. As the Danish Chief of Defense Staff suggests, it should provide the UN Standby Arrangements with a ‘jump start capability’ to deal with the first phases of an emerging or spreading conflict. As deployments are limited to six months there should be fewer excuses and faster responses. If all goes smoothly, there is the potential for response times (from initial notification to actual deployment) within 30 days, rather than the 1990’s average of 3-to-6 months. Nations can still decide whether they will participate in any specific mission, but there will be more flexibility to choose from diverse participants and a larger pool to draw from. Gradually, with a wider commitment to standardized training and operating procedures, familiar equipment and joint exercises, national decision-making processes may also speed up in times of crisis.

Third, aside from establishing a new formation for UN operations, the cooperation by the participating Member States has helped to offset much of the work and assistance usually provided by the DPKO. Unlike most national contingents, which require the majority of their support from
the UN, the SHIRBRIG comes with a relatively complete support package in a relatively timely manner. There has also been significant progress made in developing a full brigade headquarters with its own company and communication facilities, which could be used as a core element (without the larger brigade) in the first phase of a new UN operation. The DPKO and the UNSAS are likely to need access to such a headquarters.

Fourth, it is more cost-effective to pool defense resources in cooperative arrangements, particularly when they are designed to assist the UN. The additional costs for each participant are modest. Denmark provided a facility for the permanent planning element. Training and preparation of military units is conducted as part of their routine national training programs. Once deployed, the UN covers the majority of expenses according to existing rules for reimbursement of both personnel and contingent-owned equipment. The additional costs incurred are largely associated with manning the planning element, the occasional meetings of the steering committee and training seminars for officers of the SHIRBRIG staff.

Fifth, there are indications that coalitions in other regions are thinking of adopting a similar model. From its inception, SHIRBRIG was intended to encourage similar partnerships elsewhere. The idea is attractive and it appears to be spreading. In June 2001, the UN was informed of a new Multinational Peace Force of South-Eastern Europe (SEEBRIG), a brigade-size, ‘on-call’ force, which was to be ready for cooperation within the UN framework. Although arrangements have yet to be finalized, this brigade is to be composed of Turkish, Greek, Italian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Albanian and Macedonian forces. As well, there are indications that a SHIRBRIG-style arrangement remains an objective for countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC). In both cases, however, further development is constrained by a shortage of funds and a lack of appropriate equipment. This calls for renewed efforts to develop partnership agreements between those who retain a surplus of such equipment and those who need it.

Finally, the SHIRBRIG may eventually facilitate the development of a more ambitious, dedicated UN mechanism. In the words of its initial commander, Brigadier-General Finn Saermark Thomsen, the brigade “is the most realistic step towards a standing UN force.” There are additional steps that could be negotiated by those participating within the SHIRBRIG to realize this objective. For one, co-locating earmarked national units at a designated SHIRBRIG base would ensure joint training, common standards and interoperability. In turn, this would increase political
and military confidence, leading to faster response times. Moreover, the optimal way to introduce a Standing UN Capability might be through the establishment of a Standing Multinational SHIRBRIG. If agreed, the latter could provide the necessary structure for recruitment, selection, training and development of personnel, volunteering for service in a new UN Standing Formation. Notably, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has repeatedly expressed enthusiasm for the SHIRBRIG initiative. As he stated,

I truly believe that SHIRBRIG is a model arrangement that finally can begin to address the need and the potential that we all recognize: a small, well-trained, well-equipped force rapidly deployed with an adequate mandate and sufficient support can stop a conflict before it engulfs an entire society.\textsuperscript{111}

In January 2000, the participating Member States informed the UN that the SHIRBRIG was available for deployment. Within the year, it deployed to monitor the cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). It succeeded in its first trial at traditional peacekeeping and helped to avert further violence in a conflict that had already claimed over one hundred thousand lives. By January 1, 2002, the SHIRBRIG was ready for a subsequent deployment.

\textbf{Limitations of the SHIRBRIG}

Although designed as a High Readiness Brigade, specifically for UN Rapid Deployment, the SHIRBRIG has yet to demonstrate its potential. In UNMEE, the time between the UN’s initial request for support and the actual deployment of national units exceeded four months. Although credited with being faster than the alternatives, this is not a satisfactory response time.\textsuperscript{112} Delays stemmed from a combination of slow political decision-making, inadequate support and headquarter arrangements, as well as insufficient prior training. Despite early warning, some governments were obliged to debate their participation in parliaments that had recessed for the summer and were unavailable to provide prompt approval.

Once directly notified that they were to participate, some of the participating military units still required two months to complete training for the operation. Comprehensive prior training for diverse UN Operations would reduce the necessity for an extended period of mission-specific training, thereby reducing the delays in achieving operational readiness, delays in securing authorization and delays in deployment. To date, the SHIRBRIG members have conducted staff
and command training, as well as training exercises for other troop contributors, but little, if any joint training or exercises for the entire brigade aside from the operational experience in UNMEE.

Both the SHIRBRIG and the UNSAS depend upon national approval and appropriately trained national units—conditions that have frequently stymied and slowed responses. UN officials will still face the onerous task of negotiating with each national government selected for a particular operation. Delays in this respect are almost inevitable. As noted, some governments are bound by legislation to an extensive debate prior to authorizing any deployment. As this can jeopardize a rapid response not only at the national level, but also from the other SHIRBRIG members, the onus is on participating governments to reform legislation in a manner that allows for prompt political consultation and decision-making. As they have made an explicit commitment to assist the UN with rapid deployment, these participants should be encouraged to explore the options for ‘fast-tracking’ approval when presented with an urgent request.

National military units are to remain in their home bases. Once deployment is authorized by the UN Security Council and approved by participating members, national units will stage independently from various locations and assemble together for the first time in close proximity to armed conflict. Operational command of the brigade will then be passed to a special representative of the UN Secretary-General or an individual selected to command the mission. Obviously, the multinational planning of the past six years will help, but it may still be difficult to assure sufficient interoperability and a cohesive response within the projected 15-30 days.

Moreover, there may be a need for a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) governing the use of this standby brigade. As initially stipulated, the SHIRBRIG arrangement was to be solely for Chapter VI peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, which would constrain its use in fast-breaking crises that necessitate intervention or preventive deployments under a Chapter VII mandate permitting the limited use of force. As noted, the majority of recent missions have included Chapter VII mandates. However, in February 2002, Norway informed the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that consideration would be given to the potential use of SHIRBRIG in more robust peacekeeping operations, although such a decision could only be taken by the Brigade’s respective members on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{113} Consideration on a case-by-case basis may be helpful, but confirmation of potential availability would be far more encouraging.

Future deployments of the SHIRBRIG may be delayed by other factors. Additional participants will be required, particularly from those inclined to provide a meaningful commitment
to this arrangement. As an Ambassador from a participating member state recently cautioned, “one challenge facing the use of the SHIRBRIG is that a large pool of resources is needed to allow for last minute reductions in resource commitments by individual member states.” Clearly, if it is not to be constrained at the last minute, the pool will have to be larger and the political commitments will have to be deeper.

Moreover, a few of the SHIRBRIG members have been unwilling to earmark or assign forces specifically for this commitment. If tasked to other defense priorities, any contribution to the SHIRBRIG is unlikely. Complementary national defense reforms could elevate the priority accorded to SHIRBRIG, providing it with pre-assigned units and ensuring the availability of appropriate equipment. There are indications that this multinational brigade will require additional support in logistics, as well as strategic air and sealift. Aside from providing a military battalion, the participating Member States could coordinate a better division of labor through functional role specialization in one area of particular need. This might help to offset costs and reduce each participant's independent requirements, particularly in areas such as lift, supply and logistics. It also appears evident that the SHIRBRIG will need a capacity to provide a wider range of services.

SHIRBRIG is a military force. While this facilitated the brigade’s organization, planners would be wise to expand its composition with police and civilians in both planning and deployable elements. It is widely recognized that there are limitations to what military force alone can achieve. To secure respect, legitimacy, and consent (e.g., host nation approval) it is increasingly important, even in rapid deployment, to provide a broader range of incentives and services in the initial stages of a UN operation. The Panel on UN Peace Operations confirmed the importance of civil-military cooperation, reporting that “history has taught that the peacekeepers and peace builders are inseparable partners in complex operations; while the peace builders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peace builder’s work.” As the SHIRBRIG relies upon the assurance of an early exit (6 months), it will be very reliant upon prompt peace building and police work. Additional arrangements may be necessary to ensure these elements are represented and available within the wider pool.

For example, as noted in Recommendation 8, the SHIRBRIG model could be emulated to develop a similar arrangement for civilian police. With a number of Member States considering national CIVPOL companies, they might be encouraged into partnership agreements that formed multinational, standby, high readiness police battalions (SHIRPOL) for UN operations.
Contributions to a future SHIRPOL could be made by any Member State willing to participate and prepare police elements for such a standby capability. Although the SHIRBRIG and SHIRPOL headquarter arrangements could remain distinct, it would be beneficial to ensure that each retained a liaison officer from the other to assist with joint planning, coordination, command exercises, as well as the development of guidelines or doctrine specifying their roles and responsibilities. These military and police elements need not be dependent upon one another, but they should be prepared for simultaneous deployment into a joint operation. Each would retain their own force commander, who once deployed, would be under the direction of the individual assigned to command the mission.

There may also be advantages derived from broadening the geographic representation of the SHIRBRIG participants. While there are exceptions, the majority of nations participating are white, wealthy and from the North. Contributors from other regions would help it to better reflect a universal composition. Contributions of police and civilian elements would ensure a better balance of deployable elements and useful services.

To enhance their potential for rapid deployment, the SHIRBRIG members could also collocate their national contributions at a larger SHIRBRIG base. Any deployment would still be subject to the authorization of the UN Security Council and the explicit approval of each government requested to provide a contribution. This would be a promising precedent for advancing UN Peace Operations. A number of the participants already have experience with similar arrangements in NATO. Aside from the likelihood of faster and more sophisticated responses stemming from prior training and staging out of one location, common basing might foster the political confidence necessary to speed up decisions, as well as consideration of more ambitious arrangements. In effect, co-located national elements would represent a multinational standing capability. This option would not incur great expense for either the UN or participating Member States. Supportive members would simply relocate national elements in service and assign them to a designated base for a one to two year period. In the event of a national crisis, they would be subject to recall. As they would remain multi-tasked to national and UN service, their governments would retain primary responsibility for their administration, pay and benefits. The UN might assume responsibility for incremental costs, including transportation to and from the site, maintenance of facilities, as well as provision of accommodation. Participation in such a UN
capability might provide a degree of recognition and prestige for the contributing nations and the
various services involved.

In short, while SHIRBRIG is a substantive step forward, there remains a need for additional
steps to enhance readiness, reliability, effectiveness and legitimacy.

Recommendation 11

Participating Member States must attempt to streamline or ‘fast-track’ national decision-making to
ensure that the SHIRBRIG, and their potential contribution to the brigade, is not delayed by unduly slow
political and legislative procedures.

Recommendation 12

Partnerships should be encouraged to facilitate political and military support, as well as training
assistance for additional SHIRBRIG-type arrangements in other regions.

Recommendation 13

Given the evolving nature of UN peace support operations, SHIRBRIG participants will have to re-
negotiate the terms under which they may accept more demanding, ‘robust’ operations, including those
that entail Chapter VII mandates and the potential use of force.

Recommendation 14

To help ensure the availability of national contingents, Governments participating in the SHIRBRIG
must be encouraged to earmark units specifically for this commitment. Combat readiness must also be
supplemented with comprehensive prior training for diverse UN Peace Operations.

Recommendation 15

While the initial planning of the brigade has focused on the development of a multinational force, it is
time to consider the development of national CIVPOL companies and partnership agreements to form
multinational standby high readiness, SHIRPOL battalions. Similarly, plans should now be expanded to
include civilian peace building elements that address ‘human needs.’

Recommendation 16

SHIRBRIG members should be encouraged to pursue functional role specialization in several of the
areas that require additional resources. For example, rather than have each carry a long independent
national logistics train, such a task can be either shared or selected by one or two participants as their
contribution. Similarly, one country might provide modern communications while another provided air or
sealift.

Recommendation 17

To ensure legitimacy, impartiality and consent, political efforts should be devoted to attracting broad
regional representation and additional SHIRBRIG participants. While a further measure of redundancy
may not be a prerequisite to deployment, additional participants could facilitate rapidity and effectiveness.

Recommendation 18

Within the next three years, it would be beneficial to co-locate military, police and civilian elements at a
dedicated SHIRBRIG base.
SECTION III: Modest Success but Major Gaps

Moving beyond the pragmatic, incremental approach to accelerate the process

The period since the Millennium has been characterized by a surge of official efforts to improve UN peace operations, particularly peacekeeping. Combined, the reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the high-level Panel on UN Peace Operations and the subsequent Comprehensive Review of the Secretary-General have served to refocus attention and provide much-needed direction. Finally, there is wide international agreement, if not consensus, supporting the proposed agenda.

It is apparent that numerous recommendations have already been acted upon and implemented. Consolidating these and other recommended reforms is likely to require another two years of work from the Secretariat and the Member States.

It is evident that the current approach is similar to that of the former (1995-97) multinational initiative to enhance rapid deployment: both emphasized reform and adaptation through pragmatic and incremental measures pursued within official forums. Both reflected an international political culture, which insists on reforms, but only those that can be implemented within the limits of available resources. The wider package now appears acceptable to the majority of Member States as it builds largely on familiar, existing arrangements. The underlying assumption was that technical and administrative modifications might help to inspire political will, slowly shifting the attitudes and the behavior of Member States. To minimize controversy and maintain official support little that was particularly ambitious was requested.

This pragmatic and incremental approach can be credited with prompting modest changes at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. As noted, the UNSAS has been refined for more active use in generating assistance for rapid deployment and seventy-three Member States have provided conditional commitments. Participating States have developed a better understanding of the various requirements. Efforts to expand the ‘on-call’ lists of military officers and civilian specialist are ongoing, but by 2002, they had already attracted a tentative list sufficient to staff the majority of posts for one UN mission headquarters. With further contributions, it might be considered deployable.
The SHIRBRIG is assumed to be ready for a future operation. It was also successful in its first trial, managing a traditional peacekeeping operation and managing a relatively prompt exit, if not a rapid entry. Member States in other regions are interested in emulating this model, as inferred by the announced development of SEEBRIG.

The DPKO is in the midst of a substantive restructuring with a number of important new offices, as well as additional personnel and stable, core funding. Although the organizational restructuring of the Department is scheduled for completion by 2004, there are indications that it is considerably ahead of the projected timetable. Many countries are also interested in ensuring their personnel are selected for the new DPKO posts. Although initially viewed as a long shot, there has been widespread support for ensuring the UN has a strategic reserve of pre-positioned critical material, equipment and mission start-up kits at its logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. An integrated mission task force (IMTF) is being used to assist coordination of peace building efforts in Afghanistan. IMTFs have attracted support as useful mechanisms for mission-specific coordination and support activities. Although still controversial and subject to opposition, there have been modest improvements in training and developing the wider unity of effort and purpose between those engaged in military, civilian and police functions.

For its part, the Security Council appears to have recognized the need for a consultative forum with the contributors. In January 2002, the President of the Security Council provided the outline of a new cooperation mechanism for joint meetings of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and troop-contributing countries. It has also understood the importance of mission mandates that include a combination of promising incentives and credible disincentives. The composition of recent missions suggests that there has at least been an attempt to ensure more robust capabilities for operations beyond traditional peacekeeping.

Combined, these arrangements are establishing the institutional foundation for peacekeeping. Gradually, this foundation may generate wider support and confidence. This has not been an easy process. Considering the impediments of limited political will, insufficient funding and overworked personnel answerable to 189 bosses with divergent interests, the wider package of modest reforms should not be underestimated. An institutional foundation for peacekeeping might yet be a preliminary foundation for more ambitious steps.

These recent reforms were also attained in the absence of powerful statesmen committed to championing the cause. Moreover, most observers recognize that the larger UN System is not
altogether amenable to rapid modernization. Indeed, the various efforts were somewhat akin to constructing a multi-faceted, evolving foundation for peacekeeping through several fractious forums. In such a context, even modest steps can attract the impression that they constitute major change and a solution to previous problems.

**Limitations of the Approach**

Numerous problematic gaps remain. At the forefront, it is clear that the UN does not have a rapid deployment capability. While the majority of recent efforts are laudable and helpful, they are insufficient to provide rapid and reliable responses to diverse emergencies.

At the political level, there is a wider appreciation of the commitment-capacity gap. Even recent resolutions of the UN Security Council acknowledge “the problem of the commitment gap with regard to personnel and equipment for peacekeeping operations…”\(^{117}\) Yet, aside from encouraging others to recognize their responsibilities, there has been little leadership or substantive support from the permanent five members of the Security Council. Furthermore, despite widespread rhetoric about rapid deployment, the list of tangible commitments is very short. This has diminished the UN’s capacity to address new challenges, particularly the avowed commitments of its members. As the Panel on UN Peace Operations reported, the one major impediment to effective crisis-preventive action is the gap between verbal postures and financial and political support for prevention.\(^{118}\) In June 2000, the UN Secretary-General drew attention to the greater problem when he stated:

> Where the will is not there and the resources are not available, the UN peacekeepers will arrive late. It takes us on the average 4-5 months to put troops on the ground because we have no troops. The UN doesn't have an army. We borrow from our governments. So we can put on the ground the troops the governments offer. And as fast as they come, and not always with the equipment they promised. If those with the capacity were to cooperate, the UN can do the job, we would arrive on time, not late.\(^{119}\)

Yet those with the capacity seldom cooperate fully.\(^{120}\) For a number of affluent Western Member States, the political will to contribute declined markedly with a fear of casualties and apprehension over extended commitments and increasing costs.\(^{121}\) By 1995, it was evident that ‘donor fatigue’ – both weariness and frustration with recurring demands and stretched resources – would reduce the
will and contributions of those who assumed they were less directly affected by distant conflicts. There is little to indicate that this gap in political will has been narrowed.

In turn, the heavy burden has been quietly shifted onto developing countries, which now provide over seventy percent of the personnel for UN Peacekeeping Operations. 122 Aside from offering their human and material resources, and assuming the risks, these poorer countries are also carrying much of the financial burden. Although reimbursement of troops and contingent-owned equipment is agreed in advance, the UN has not been able to fully pay these countries due to the arrears of the wealthiest and the withholding of their assessed contributions. In response, several Member States initially argued that instead of expanding the offices, personnel and funding allocated to the DPKO, the first priority should be the prompt repayment of funds owed to those that have contributed. 123 Fears also persist that the UN will simply redistribute scarcity and shift resources away from current development programs to peace operations. 124

This funding gap is widely attributed to one Member State. 125 It also coincides with legitimate concerns about an increasingly unrepresentative, two-tiered system that is far too selective and slow. 126 With rising frequency, the UN has discovered that those with the capabilities tend to be unwilling and those who are willing tend to lack the capabilities. 127 It is not difficult to understand why those who are willing are not pleased by the reluctance of the most capable. A confidence gap has emerged between the directors and those deploying. This also reflects a leadership gap in the UN Security Council and a responsibility gap in its reluctance to maintain the peace and security of Africa.

In short, the Commitment-Capacity Gap has negative implications at nearly every level of UN Operations. It also limits the funding, political will and support necessary to develop a UN Rapid Deployment Capability.

With few exceptions, response times have not improved. This is primarily a political problem. It is the government of each Member State that decides how it will respond to a request for assistance. Recently, many have tended to wait, defer and decline participation. As noted, even when the conditions are favorable, the time between a Security Council mandate authorizing a mission and the deployment of national troops still averages 4-to-5 months. Despite the security risks, recent missions have been mounted with little more than half the personnel strength assumed necessary.
Although the conditions have since changed with unprecedented demand and added complexity, it is noteworthy that in an earlier era, Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart demonstrated that peacekeeping operations could be arranged in hours, deployed in days, and frequently be at full strength within a week. Subsequent events in Somalia and Rwanda confirmed fears that there might be no international response, even to genocide. These were among the concerns that prompted the multinational initiative of the Friends of Rapid Deployment. During this initiative in 1996, Kofi Annan claimed that the lead-time of the UN's rapid deployment capabilities would be reduced by 50 percent during the next two years. Hopes were high, but not easily sustained. They were premised primarily upon the anticipated support of the Member States, the expansion of the UNSAS and the development of a permanent rapidly deployable mission headquarters. By the spring of 2000, UN officials had scaled back their expectations to the point that they suggested rapid deployment would have to be conceived of as a response within four-to-six months.

