A Priority Agenda for the Next UN Secretary-General
Dialogue on Globalization

Dialogue on Globalization contributes to the international debate on globalization – through conferences, workshops and publications – as part of the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Dialogue on Globalization is based on the premise that globalization can be shaped into a direction that promotes peace, democracy and social justice. Dialogue on Globalization addresses “movers and shakers” both in developing countries and in the industrialized parts of the world, i.e. politicians, trade unionists, government officials, businesspeople, and journalists as well as representatives from NGOs, international organizations, and academia.

Dialogue on Globalization is co-ordinated by the head office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Berlin and by the FES offices in New York and Geneva. The programme intensively draws on the international network of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – a German non-profit institution committed to the principles of social democracy – with offices, programmes and partners in more than 100 countries.

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Preface

On January 1, 2007, Ban Ki-Moon will assume leadership as the UN’s eighth Secretary-General and, in effect, the world’s top diplomat. Against this background, in the fall of 2006 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Ralph Bunche Institute (RBIIS) of The CUNY Graduate Center brought together experts from the UN Secretariat, diplomatic missions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academia to reflect on global problems and refine an agenda for the next Secretary-General. The sessions were organized to critically analyze political conditions and evaluate policy options for Ban Ki-Moon. Thomas G. Weiss moderated the discussions, each attended by some twenty specialists, for which Peter J. Hoffman served as rapporteur.

Four sessions were held – each geared to examine a particular theme and introduced by a leading analyst: development and environment (5 October, Richard Jolly); human rights and humanitarian action (19 October, Iain Levine); international peace and security (26 October, Edward C. Luck); and the Secretariat and its management (16 November, James O. C. Jonah).

The contents of this report are the responsibility of the sponsoring agencies. The report’s findings may not necessarily reflect all the views of every participant but is an honest attempt to summarize points of concern and consensus.

We hope that this publication contributes to what will surely be a lively debate on the way forward at the UN once the new Secretary-General has taken office.

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2. Executive Summary

History has shown that the likelihood for substantial change at the United Nations is greatest when a new Secretary-General takes office. To facilitate the construction of a precise, credible, and meaningful agenda, a necessary first step is to identify, evaluate, and rank challenges in terms of priorities and feasibilities. Towards this end, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies (RBIIS) of The CUNY Graduate Center jointly organized a series of four workshops in October and November 2006. These deliberations on the major substantive areas of UN business – development and environment; human rights and humanitarian action; peace and security; and the Secretariat – drew on expertise from the UN Secretariat, diplomatic missions, non-governmental organizations, and academia.

Participants reached consensus regarding what Ban Ki-Moon could act on, what he should look to work with others on to achieve, and what is unrealistic and should be set aside. The tables below summarize these findings.

### ACTIONABLE:
*Issues for which progress can be made relatively easily (mainly Track II issues for which no governmental decisions are required).*

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<td>1. Embrace Role as “Public Conscience”</td>
<td>1. Establish Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms</td>
<td>1. Reinvigorate the International Civil Service</td>
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<td>5. Organize Economic Conference in Asia</td>
<td>5. Partner with NGOs</td>
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### ACHIEVABLE:
*Issues that require strong diplomacy and bold action to achieve objectives but are within reach or able to move up on the international agenda.*

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<td>6. Address WMD and Proliferation</td>
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### UNTENABLE:
*Issues that should not be addressed because they are so divisive or impossible that action would be counterproductive.*

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History has shown that the likelihood for substantial change at the United Nations is greatest when a new Secretary-General takes office, and the coming term of Ban Ki-Moon is unlikely to be an exception to this rule. To facilitate the construction of a precise, credible, and meaningful agenda, a necessary first step is to identify, evaluate, and rank challenges in terms of priorities and feasibilities. Part of the exercise is to specify those reforms that should be eliminated from consideration.

In establishing an agenda, a framework proposed at the first session was followed throughout. Issues were classified into one of three categories:

- **Actionable**: Issues for which progress can be made relatively easily (mainly Track II issues for which no governmental decisions are required).

- **Achievable**: Issues that require strong diplomacy and bold action to achieve objectives but are politically and operationally at least within reach or able to move up on the international agenda.

- **Untenable**: Issues that should not be addressed because they are so divisive or impossible that action would be counterproductive.

Participants noted that, like porous national borders in a globalizing world, distinctions among substantive areas were not always clear or permanent. Moreover, participants often felt compelled to go beyond the intended thematic focus of a session and touch upon issues that were intended to be examined in a different substantive discussion; they are placed here, however, under the heading that is most logical. Indeed, several expressed the view that UN activities officially outside of a particular evening’s focus had direct and serious ramifications for their own portfolios – at times imperiling their ability to be credible as well as to deliver. Finally, some participants resisted the third category, noting that there are always “surprises” and that issues that seem politically impossible one day may suddenly become more feasible. Nevertheless, there was considerable consensus on most issues and agreement on this schema for presenting an agenda that would be both sensitive to urgent challenges and realistic in its reach.

In addition to the mechanics of fashioning a clear agenda, a number of participants suggested the need to secure the “buy in” of key participants throughout the UN system – both in diplomatic missions and among key staff of the Secretariat. Several commentators speculated about the possible relevance of Ban Ki-Moon’s personal and political background to agenda-setting. While some have characterized Ban as enigmatic, others have discerned a distinctive operating style. He encourages discussion and listens carefully before making decisions, but once he has decided he is resolute. Ban also firmly believes that “promises are for keeping,” which suggests that he may promise less but deliver more. He is modest in style...
but not in ambition; according to his acceptance speech, he will “seek excellence with humility.”