Since the report of the UN Panel on Peace Operations, the UN Secretariat has worked to support their recommended response times. As indicated, the Panel called for deployment within 30 days of a Security Council mandate for a traditional operation and 90 days for more complex operations. In contrast, the modern defense establishments that retain national rapid deployment forces tend to prepare for sending initial units within 24-48 hours (usually both reconnaissance and air-borne battalions), as staging commences for moving light, mechanized brigade-groups within two weeks and heavy, large divisions within the month. Having scaled back the interpretation of rapid deployment to between 30 and 90 days, the UN and the Member States may be better positioned to meet these standards. But few outside the UN System will consider a response within 90 days as constituting rapid deployment. This is more likely to be seen as a modest improvement on a desperate situation. More troubling is the likelihood that these response times are simply too slow to prevent fast-breaking crises from escalating. When conflicts degenerate into armed violence, they tend to spread at a speed that exceeds these response times.

Such standards do provide an indication of the difficulties encountered in addressing the *time gap* or *response gap* within the existing system. Although there have been other supportive changes, these new standards will remain largely dependent upon the same arrangements that formerly prompted high hopes and recurring delays.

The UN Secretariat now has an updated list of, and occasional access to, the troops, police and critical equipment of the Member States through conditional standby arrangements that are
subject to national approval and availability. As the Organization has repeatedly experienced, it has little, if any, assurance that these assets will be provided promptly for rapid deployment to demanding operations. Securing access to strategic air and sealift is time consuming and often very expensive to arrange, particularly when the destination is into the midst of a war. Rapid deployment requires a level of reliability and immediate access that current arrangements cannot provide.

At the operational level, there have been several encouraging changes. Nevertheless, the lack of a permanent rapidly deployable mission headquarters and a reliable surge capacity are troubling voids. New ‘on-call’ lists may generate a Headquarters’ Team if the conditions are acceptable, but it will be difficult to quickly assemble 154 highly specialized military and civilian personnel from different countries into a cohesive operational headquarters. This arrangement appears insufficient to ensure the prompt start of a difficult mission or its effective management in the critical early stages.

At the tactical level, there are shared concerns about the capacity and competence of some national contingents. These have prompted numerous proposals to improve discipline, training and equipment. When neglected, these issues can increase the risks to personnel and jeopardize the success of a mission. As well, they tend to determine the extent to which Member States are willing to cooperate with one another and whether or not they will participate in a particular operation. To effect rapid deployment, there has to be prior assurance of capacity and competence, with higher standards in most categories. Preparing national and multinational contingents that are interoperable and cohesive has already proven to be a difficult challenge.

Irrespective of any urgent need, the UN is likely to experience many of the same problems that previously impeded rapid deployment. Within existing arrangements, the short-list of requirements includes: pre-authorized funding, approval from a dozen national governments for deployment of their personnel, immediate access to well-trained military, police and civilian experts, as well as contingent-owned equipment, sufficient staff for a mission headquarters, sound coordination, planning, administration, sufficient support, logistics and communication, as well as an assurance of movement to and within the mission area. Overall, this is a complex, interdependent system that cannot function effectively in the absence of any aspect. Nor can it function rapidly or reliably, if the most critical elements have to be negotiated in the midst of an emergency.130
When assessed on the basis of the aforementioned criteria, the recent results are definitely mixed. The pragmatic and incremental approach has facilitated modest progress. Yet, there are no immediate technical or administrative solutions to political problems. At least, they have revitalized a process, shifted attitudes in a few key areas, established new positions and an institutional foundation within DPKO and encouraged further consideration of the requirements. Gradually, the political context may change, as may the prospects for further cooperation.

At this stage, however, there are few, if any, indications that the current approach will be sufficient to bridge the *Commitment-Capacity Gap* or the related gaps pertaining to political will and funding, representation, response times, and reliability, training and equipment. It is evident that the UN will continue to be confronted with delays in securing sufficient resources, well-trained personnel and adequate mechanisms for rapid deployment.

While addressing reform to short-term requirements and employing the ‘minimum threshold of change’ principle may give the impression of progress, it also entails the twin risk of confining efforts and overlooking critical future needs. As Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, warned, “if we continue to define our required capacities strictly based on the bare minimum needed today and only today, then we will be no better off two to three years down the road.”

Moreover, in an era characterized by increasing complexity and unprecedented change, a pragmatic, incremental approach runs the risk of being simply too slow to cope. In the UN System, efforts to modernize and adapt to new circumstances are also constrained by an official culture that recognizes the limitations of existing arrangements, but is unwilling to advocate for anything more.

A prominent example is the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Over the past seven years, this Committee has repeated numerous modest recommendations for enhancing UN rapid deployment. However, it has not been willing to consider or call for a bold new departure beyond existing arrangements. In its report of July 2001, this Committee reaffirmed support for seven of the less controversial recommendations pertaining to rapid deployment that had already been raised in both the Brahimi Report and the Comprehensive Review. The objective during that session was to ensure progress in strengthening the DPKO. In the subsequent session in February 2002, it was agreed that the priority would be on improving rapid deployment, although the discussion focused primarily on implementing several of the earlier proposed reforms. Moreover, while this session commenced with near unanimous support for enhancing UN rapid
deployment, it concluded without a substantive new proposal in this respect. What initially appeared to be a very promising agenda was diminished throughout the consultative process and downplayed in the Committee’s Report. Once again, numerous supportive concerns and ideas were ignored.

While stressing that it should be the forum for the discussion of new proposals, this Committees’ record indicates that it is not a forum that will seriously consider or encourage proposals for new mechanisms or requests for further resources. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping tends to be an exceptionally slow and cautious forum, partially because it proceeds on the basis of securing agreement from each participating Member State and a consensus among their regional affiliates. While useful in facilitating an exchange of official positions and preferences from over 100 Member States, this Committee is not inclined, nor presently capable of accelerating the sort of adaptation and modernization required.

As a result, the more recent arrangements reflect the pursuit of agreement only slightly above the level of the lowest common denominator. The context placed a priority on modest short-term, technical and administrative changes that could be promoted among different states without major controversy, major funding or major national contributions. Few can be heralded as visionary, courageous gestures that correspond to the wider human security challenges of the new millennium.

Further, when pursued solely in the quiet, official forum of international politics, an incremental, pragmatic approach also tends to be insufficient for attracting a broad constituency or inspiring more ambitious steps. Few efforts were made to build a coalition among NGOs, related agencies and the interested public, effectively limiting the leverage and political pressure that is needed to launch further reforms.

As previously noted, the UN Charter sets forth the obligations of Member States to uphold international peace and security through the more binding arrangements outlined in Chapter VII, Article 43. In response to the widespread and persistent reluctance to meet these obligations, there have been a number of related calls for some form of standing UN rapid deployment capability or Permanent UN Force.

Unfortunately, at the official level, these aspirations remain largely ignored with bold proposals being frequently downplayed as unviable, premature and unworthy of concerted effort. A common vision of complementary and mutually reinforcing initiatives has not been sufficiently
articulated or endorsed by the UN or supportive Member States. In attempting to balance principle and pragmatism, the bar was dropped to effect what the Panel on UN Peace Operations described as the minimum threshold of change needed. As a result, recent reports overlooked the more ambitious steps and new mechanisms that might gradually ensure the Organization could fulfill assigned tasks. At the official level, this vision gap has reinforced the perception that the current approach is the only feasible option.

Yet the larger task is far from finished. If rapid deployment is a demanding concept, it is an even more difficult reality to achieve. The Organization must be sure of each critical element in the process. As the Secretary-General confirmed, missing components and conditional agreements lead to delays. Increasingly, it is understood within the Organization and civil society that delays not only risk lives, they incur the additional expense of later, larger efforts.

For many governments, however, there is a strong preference for political and economic expediency that overrides any enlightened calculation of paying modestly now or substantively later. It is not simply that governments prefer “later”; most simply want to avoid any additional expense or investment in the UN. Clearly, there is little prospect of developing a new UN Rapid Deployment Capability if the Member States adhere to a zero growth budget. Already, their demands for fiscal austerity and cost cutting have jeopardized the UN's capacity to conduct peace operations, as well as the Organization's credibility and future. Notably, demands for a lower, no-growth budget arose within a period of increasing demand for UN assistance and intense operational activity worldwide. Again, it was a case of powerful member states increasing expectations and assigning new tasks while actually reducing the UN's capacity to cope. This is a poignant reflection of the commitment-capacity gap that must be addressed if the UN is to develop a reliable rapid deployment capability. Without tangible commitments to enhance the UN's capacity, this gap renders international discussions of preventing armed conflict and genocide or advancing “human security” and the “responsibility to protect” as little more than nice standards and new principles to flout in public, but overlook in practice. In short, the UN budget is now insufficient and will need to be increased to ensure the Organization can fulfill assigned tasks.

The experience of the past few years has demonstrated that the UN needs help to develop a reliable and effective rapid deployment capability. Similarly, even supportive Member States need help to revitalize related efforts. Neither will be able to escape the need for a common vision, innovative practices, as well as additional funding and new mechanisms. But, the task is simply
too demanding and too urgent to be relegated solely to the Organization and interested governments. There are options.

It is time for a far more inclusive and cooperative approach that draws on the respective strengths of all supportive parties. A new “soft power” approach may have the potential to attract wider assistance, mobilize a broad-based coalition and constituency of support, prompt further partnerships and restore political will. Both the Security Council and other Member States are likely to need powerful encouragement to resume and expand this process.

At present, there are no indications further steps or new initiatives will be actively pursued at the political level. Since 1996, many national diplomats have shared a concern that there be no further initiatives in this area. However, over the past year the political context has changed, partially as a result of the diverse reports and the larger cooperative endeavor. Within two years, the UN will likely be in a position to accommodate more far-reaching measures. Gradually, some officials are recognizing the importance and potential opportunity for further initiatives. Finally, there is an institutional foundation upon which to build more ambitious mechanisms. Increasingly, it is recognized that they will be needed. But, political change will not be forthcoming without new political effort and initiatives. In this respect, there are several preliminary, yet critical, requirements.

First, the need for a wider educational process is evident. A few unsupportive parties have generated suspicion and a unique degree of paranoia over the UN Rapid Deployment Initiative. To allay such concerns and restore wider support, there is a need for an explanation of the costs and benefits regionally, as well as universally. Demonstrating the potential benefits may help to inspire a broader base of support. In the near term, a UN rapid deployment capability should help to prevent and limit some violent conflicts, not all. That is progress, as well as an indication of potential. Progress will also depend on the extent to which further efforts are organized, informed and democratized. Information technology, the transnational network of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the global media provide new means for directing related educational efforts at the governments of UN Member States and civil society. New partnerships in and between each level will be necessary to stimulate forward momentum, as well as new ideas and approaches. While public diplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon, it has already demonstrated remarkable influence, particularly on initiatives such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the International Criminal Court. To generate momentum and support, it may soon
be necessary to move this initiative beyond official UN councils, assemblies and committees. A parallel forum coordinated by the wider NGO community and partners within civil society might be appealing to many Member States and even the UN Secretariat. This would bring a measure of transparency and political accountability to a process that has frequently been obscured and delayed behind closed doors.

Reliable information will be a key component in any such campaign. In this respect, the academic community is also needed, as independent analysis will be necessary to generate ideas that move events. Encouraging a clearer appreciation of the issues and current arrangements will increase confidence and a commitment to continue building on the current foundation with more far-reaching measures. These are necessary steps toward acquiring wider political influence and leverage, as well as attracting powerful political champions. The latter can only lead as far as their constituents are prepared to provide support. As the Carnegie Commission noted, “although the prevention of deadly conflict requires many tools and strategies, bold leadership and an active constituency are essential, fundamental requirements for these tools to be effective.”

Moreover, if rapid deployment is to succeed as a legitimate and widely valued mechanism for conflict prevention, a far more comprehensive and sophisticated approach is needed. Whereas much attention has been devoted to ensuring sufficient “hard power” (military forces) capable of restoring security, greater efforts will have to be devoted to ensuring they are accompanied by civilian elements that can restore hope and address human needs. Complex political emergencies will demand prompt attention from both. The promising work to develop a greater unity of effort in field operations now needs to be accompanied by a similar unity of effort to influence the political level. In this respect, there is increasing evidence that the importance of revitalizing and expanding upon UN rapid deployment capabilities has attracted wider interest and started to establish a common bridge between those within the peace and security communities, the partnership for effective peacekeeping, the peace building network and those concerned with social justice issues. Numerous prominent bodies such as the Commission on Global Governance, the World Federalist Association, the Campaign for United Nations Reform, Refugees International, the Center for Defense Information, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the recent Millennium Forum have called for a UN rapid deployment capability, including some form of Permanent UN Standing Force. Cora Weiss, President of the Hague Appeal for Peace, has
identified several of the key problems, as well as the need for a more concerted effort from civil society:

The UN needs a voluntary international military force under a single command and control. What is lacking is the political will and funding. Civil society needs to organize to muster that will and those funds...The Secretary-General's proposal for a rapid intervention force needs our support.\textsuperscript{140}

While the notion of a UN standing capability has been deliberately relegated to obscurity at the official level, the need for such a capability has not diminished. Nor has the wider interest. In the earlier words of Stephen Kinloch, “driven back, the idea will, as in the past, ineluctably re-emerge, Phoenix-like, at the most favorable opportunity.”\textsuperscript{141}

Once again, the idea has resurfaced. Despite skepticism at the official level, this may be a favorable opportunity; one, which affords sufficient time to organize interested parties and to prepare more detailed plans for the required capability. Clearly, if informed and coordinated, civil society could accelerate this process. Among the challenges that warrant consideration are:

- Identification of interested parties on a transnational basis;
- Preparation and circulation of a background paper to solicit general agreement and support for enhancing UN rapid deployment capabilities as a foundation for the development of a UN Emergency Service;
- Development of an institutional base of expertise with working groups directed to specific requirements;
- Encouragement of further cooperation and partnerships at all levels of civil society; and
- Preparation of the groundwork for national, international and transnational initiatives.

Recommendation 19

\textit{Supportive parties must work to coordinate a comprehensive political approach to accelerate the process of adaptation and modernization. This should be directed not only to focus the Security Council and revitalize the Member States, but also to empower a transnational coalition and constituency of support among citizens, Non-Governmental Organizations, related agencies and academic communities.}

Recommendation 20

\textit{Reliable information will be required to generate a broader public and professional understanding of current UN Rapid Deployment initiatives and the various options available for enhancing these efforts. Government, institutional or foundation assistance for developing a focused research program and a series of conferences addressing the issues of rapid deployment would be a tangible commitment to the process.}

Recommendation 21

\textit{It is time to plan for a new parallel forum on UN Rapid Deployment; one that can help launch and sustain a supportive transnational initiative. It will be important to ensure that this is an inclusive, open forum that encourages broad participation, as well as the identification of options and impediments.}
Recommendation 22

As a zero-growth budget limits the UN’s capacity to fulfill assigned tasks and impedes any prospect of the Organization developing a reliable rapid deployment capability, serious consideration must be accorded to new innovative methods for generating additional funding. It may be appropriate to revise the scale of assessments to reflect a percentage of national military expenditure or a tax on exports of military equipment.

SECTION IV: The Case For and Against a UN Standing Capability

Over the past decade there have been numerous calls for the development of some form of a Standing UN Rapid Deployment Capability. Among the prominent options put forth are a dedicated UN Legion of Professional Volunteers, a Permanent UN Rapid Deployment Brigade, a UN Constabulary, a Standing UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force and a UN Standing Emergency Group. Many of the proposals share a number of common objectives.

First, it is assumed that a dedicated UN mechanism would help address the gap associated with insufficient political will. As the Organization would have its own discrete capability there would be fewer immediate demands on governments to provide personnel for the difficult and often risky, initial stages of demanding operations.

Second, it is seen as a means to address the commitment-capacity gap, by ensuring the UN has at least another option; one which is immediately available to intervene when there is an urgent requirement to prevent armed conflict, stop genocide and protect civilians.

Third, whereas national standby arrangements provide little assurance that the UN will be able to mount an operation, a UN standing capability would not be constrained by the need to acquire approval and meet the conditions of each participating Member State. The latter is regarded as more reliable.

Fourth, a standing capability is viewed as the optimum way to eliminate the time-gap between a UN mandate and the long period before the actual start of a mission. Standing deployable elements with prior training would be more rapid as they could immediately prepare for departure following authorization from the Security Council. Rather than plan for deployment within 30-to-90 days, there would be the potential to send initial elements within days, lighter elements within the week, with concurrent staging for heavier units that would follow within 2 weeks.
Fifth, as most designs project a more sophisticated capability – selecting the best military, police and civilian recruits worldwide and providing prior training, as well as appropriate equipment – it is considered a development that would bridge the preparedness and competence gap. Command and control, as well as cohesion, high standards and interoperability are easier to develop in a standing formation.

Sixth, it follows that a dedicated UN element with a universal composition of those volunteering to serve the Organization would help to alleviate much of the legitimacy gap, as well as the representational gap. The burden of responsibility for preventing armed conflict would be more equitably shared.

Seventh, a UN standing capability is considered be more cost-effective than the alternatives. Increasingly it is recognized that later, larger efforts to contain and manage conflicts, once they have become violent, tend to be very expensive, difficult and time-consuming; often defying resolution and any prospect of an early exit.

Finally, a standing UN rapid deployment capability is viewed as representing the higher ideal of a universal system for preventing armed conflict, protecting civilians and enforcing international law. In this respect, it is seen as a potentially critical step toward an effective and empowered UN. Further, it is regarded as a critical hinge in transforming an international security system, characterized by high risks, periods of high tension, high national defense expenditures and a very limited capacity to address the security needs of the majority of people and States.

Despite these objectives and perceived advantages, the issue of a UN standing capability remains very controversial. It is also subject to considerable opposition. Although the concerns of the Member States vary, often in relation to vested interests and national priorities, the wider issue has been clouded by considerable suspicion, apprehension and misinformation. The case against further consideration of this option is often premised on eight general concerns.\textsuperscript{148}

First, it is argued that it is impractical given the absence of political support. Even in the 1995 Canadian study, which outlined a UN Standing Emergency Group and encouraged further consideration and study of the option, it was acknowledged that, “no broad or even significant international support, much less consensus, currently exists for taking such a step in the short to medium term.”\textsuperscript{149}

Second, the divisions among the UN Member States, particularly those related to distrust of the Security Council are often cited as a near insurmountable impediment to any such development.
In the earlier words of former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, “it is going to take an awful lot of persuasion to make developing countries give up their reservations about vesting power in the Security [Council] to call up its own force without having to put together the usual balanced multinational group. And the Permanent Five and quite a few others are going to be very cautious about accepting a force under the day to day direction of the Secretary-General.”  

*Third*, formerly there were justifiable warnings that the UN was not ready to manage its own rapid deployment capability and that there would be risks in introducing a controversial new departure, when the Organization was struggling to cope with unprecedented demands. Although promising changes have occurred, it is important to note Lee Hamilton’s earlier caution that, “there is a danger in overloading an already overburdened system with proposals which may tear the fabric of cooperation.”

*Fourth*, there are legitimate, related concerns that there would be additional expenses associated with any such development, which might render it unfeasible for an Organization that is chronically constrained by limited funding. Citing an array of potential obstacles, Adam Roberts correctly observed that, “the financing of a standing UN force, whether volunteer or composed of national contingents would be difficult. Some States have ruled out the standing force option on what are basically financial grounds.” Others have inflated the personnel and cost requirements in an attempt to foreclose on any further consideration or study of the option.

*Fifth*, it has been argued that there are likely to be too many complex issues involved in developing such a capability, leaving some to doubt its desirability and practicality. While supporting further study and the development of definite plans, Field Marshall Lord Carver expressed similar apprehension, noting that, “the practical objections are many, including training, legal status and the maintenance of discipline, and the quality and suitability of personnel.”

*Sixth*, among established powers, it is viewed as a feasible development, but one frequently objected to on the grounds that there is no justification for any step that might create what is construed as a large UN force for a supranational authority. To cite one prominent example, U.S. Senator Jesse Helms led opposition to a small UN rapidly deployable mission headquarters, arguing that it would be a harbinger of world government.

*Seventh*, conversely, others view the option as having limited potential, largely because the size and structure of the capability would be limited. According to Adam Roberts, “the proposal for a small quick reaction force risks an under-estimation of the size of forces required for certain
urgent tasks.” Questions arise as to whether a relatively discrete capability would be worth the effort if it still lacked a capacity to deal effectively with larger peace enforcement operations or conflicts similar to Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan.\footnote{157}

Finally, there are those who oppose any development of a standing UN capability on the grounds that its proponents are simply misinformed; that it is not needed and that it reflects a slavish insistence on an unrealizable dream; one that will never happen. Retired Lt. Colonel Alex Morrison, claims that related proposals and discussions “have revealed a lack of understanding of all of the factors involved in such a course of action, including those of command and control, finance, training, and freedom of use and movement.”\footnote{158} In a 1994 article, this author wrote, that “the UN has rarely, if ever, experienced difficulties in finding the military forces needed to take part in a particular mission,” and that with current arrangement and actions taken by individual States, “there is already in existence all the SMF [standing military force] the UN will ever need.”\footnote{159} Given the evident changes over the past decade, these are difficult arguments to sustain. The need is apparent; difficulties in securing national personnel have been repeatedly experienced, despite slavish insistence on current arrangements; and, those proposing a new UN capability understand many, if not all the factors involved. It is noteworthy that in an earlier period, it was also widely assumed people would never walk on the moon, there would never be an end to the Cold War, and the peaceful demise of apartheid would never happen. Prevailing conditions are far from immutable.

To date, the development of a standing UN rapid deployment capability has not attracted broad support among the majority of UN Member States. In fact, one of the more powerful arguments against it is that most Member States are not ready to provide the necessary approval or funding. In the absence of such support, the UN Secretariat has simply attempted to avoid the issue, while working to increase cooperation and confidence in the institutional foundation for peacekeeping. For its part, the UN Security Council has repeatedly narrowed the options, expressing preference for a standby system, but not a standing capability. Without the lead of prominent statesmen and influential Member States, other governments have an easy excuse to pursue less challenging options. The further development of regional organizations is the preferred alternative of many Western defense establishments, although NATO and the European Union are virtually alone in having the capabilities. Similarly, there is also interest in delegating such tasks to “coalitions of the willing,” premised on the example of the Australian-led, multinational force that
restored a semblance of order in East Timor after most of the cleansing and killing had subsided.\textsuperscript{160} A few governments have even expressed interest in delegating UN peace operations to mercenaries on the dubious premise that they might generate both profits and better results from private security firms.\textsuperscript{161}

Many of the recent troop contributors, particularly developing countries, favor the current system as it provides a source of revenue with the UN paying a set fee to participating governments for each individual provided.\textsuperscript{162} The Member States in this category, which also constitute the more influential members of the Non-Aligned Movement, remain committed to a strict interpretation of sovereignty and non-intervention without the consent of the host governments.\textsuperscript{163} In particular, many do not want a greater capacity for intervention to be ceded to the UN Security Council. As well, there are concerns that a UN rapid deployment capability, particularly a standing force, might develop into a larger supra-national army that would be used by the major powers to enforce their will on smaller sovereign states.\textsuperscript{164} Conversely, some governments represented on the UN Security Council oppose the development of a discrete standing capability on the implicit assumption that it may gradually impede or offset their capacity to control conflicts independently, in a manner that serves their national interests. Rather than encourage a more effective United Nations, the most powerful government has demonstrated a preference for eschewing multilateral cooperation and treaties while pursuing massive increases in defense spending.

Although a promising foundation has been established within the UN to plan, manage and support operations, there is a recurring refrain among governments and defense establishments that the UN continues to be incapable of such tasks. Given the persistence of this claim, it now appears to be a deliberately perpetuated myth construed by those who are opposed to the UN having a lead role in conflict prevention and management. Sir Brian Urquhart is correct to note, “the argument that the UN does not have the capacity to direct and control complex operations is often made by governments that really do not want it to do so.”\textsuperscript{165} Such arguments will be increasingly difficult to sustain, but it is apparent they have generated skepticism, as well as a wider reluctance to provide resources and further support.

Nevertheless, in a world characterized by unprecedented change, it is inevitable that there will be new standards, new precedents and eventually new mechanisms. These arise out of perceived needs, often after it is recognized that longstanding arrangements are incapable of coping with the demands of a new environment. It is also inevitable that there will be opposition to such
change, particularly when it challenges an established order, as well as traditional thinking, priorities and practices.

Notably, over the past decade, the traditional interpretation of sovereignty has been largely eclipsed by the onset of globalization, particularly increasing economic, political and environmental interdependence. With the attendant fragmentation and failure of many States jeopardizing common interests, numerous precedents have been set to intervene when there are threats to international peace and security or gross violations of human rights, including genocide. While host nation consent remains preferable to the United Nations and the majority of Member States, the conditions for acquiring it in the midst of internal conflict have often been elusive. Contemporary conflict is not only challenging traditional ideas and approaches to peacekeeping, it is shifting international security priorities and establishing new principles.

Already, the definition of international peace and security has been expanded well beyond the limits previously considered the norm. Humanitarian emergencies, humanitarian assistance in areas of conflict, failed States, intra-state conflict and civil wars have all been categorized by the Security Council as matters of international peace and security. Although there are exceptions, the notion of protecting one’s own citizens at home is quite familiar to most governments, most of the time. The responsibility to protect others abroad, however, is another new standard that many sovereign States find quite challenging. For repressive regimes, the fear is that –what goes around might come around. Couple such a standard, as well as others for upholding human rights and human security to a new UN mechanism for intervention, and it is quite easy to see why some are unnerved and, for the time being, opposed.

In the absence of broad political support, the question of funding may appear secondary, but it is perceived as a primary impediment. As the UN has already been hurt by insufficient funding, failure to pay assessed contributions and no growth budgets, it is imperative to avoid further debts and damage. Moreover, it is evident that any standing capability would incur quite considerable expenses for the Organization. On this basis, it has been claimed that there is no justification for the additional expense; that the cost of salaries, equipment and maintenance of a standing capability render it unfeasible. A more critical question, however, is whether this would be a sound, cost-effective investment. While it is difficult to provide a definitive answer, recent experience provides some clarification of the opportunity costs.
To cite one example, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, who commanded the tragic UN operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR) claimed that prompt access to a force of 5,000 well-trained soldiers could have prevented much of the genocide. In response to Dallaire's pleas for further troops, which might have cost $200-300 million (U.S), the international community simply delayed for three months. After initially refusing to help, while 800,000 people were slaughtered, it then poured several billion dollars into relief for refugees and reconstruction aid.

Yet, the violence triggered in Rwanda did not stop there as armed conflict gradually spilled over into neighboring States and spread throughout much of the Great Lakes region. There is no fair estimate of the human and financial costs since 1993, as a genocide that could have been avoided continues to thwart peace and development. This bad precedent was also a factor in fostering a wider culture of impunity, premised on the assumption that one could get away with mass murder and crimes against humanity as long as the interests of the great powers are not challenged.

Moreover, while the vast majority of UN Member States have considered the costs of UN peace operations to be worth their investment, it is not an inexpensive endeavour. In recent years, the financial cost of UN peacekeeping has hovered between $2-3 billion (U.S.) annually. As noted in the Comprehensive Review, “…there have been an average of 14 to 16 operations over the past 10 to 12 years, and that periods of apparent lull in peacekeeping activity have been followed by a sudden and dramatic increase of activity.” Notably, after an apparent lull between 1997 and 1998, there has been another dramatic surge in peacekeeping activity over the past three years.

One lesson derived from this body of experience is that when delays in securing approval and deployment fail to stem violence, there tend to be far higher costs and lower prospects of success. First, as the violence spreads, larger forces are required. Second, these forces are usually needed for a longer time period, often beyond the point where belligerents have fought to a stalemate. Third, in both inter-state and intra-state wars, the fighting destroys much of the infrastructure, housing, private and public facilities, necessitating extensive peace building and expensive post-conflict reconstruction. A standing UN rapid deployment capability might be cost-effective if it reduced the need for larger forces, longer deployments and vast reconstruction efforts. In making the case for a standing UN rapid response group, former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Sir Brian Urquhart writes:

"Experience of recent UN operations shows that even a small, highly trained group, with high morale and dedication, arriving at the scene of action immediately after a
Security Council decision, would in most cases have far greater effect than a larger and less well-prepared force arriving weeks or even months later. The failure to come to grips with a situation before it gets completely out of hand usually necessitates a far larger, more expensive and less effective operation later on. Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda are only three examples of this syndrome. The lesson from these and other recent cases needs to be learned and acted upon.\textsuperscript{168}

Despite such perceived advantages, some view such a capability as simply another military force, which will divert critical resources away from development, disarmament and peace building. In fairness, these are often concerns related to legitimate priorities. Ironically, these are also among the principal reasons for developing a UN standing capability. Aside from posing a major threat to development, armed conflicts and wars tend to militarize national priorities and spending. Once launched, they can reverse progress for decades, destroying nations and often what is most valued within. The problems for peace building are compounded exponentially when people, critical infrastructure and relations are ruined.

Paradoxically, one of the least stated, but most fundamental objections to a UN standing capability is likely to be the fear of it being too effective and efficient, to the point where it initiates a wider process that challenges powerful, vested interests.\textsuperscript{169} It is noteworthy that national defense officials from supportive Member States are very nervous that proposals of this nature will lead to embarrassment, if not criticism from the international defense community, particularly the Pentagon. There is a perception that, over time, such a development might shift military and defense-industry priorities, reducing demand for major acquisition programs and higher defense budgets. A 1961 U.S. State Department paper draws a compelling connection between disarmament and the development of a UN Peace Force:

> There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peacekeeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.\textsuperscript{170}

It is apparent that these are intimately related processes, which have the potential to free up substantive resources for addressing other pressing global challenges, including sustainable development. Robert Johansen points to another related aspect of this process: the potential of a
UN rapid deployment capability to help civilize international relations in a manner that would provide significant cost returns. As he writes,

Such a force, even if relatively small at first, would help set the institutional stage for educating publics and governments about the possibilities for gradually and reliably curtailing national uses of military power by impartially enforcing key rules against armament and aggression. To increase enforcement reliability, it is essential for governments to learn that it is indeed possible for community-established norms to be enforced by the world community.171

A further argument that pertains to cost and effectiveness is the extent to which a standing UN capability might lower the average number of operations conducted. It is evident that some of the larger, longer and more expensive operations (UNPROFOR, UNTAC, UNMIH) arose because late and inadequate responses allowed conflicts to spiral out of control. Again, while proof is difficult to establish, a prompt and effective response should reduce the need to maintain an average of 14-to-16 operations per year. When the Organization is forced to respond to sudden and dramatic increases in activity, there would at least be an option and there would likely be savings for both the UN and the Member States if the option forestalled further violence and an escalation of the conflict into protracted warfare.

Would a standing UN capability have a capacity to lower the incidence of violent conflict? It is reasonable to assume that those responsible for planning violent actions might be deterred from such behavior if the UN had ready access to a mechanism that could not only thwart their plans, but hold them accountable for their actions. In this respect, it is worth noting the establishment and potential influence of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (1993), Rwanda (1994), and Sierra Leone (2001), as well as the development of a new International Criminal Court. Combined, these are likely to impose doubts in the minds of bad leaders. The next promising step to further shift their thoughts and policies away from violent options would be to ensure such international tribunals and courts are supported by a legitimate UN enforcement mechanism. A standing UN rapid deployment capability could serve in this capacity, representing both the psychological and physical presence required to uphold international law. As the Commission on Global Governance reported in 1995, “the very existence of an immediately available and effective UN Volunteer Force could be a deterrent in itself. It could also give important support for negotiation and the peaceful settlement of disputes.”172 The current culture of impunity might dissipate if confronted with a discrete, albeit credible UN rapid deployment capability.
Similarly, it is evident that the prospects for preventing armed conflict would improve with immediate access to such a UN standing capability. As any new UN mechanism will be limited in size and composition, its optimum application is in preventive deployment; in acting before a wider, unmanageable situation arises. In this respect, a standing capability may be seen as roughly analogous to the sort of fire extinguisher one keeps in the kitchen; it is useless once the entire house is ablaze, but usually very effective when the first flames begin to spread.

Notably, the UN succeeded in the preventive deployment of a relatively small multinational force (UNPREDEP) to Macedonia in 1994. Success in this operation stemmed partially from the potential of the conflict to erupt into a wider Balkan war; a dangerous situation that attracted the prompt engagement of the United States and others. Experience with UNPREDEP and elsewhere demonstrated that prevention tends to be far easier and less demanding in the early stages of a conflict. It also indicated that without the support and direct participation of a great power, preventive deployment would be very unlikely in the near future. A wider war was averted in this instance, but there was little, if any, assurance that the UN could rely on similar support for the next emergency. After an extensive review of the requirements, the Carnegie Commission reported in 1997 that, “a standing force may well be necessary for effective prevention.” A standing UN capability would definitely need the approval, and occasionally the support, of a great power, but seldom would it require the direct participation of their personnel. In comparison to the options, it would also appear to be more cost-effective and reliable.

Concerns about costs will inevitably generate opposition, but it would be irresponsible to ignore the already substantive costs from both inaction and ineffective action. Larry Thompson of Refugees International has clarified the opportunity costs:

We can throw good money after bad, risk failure over and over, and waste innocent lives by continuing with the present inadequate system. Or we can find a better way of doing things. The creation of a rapid reaction force is an idea whose time has come. An international task force of military and police experts, as well as diplomats should take a high priority look at the concept.

There are no overriding legal obstacles to the creation of a standing UN rapid deployment capability. The UN Charter provides sufficient legal authority to deploy UN Peacekeeping Forces and to establish other international bodies, such as war crimes tribunals and the recent International Criminal Court, although these are not explicitly mentioned in the Charter. Moreover, Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to take at any time such actions, as it
deems necessary in order to maintain international peace and security. A treaty or amendment to the Charter would not appear to be necessary. 175

While the United Nations is widely viewed as the only legitimate Organization for coordinating a universal response, its limitations have also been widely recognized. The fact that a few powerful sovereign States on the UN Security Council have a capacity to influence decisions that affect all has not inspired the confidence of all. Moreover, as noted, there are fears that this body cannot be trusted with the control of a new mechanism that might facilitate further intervention, and possibly even interference, in the domestic affairs of sovereign States that cannot or will not ensure the security of their own citizens.

A standing UN rapid deployment capability would definitely be an additional new tool, but it would not confer additional new powers. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council already has the power to determine what constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression; and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken …to maintain or restore international peace and security.” A decision to use a new UN capability or even existing arrangements can only be authorized by the Security Council.

Despite its perceived flaws, there are checks and balances built into decision-making within the Council, as well as within the UN System. A decision to establish a UN rapid deployment capability would have to be made in the UN Security Council and this forum would likely specify the size, composition, command structure and base location. A supportive resolution from the UN General Assembly would also be necessary to provide sufficient legitimacy.

Nine of the fifteen members on the Security Council would have to approve an operation and any one of the five Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) could veto any decision and effectively stop a deployment. Once a decision was reached to use this capability, responsibility would be vested in the UN Secretary-General. Operational command and control would likely be assigned to a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The wider approval of the majority of the UN General Assembly would be required to secure support and funding for a particular operation. Within this forum, each Member State has a vote and the majority are relatively small States. Once the Secretariat has prepared the budget for a mission, it not only goes before the General Assembly for discussion and approval, but also the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee. They can determine whether a mission will be authorized. The non-aligned movement is well represented, as it is the largest coalition of Member
States. It is also unlikely that a UN capability could be exploited to advance narrow, national interests, because it would immediately risk a wider loss of credibility, funding and further support. Given these and other safeguards, as well as the fact that a standing UN rapid deployment capability would not be of the size nor composition to be a war-fighting force, there is little, if any, prospect of it being used for illegitimate intervention.

Yet persistent concerns of this nature remain. A vocal minority of Americans and Cubans share fears any UN capability will eventually be used in an invasion against Cuba or even the U.S. Aside from the United States’ capacity to veto any operation, it is evident that both countries retain substantive military assets, far in excess of any proposal for a UN rapid deployment capability. Although these suspicions are unwarranted, they have influenced policy to stem the development of a standing UN capability. Such superficial concerns must not only be addressed through education and clarification of projected tasks, but also in the terminology adopted, as well as the composition of any new capability.

In this respect, it is noteworthy that there are no definitive blueprints, but several potential options for developing a standing UN rapid deployment capability. Something of this nature, possibly on a larger scale, may arise quickly in the aftermath of another tragedy that jeopardizes common interests and embarrasses governments into action. It may also develop over time as a result of multinational cooperation and the further evolution of the UN Standby Arrangements, possibly through Article 43 or co-location of the national elements participating in the SHIRBRIG.

However, after conducting a number of detailed studies, several governments and prominent organizations reached an understanding (shared by many opponents of a standing UN capability): that governments will be reluctant to assign national armed forces to UN service under UN Command and Control, and that both the governments and their armed forces’ personnel should not be obliged to assume the risks of demanding operations. The alternative foreseen is to recruit dedicated volunteers from all regions for a standing UN capability; individuals who would be selected, trained and paid as international civil servants. Clearly, this would help to offset the political pressure many contributing governments face when confronted with decisions about whether to participate in potentially high-risk operations. It would also allow the UN to tailor the composition and character of a new capability based on its own professional volunteers. It could be designed as a more sophisticated mechanism for addressing global emergencies, with a combination of military, police and civilian volunteers –attributes often overlooked in national
security and defense planning. As Canada's 1995 study noted, “UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response times significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision.” Ultimately, the report acknowledged, a UN rapid reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on Member States of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations.

The 1995 report of the US Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations sheds more light on a similar concern, proposing a UN Legion:

To strengthen the U.N.’s peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities the Commission proposes the creation of a 5,000 to 10,000-man blue helmet rapid deployment force of volunteers... The Commission believes that a UN rapid-reaction force is necessary because no nation likes to send its soldiers into potential combat zones when its own interests may not be directly affected by the outcome... On its own (a small international force) has limited value if a large-scale conflict breaks out, but a UN legion would...be a useful arm of the Security Council for deterring conflict or providing early on-site reconnaissance. It could also be used to give the UN an immediate presence in a troubled region while a larger force is formed using units contributed by Member Nations.

In 1994, The Netherlands also identified a similar gap in the UN Peacekeeping System and proposed dedicated units that were instantly deployable. The focus, the Dutch stressed, should not be on the further development of the UN Standby Arrangements System so much as a military force along the lines advocated by Robert Johansen and Brian Urquhart – a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade at the service of the UN Security Council – one that would guarantee the immediate availability of troops when they were urgently needed. The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations shared the perspective of The Commission on Global Governance: both preferred a standing UN Volunteer Force to enhance the UN’s performance in time and function.

While the proposed use of dedicated UN Volunteers has assuaged some concerns, it has led others to object to what they perceive as a new army of mercenaries. This overlooks the fact that the volunteers would be part of a UN Service, selected and recruited from the most promising candidates worldwide. These individuals would have to demonstrate their professionalism and ability to meet high standards, as well as their commitment to the UN and dedication to the principles of the Organization. Those who volunteered and met the criteria would have a status similar to the UN Guards and UN Civil Servants. Unlike mercenaries who fight for profit or
soldiers who serve a particular State, UN volunteers would provide services for a universal Organization and assume risks for the higher ideals of protecting civilians and preventing armed conflict. Stephen Kinloch notes that aside from meeting the requirements of neutrality, UN volunteers would also be more credible, having “the character of an elite force determined to accomplish its mission, the costs being accepted in advance by those who would have individually volunteered for the job.”

Nevertheless, even the option of a relatively small force composed of UN volunteers has been insufficient to counter worries of a large, ‘supra-national UN army.’ This misunderstanding arises despite the fact that proponents of a standing UN rapid deployment capability have not argued for a large military force or for the systems required to conduct sustained offensive operations or mid to high-intensity war-fighting.

To explain, supportive governments and prominent organizations have identified the need for a standing UN capability that can deploy 6,000 – 12,000 volunteers. The rationale is that 6,000 personnel correspond roughly to the size of a multinational brigade, with civilian administration, which is frequently the requirement in a traditional UN Peacekeeping Operation. Given chronic fiscal constraints, a smaller size is also viewed as more feasible. The justification for 12,000 personnel is two-fold: first, the UN could manage two traditional operations, although not simultaneously as roughly thirty percent of personnel would be needed to support deployed elements; second, a capability of 12,000 personnel corresponds to the minimum requirements of a complex, multidimensional UN peace operation. Additional personnel simply expand the range of options for responding to diverse emergencies.

A capacity to deploy 12,000 personnel would not constitute a capacity for anything more ambitious than peace operations that include minimal enforcement at the tactical level. In fact, due to the modest size projected, and its inherent limitations, others caution that it might still be incapable of coping with more than one mission each year. As it would lack a substantive enforcement capacity, some suggest it could not be used for more than traditional peacekeeping and would not be capable of effecting humanitarian protection.

Clearly, there are numerous potential tasks for a UN rapid deployment capability. Indeed, such a mechanism can be more easily justified if it can provide a cost-effective and timely response to an array of challenges. But the anticipated challenges are largely, although not exclusively, within the wider interpretation of UN Peace Operations. Roles and responsibilities for specific
missions will vary with Security Council mandates, of course, and much will depend on what is provided and on what terms.

Expectations vary considerably over the priority of tasks that should be incorporated into planning. Many officials maintain that any rapid deployment capability should simply assume responsibility for the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission. Deployable elements will be the first in to establish security, headquarters, and services, and then the first out, to be replaced by regular peacekeeping contingents within four- to six-months. Such a capability is also seen as the preferred instrument for preventive deployment, particularly in preventing the spread and intensity of armed conflict. Increasingly, as noted, it is viewed, as critical tool for stopping genocide and war. Protecting civilians at risk in such situations must be considered another priority task. While it may impose further requirements, it establishes a baseline of credibility within an operation and for the wider UN System.

Over the past decade, the related problems have multiplied, but they have also helped to clarify the range of services required for diverse situations. In 1995, Sir Brian Urquhart outlined the following potential roles for a UN rapid deployment capability:

- to provide a UN presence in the crisis area immediately after the Security Council has decided it should be involved;
- to prevent violence from escalating;
- to assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;
- to provide the emergency framework for UN efforts to resolve the conflict and commence negotiations;
- to secure a base, communications, and airfield for a subsequent UN force;
- to provide safe areas for persons and groups whose lives are threatened by the conflict;
- to secure humanitarian relief operations; and
- to assess the situation and provide first-hand information for the Security Council so that an informed decision can be made on the utility and feasibility of further UN involvement.

Another list of potential tasks were identified by Jane Boulden and Andy Knight:

- as a vanguard force for follow-on peacekeeping operations;
- to counter/deter an imminent border incursion;
- to consolidate and enforce peace agreements, immediately on their signing;
- to separate warring or potentially warring factions;
- to deal with large-scale refugee flows in situations of potential or ongoing conflict;
- to distribute aid and other forms of relief;
- to help in failed state situations where there is an absence of any form of government control;
- to shore up peacekeeping operations in trouble; and
- to re-establish ceasefires or to deal with violations of peace agreements.
A modest expansion of the proposed tasks is now warranted. Subsequent multidimensional operations have confirmed the need to address wider human needs and restore essential services and security as promptly as possible. As noted in the Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Review, “in practically all places of armed conflict, particularly in intra-state conflicts, the UN will be involved both in consolidating peace and security and in the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance.”\textsuperscript{191} Frequently, the UN will also be needed to provide food and shelter, re-establish communications, restore a sense of order with civilian police services, open schools, rebuild bridges and develop the necessary infrastructure for good governance. Faith and confidence in the future diminish rapidly in the absence of such efforts. While UN forces must play an essential role in dissuading violent options, immediate conflict resolution and rehabilitation projects play an equally important role in demonstrating an enduring commitment to a sustainable peace process. Together, they facilitate the work of those engaged in peacemaking.\textsuperscript{192}

Increasingly, it is apparent that success is likely to depend on the speed and extent to which the UN provides a sophisticated mix of promising incentives to restore hope and cooperation, and robust disincentives to establish security, deter violence and create a safe space for wider participation and dialogue. At the outset of a mission, protecting civilians must be the first priority, but such activities may have to be accompanied by protection of the environment and the reconstruction of critical infrastructure. Simultaneously, there must be an ongoing commitment to, and assistance for peace building over the short, mid and longer-term.

While the first objective of rapid deployment is to address short-term needs and operate as the first into, and the first out of, an operation, its reception will depend on the extent to which it establishes the groundwork for further efforts. The old cliché that ‘first impressions matter’ should not be ignored, particularly in matters of survival. Getting off to a good start, as previously noted, may also determine the prospects, size and expense of subsequent efforts. Yet credibility and commitment are too important to base on impressions or displays; both have to be established through the provision of tangible assistance when it is urgently needed. By including a wider range of emergency services, a standing UN rapid deployment capability could better address these needs. As such, it might also be more appealing to a wider range of parties, in theatre and abroad. The potential roles foreseen are challenging, but that is already the nature of contemporary conflict and simply a reflection of the demands and needs frequently imposed by such conflict.
List of potential future roles and tasks of a Standing UN Rapid Deployment Capability

**Advisory**
- to provide early technical reconnaissance, an assessment of the situation and first-hand information for the Security Council and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security to enhance informed decision-making;
- to report on initial stages of the mission, identifying potential problems, options and requirements;

**Preventive Action & Protection of Civilians**
- to provide a UN presence in the crisis area immediately after the Security Council has decided it should be involved;
- to stem any escalation of violence;
- to provide defensive support for safe areas and civilians at risk, while expanding a safe environment within the theatre of operations;
- to dissuade (and where necessary disarm) those engaged in hostilities;
- to counter/deter imminent attacks or border incursion;
- to consolidate and enforce peace agreements, immediately on their signing;
- to secure a base, communications, and airfield for a subsequent UN force;

**Peacekeeping**
- to separate warring or potentially warring factions;
- to assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;
- to deal with violations of peace agreements;
- to initiate de-mining operations;
- to act as a vanguard for follow-on peace operations;

**Policing**
- to establish a presence that restores respect for law and order;
- to conduct routine patrols and investigations;
- to apprehend those guilty of war crimes;
- to commence training of local police;

**Peace Building**
- to coordinate consultations with local parties over the options for conflict resolution;
- to establish a framework for UN efforts to negotiate a settlement between representative parties;
- to provide assistance in situations of failed states where appropriate governance is absent;
- to facilitate prompt reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation programs;
- to identify, advise and assist with problems pertaining to health, the environment and social welfare;

**Humanitarian Assistance**
- to maintain communication and contact with humanitarian relief and refugee organizations;
- to support and safeguard humanitarian operations; and
- to initiate and provide such assistance when other sources are unavailable.
A survey of the potential roles and missions suggests that the requirements, particularly the deployable elements of a UN rapid deployment capability must include a combination of military, police and civilian elements. No armed force can provide the range of required services. No police or civilian elements can safely manage rapid deployment operations in a mid to high threat environment. Working together, however, each contributes essential services within what would be a far more advanced and effective capability.

Rather than a standing army or any further development of national, offensive ‘strike forces,’ the first requirement is to outline the options and general requirements for a modest standing UN rapid deployment capability to complement existing arrangements and address the most critical gaps. Simultaneously, it will be important to consider a variety of blueprints that not only identify the composition and requirements of these options, but also indicate how they might be initiated.

Experience derived from former attempts to develop a UN capability suggests the need for concerted efforts upon two tracks. First, as there is an urgent need, it would be best to commence development as soon as possible, which indicates an immediate requirement for more detailed plans. In the aftermath of five major conflicts over the past century, the international community has temporarily shared a consensus that a new capability was warranted. Regrettably, as countries worked to develop appropriate plans, the consensus dissipated and little was accomplished. Second, given prevailing constraints, consideration should also be accorded to a vision-oriented, ongoing cumulative development process that builds on the established foundation. A brief summary of the critical contributions to date may help to clarify where to head and the routes available.

Since 1992 and the former Secretary-General’s An Agenda for Peace, it has been evident that the UN would need new arrangements to cope with the complex new conflicts. Shortly thereafter, Sir Brian Urquhart prompted a broad debate, encouraging consideration of dedicated UN volunteers. Instead of having the UN remain entirely reliant on national decision-making and national armed forces, he proposed that volunteers could be recruited, trained and prepared to respond to diverse, demanding emergencies within a dedicated UN Legion. The Netherlands’ study of a Permanent UN Brigade elaborated on the particular requirements of a discrete (5000 personnel) force for rapid deployment. It confirmed that there were no insurmountable technical impediments—that given political will and funding, a Permanent UN Brigade was feasible and that with some assistance, it would be more rapid and reliable. The Canadian study demonstrated the
merits of a cumulative development process wherein additional requirements would be addressed sequentially over the short, mid and long-term. After an in-depth review, including widespread consultations, this study emphasized the importance of a multidimensional capability instead of simply a force. The Danish-led multinational study of a Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) did not rule out permanently assigning military units to the UN, but acknowledged that it was a long-term option. Working in cooperation with the UN Secretariat, these governments proved that it was possible to mobilize a multinational coalition of supportive Member States, or the “Friends of Rapid Deployment.” Aside from increasing awareness of the related issues, they generated sufficient support to implement a range of required reforms.

Both pragmatists and visionaries are aware that the recent political environment has not been conducive to the immediate establishment of a standing UN rapid deployment capability. Nor, in the earlier period of unprecedented activity, was the Organization prepared to manage additional, controversial capabilities. As well, the enthusiasm of supportive Member States, particularly the ‘Friends’ dissipated quickly when they encountered concerns related to sovereignty, risks, representation, limited support and insufficient financing. Yet rapid changes, ongoing conflicts, and the wider challenges of interdependence, are now altering the situation.

Encouraging changes are underway as a result of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Review. Although the core of the existing arrangements have inherent limitations, these are essential building blocks and complementary to the development of a UN standing capability.

National units listed in the UNSAS will still be needed to provide a substantive pool of personnel who can rotate into steady-state operations and provide the exit opportunity for UN rapid deployment units. Similarly, arrangements such as the SHIRBRIG and SEEBRIG will be needed for concurrent operations and for periods of intense activity. As well, they should provide a critical high-readiness reserve for prompt augmentation of UN standing elements in the event of a crisis. The expansion of DPKO is imperative to ensure an institutionalized capacity to plan and manage assigned tasks, as well as assist with administration and support of further developments. The challenge is not to replace these arrangements, but to expand them and ensure they are capable of providing the necessary support. These are the core foundation for current operations. Within two years, this should be a stronger foundation that can support more ambitious developments.
Rapid deployment presents an array of demanding requirements. Missing components, whether in personnel, supportive infrastructure or equipment, cause delays and lead to failures. Even the basic requirements of a new capability include: an early warning mechanism, an effective decision-making process, readily available transportation and infrastructure, logistics support, adequate finances and well-trained personnel.\textsuperscript{195}

In this case, \textbf{seven components} will demand sustained efforts:

- \textit{first}, all deployable personnel, equipment and supplies must be adequately prepared for prompt staging. They will be expected to stand at a high degree of readiness for deployment at very short notice. Prior comprehensive training of all personnel will be a prerequisite;
- \textit{second}, all deployable elements will require a unique degree of self-sufficiency – a capacity to operate on their own for up to 90 days. Logistic support must be built within the structure and ready for diverse conditions;
- \textit{third}, prompt transportation to the mission area, as well as within the specific theatre of operations is essential. Strategic and tactical airlift, as well as sealift must be assured by prior arrangement;
- \textit{fourth}, a high degree of mobility will be needed to respond rapidly over a large area. Deployed elements must be equipped for quick and secure movement. An array of vehicles will be required for protection, support and transportation;
- \textit{fifth}, as deployments are to be of a strictly limited duration, there will be a need to ensure replacements or rotations within three to six months, as well as augmentation and reinforcement in the event of a serious escalation;
- \textit{sixth}, flexibility is required at various levels given the relatively broad range of potential tasks and contingencies. Accordingly, a standing UN rapid deployment capability should be organized in a modular structure. Such a structure expands the range of choice for selecting elements essential to a particular operation. The composition can be quickly customized according to the initial assessment of requirements. There may also be advantages in having elements that can operate on their own, independent of the entire capability. A modular structure would allow for simultaneous deployment of military police or civilian elements to different operations should the need arise; and,
- \textit{seventh}, since another objective is to develop a more sophisticated capability, contingency planning, doctrine and training must also ensure a higher degree of flexibility at the operational and tactical level.

Overall, this will entail new approaches, refined tactics and diverse skills. As former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged,

…we must recognize that old models of peacekeeping don’t always meet current challenges. Peace operations today often require skills that are neither strictly military nor strictly police, but rather a combination of the two. The international community needs to identify and train units that are able to control crowds, deter
vigilante actions, prevent looting and disarm civilian agitators while, at the same time, winning the trust of the communities in which they are deployed.\textsuperscript{196}

Sir Brian Urquhart makes a compelling case for a standing rapid deployment capability in which “the rules of engagement and for the use of force will be different from either peacekeeping or enforcement actions.” Flexibility is a prerequisite, aside from training in peacekeeping and problem-solving techniques; he notes it must also be prepared with the expertise and \textit{esprit de corps} to pursue those tasks in difficult and even violent circumstances.\textsuperscript{197} With a higher incidence of conflicts that necessitate Chapter VII mandates, including robust rules of engagement, it should be apparent that a standing UN capability will require military credibility, as well as advanced police and civilian elements.

Given recent trends, the “Comprehensive Review” of May 2001 suggested hypothetical planning for both traditional and complex missions.\textsuperscript{198} In traditional operations, the UN frequently assumes a requirement for a multinational brigade of 5,000 troops, as well as approximately 1,000 personnel serving as observers, civilian police, civilian staff and administrators. Complex missions often double the military requirements and triple the civilian staff, observers, civilian police and administrators. Yet, the planning of a new standing capability should not duplicate designs for traditional or complex peacekeeping operations. If well conceived, this tool should work in addressing the initial stages of both mission-types. These figures and mission-types simply provide useful guidelines and a rough indication of possible requirements. This study departs from conventional thinking and assumes the UN will need a rapid deployment capability on a scale commensurate with the tasks it is likely to be assigned. The UN cannot be asked to improvise and make do with less on an ongoing basis. Several options merit further consideration. An indication of their potential strengths and limitations may help stimulate informed discussion, more comprehensive analysis and detailed planning.

\textbf{SECTION V: A UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force}

The United States Congress, in H.R. 938 proposed one of the more promising initiatives in recent years.\textsuperscript{199} Introduced by Congressmen James McGovern (D-MA) and Amo Houghton (R-NY), H.R. 938 is referred to as the United Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001.\textsuperscript{200} It calls on the
U.S. to work with the UN Secretary-General and other Member States to establish a UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (PSF).201

As proposed, this PSF would consist of at least 6,000 volunteers recruited globally and directly employed by the UN. These volunteers would train together and be appropriately equipped for rapid deployment to international peace operations, including civilian policing. The general objective is to address the time gap, the training gap and the political will gap with well-trained, professional military and police units that can respond to a crisis within 15 days of a Security Council resolution. Deployments are to be limited to a six-month duration. Once dispatched, the PSF is seen as a temporary ‘stop-gap’ measure; one that addresses the three-to-six month period until Member States are ready to provide personnel and resources to establish a peacekeeping mission. As noted, the PSF “should only be deployed when the United Nations Security Council determines that violations of human rights, breaches of the peace, or failure to restore the rule of law, requires rapid response to ensure adherence to negotiated agreements to prevent or end hostilities.”202 Moreover, the PSF would “be given the authority to protect itself, execute negotiated peace accords, disarm combatants, protect civilians, detain war criminals, restore the rule of law, and to carry out other purposes as detailed in Security Council resolutions.”203

The precise structure of the PSF has not been developed. However, this proposal merits further elaboration and an attempt to model a possible structure for the PSF. Among the foreseeable requirements would be a permanent Headquarters, under the direction of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General with a field deployable mission headquarters, a military brigade of approximately 5000 troops, additional logistics and support elements, a joint observer group, as well as a battalion of civilian police nearing 600 personnel. The deployable military elements would likely include an integrated, multidimensional mission headquarters, brigade staff, observers, technical reconnaissance units, two motorized infantry battalions, two armored (wheeled) infantry battalions, an engineering battalion, a helicopter squadron and a substantive logistics support battalion, including supply, transport, service and equipment companies. The deployable civilian police elements might be structured around three police companies of 125 personnel directed by a police and legal affairs staff, with separate units for criminal investigations, forensics and training. An example of potential deployable elements for the proposed PSF is projected in Figure 1, p. 87.
With a combined capability of approximately 6,000 military and police personnel, the PSF would be incapable of large-scale intervention or any type of sustained combat operation. Although it might include a military brigade group, it would still be a relatively light option, designed for rapid deployment into peace operations authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. If assured of prompt augmentation and support, it might also have sufficient strength to conduct the initial stages of complex operations. In responding to either mission-type, it would require considerable assistance from UN DPKO, particularly for civilian support, administration, logistics, as well as air and sealift. Given the need for wider assistance, its limited size and incapacity to project larger, heavier forces, it could not be legitimately construed as a standing army.

However, the projected size, combined with the added effectiveness of appropriately trained and equipped UN Volunteers, indicates substantive potential and a major step toward addressing the gaps identified and the tasks proposed. By providing volunteers with a combination of basic military and police training, as well as comprehensive training for UN operations and specific training for assigned tasks, a PSF could be far more cohesive and competent than any collection of multinational contingents. As it would be more rapid and more reliable, such a capability could have prevented the genocide in Rwanda and much of the violence in Sierra Leone and East Timor.204

Given these attributes, in certain circumstances a UN PSF may also have the ability to undertake a peace operation that includes a modest Chapter VII mandate, authorizing the limited use of force at the tactical level. But such operations would require prior assurance of first-rate equipment, reliable augmentation and a demonstration of competence in exercises, as well as experience in less-demanding missions.

As outlined here, the PSF should be capable of managing one, three-to-six month mission per year. While some of its deployable elements could be temporarily assigned to provide prompt support for other UN operations, the larger body of the force would need the remainder of the year to rest, reconstitute, train and prepare for the next assignment.
Figure 1.

UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (PSF)
(Possible Structure of Deployable Elements)

MSN HQ INCL: Deputy/SRSG, Civilian Staff, Political & Legal Advisors, Translation Cell, Public Affairs, NGO Liaison Cell, Signals & Intelligence Units, Defense & Security Platoon.

SRSG
Mission Headquarters

Military Brigade Staff

CIVPOL Battalion Staff

Observers

Infantry Battalion Staff

Logistics & Support Staff

Police & Legal Affairs Staff

Logistics Battalion

Supply Company

Service & Maint. Company

Transport Company

Equipment Company

Police Companies

Motorized Infantry Battalion

Armoured (wheeled) Infantry Battalion

Helicopter Squadron

Technical Recce

Engineering Battalion

Medical Company

Construct. Company

De-Mining Company

Criminal Investigations Unit

Forensics Unit

Training Unit
A UN Peace and Security force of this size (although still an approximation of at least 6,000) would require co-location for training and staging at a base, which may indicate the need for extensive assistance from a supportive Member State or coalition of Member States. It is conceivable that a group similar to the ‘FORD’ or the new Human Security Network\(^{206}\) might be willing to adopt and support a UN PSF.\(^{207}\) Adoption of the force by a regional organization or military alliance should be avoided though as any such reliance might diminish perceptions that this is a legitimate, universal service.

H.R. 938 is a thoughtful and courageous initiative that is revitalizing interest and diverse efforts in the United States and abroad. But, it is still a work in progress. The design, composition and preparation of a UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will require further elaboration and detailed study. A number of important issues such as basing, infrastructure, headquarters, support, recruitment, doctrine, training, equipment, cost and ‘start-up’ need to be addressed.

Although a similar proposal was initially introduced in May 2000, H.R. 938 has already attracted the support of a bipartisan coalition of approximately fifty-five American legislators, as well as numerous Non-Governmental Organizations.\(^ {208}\) Recent polls infer a majority of Americans are in favor of a Standing UN Peacekeeping Force made up of individuals who are not part of a national army, but who volunteer to be part of a UN force.\(^ {209}\)

It should be emphasized that this initiative does not arise out of isolation from wider international efforts. The legislation supports recent UN efforts to enhance rapid deployment and peace operations, urging partnerships between Member States for the purpose of forming multinational standby high-readiness brigades. Moreover, the proposed UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force appears to be a modest expansion upon, and complement to, earlier proposals for a UN Legion and The Netherlands option of a permanent UN Brigade, albeit with a greater emphasis on civilian police.

In both terminology and composition there is a case to be made for several minor modifications of the proposed UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force. By including a wider array of deployable elements (particularly civilians), this capability could address a wider array of tasks and contingencies.\(^ {210}\) If it represented more than a force, it might also appeal to a larger number of people and Member States.
SECTION VI: A UN Emergency Service (UN ES)

A multidimensional UN Emergency Service— a UN ‘911’, composed of military, police and civilian volunteers – would correspond to the diverse operational requirements of contemporary, as well as future UN Peace Operations. The proposal presented in this Section is compatible with Bill 938 and intended to address the critical gaps identified, although within an expanded composition and structure.

Again, this is not a new idea, but one that draws on earlier and broader initiatives. In fact, Pakistan was the first Member State to propose a Permanent UN Emergency Force during the Suez crisis and the establishment of UNEF I.211 Four decades later, Canada raised the option of a UN ‘Standing Emergency Group’ following UNAMIR and the Rwandan genocide.212

A number of the general requirements for such a permanent, Standing UN Service have already been identified in related studies conducted by governments, organizations and individuals.213

A UN Base is frequently at the forefront of the requirements. If UN responses are to be rapid, there is a need for a dedicated facility from which to prepare, mount and manage future operations. A base is the best way to consolidate the personnel, equipment, and combined effort necessary for rapid deployment. Aside from accommodating up to 14,000 personnel, the base would have to assist in the organization of the capability, the recruitment of volunteer personnel and their preparation into cohesive elements. It would also serve as a central training, logistics, staging and equipment stockpiling centre.

As early as 1957, William R. Frye wrote that, “as a practical matter, the UN almost certainly would have to rent or buy, on advantageous terms, a base already in existence, and this would mean finding a member state which was willing to dispose of one of its own.”214 With force ‘build-down’ occurring in numerous countries, it may be possible to convert a surplus national defense facility to this task at modest cost. While establishing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure will clearly demand new resources, a supportive Member State could help the UN avoid a major capital acquisition and development project.

Site selection should be determined by the need for a secure, cost-effective, easily accessible, strategic location. To ensure prompt airlift, this base should be within an hour of an air base that can assist in staging operations. To provide concurrent sealift of necessary equipment and
supplies, it should be located within several hours of a seaport that has a ‘roll-on roll-off’ platform for docking and loading. Such a location would also facilitate stockpiling, as well as staging and logistics efforts. Relative proximity to land, air force and naval establishments of the host nation might also offer the potential for joint exercises in a realistic environment, as well as valuable assistance. Among the assets required are: officer and other rank quarters, administrative offices, drill and training areas, class rooms, a language training centre, firing ranges, storage depots, hangers, self-contained medical and dental services, recreational facilities and approximately 20,000 acres of varied terrain. The surrounding area should also be able to house and provide for the needs of families and dependents.

Clearly, there would be a need for host nation support. A committed Member State would need to provide a facility with sufficient infrastructure and terrain to train and accommodate approximately 14,000 personnel. Community support for a large multinational presence would be necessary. However, as there would be substantive economic and political benefits for both the host nation and the surrounding community, there would also likely be substantive competition to provide a surplus facility and related assistance.

The second critical requirement, which should coincide with the development of the UN base, is the establishment of an expanded, static, operational-level headquarters. Together, this headquarters and base could serve as a focal point for recruitment, contingency planning, doctrinal development and the training of military, police and civilian elements. Among its anticipated tasks an operational-level headquarters would: forecast detailed requirements; coordinate police, civilian and military aspects of operational planning; confirm standing operating procedures; assist with equipment procurement and stockpiling; establish readiness and training standards; promote interoperability; and develop training curricula and courses. It might also assume responsibility for deployment of all of its assigned mission elements, thereby easing the burden on UN Headquarters.

Overall coordination of the headquarters and base might best be assigned to a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) who would serve as the direct link to the Secretariat. The SRSG should have experience in previous operations and be advised by senior military and police officers. The operational headquarters and base could be organized to include: the office of the SRSG; a national liaison cell; an operations group consisting of military, police and civilian staff that would conduct the planning and management of deployable elements; a support group comprised of a deployment cell as well as base infrastructure and support
components; and a training group with specific offices for doctrine, training standards and research and analysis. It would also be prudent for cost-effectiveness, as well as for the obvious benefits from a military, doctrinal and administrative perspective, to co-locate two field deployable tactical (mission) headquarters at the UN base.

As the number of civilian, police and military elements on the base increases, so, too, does the requirement to staff the base. An example operational headquarters is outlined in Figure 2, page 92. The model illustrated suggests the need for approximately 1850 personnel (150 military, 40 police and 1,540 civilians) to provide this permanent headquarters, as well as support and administration at a rapid deployment base capable of hosting a total of 14,000 personnel.

The recruitment of volunteers for the various military, police and civilian positions could commence after a decision to establish a base and an operational headquarters. Recruiting and selecting appropriate personnel is a time-consuming process, but it should not be difficult to attract a sufficient number of excellent candidates from around the world. To facilitate political approval and enhance legitimacy, the criteria for recruitment should emphasize broad geographical representation. Dedicated UN elements must be of a heterogeneous composition with no distinct national representation. As well, a rigorous selection process will be required to ensure individual qualifications, high standards of expertise and experience, as well as dedication to the principles and objectives of the UN, including a strong commitment to service within a new UN formation. It will be important to screen out ‘soldiers of fortune’ and to avoid any impression of a mercenary force. The UN would directly employ these individuals as international civil servants. This would entail the development of appropriate command and control procedures, specific codes of discipline, as well as new status of personnel and act of service agreements.

Remuneration, as well as comprehensive insurance and pension programs, would be based on a scale similar to that of personnel within the UN Secretariat, which provides compensation for expertise, special skills and experience. As UN employees, these individuals would be subject to disciplinary rules for all UN personnel and they would retain a legal status, which grants them immunity from the jurisdiction of the host country, as well as fiscal privileges. Status agreements would need to be concluded with the nation hosting the UN base. While a few key administrative and financial offices would need to be located at the base, the UN Secretariat in New York might assume the majority of these tasks. They have sufficient experience and expertise to direct the recruitment, administration and management of new personnel.
Figure 2
Operational Level

UN Emergency Service
Permanent Operational Level Headquarters and Base

Personnel: 270 MIL, 40 POL, 1540 CIV

SRSG
National Liaison Cell

Office of SRSG
Pers 3 MIL, 2 POL, 10 CIV.
-Senior MILAD, POLAD & CIVAD
-Policy & Legal

OPERATIONS
Military Staff
Pers 100 MIL
-Contingency Planning
-Operations
-Training
-Logistics
-Personnel

CIVPOL Staff
Pers 25 POL
-Contingency Planning
-Operations
-Training
-Personnel

Civilian Staff
Pers 25 CIV
-Contingency Planning
-Operations
-Training
-Personnel

[Joint 24/7 OPS Cell]

SUPPORT
Deployment Cell
Pers 50 MIL, 10 POL&CIV
-Contingency Move Planning
-Staging
-Mission Support Planning
-Rotation/Augmentation Planning
-Airlift/Sealift Contracting
-Deployable Movement Support Teams

Base Support & Infrastructure
Pers 100 MIL, 1500CIV
-Administration
-Personnel
-Housing
-Finance
-Host Nation Support

TRAINING
Doctrine
Pers 5 MIL, 2 POL., 2 CIV
-Ongoing Development of Doctrine
-SOPS
-ROE Options

Training Standards
Pers 10 MIL, 2 POL, 2 CIV
-Set & Assess Standards
-Course & Curricula Development
-Training & Exercises
-Interoperability

Research & Analysis
Pers 4 MIL, 2 POL, 4 CIV
-Long-Term Planning
-Lessons Learned
-Multidisciplinary
-Think Tank

Deployable Elements
Military
Police
Civilian

Military

CIVPOL

Civilian

Staff

Staff

Staff

Deployment

Cell

Support

Teams
New doctrine must be developed for a new multidimensional structure, for new missions and for new personnel. The added complexity and risks of future operations, particularly those that include diverse elements, necessitates the preparation of more advanced doctrine. Doctrine establishes the fundamental principles according to which various elements plan and conduct their activities in support of UN objectives. As a UN Emergency Service is designed for a wide array of potential tasks, including the prevention of armed conflict and the protection of civilians, the emphasis in doctrinal planning should shift toward dissuasion, minimal deterrence, non-provocative intervention, defensive support, well-controlled escalation and de-escalation, conflict resolution, peace building and the provision of useful services. This will require ongoing multidisciplinary research and analysis focusing specifically on UN rapid deployment to diverse peace operations. Detailed consideration must be accorded to appropriate rules of engagement, new standing operating procedures, strict control over the use of force, modern command and control procedures, as well as common standards for training and readiness.

Prior training for various rapid deployment tasks and contingencies will be essential. Training provides a crucial link in the process of understanding doctrine and its implications for individual and common efforts to conduct day-to-day activities, as well as field operations. A comprehensive training system is necessary to ensure competence, high standards and interoperability. The training efforts should be consolidated at the UN base under a designated training group. It could draw on assistance from DPKO’s training unit and other national peacekeeping training centres. It would also be beneficial to initiate cooperative programs with other academic, police and military establishments, particularly those engaged in conflict resolution, cultural sensitivity training, regional studies, basic language training and those who train national rapid reaction police and security forces.

There will be a need for general, specialized, and mission-specific training programs, including modern training courses and a wide range of curricula. All personnel must be provided with a common understanding of various UN operations and objectives, as well as with intensive preparation for their specific roles and responsibilities. As military credibility and proficiency is essential in high-risk operations, training must ensure multi-purpose combat-capable soldiers and units. Moreover, all ranks should be trained in contact skills such as mediation and dispute resolution to help ensure that minor conflicts are quickly contained before they risk early escalation. The list of skills, methods and tactics required is rather extensive. Before any
operational deployment, they will need to be tested and refined in joint training, simulations and exercises at the designated base.

Aside from improving professionalism and cohesion, another advantage of prior comprehensive training at a UN base, is that it allows for shorter programs of mission-specific training. Briefings could commence at the base immediately, with all required elements at the first alert provided by the Security Council. Concurrent staging efforts could proceed. The net result would be a much quicker and more effective response.

Appropriate, modern equipment must be pre-packed and prepared for immediate deployment. Similar equipment must also be available at the UN base for training. Ultimately, the UN will require its own equipment if the deployable elements of a new capability are to be interoperable and standardized. Standardization of equipment (particularly with respect to vehicle fleets) would greatly reduce overall costs, manpower, overhead and efficiency. To illustrate, one set of costly equipment, such as armoured personnel carriers and helicopters, might be shared in training, while a second similar set was being used in a mission or being pre-packaged ready for immediate deployment. Overall, this would entail roughly thirty percent more equipment than might be required for two high-readiness, brigade-size formations. Although concerns would arise over substantive acquisition costs, the complex job of coordinating and maintaining appropriate equipment for training and missions might be considerably less taxing.220

At the tactical level, the benefits of standard and interoperable equipment would provide an added measure of safety and reliability. Personnel would be familiar with the tools of their trade and assured of support and immediate re-supply out of reserve or training stocks at the UN base. Logistics efforts would also be considerably streamlined.221 For example, one deployment cell could oversee mission requirements with a view to ensuring self-contained, smaller logistics elements and self-sufficiency for 60 – 90 days. Planning would be simplified with the development of fully integrated, task-organized mission support teams capable of managing operations from deployment to the field and early withdrawal.

Similarly, there would likely be fewer problems in arranging immediate transportation. As noted, the ability to move personnel and equipment quickly into and out of any mission is critical. Coordinating lift out of one airhead near the UN base would be considerably less expensive, quicker, and easier to plan than picking up nationally-based, standby contingents or even
SHIRBRIG units located world-wide. Units on high readiness would have all necessary material pre-packed and ready at the airhead.

Immediate access to strategic and tactical airlift, as well as sealift is necessary for rapid deployment (and for rapid extraction). A major effort is needed at the outset to move a brigade size formation, including police and civilian elements, as well as heavy equipment, into a distant theatre of operations. Experience has demonstrated that the UN cannot depend upon a few contractors or the two countries that retain such assets. Transportation has been encumbered by delays, demands for exorbitant payment and conditional agreements. A number of other Member States are acquiring strategic lift that might be rented through stand-by arrangements that ensured prompt availability on 12-hour notice. Other options for acquiring UN lift capabilities also warrant exploration.

Overall, this UN Emergency Service is projected to require a total of approximately 13,200 personnel. This number includes all deployable elements, base support and administration, as well as the operational headquarters. The latter would be expected to ensure the two tactical-field headquarters (mission headquarters) were fully functional and capable of assuming operational control over one of the two formations of deployable elements. Once deployed, these mission headquarters could be placed under the direction of a Deputy Representative of the Secretary General (DRSG) supported by military and police commanders. Both headquarters would include police, military and civilian staff, political and legal advisors, a translation cell, an NGO liaison team, as well as units for communications, signals and intelligence and a defence and security platoon. Both would be multidimensional headquarters with approximately 275 personnel with the capacity to act as a vanguard HQ, a sector HQ, or a mission HQ for a limited period of time.

The deployable military elements assigned to each mission HQ would include: high-readiness, technical reconnaissance units; a light-armored reconnaissance squadron; motorized infantry battalions; light-armored (wheeled) infantry battalions; a helicopter squadron; an engineer unit; a logistics battalion and a medical unit. The deployable civilian police elements under each mission headquarters would consist of a staff of civilian police, three CIVPOL companies of 125 personnel, as well as special units for investigations and training. Among the diverse civilian elements, there would likely be a requirement for disaster relief and humanitarian response teams, peace building advisory teams, conflict resolution teams, medical teams, public affairs teams, an
environmental crisis response team and a transport team. An example of the deployable elements, including the mission headquarters is outlined in Figure 3, p. 97.

To ensure prompt provision of sufficient personnel at the operational and tactical levels, there will be a need to build and maintain considerable redundancy. The deployable military elements stationed at the designated UN base are projected at approximately 10,270 personnel. The required CIVPOL elements call for approximately 850 personnel. The combined strength of the other deployable civilian elements is estimated at approximately 550 personnel.

Whereas the majority of battalions will be kept on a relatively high state of readiness, contingency planning should prepare for deployments limited to roughly 5,000 military, 400 CIVPOL and 250 civilian personnel. As this represents a 2-to-1 ratio, it would facilitate deployment of tasked elements since those that remained on site might assist with logistics and support functions while continuing to prepare for future missions.

Moreover, with two mission headquarters supported by an equal number of deployable elements, the UN would have the potential to respond to two operations annually, although not at full strength simultaneously. Two concurrent operations would be manageable if each deployment was limited to 3,300 military personnel, 300 CIVPOL personnel and 200 civilians. As a modular structure is proposed, smaller deployments of specific elements could also be used in the initial stages of a UN operation or to provide prompt support for an ongoing mission encountering difficulties. Yet at full brigade strength, the UN would have a robust, elite capability. In certain circumstances, it could manage a UN operation that included a Chapter VII mandate.

This model of a UN Emergency Service projects a requirement for approximately 13,200 personnel stationed at a UN base under an operational headquarters and two mission headquarters. As previously noted, the deployable elements assigned to each mission headquarters are identical, including a military brigade group, three companies of civilian police, as well as civilians skilled in diverse tasks. Each deployment package could carry a credible military capability, provide unique support and services, and potentially fulfil a wide array of operational tasks.
Figure 3. Composition of Deployable Elements for a UN Emergency Service
(assigned to UN Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Mission HQs)

Total Personnel: MIL 5000, CIV 274, POL 400

MSN HQ Includes:
Military, Police & Civilian Staff
Political and Legal Advice,
Translation Cell, Comms/Signals/Intell,
Defense & Security Platoon
NGO Liaison Team

Mission HQ
(Tactical)

Deputy/SRSG
Military & Police Commander
MIL-1 x 250 Pers
CIV-1 x 20 Pers
POL-1 x 20 Pers

Technical Recce Unit
MIL-4 x 50 Pers
POL-3 x 125 Pers

Light Armoured Recce Squadron
MIL-2 x 150 Pers
CIV-2 x 30 Pers

Motorised Light Infantry Battalion
MIL-2 x 600 Pers
CIV-20 Pers

Armoured (Wheeled) Infantry Battalion
MIL-2 x 600 Pers
CIV-2 x 10 Pers

Helicopter Squadron
MIL-450 Pers
2 flights of 8 utility Helis
1 flight of 3 Heavy Lift Helis
1 flight of Armed Scout Helis
CIV-2 x 10 Pers

Engineer Battalion
MIL-500 Pers
-3 Field Squadrons
-3 Support Troops
CIV-10 Pers

Logistics Battalion
MIL-1 x 500 Pers
CIV-100 Pers

Medical Unit
MIL-400 Pers
Forward Surgical Teams
CIV-2 x 12 Pers

Civilian Police Companies

Disaster Relief Humanitarian Assistance

UNHCR, WHO WFP, UNICEF Field Support, Finance, Admin

Conflict Resolution Team

Peacebuilding Advisory Teams

Environmental Crisis Response Team

Medical Teams

Public Affairs

(N.B. This is a modular capability that can be tailored for the specific demands of diverse assignments.)
Given resource constraints, it is important to note that this model can be scaled down. Start-up could commence without staffing the second mission headquarters and its assigned elements (5,674 personnel). Immediate staffing requirements could be reduced to approximately 7,500 personnel. This would still constitute a UN Emergency Service, but its potential tasks would also be scaled back, as would the size and frequency of deployments.

In either case, a UN Emergency Service composed of volunteers would inevitably entail major start-up and recurring costs. While supporting such an option, the 1995 study of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations acknowledged that a volunteer force of 10,000 might involve annual costs of approximately $500 million (U.S.) with a one-time start-up cost of $500 million (U.S.). The Dutch study of a permanent 5000-man UN Brigade conceded that it would only be possible to provide a preliminary estimate of $500-$550 million (U.S.) for procurement of equipment, with an annual running cost of $300 million (U.S.). In their 1995 “Design for a 15,000-person UN Legion,” Carl Conetta and Charles Knight estimated initial capital expenditures of $1,568 million (U.S.), an annual budget of $745 million and incremental costs for field operations of $590 million, assuming full utilization. Notably, with inflation compounded over the past seven years, each estimate would now likely entail as increase of approximately 11.7 percent.

While these three estimates vary in relation to the projected costs, size, composition and equipment, they provide a rough illustration of the potential costs for a UN Emergency Service. Given a full complement of 13,200 personnel, the start-up costs would likely be in the range of $1.2 billion (U.S.), with annual recurring costs of approximately $760 million (U.S.). In its ‘scaled down’ variant, with deployable elements for only one mission headquarters (which would be analogous to the proposed UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force) the start-up costs might near $700 million (U.S.), with recurring costs in the area of $500 million (U.S.).

Financing will inevitably be construed as a significant problem in the prevailing political environment, which demands the UN is limited to a zero growth budget. As noted, it is impossible to acquire a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability without substantive additional expenditures. However, to put these figures into perspective, it appears that the cost of developing a UN Emergency Service comprised of 13,200 personnel would be roughly equivalent to the cost of one B-2 bomber. The U.S. Air Force estimates development of each plane to entail a cost of $1 billion, industry analysts estimate that it may be closer to $1.5 billion and others claim it will
exceed $2.2 billion per bomber. Compared to global military expenditures exceeding $810 billion annually, the financial burden of the proposed UN Emergency Service would be modest, especially if shared proportionally among 189 Member States. The potential cost-returns of this investment are increasingly apparent, as are the costs of ‘too little, too late.’ This option is viewed as an optimal mechanism for UN rapid deployment, combining the necessary sophistication, credibility, assistance and legitimacy.

Recommendation 23

*There is an urgent need for a UN Emergency Service – a dedicated, multidimensional ‘UN 911’ that can address human needs, including protection, security, health and hope. This service should be composed of military, police and civilian volunteers that are recruited globally, selected for high standards of professionalism and commitment, and then directly employed by the UN.*

Overall, this section has provided a short and preliminary list of the anticipated requirements for a UN Emergency Service composed of volunteer military, police and civilian personnel. Since 1995, there have been many noteworthy attempts to model the composition of a larger UN Legion. Several proposals, including the Dutch study and the works by Conetta and Knight, provide considerable detail on issues of force structure, military organization and equipment. They also provide insight into the range of options.

For example, after conducting a needs-analysis derived from a review of five UN operations, Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens concluded that a UN Legion of 15,000 volunteers would be the optimal mechanism given prevailing resource constraints. At this size, it was noted that the Legion could rapidly deploy a total of 11,000 troops with the potential to manage two concurrent operations. While designed for a wide array of UN operations, including deployments under a Chapter VII mandate, the size and structure of this force also preclude any large-scale enforcement or war-fighting operations. This option is a ‘streamlined’ model of a considerably larger UN Legion (*Vital Force*), proposed by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. Their initial assessment called for a four brigade Legion of approximately 43,750 military personnel. As the unit types foreseen are virtually identical, it is also a modular force that can be tailored to diverse deployment packages as the need arises. In this respect, it is quite similar to the Canadian vanguard concept and the notion of specific elements selected according to the context of an emergency, as proposed above. The *Vital Force* option would allow for short-term deployments of up to 30,000
military personnel representing a modest enforcement capability or continuous deployment of 15,000 indicative of a capacity to manage three concurrent peacekeeping operations.

To date, most, if not all, related proposals have focused on what force might be appropriate to address the evident gaps and meet the UN’s needs. Aside from overlooking the importance of civilian elements, another crucial question has been largely neglected: how is it possible to start? If merely introducing the idea is controversial, it may appear hopeless to implement without the explicit support of the Security Council, as well as a consensus from the Member States.

There is an old saying that, ‘the development of anything more complex than a dog house can be expected to run into a few delays.’ But the start-up of any dedicated UN capability for rapid deployment would be a very complex and challenging endeavor, particularly if it entailed recruiting thousands of volunteers, selecting a base, securing agreement on command and control and acquiring modern, expensive equipment. Without powerful champions, the delays and resulting disputes might jeopardize the Organization’s future credibility. Yet when confronted with an immediate challenge, Nation States and coalitions of States have repeatedly demonstrated that seemingly insurmountable tasks can be managed fairly quickly.

Within the wider UN System, however, it is evident that piecemeal reforms pertaining to peace and security can be very difficult and prone to delays. Even when confronted with serious challenges, the Organization’s record for prompt adaptation and major innovation is hardly encouraging (with the exception being the development of peacekeeping). This is not to suggest that efforts to initiate a major new capability are not worthy of support, nor is it to imply that the current emphasis on pragmatic, incremental change is the only option. As indicated in Section IV, there will be a need for more support and a new approach. In this respect, it will be important to encourage the immediate development of a UN Emergency Service for rapid deployment, as well as more ambitious steps that build on and beyond the existing foundation. The latter may provide an indication of how to develop the former. It is simply another option.
Irrespective of immediate needs, the development of a UN Emergency Service will likely take time, vision and a coherent, goal-oriented plan.

Recent discussions on improving UN rapid deployment continue to focus on the relative merits of three options: either coordinate better arrangements for the prompt provision of contingents within the UN Standby Arrangements System; organize partnerships among committed Member States to establish additional SHIRBRIGs;\textsuperscript{234} or, initiate a UN Police and Security Force (UN PSF) or UN Emergency Service (UN ES), composed of volunteers. Since 1995, there has been a tendency to regard such proposals as distinct, if not mutually exclusive. Yet in a stage-by-stage cumulative development process, there is the prospect of a coherent, accelerated evolution; one that integrates the strengths of potentially compatible and reinforcing options. As we look ahead, it is evident that there will be a need for further measures that complement and build on and beyond the existing foundation.

There are several cost-effective options that merit consideration by the United Nations, its Member States, and interested parties. The following sequential proposals are intended to stimulate further discussion and analysis.

**Stage One: Reinforce Existing Arrangements**

- Revitalize and expand the consultative process of all supportive parties with the following objectives:

**SHIRBRIG**

- Launch a concerted effort to promote establishment of similar arrangements in other regions;
- Negotiate new Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) facilitating deployment to operations necessitating a mandate within Chapter VII;
- Integrate civilian elements to ensure provision of necessary services; and
- Initiate research into the financing, administration, basing, equipment, and lift arrangements necessary to ensure immediate responses from co-located, standing national SHIRBRIG units.

**UNSAS**

- Given the promising quantitative foundation established, promote standby political commitments whether through expanded Memoranda of Understanding or through additional levels of the agreement facilitating deployment in response to Chapter VII mandates or Article 43.
UN Emergency Service

- Initiate a parallel inquiry into the option of dedicated UN volunteer elements, with particular emphasis on administration, financing, recruitment, terms of service, remuneration, training, basing and command.

Stage Two: Consolidate Capability in a Sound Operational Environment

- Establish a UN Rapid Deployment Base.
  A dedicated UN base would facilitate preparation, training, rapid deployment and management of future operations. A review of redundant military bases might help to determine a cost-effective location capable of providing existing infrastructure for training and equipment stockpiling, as well as nearby access to air and sealift for prompt staging.

- Develop a permanent, Operational-level Headquarters at the UN base.
  Experienced officers, civilian experts, and qualified planners can be seconded to the base and co-assigned responsibility to expand the operational and tactical foundation for future efforts. To manage a variety of complex tasks effectively, it is in the interests of all parties to shift from UNHQ to a static, expanded operational-level headquarters at a UN base. It would also be prudent for cost-effectiveness, as well as for the obvious benefits from a military, doctrinal, and administrative perspective, to co-locate two field-deployable tactical (mission) headquarters at this base. An example of this headquarters is provided in Figure 2, p.83.

- Launch an ongoing process of doctrine development for the range of diverse elements.
  New organizational practices, methods and skills will be required in future UN Peace Operations. Doctrine provides the guidance and fundamental principles for the organization, planning and training of units, as well as the conduct of operations. It will be essential to synchronize diverse elements into a cohesive capability. As such, an emphasis must be accorded to integrating and coordinating assigned personnel to achieve the necessary unity of purpose and effort for advancing UN objectives.

Stage Three: Co-locate National Contingents

- Assign the national elements of a SHIRBRIG group to the UN base for a one to two year period of duty.
  The general reluctance to move quickly can be partially overcome by stationing multinational elements in a sound operational and tactical structure. Response times of standing multinational elements should be considerably quicker than the projected thirty-day response from home-based national SHIRBRIG elements. At this stage, tactical units and civilians would still remain under national political control and operational command. Locating these elements under the operational control of the permanent headquarters would improve multinational training, exercises, lift, and logistics co-ordination. Co-located, standing national units would enhance overall effectiveness, increase the prospect of timely national approval and lead to faster responses. Ideally, plans would entail a similar composition of deployable elements for a standing SHIRBRIG group and one of UN volunteers. The model projected in Figure 3, p.88 may be appropriate for multinational and UN elements.
• Provide three company formations of civilian police at the company level, with representation in the headquarters.
This could have similar benefits in terms of efficiency and cohesion. Further, it should improve community relations at a tactical level during deployments. As initial tasks would focus on restoring law and order and the investigation of war crimes, the presence of CIVPOL personnel might help sustain public confidence, thereby reducing the burden on military units.

• Identify five appropriately-dispersed regional facilities to serve as UN bases for the preparation and deployment of other SHIRBRIG groups.
Aside from reducing response times, the gradual consolidation of UN bases in Africa, Southern Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America could encourage wider participation and foster additional partnerships. Among the benefits would be improved access and familiarity, as well as a UN center for regional training, equipment stockpiling and staging. This would represent a universal commitment and help expand the pool of qualified personnel.

Stage Four: Initiate A Composite Emergency Service

• Recruit and co-locate professional UN volunteers into distinct capability component groups of both the headquarters and field-deployable elements at the initial UN base.
In effect, these would be personnel recruited from volunteers of all countries and directly employed by the UN. Each would be expected to meet high qualifying standards. They would remain exclusively under the command and control of the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General and a designated Special Representative. The integration of UN volunteers into this composite group should be viewed as a complementary and mutually reinforcing stage in the development of an increasingly effective UN rapid deployment capability.

• Integrate volunteers into a dedicated UN Emergency Service of approximately 6,000 personnel under one of the two field-deployable mission headquarters.
The size and structure of this new formation should approximate that of the multinational, multidimensional standing capability noted above. By co-locating UN Volunteers alongside national contingents, the UN might advance the prospects of appropriate selection, individual and joint training, as well as a higher degree of standardization and interoperability. At this stage, the UN would assume sole control and responsibility for one of the two mission headquarters and its deployable elements. Volunteers would be developed into cohesive units under this headquarters.

• Provide personnel with advance training and two complete, modern equipment kits (one for training and one pre-packed for immediate staging).
Prior comprehensive training for diverse UN Operations will be a prerequisite for rapid deployment as there will be far less time for an extended period of mission-specific training. Two standard and interoperable equipment kits would ensure access, reliability and familiarity, as well as an added measure of safety. Re-supply could be promptly arranged out of reserve or training stocks at the UN base.

• Recruit and train company-level formations of UN Volunteer Civilian Police to mirror the modified structure of the standing national contingents.
Dedicated UN Police contingents would reflect the Organization’s commitment to enforce international humanitarian law, particularly the protection of civilians.

- **Ensure UN elements have a credible stand-alone strength for emergency deployments of approximately 5,700 military, police and civilian personnel.**
  At least 5,700 well-trained personnel are viewed as the minimum necessary to achieve a balance between rapidity and operational effectiveness. This number reflects the requirement for security and self-defense within a volatile environment, as well as support for humanitarian assistance, restoring law and order, providing basic services and preliminary peace building efforts.

  Ultimately, these efforts could evolve into a composite UN Emergency Service comprised of national military and police contingents, as well as dedicated UN volunteers that are stationed and trained together. Both could be co-located at a UN base in a formation roughly similar to a SHIRBRIG, albeit with modifications to include civilian and police personnel.

  For purposes of comparison, a composite UN Emergency Service with 5,700 deployable multinational personnel and 5,700 deployable UN personnel, would likely be sufficient to conduct two operations, although not concurrently. Both have sufficient strength and assets to manage the critical early stages of a peace support operation, but it would likely be necessary for one to provide support and act as a primary reserve for the group in active service. Each would have a capacity for self-defense and tactical offensive maneuvers, but neither is intended for, nor capable of, major enforcement operations. However, given their rapid deployment nature, neither should be considered as another mechanism for the tasks of managing steady-state operations.

  A comparison of the various options, including an estimate of their response times and effectiveness, is outlined in a deployment chart in Figure 4, p. 110.

  Dedicated UN Volunteers, supported, trained and backed by multinational military and civilian elements could be relatively cost-effective. Although UN volunteer elements could put approximately 6,500 new personnel on the UN payroll, and entail considerable expenditures for new equipment, administrative and managerial requirements, the overall costs incurred would decrease given the ongoing participation of national elements and the potential use of national resources such as a redundant military base capable of hosting 14,000 personnel.

  *Section VII* of this report attempts to demonstrate an ongoing cumulative development process of four stages that may offer a better chance of accelerating start-up while improving reliability, readiness and the support of diverse parties. A sequenced process might help initiate the recommendations contained in U.S. H.R. 938 and the proposed UN Emergency Service. Notably, it
also builds on the Canadian model, the Dutch study of a Permanent UN Brigade, the initial Pakistani proposal for a Permanent UN Emergency Force and the Danish-led multinational initiative, which established the SHIRBRIG.

Committed Member States can also take a lead role in initiating such a process. As capabilities are consolidated at each stage, one can anticipate a parallel expansion in the scope and scale of potential activities. Expanding the operational and tactical structure of this capability to include dedicated UN personnel volunteering for service would expand the range of options at the political and strategic levels. Through further contributions to an increasingly sophisticated service, participating Member States would develop more confidence in their capacity and that of their partner’s. They would also know there were options and prospects of prompt support from more reliable sources.

However, as noted, this cumulative development process of four stages leading to a composite capability simply illustrates another approach to developing a more reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability. It is noteworthy that a coalition of supportive Member States has already developed a relatively innovative SHIRBRIG for UN Peace Operations. By working through a similar partnership, albeit with broader regional representation, it would be possible to develop more ambitious arrangements for difficult UN Peace Operations. While still far from the ideal of a dedicated UN mechanism, it may be a means to advance that objective. Of course, any multilateral development of this nature would initially be subject to controversy and some opposition. But if approached in a professional manner with sufficient political support and resources, a UN Emergency Service would likely be viewed as a very tangible and worthy contribution on the first occasion when the need for such a mechanism arose. Current trends infer that such a UN Service will be required within the next few years, but they also indicate that the necessary level of multinational cooperation and commitment of resources will not be forthcoming without substantive pressure.

While the various studies conducted over the past decade have helped to initiate a process and a preliminary foundation, they have not generated a model with sufficient sophistication and appropriate elements for the prompt prevention, management and transformation of contemporary armed conflict. Nor have they generated a model that appeals to the broader array of interests among the different member states. But this remains a critical inquiry that should neither be dropped to await consensus nor relegated solely to any individual or Member State.
As neither the UN or its Member States have a definitive blueprint or even a plan for any such development, the alternatives definitely merit further consideration and a review that is beyond the scope of this particular report. As noted, the need for a dedicated UN rapid deployment capability has been recognized for over fifty years and repeatedly confirmed over the past decade. It would now be remiss to await the next crisis before conducting a detailed, independent study of the options and the requirements. A study of this nature would need to draw on organizations and individuals from different regions and backgrounds. There is sufficient expertise and experience outside ‘official’ circles to conduct a rigorous examination and provide fair evaluations.

Recommendation 24

*It is time for an in-depth, independent, transnational study to identify the general and specific requirements for starting, maintaining and operating a UN Emergency Service. This study should provide a review of diverse options and assess their potential for addressing probable tasks and contingencies. It should also offer guidance into appropriate composition, structure and organization.*

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**CONCLUSION**

The United Nations is acquiring a core foundation for peacekeeping and peace building, but it does not have a capacity for rapid deployment to diverse emergencies. The international community is not prepared for the next Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone or East Timor. Regrettably, there is an alarming gap between the UN’s actual capacity and the avowed commitments of its Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, protect civilians, and prevent armed conflict and genocide.

The Brahimi Report and the Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Review have revitalized an important process. A restructured and expanded DPKO is essential, as are new ‘on-call’ lists, the strengthening of the UNSAS and additional partnerships for new SHIRBRIGs. In short, recent official efforts provide necessary, but insufficient reforms.

Although the focus on technical and administrative change may gradually inspire confidence and wider support, critical gaps remain at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. Similarly, the official emphasis on pragmatic and incremental change to existing
arrangements risks locking the UN into another extended period of *ad hoc* improvisation. The consensus required in the majority of related UN committees has already delayed adaptation and modernization, as agreement can only be reached at the level of the lowest common denominator.

Yet within two years there will be a more durable foundation for UN Peace Operations; one that should be capable of supporting additional ‘building blocks’ and more ambitious mechanisms. There will also be the potential to fast-track supportive change through public diplomacy and transnational initiatives. Overall this study makes twenty-four recommendations that build on and beyond current arrangements to bridge the *Commitment-Capacity gap*. Rather than await the next catastrophe, it is time for new initiatives, new ideas and wider consultations in new forums.

The UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force called for in H.R. 938 is very timely. It has the potential to address three gaps frequently identified in UN operations: slow response times, inadequate training and equipment, as well as the recurring problem of reliability. Of equal importance, it complements previous efforts and has already renewed interest and support for a dedicated UN rapid deployment capability here and abroad. As the success of future UN peace operations will likely depend upon a sophisticated combination of appealing incentives and, if necessary, forceful disincentives, the composition and structure of the force proposed in H.R. 938 may need to be modified and expanded. This report’s review of potential future roles and tasks suggests the need for a permanent multidimensional- multifunctional UN service.

Irrespective of the temporal constraints, there is a persuasive case for a dedicated UN Emergency Service, particularly one composed of volunteer military, police and civilian elements. This is an optimal mechanism for rapid deployment, combining advanced sophistication, credibility, assistance and legitimacy. The general requirements have been reviewed and identified. As indicated, dedicated UN volunteers, trained and equipped within a sound organizational structure, are likely to be far more rapid, reliable and cost-effective The proposed model projects a need for approximately 13,200 personnel stationed at a UN base under an operational headquarters and two mission headquarters. Among the deployable elements assigned to each mission headquarters would be a military brigade group, three companies of civilian police and civilian teams for peace building, conflict resolution medical aid, disaster relief and environmental crisis response units. This is a modular capability that can be tailored to the specific requirements of a particular operation. The model depicted herein presents a range of choice as it can be scaled down, or up, to include diverse elements under one or both mission headquarters, with attendant
implications for the size and frequency of deployments, as well as the range of potential assignments.

The proposed UN Emergency Service is designed to deal with a wider array of diverse, demanding assignments and, hopefully, wider political preferences. It could provide a credible military presence, as well as unique support and services. It is viewed as an essential tool for the prevention of armed conflict, for effective peace operations and for the protection of civilians. It would also be a complementary, parallel development to existing arrangements and multinational contingents. Aside from providing a prompt and well-conceived response to offset human suffering, it would allow time for Member States to organize and prepare for rotation into operations that are likely to be more stable than the high-risk volatile environments, which often arise from delayed responses.

Of course, the development of any UN rapid deployment capability, however sophisticated, will not be a cure-all or panacea; there will be situations where it is neither appropriate nor likely to succeed. In this respect, Nobel Laureate, Dr. John Polanyi presents a fitting analogy:

> Fire departments and police forces do not always prevent fires or crime, yet they are now widely recognized as providing an essential service. Similarly, a rapid reaction capability may confront conditions beyond its capacity to control. This should not call into question its potential value to the international community. It is a civilized response to an urgent problem.238

Hopefully, this report will stimulate further thought and supportive effort. It is not intended to preclude the pursuit of more ambitious arrangements, should the political context change. Among numerous objectives, it has attempted to address two critical questions frequently overlooked in academic and official circles. How do we revitalize and accelerate supportive efforts? And, how might supportive parties facilitate the elusive development of a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability? *First*, in Section IV, this study recommends a more comprehensive and inclusive ‘soft power’ initiative. Such an approach will help educate and inform interested parties, and it should also stimulate further efforts, including a broad-based network or constituency of support. There are new opportunities for developing partnerships between Member States, Non-Governmental Organizations, institutes and individuals.

*Second*, a vision-oriented, cumulative development process that builds on and beyond the foundation provided by existing arrangements will help. There is the prospect of consolidating the foundation for dedicated UN elements through a sequence of stages that introduce additional
SHIRBRIGs, more binding standby arrangements, a UN base with a permanent operational headquarters, new doctrine and comprehensive, prior training. A UN Emergency Service is urgently needed! However, the difficulties associated with start-up and development suggest that it may also be prudent to consider a composite capability of standing multinational elements and the gradual introduction of dedicated UN volunteers.

Obviously, a host of related issues will have to be addressed before a UN Emergency Service becomes a reality. Financing is one major concern. Securing a political commitment to the process appears to pose a far greater challenge. But these issues hardly preclude the need to consider new approaches, illustrate diverse options, or design compelling steps that might facilitate such a transition.

It is worth recalling that there have been occasions when the necessary consensus was close at hand. The challenge remains, as does the urgent need. At least, we should be better prepared.

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### Deployment Chart of UN Rapid Deployment Capability Options

(Projected schedule indicating the potential response & effectiveness)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)</th>
<th>Home-based SHIRBRIG Participants</th>
<th>Standing SHIRBRIG Elements Co-located at UN Base</th>
<th>UN Emergency Service of Volunteer Elements (UN ES)</th>
<th>Composite UN ES of Volunteer &amp; National Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Notification</td>
<td>Notification; review within Operational H.Q. to coincide with high readiness alert for all national standing elements;</td>
<td>Notification; review within Operational H.Q to coincide with high readiness alert; -immediate request for air and sea lift; -implement initial staging and deployment plans;</td>
<td>Identical to UN ES of Volunteers, but also with high readiness alert to national standing elements at UN base;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Channel request for review &amp; related info to national defense, foreign affairs and political institutions;</td>
<td>Channel request for review &amp; related info to national defense, foreign affairs and political institutions;</td>
<td>Channel request for review &amp; related info to national defense, foreign affairs and political institutions; -commence mission-specific planning, training and required multinational coordination;</td>
<td>Stage &amp; deploy technical recce with Deputy SRSG; -commence mission-specific training and preparation of all potentially deployable elements;</td>
<td>Stet, with requests channelled to national defense, foreign affairs and political institutions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-implement initial staging and deployment plans; -ongoing multinational mission-specific planning, preparation &amp; training;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical recce deploys to identify &amp; inform UNHQ &amp; operational HQ of situation and potential requirements for further elements;</td>
<td>Stet, technical recce would include pre-authorized national personnel and UN volunteers and, it would also inform national authorities;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Request from political level to UN DPKO for clarification of mandate &amp; ROE, SOPS, etc;</td>
<td>Deploy pre-authorized, multinational, technical recce;</td>
<td>Review of plans; -commence staging of pre-packed equipment from UN base;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standing SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>UN ES With UN Volunteers</td>
<td>Composite UN ES</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultations between Governments participating in SHIRBRIG; -Defense establishments assign national units to SHIRBRIG groups pending political approval; -Finalize H.Q. &amp; support arrangements between participating member states;</td>
<td>Recce informs OP H.Q., national &amp; UN officials of situation, and potential requirements for further elements; -Initiate process for cabinet &amp; parliamentary approval;</td>
<td>Stage and deploy light elements assigned with support from other elements at UN base; -Concurrent plans for withdrawal, replacement, or if necessary, augmentation;</td>
<td>Request prompt political approval to deploy any specific national elements assigned to the UN base, OPHQ and UN Mission HQ; - Secure approval for deployment of national elements within 48 hours or proceed with UN volunteers assigned to one of the two mission Headquarters;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initiate process for cabinet &amp; parliamentary approval;</td>
<td>-SRSG and OPHQ notify appropriate elements from those standing on site;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finalize deployment package, pending consultation with all participants;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Governments negotiate with UN over other potential contributors, command arrangements and financial re-imbursement;</td>
<td>Readiness warning provided to assigned national military units to commence training (minimum trg. 2 weeks); -If agreed by national cabinets &amp; parliaments, UN is notified of lift &amp; logistics requirements;</td>
<td>If national approval is withheld, select alternates from others assigned to UN base; -Concurrent plans for withdrawal, replacement, or if necessary, augmentation;</td>
<td>Commence staging and deployment of heavier elements required;</td>
<td>Commence staging and deployment of light elements assigned with support from either the UN volunteer or national elements at the UN base;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-15</td>
<td>Cabinet &amp; parliamentary review of potential contribution; -If approved, national units receive warning to prepare for potential deployment;</td>
<td>Potential to deploy multinational SHIRBRIG technical recce; -If national approval is withheld, select alternates from other SHIRBRIG participants;</td>
<td>Potential to stage and deploy light elements;</td>
<td>UN mission HQ established in theatre and initial light elements commence operations;</td>
<td>Commence staging and deployment of heavier elements required; - UN mission HQ established in theatre and initial light elements commence operations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-30</td>
<td>National units commence a one-to-three-month period of mission-specific training;</td>
<td>Training continues as each Government negotiates specific arrangements with UNDPKO;</td>
<td>Potential to establish Mission HQ &amp; commence staging of heavier elements out of UN base;</td>
<td>All diverse elements selected assemble in theatre under direction of UN Mission HQ;</td>
<td>Stet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standing SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>UN ES With UN Volunteers</td>
<td>Composite UN ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31+</td>
<td>Await national parliamentary approval or non-approval for participation; -UN reviews options from UNSAS 'on-call' lists;</td>
<td>Commence staging, air &amp; sealift for SHIRBRIG groups in various regions; -SHIRBRIG assembles in theatre; -Coordination of SHIRBRIG groups continues for app. 1 week;</td>
<td>Interoperable multinational, standing SHIRBRIG elements may be in theatre, if a sufficient number of participating governments approve deployment;</td>
<td>UN mission ongoing; -Cohesive elements with a capacity to manage a wide array of tasks;</td>
<td>Stet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-?</td>
<td>Training continues; -UN DPKO arranges air &amp; sealift for each national contribution out of their home-bases.</td>
<td>UN mission may be consolidated and in progress, depending upon the interest &amp; support of participating governments;</td>
<td>UN mission ongoing;</td>
<td>UN mission ongoing;</td>
<td>UN mission ongoing;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-90</td>
<td>If approved, loose coalition of Stand-by units from various members deploys and meets in theatre, likely for the first time;</td>
<td>SHIRBRIG mission ongoing for app. another three-to-four months;</td>
<td>Standing SHIRBRIG begins to integrate UNSAS units into steady-state operation, if necessary;</td>
<td>UN ES begins to integrate UNSAS units into steady-state operation, if necessary;</td>
<td>Stet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91-175</td>
<td>UN mission may be in progress.</td>
<td>Rotation from UNSAS into steady-state operation; -SHIRBRIG returns to reconstitute in national bases.</td>
<td>Standing SHIRBRIG returns to UN Base ASAP.</td>
<td>UN ES returns to UN Base ASAP.</td>
<td>Composite UN ES, whether national elements or UN volunteers returns to UN Base ASAP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Response Times:**

| At best, slow to traditional ops & very slow to complex ops. | Better at traditional ops & questionable in complex ops. | Rapid to traditional ops & modest-to-rapid at complex ops. | Immediate response to traditional & complex ops. | Either immediate or rapid to traditional & complex ops. |

**Potential Effectiveness:**

| Questionable, with variable training, discipline, equipment & leadership. | Relatively well-trained and equipped to high military standards. | Higher degree of competence & interoperability with advanced joint training. | Cohesive, diverse elements with specific doctrine, trg. & equipment for assigned tasks. | Stet, with the additional support of the participating Member States. |
Acknowledgements

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This paper expands on research undertaken for the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and for the earlier Canadian Government study, Towards A United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability. I am indebted to my fellow members of the Core Working group of the former, particularly to Lieutenant Colonel James Hammond (CF) and Carlton Hughes. A number of individuals in the UN Secretariat provided additional insight and information. Special thanks are extended to: Chris Coleman, Senior Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO; Lieutenant Colonel Lazarus Ray Ncube, Mission Planning Service, DPKO; Wasantha Bandarage, Information Officer, Office of the Under-Secretary-General, DPKO; Ambassador Michel Duval, Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN; Minister Motohide Yoshikawa, Head Political Section, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations; Lieutenant Colonel Remi Landry (CF), formerly at the International Peace Academy; Major Michael Lollesgaard, Asst. MILAD, Danish Mission to the UN; Major-General Klaas C. Roos, MILAD, The Netherlands Permanent Mission to the United Nations; Fergus Watt, Director of World Federalists, Canada and; Ambassador (ret.) Geoffrey Pearson, President, UNA Canada.

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Again, many thanks to Prof. Erika Simpson and Howard Ben Langille for the wonderful support! Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this report, as well as any errors or omissions, are the author's.

******************************************************************
Endnotes*


7 U.S. President George Bush, Address to the Congress, March 6, 1991.

8 Moreover, by 1945 the prevailing pattern of armed conflict had largely, but not exclusively shifted to internal, civil and intra-State violence rather than the inter-State wars that the UN Charter was designed to address. Despite increasing interdependence, these were increasingly complex conflicts that defied traditional and hastily improvised solutions. Protecting people within States, as well as the sovereignty of those and other States, would inevitably pose a challenge to an Organization committed to both.

9 This was evident as early as August 1992, when US presidential candidate Bill Clinton expressed support for a voluntary UN Rapid Deployment Force. In February 1993, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed the UN Secretary-General that the US would back proposals for a UN Rapid Deployment Force. On various occasions, Russian statesmen endorsed UN Standby Forces, negotiation of Article 43 agreements, and even their readiness to commit forces to a UN army. In 1992 French President Francois Mitterand called for revitalising the UN Military Staff Committee and offered to commit 1,000 French soldiers at its disposal on forty-eight hours notice with another 1,000 ready for UN service within a week. See the sections on “Presidential Support” and “International Support” in Capt. Edward I. Denney, LTC William J. Droll, Capt. Gregory P. Harker, LTC Stephen M. Speakes, and LTC Fred A. Treyz, III, A Blue Helmet Combat Force, Policy Analysis Paper 93-01, National Security Program, Harvard University, 1993, pp. 9-10.


15 --- “In these circumstances,” the Secretary-General wrote, “I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. Such a force would be the Security Council’s strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peacekeeping troops. It might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of Member Countries.” As he noted, “these units would be trained to the same
standards, use the same operating procedures, be equipped with integrated communications equipment and take part in joint exercises at regular intervals. They would be stationed in their home countries but maintained at a high state of readiness.”

Ibid, para. 44, p. 11.


20 A number of these criteria are drawn from the Government of Canada's report, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability, Ottawa, Sept. 1995. See for example, chapter 2, “Principles of the Study,” pp. 8-16.

21 There remain diverse perspectives among the members over what changes (offices, procedures and purposes) are required and what they are intended for. As this is an ongoing process that still shifts in response to review and approval, there is a risk that any analysis will be soon be dated. For a useful review of the diverse perspectives see: “Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations,” a joint report of the International Peace Academy and the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2001. Available: http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublrepoReseBrahimi_body.htm


24 Ibid., Para 4.


26 Ibid., Para 68.


28 Ibid., Para 213.


30 Ibid., Para 85.

31 Ibid., Para 87-88.

32 Ibid., Para 89.

33 Ibid., Para 90. In a brief overview of the impediments, the Panel wrote that, “many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and effectively’ within the timelines suggested. The analysis that follows argues that at least some of these circumstances must change to make rapid and effective deployment possible.”

34 Ibid.


36 Ibid., Para 116.

37 Ibid., Para 110.

38 Ibid., Para 118-126.

39 Ibid., Para 162.


The “Comprehensive Review” commissioned for the UN Secretary-General was also intended to reconcile and address several different recommendations of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping. Consultants were hired to conduct an independent analysis of the qualitative and quantitative problems and requirements. Their findings were subsequently assessed by both an External Review Board and the UN Secretary-General in preparing his report for submission to the UN General Assembly. See: United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, “Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on UN Peace Operations,” A/55/977, May 28, 2001.

42 Ibid., Paras 110-143.
43 Ibid., Para 113.
44 Ibid., Para 111. This warning was initially expressed in the Secretary-General’s ‘Implementation Plan,’ See: A/55/502, Para 112.
45 The report recommended a ‘medium strategic reserve’ of equipment and material be pre-stocked at Brindisi, (entailing approximately $170 million up-front investment and some $40 million annual recurring costs). See: Para 120, p.24.
46 Pre-commitment authority to procure required goods and services was identified as another measure to advance preparations in the lead up to a Security Council resolution. See, Para 117, p. 22.
51 UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno, citing a quote from the “Comprehensive Review” in Annan’s Report on Follow-up to Brahimi Report is Pre-viewed, June 5, 2001.
52 The four previous official reports cited in Para 1 of the Secretary-General’s report of May 28, 2001 were: the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/54/839), March 20, 2000; the report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), August 21, 2000; the Secretary-General’s report on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel (A/55/502), October 20, 2000; and the Special Committee’s response to the Panel’s report and the implementation plan contained in (A/C/4/55/6), December 4, 2000.
53 For a useful review of the earlier changes in DPKO see Brigadier General Mono Bhagat, “Trends In UN Capabilities: Standby Arrangements, Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, Regional Arrangements,” Available: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/No.%2021/Bhagat.html
54 DPKO’s Training Unit has written training guidelines, manuals and other materials to assist Member States in preparing military, civilian and police personnel for UN assignments. Aside from its numerous publications, the Training Unit has also helped to improve and standardize peacekeeping training through seminars, workshops and training assistance teams.
55 The Mission Planning Service has been identified as the focal point for all peacekeeping planning. Its activities include: generic guidelines and procedures to streamline the process of mission planning; generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries, from which mission-specific guidelines are formulated; the preparation of standard operating procedures for essential functions; and in-house studies pertaining to important issues such as command and control, rules of engagement, structure of mission headquarters, etc. See: “General Framework, United Nations Peacekeeping,” Available: http://www.un.org:80/Depts/dpko/MP.htm
56 Brigadier General Mono Bhagat, “Trends in UN Capabilities: Standby Arrangements, Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, Regional Arrangements.”
57 This is drawn from the Report of the Secretary-General on “Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on UN Peace Operations,” Para 18, p. 10.
58 Ibid. Para 27, p. 11.
59 Only 32 officers in DPKO were available to provide substantive and operational military guidance to 27,000 troops in the field. These figures are drawn from the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, “Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peace operations,” Para 174-191.
60 Ibid., Para 197.
61 The Panel on UN Peace Operations, Para 194 & 195.
The external consultants' quantitative analysis revealed that DPKO would need 650 staff to ensure “(a) a solid management infrastructure; (b) effective strategic planning and ‘lessons learned’ capacities; (c) significantly enhanced policy and capacity development capabilities (d) the establishment and maintenance of solid operational planning infrastructure; (e) depth in its resource base to dedicate sufficient (and quality) time to operational planning and mission support; (f) capability to provide the first line of response to operational exigencies (or surge requirements). This would include the need to plan an unexpected new mission, providing back-up to colleagues to deploy to the field for mission start-up or to trouble-shoot an existing one.” Cited in Report of the Secretary-General, June 1, 2001, Para 185, p. 34.

Ibid., Para 77, p. 17, These include “(a) the office of the Military Advisor; (b) the Force Generation and Military Personnel Service in the Military Division; (c) the Training and Evaluation Service in the Military Division; (d) the Policy and Planning Unit in the Civilian Police Division; (e) the Transport, Supply Communications and Electronics Services, Engineering and Logistics Operations Sections in the Logistics and Communication Service; (f) the Financial Management and Support Service; (g) the Office of Operations; (h) the Mine Action Service.”

To cite one recent example, the Fifth Committee refused to support the creation of a post for a Director of Management, which both the Secretariat and numerous Member States viewed as essential for leading the overhaul and strengthening of the DPKO’s management and system practices.

With budgetary constraints in 1997 and demands for the elimination of all gratis personnel (100 military officers), DPKO was downsized and denied numerous professionals and numerous key positions. The absence of free military expertise strained the Department's capacity for professional and competent planning, leaving personnel in an ‘uphill struggle’ to do more with less. For example, the reduction of DPKO’s training unit from fifteen to two personnel would put many of their announced programmes on hold. UN training assistance teams were unlikely to be available for the newer troop contributors and DPKO was not well positioned to participate in the development of training programmes, doctrine or standard operating procedures for the newer peace support operations that included Chapter VII mandates.

As noted, “at present, DPKO staff are located in six different floors of the Secretariat, four floors across the street in UNITAR, 1 floor in the FF building on 45th Street and yet another in DC1.” Some staff were recently moved into Nigeria House on Second Avenue. See: Address of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, New York, March 8, 2001, p. 6.


DPKO claims to have commenced planning in each of the following capacities: “(a) standby teams available on 72 hours’ notice to deploy as part of an initial mission survey team, for periods of up to two weeks; (b) mission start-up teams, available on one week’s notice for assignments of up to 60 days in order to help establish a mission headquarters; longer-term deployment teams, available on 30 days’ notice for deployments of 12 to 24 months.” Cited in Report of the Secretary-General, June 1, 2001, Para 140, p. 28.

Major-General Frank Van Kappen detailed the five primary tasks of the RDMHQ:
1. translating the concept of operations prepared by the mission planning service into tactical sub-plans;
2. developing and implementing RDMHQ preparedness and training activities; providing advice to the Head of Mission for decision-making and coordination purposes;
3. establishing an administrative infrastructure for the mission;
4. providing, during the early stages of the operation, essential liaison with the parties;
5. working with incoming mission headquarters personnel to ensure that, as the operation grows to its full size and complexity, unity of effort to implement the Security Council mandate is maintained.


The Friends Group stipulated that the RDMHQ would require the following capabilities:
a. It must be deployable at very short notice.
b. It should be able to deploy for up to six months.
c. It should provide initially the nucleus of a headquarters for a new PKO.
d. It must be integrated into DPKO as a core function in order to retain its interoperability with the UN Headquarters in New York.
e. It must be capable of undertaking technical reconnaissance missions prior to deployment.
f. It must have undertaken operational deployment preparations prior to its commitment. This must include such things as the production of Standard Operating Procedures and the completion of pre-deployment training.
See: Friends of Rapid Deployment, Technical Working Group Paper, “A Rapidly Deployable Headquarters: Roles, Functions and Implementation,” March 26, 1996. As this paper noted, “this headquarters would be multinational, drawing its personnel widely from contributing Member States of all regions. It would also be multidimensional, reflecting the requirements of the more complex operations of the 1990s, with a substantive civilian staff of diverse experience in the areas of civilian police, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and legal affairs. This headquarters would be a ‘first-in, first-out’ operation, moving into an area rapidly but capable of being removed equally quickly. It should be capable of directing at least 5,000 personnel, possibly more if it is augmented at the time of deployment. This staff, seconded or loaned by Member States to the UN Secretariat, could be deployed into a theatre of operations under the authority of the Security Council and at the direction of the Secretary-General but without further authorization at the national level.”


74 It should be noted that the UN began to construct a system of standby forces in 1964, but only a small number of Member States demonstrated a willingness to enter into any related arrangement with the UN.


79 As previously noted, response time is defined by the UN as the period between the time the request to provide resources is made and the time these resources are ready for airlift/sealift to the mission area.

80 Resources were divided into four groups on the basis of their potential. UN officials initially estimated that 40% of the overall pool -- fall into the first two categories of (1) up to 30 days, and (2) between 30 and 60 days. In other words, it was previously assumed the UN had a conditional commitment of over 41,000 personnel on standby assumed to be capable of rapid deployment.


82 In response to the concerns of several member states and the poor responses received from the wider membership, a new quarterly reporting system is to replace the monthly status reports to ensure DPKO’s information provides an accurate reflection of potentially available resources.

83 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, p. 11, Para 43.

84 Ibid., p. 11, Para. 44.

85 The former Secretary-General previously cautioned, “the system of standby arrangements does not so far ensure the reliability and speed of response which is required in such emergencies. It is essential that the necessary capabilities are reliably available when they are needed and can be deployed with the speed dictated by the situations. It is evident that Member States possess such capabilities; what is needed is the will to make them available for the execution of Security Council mandates.” Cited in: Boutros Boutros-Ghali,”Peace-keeping in a Changing Context.”


87 Boutrous Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, p. 18, Para 43.

88 As reported, the information available under the standby arrangements proved most helpful in the planning for and subsequent deployment of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia, in particular the successful United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). These arrangements also helped officials coordinate the preventive deployment operation (MINURCA) for the Central African Republic. Favourable circumstances in this instance also facilitated a rapid deployment.

89 See: “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping,” May 2000. As noted, “It should be pointed out that the standby arrangements information registered in the database has proved most helpful in the planning for, and in some cases subsequent deployment to, peacekeeping operations in Angola, the Central
African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone, the former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia and Western Sahara.” In concluding, he stated that, “the system of standby arrangements has proved its ability to expedite planning by the early identification of possible troop contributors and by providing timely, accurate and reliable information to whose who have to plan for the deployment of troops and equipment.” Para 14 & 20. Available: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/anr.htm

See: Ibid., Para 21. This was again confirmed by the UN Military Advisor in the December 20, 2001, “Annual Update On The United Nations Standby Arrangements System,” where he stated that, “while the United Nations still does not have a true rapid reaction capability, the development of the standby arrangements has been a positive step.”


United Nations Charter, Article 43 (1).

Among the other determining factors noted are “political approval and support at the national level, availability of airlift/sealift, a capacity for mission management and logistic sustainment in the field, as well as the conclusion of the necessary administrative procedures.”

The ‘Background’ document on the SHIRBRIG attests to several of the limitations inherent in the UNSAS. As noted, “not all contributions meet the readiness and self-sufficiency criteria originally foreseen. Some of the allocated forces are already engaged in operations, while others are not fully prepared and finally: none of the units [have] trained or cooperated before deployment. Consequently, the Standby Arrangement System does not at present provide the UN with a well-prepared rapid deployment capability.” Available: http://www.shirbrig.dk/background.html

These areas of insufficient numbers were identified in, UN DPKO, “Monthly Status Report: United Nations Standby Arrangements,” Status Report as of July 12, 2001.

Letter dated 19 March 2001 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, to the Permanent Representatives of all Member States on enhancing the Standby Arrangement System.


For example, while Japan is one of the wealthier Member States, it has yet to participate in the UNSAS. China has solely expressed a willingness to participate. The United States and the Russian Federation have committed only to provide preliminary planning data.

Moreover, Danish officials write that when SHIRBRIG is deployed it will be “subject to UN command and control arrangements and operate exclusively under the direction of the Secretary-General or his Special Representative and under the operational control of the Force Commander for the operation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, “Background Paper About Establishing a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces Brigade at High Readiness (SHIRBRIG),” pp. 1-2.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, “Background Paper about Establishing a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces Brigade at High Readiness” (SHIRBRIG), Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in the ‘Friends of Rapid Deployment’ Group, New York, 26 September, 1996. See @ http://www.undp.org/missions/denmark/policy/shirbrig.htm

The countries that initially signed the ‘Letter of Intent’ are Austria, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. The Czech Republic, Finland and Ireland participated in the signing ceremony as observers. See: “Status in the establishment of the Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade,” Danish Ministry of Defence, December 19, 1996. Also see: http://www.undp.org/missions/denmark/policy/standby.htm

Among the new members of the SHIRBRIG are Argentina, Italy and Romania. See: http://www.shirbrig.dk

Finland, Spain, Portugal and Slovenia are also in the process of becoming SHIRBRIG participants, while the Chech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan and Senegal are working to support the SHIRBRIG.

Although the arrangements are preliminary, there has been related progress in Central and South Eastern Europe, as well as in the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
As Danish officials informed the Friends Group, “the conceptual work done so far on the establishment of a multinational UN [SHIRBRIG] carries a relevance far beyond the group of nations participating in the present project. The concept could inspire other groups of nations to take a similar initiative.”

See: Statement by Mr. Altay Cenziger, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, to the Meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, New York, June 18, 2001. As noted, this brigade was formed in 1998 with a headquarters activated in 1999 in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.


UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan praised the Dutch soldiers of the SHIRBRIG contingent for their rapidity in becoming operational and stated that, “if we did not have this system, it would have taken us much longer.” Cited in Unofficial Transcript of UN Secretary-General’s Press Conference in Asmara, Eritrea, December 9, 2000. Available: www.un.org/depts/dpko/unmee/pc9dec.htm. It is noteworthy that some officials have argued the SHIRBRIG members managed the deployment to UNMEE within 30 days. This is a dubious claim. Most Member States and UN officials were aware that a peacekeeping operation would be required early in the Spring of 2000. The UN conducted a technical reconnaissance mission to the theatre in July. The Security Council passed resolution 1312 on July 31 establishing UNMEE and on August 9, the UN Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a peacekeeping force of 4000 military personnel. A number of national observers were deployed to UNMEE as early as August when the UN approached SHIRBRIG members to provide troops. In September, national warning orders were given to specific units that commenced training for the next two months. Parliaments and Cabinets debated the deployment in October. The UNMEE mission was deployed at full strength in early December 2000, roughly four months after the official request.


See: Statement of President of the UN Security Council, S/2000/56, January 14, 2002. This statement was preceded by Security Council Resolution 1353 in June of 2001, which laid out an initial blueprint for cooperation between the Council and the countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions.


It is increasingly apparent that a number of Member States have a vested interest in maintaining the current system, despite its deficiencies. Many independent national defence establishments are opposed to an empowered UN, as such a development is perceived to entail potential competition to preferred regional military alliances, national defence priorities, budgets, major capital acquisition programmes and control over the security agenda. For some of the poorer countries, participation within current arrangements for UN peacekeeping has provided a major source of revenue that they do not want to lose.

This phenomenon is evident even among the list of former regular troop contributors. As of June 30, 2001, it is noteworthy that the United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributors” (Military observers, civilian police, troops) lists Canada at 328 personnel; Denmark at 101 personnel; The Netherlands at 74 personnel; Norway at 73 personnel; and Sweden at 132 personnel. Nor are those with the greatest capacity, particularly the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, leading by example. The summary lists China at 113 personnel; France at 644 personnel; the Russian Federation at 314 personnel; the United Kingdom at 681 personnel; and the United States at 797 personnel. This is in rather marked contrast to member states such as Bangladesh at 6040 personnel; Nigeria at 3404 personnel; India at 2791 personnel; Jordan at 2697 personnel; Kenya at 2077 personnel; Ghana at 2045 personnel; and Pakistan at 1812 personnel.

Ibid.


For example, Egypt, Pakistan and India have been the sharpest critics of the proposed policy planning staff and unit for information collection and analysis. See: Barbara Crossette, “U.N. Plan for a New Crisis Unit Opposed by Wary
Poor Nations,” The New York Times, November 26, 2000. Crossette also writes that, “countries that provide troops for many missions, most of them in the developing world, are also attacking the richer countries for their unwillingness to send their own soldiers to peacekeeping operations, saying that the system suffers from a kind of apartheid, where rich countries order the missions and pay the bills and poor countries send their troops to die.”

125 A very damaging precedent has been set by the United States, which effectively allows others to opt out of global responsibilities on the premise that if the most powerful and wealthy will not commit personnel and resources, then those with lesser capabilities should have fewer obligations to support this system.


127 This is paraphrased from the statement of the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, New York, June 18, 2001.

128 Cited in “Daily Highlights,” October 25, 1996, Central News Section, Department of Public Information, United Nations.

129 A senior UN official in the DPKO presented these revised assessments to the International Peace Academy’s, “Experts Seminar on UN Rapid Deployment,” New York, April 1, 2000.

130 Notably, rapid deployment is beyond the capacity of the majority of nation states, with only the more affluent and powerful retaining such a capacity. It also tends to be very difficult for multinational coalitions and regional organizations.


135 According to one source, the lesson DPKO drew from the earlier rapid deployment initiative was that they would have to consult with those most opposed and ask their preferences. In effect, those least supportive of the earlier initiative were provided with a unique opportunity to participate in setting the new agenda. Their concerns and interests would have to be accommodated, despite the immediate implications for a few other priorities, including rapid deployment. It is understandable that those within the UN would want to ensure at least the start of a more cooperative and inclusive process.

136 Fortunately, the arrangements now being implemented are not a “done deal.” They represent a relatively promising start, yet they need not, and should not, be viewed as having achieved sufficient reliability or sophisticated capability.

137 The term ‘soft power’ has been interpreted as entailing the ability to communicate, negotiate, mobilise opinion, work within multilateral bodies and promote international initiatives. It is essentially about increasing political leverage to advance peaceful change by building new partnerships and coalitions not only between governments, but also with other elements of civil society such as NGOs, related agencies, the media and interested parties. The term was coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in: Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1990. It has since become a foreign policy strategy for a growing number of Member States.

138 Even prior to the League of Nations, it was understood that an effective collective security system would provide states with more than simply a security guarantor. For one, it would reduce tensions, thus allowing all to reduce their national defence expenditures and devote those resources to other pressing challenges. It would also restore the conditions necessary for wider, if not universal, disarmament. In short, an empowered UN holds considerable promise to introduce further cooperation in a mutually reinforcing and progressively positive manner. For a brief assessment of the potential of UN rapid deployment capabilities see: The Centre for Defense Information, “The United Nations At Fifty: A Force For The Future,” The Defense Monitor, vol. XXV, no. 1, January 1, 1996.


This option was presented by Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek, “A UN Constabulary to Enforce the Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity,” Neil Reimer (Ed.), Protection Against Genocide: Mission Impossible? London: Praeger, 2000, pp. 105-122.


Over the past five years, there have numerous studies pertaining to the prevention of armed conflict, which have frequently identified the need for a UN rapid deployment capability. Among the more comprehensive see: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Commission, 1997. Available: http://www.ccpdc.org. Similarly, increasing attention and effort has been devoted to the prevention of genocide. For a very thoughtful assessment of the problem and a proposal similar to that recommended within this study see: Mendlovitz and Fousek, “A UN Constabulary to Enforce the Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.” For a more comprehensive review and list of related proposals see: John G. Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen, Westport: Praeger, 2001. For NGO analysis and recommendations see: Earth Action, “A UN Volunteer Force to Prevent Genocide and War,” Available: http://www.endgenocide.org/ceg-rrf/index.htm

An excellent review of the arguments for and against such a development is within, Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Force”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996.

Canada, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability, p. 60.


Adam Roberts, “Proposals for UN Standing Forces…,” p. 62.

Such reservations were initially raised by Gareth Evans in his 1993 contribution to, “A UN Volunteer Military Force—Four Views.”


Ibid., pp. 185-204. In Morrison’s opinion, “arguments advancing a Standing Military Force as the solution to the world’s ills are exercises in procrastination and temporising.” p. 202.

See for example, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect, Ottawa, December 2001.

This option was recently raised by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, despite an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries agreed to in December 1989. See: “Peacekeeping ‘Role’ for

Troop contributing governments are paid approximately $1,000 per month for each soldier, regardless of rank, with a modest supplement for personal equipment, and an additional allowance of $291 monthly for those with special skills.

For elaboration on this perspective see the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement by H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, New York, June 18, 2001. Notably, at the political level, the NAM has insisted UN peace operations should abide by the principle of securing consent from host nations and that in a UN mission force should only be used in self-defense. However, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, they have demonstrated considerable flexibility and cooperation in adapting to demanding missions.

Mendlovitz and Fousek suggest the establishment of a UN police force raises two distinct fears about the potential erosion of sovereignty. As they write, “first, States fear that any UN police force might be used against the interests of a Member State, and that this would erode the general principle of state sovereignty. Second, they fear that the UN, for whatever reasons, might intervene directly into their own territory, thereby undermining their own sovereignty, quite specifically. Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek, “A UN Constabulary to Enforce the Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity,” Neil Reimer, (Ed.), Protection Against Genocide: Mission Impossible? London: Praeger, 2000, p. 119.


Comprehensive Review, Para 193, p. 35.


Sir Brian Urquhart, “Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability,” in Cox and Legault, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities, p. 31.


Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, p.66. It should be noted that this report did not endorse UN volunteers but proposed the establishment of rapid reaction force of 5,000 to 10,000 troops to be drawn from sitting members of the Security Council.


Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability, p. 62.

Ibid., p. 60. A Canadian discussion paper on the issue also acknowledges that, “it would provide the UN with a small but totally reliable, well-trained and cohesive group for deployment by the Security Council in urgent situations. It would break one of the key logjams in the current UN System, namely the insistence by troop contributing nations that they authorise the use of their national forces prior to each deployment. It would also simplify command and control arrangements in UN peace support operations, and put an end to conflicts between UN commanders and contingent commanders reporting to national authorities.” Canada, DFAIT, “Improving the UN’s Rapid Reaction Capability: Discussion Paper,” April 29, 1995, p. 3.

181 Ibid., p. 4.
183 Brian Urquhart, “For A U.N. Volunteer Military Force.”
184 As noted, the proposed brigade would complement existing arrangements for peacekeeping, crisis management and emergency humanitarian situations. Its chief value would be as a ‘stop-gap’ measure when a crisis was imminent, and its deployments would be of strictly limited duration. The Netherlands ‘Non-Paper’, p. 5.
187 Ibid. p. 172.
188 As Kofi Annan wrote, “rapid response is vital particularly from a preventive perspective, because in cases like Rwanda, the conflict’s worst effects are often felt in its earliest stages. A rapid response is thus essential if we are effectively to limit the range, extent and momentum of a conflict.” “The Peacekeeping Prescription,” Cahill, Preventive Diplomacy, p. 184.
191 Comprehensive Review, Para 270, p. 46.
192 The importance of ensuring a comprehensive approach to future operations was recognized early in the past decade and emphasized in Ken D. Bush, “Missions for Peace: The Case of Somalia,” paper prepared for the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, September 1994, pp. 19-22.
193 The recent notion of using a stronger civilian police force as the lead and primary element for rapid deployment is viewed as a dangerous fallacy. To date, there are no police forces that are trained to operate on their own in a hostile environment or to start a UN mission. There are no police forces equipped and prepared to ensure their own self-defense when directly confronted by military opposition. Moreover, recent experience suggests the need for a fairly ‘robust’ deterrent capability at the start of an operation when the first UN elements are likely to be seriously tested by the armed belligerents (military and paramilitary) engaged in the conflict. This initial test tends to be a determining factor for the future success of the mission. Even the use of light infantry is often discouraged, despite their capacity for very rapid deployment as they have restricted mobility in theatre and are seldom equipped with the armored vehicles that are necessary for their own protection and the security of the operation.
195 For further elaboration see, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability, pp. 21-24.
196 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Press Briefing, February 24, 2000.
198 Comprehensive Review, Para 113, p.22. For each type of operation, it was recognized that, most of the military forces provided would require all their strategic lift and most of their service support from the United Nations. Traditional missions are likely to consist of approximately 5,000 troops (50 percent self sustaining), 100 substantive staff, 200 military observers and civilian police, 200 administrative (international and local staff). As noted, “a complex mission was hypothesized to consist of 10,000 troops (25 percent self sustaining), 300 substantive staff, 1,000 military observers and civilian police, and 1,000 administrative (international and local) staff.” It was also assumed that these missions were to be deployed in areas with limited local infrastructure at a frequency of one traditional and one complex mission per year.
201 As noted, the legislation calls on the President to use the United States’ “voice, vote and influence” to urge the UN to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force that can be quickly dispatched under the

202 U.S., H.R. 938, p.3.
203 Ibid.
204 Arguably, a UN PSF might have had a profound influence over the early stages of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as well as subsequent events in Kosovo and Macedonia. A similar case could be made for its potential to affect the outcome of other UN operations, including Somalia, Haiti and the Central African Republic. Obviously, it would be far less effective (and unlikely to be deployed) in the latter stages of a conflict once events had escalated to war. Moreover, it could not have influenced the conflict in Chechnya, as the Russian Federation, like other permanent members of the Security Council, could veto any decision to deploy it. It should be noted that this is the author’s conception of a possible structure for the proposed UN PSF and that it may not correspond to the structure envisaged by those who actually drafted and sponsored H.R. 938.

205 The members of the ‘Human Security Network’ now include: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand. As this group represents a wide geographic distribution and has an agenda that emphasizes conflict prevention, as well as members who support further efforts to enhance UN rapid deployment, it might be widely supported and inclined to assist with such an endeavour.
206 The Netherlands’ ‘Non-Paper’ initially raised the issue of ‘adoption’ of a Permanent UN Brigade by one or more member states or a regional organization. See: p. 15.
207 Among the diverse NGO’s supporting H.R. 938 are: Refugees International, Save the Children, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Council for a Livable World, the World Federalists, the Campaign for UN Reform, Global Action to Prevent War, Genocide Watch, Earth Action, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Africare, Physicians for Human Rights and the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping.
208 As noted, an October 1999 PIPA poll reports that: 1) 77% agree that if a government commits atrocities against its people “the countries of the world, including the US” should intervene with force to stop the killing; 2) 73% view themselves as “a citizen of the world as well as a citizen of the United States”; and 3) 53% favor a standing UN peacekeeping force made up of individuals who were not part of a national army, but had volunteered to be part of the UN force. A March 2000 Zogby poll indicates 52% supported a “100,000 man UN peacekeeping force. Cited from the Campaign for UN Reform, “Filling the United Nations Peacekeeping Gap: Support H.R. 938,” March 8 2001, Available: http://www.cunr.org/HR%20938%20dear%20colleague.htm
209 As noted, the tasks and contingencies of any UN rapid deployment capability should expand to include activities such as the prompt start-up of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, as well as those directed at conflict resolution and reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization and de-mining.

210 On November 28, 1956, Firoz Khan Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, proposed that the United Nations Emergency Force be developed into a permanent UN army, with the UN hiring, training and paying the soldiers. See: The New York Times, November 30, 1956.
211 For a brief overview of the initial Canadian submission on a UN Standing Emergency Group see: Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability, pp. 60-63.
212 The following section on requirements draws extensively on the previous work of the author. Several of these requirements were initially outlined in Peter Langille, Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes, and Major James Hammond, “A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability,” in Cox and Legault, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities, pp. 179-200. This proposal was revised in, H. Peter Langille, “Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces,” Special Issue, International Peacekeeping, (eds.), Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Rambotham, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 219-253. It was also elaborated upon in Langille, “Renewing Partnerships For the Prevention Of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate A UN Standing Emergency Capability,” A Policy Option Paper prepared for the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Ottawa, Fall 2000.
215 A headquarters of this nature would, by necessity, be quite large. The example provided estimates a military requirement for approximately 203 personnel not including the base infrastructure and support staff. This number is partly accounted for given the need for a 24/7 operations cell to initiate a rapid response and immediate planning in the event of a pending crisis. As this headquarters assumes responsibility for the details of reconnaissance, force composition and deployment, a 24/7 operations cell will be critical. The civilian component within this headquarters is projected at 83 personnel (not including base infrastructure). These civilians will be required to ensure a
comprehensive approach in the planning of multidimensional operations and to develop the integrated unity of effort, which must typify UN peace support operations of the future.

216 These conditions are more extensively dealt with in, The Netherlands Non-Paper, “A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade,” pp. 26-30.


218 For example, at the tactical level, doctrine can help to specify a menu of options for the deployable elements that will assist the opposing parties in pursuing appropriate solutions. In this respect, ‘incentives’ in humanitarian assistance, confidence building and support for conflict resolution have to be considered essential elements of doctrine as ‘success’ may well depend on the extent to which a mission establishes the trust of the local population and the respect of belligerents. Another key to widening the range of options is to resolve problems at the lowest practical level, or what is frequently referred to as the ‘sharp end’ between local forces and UN personnel in the field. Low-level problem solving helps to contain minor conflicts and stem the potential for escalation. It, nevertheless, demands a greater degree of tactical flexibility in doctrine as well as an assurance that all ranks have sufficient understanding and sophistication to handle the various problems that arise in the field. Doctrine will also be necessary to guide contingency planning and the development of various generic mission models, which outline specific requirements, particularly rules of engagement.


220 As the UN now reimburses Member States for contingent-owned equipment, it is already facing very heavy costs in this respect. It is noteworthy that a few powerful countries have frequently set exorbitant fees for the rental of their equipment.

221 In current standby arrangements, those nations that have the resources to deploy well-equipped personnel often find themselves faced with the prospect of providing national logistics units to provide support. The logistics tail is often quite large and invariably unforeseen. National support elements are required to provide spare parts for their own vehicle fleets, maintain and re-supply specific items including ammunition. Each large contingent deploys its own logistics support, thus increasing the manpower requirement in the mission area and the cost.

222 Lutz Unterseher provides an indication of the approximate requirements for moving such a capability: “a brigade-sized deployment package of normal dimensions (3,300-3,500 persons) could be transported from its home base to a site 5,000 miles away within twelve days. This would require less than 500 C-141 sorties (and a fleet of only 36 C-141s or its equivalents). A lead element of such a force, a reinforced light mechanised infantry battalion, could be ‘on the spot’ within only three or four days.” See: Unterseher, “Interventionism Reconsidered.”

223 Aside from the risk of slow decision-making delaying access and deployment, a few governments have attempted to impose unreasonable costs for airlifts forcing UN officials into a desperate search for affordable transport. To cite one example, after the UN sent out an urgent request for airlift to deploy personnel to Sierra Leone, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented publicly that the United States had offered to transport other nations’ troops, albeit at three times the commercial rate for such transport. Cited in, “The Preparedness Gap…”, UNAUSA, p.27.

224 To offset some of the potential acquisition, operation and maintenance costs, aircraft might be contracted out when not required or on a high state of readiness.


227 See: Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, “Design for a 15,000 person UN Legion,” Briefing Report 8. Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA, October 1995. Notably, as proposed this Legion would be a heavier, strictly military force, including tanks, additional helicopters and artillery.


Conetta and Knight, “Design for a 15,000-person UN Legion.”

Conetta and Charles Knight, Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion, Cambridge, MA, Commonwealth Institute, 1995. While an exceptionally useful model, it could be argued that the practical limitations are in the UN's operating cost of approximately $3.5 billion (U.S.), the exclusion of police and civilian elements, and basing a larger force at one central location rather than building via duplication of UN standing elements or SHIRBRIG groups at a regional level.

This section also draws on the previous work of Langille, Faille, Hughes, and Hammond, “A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability,” pp. 179-200.


There are those who dismiss the integration of UN volunteers into a composite group on the grounds that it would be fundamentally incompatible with national elements. Some military officers claim it simply will not work. Clearly, there are few, if any, equivalent precedents. The former experience of the French Foreign Legion and the British experience with the Gurkhas are noteworthy. Through ongoing participation, these forces were able to prove, largely on the basis of competence and loyalty, that they were capable of being successfully integrated into various missions over an extended period. Although of a different nature, there was similar resistance towards the integration of police and civilian personnel into UN multidimensional operations. They have since proven to be a net benefit and an essential contribution to numerous successful missions.

The proposed UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force is not included in this chart as the structure and organization of the force has not been specified beyond its two primary elements. As it is likely to depend on extensive support from a Member State or coalition of Member States, it is also likely to share a level of response and effectiveness similar to the Composite UN SEC.

Unfortunately, at least in the near term, there is unlikely to be further research of these options within government, and there is little evidence of government assistance for related research. Neither is a research programme of this nature on the agenda of the UN Secretariat or DPKO. In 1995, Major-General Frank van Kappen, suggested that a study of a UN Standing Emergency Group would have to be conducted in cooperation with other UN Departments. Yet, one should not be overly optimistic about the prospects of these departments engaging in a cooperative inquiry that many Member States do not support. Van Kappen acknowledged, however, that “further studies could be done by establishing Working Groups to present their reports to DPKO. Working Groups could either be established within UNHQ and/or Member States could sponsor a Working Group. Studies could be conducted in a sponsor county with participants from Member States, as well as from UNHQ.” See: Major-General Frank van Kappen, MILAD, DPKO, “Implementation of the Canadian Recommendation on Rapid Reaction Capability,” Summary of Presentation, December 4, 1995, pp. 1-4.

Dr. John Polanyi, Co-Chair, International Conference on a United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability, Montebello, Quebec, April 8, 1995.