Ban’s political background, as a South Korean and more specifically as a diplomat whose country has experienced so much that resonates with so many – de-colonization, war, economic development, liberalization, and democratization – may lend credibility and his voice may carry on the world stage. But participants were also careful to point out that extrapolating from the case of South Korea may not be entirely instructive because the extent to which any individual is responsible for a country’s record is unclear.

That being said, South Korea’s development experience gives the new SG credibility among countries struggling to develop and is a source of optimism in confronting the future. In 1967, the gross national product (GNP) of South Korea was roughly comparable to that of Ghana, but since then it has made substantial progress. Currently ranked 22nd in GNP, South Korea is also 28th in human development. This performance demonstrates a commitment to development and success in achieving it that can spur immediate action on this agenda.

In the area of human rights, South Korea has successfully navigated the difficult transition from authoritarianism to democracy; the country also has consistently supported international protection mechanisms and could serve as an example to other states in this regard. Its voting record in the General Assembly on human rights issues and in the Commission on Human Rights is solid – statistically, among Asia’s best performers. South Korea has ratified nine of fourteen core human rights treaties. Finally, Ban himself has spoken about the importance of human rights. During his time as Foreign Minister, he was a supporter of the International Criminal Court and more recently stated, “When a country is not able to protect its own people from crimes against humanity and genocide and prevents the international community from intervening on the excuse of sovereignty, the international community has a responsibility to protect those people from genocide.” Despite a mostly positive assessment of the prospects for progress, one serious reservation was expressed – South Korea’s “sunshine policy” of quiet diplomacy toward North Korea, which ignores gross human rights violations, detracts from an otherwise decent record.

In relation to international peace and security, Ban has personal familiarity with many critical issues as evidenced by the long and tense standoff between North and South Korea – most recently he has been involved in deliberations regarding the six-party arrangements (among the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) to avert a crisis. Furthermore, Ban has played a role in defining a South Korean foreign policy that is independent from the West, especially as an active and vocal proponent of nuclear disarmament as a long-term solution to peace and security on the peninsula. The perennial backdrop of a serious security crisis provides Ban with experience that likely will make him sensitive to the significant role of the international security and peace agenda. Moreover, any sort of disinclination an SG may show about acting in this area is largely irrelevant – ultimately, he will have no choice; political conditions and contexts invariably trump personal preferences. Whatever previous Secretaries-General thought that they might do, political crises erupted and their intended priorities were set aside.
Finally, on questions related to the Secretariat and its management, a lively discussion continued that had begun in previous sessions. Again, Ban’s experience as a diplomat will shape his perspective on this agenda item. No doubt he recognizes that UN staff members represent a manifold resource – contributing to both the nuts-and-bolts efficiency and effectiveness of administration, as well as generating support for the world organization. Criticisms of the UN from member states regarding personnel issues present Ban with an opportunity to push for early reforms in the Secretariat. He will be subject to the traditional political pressures inherent in staffing all senior posts in the organization. Thus far, Ban has remained circumspect in detailing how aggressively he will pursue administrative reforms.

Building his political capital by clearly defining and successfully meeting goals will contribute to widening the range of issues that the SG is able to address.

The Secretary-General is the public face of the world organization, and several participants commented that quickly making concrete progress on a workable agenda would inject a renewed vitality into the United Nations. Multiple, wide-ranging reform efforts should not be attempted simultaneously, but rather Ban Ki-Moon should pursue a strategy of “small victories.” Building his political capital by clearly defining and successfully meeting goals will contribute to widening the range of issues that the SG is able to address.
4. Priorities for Development & Environment

On October 5th, a first session addressed development and environment. Richard Jolly (Honorary Professor at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex and Co-Director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project at RBIIS with two decades of experience at UNDP and UNICEF) led off the discussion by laying out his vision for a development and environment agenda. Previous heads of the world organization have routinely lamented an inability to spend much of their time on development – typically a “residual” after reacting to high-profile political crises – so participants were pleased that the organizers had begun with this topic.

**Actionable:**

The discussion began with what Ban Ki-Moon should do upon taking office because none of the following requires the sign-off of states.

1. **Employ Millennium Development Goals as Benchmarks of Progress:** The MDGs are at the heart of the UN’s on-going development strategy, not merely an initiative of Kofi Annan. The idea of setting basic standards for commitments and performance in development is both a cornerstone for progress and a useful barometer. However, a few participants remarked that the current presentation of the MDGs creates the impression that the goals are too lofty and the process is a failure in spite of progress. Thus, they should be employed to feature accomplishments rather than shortcomings. Otherwise, the 2015 deadline (toward the end of a possible second term) could seem off-putting to Ban Ki-Moon and be used to discredit the effort as well as undermine the organization’s mandate and role in development.

   Others felt that the SG should concentrate on making progress on a particularly crucial goal, such as maternal mortality or child malnutrition, as a way of emphasizing a range of social goals. Kofi Annan has emphasized AIDS, which will remain a signature issue.

Despite minor differences over operationalizing the MDGs, it was agreed that Ban Ki-Moon should rely on this invaluable intellectual infrastructure. First, he should ask the UNDP administrator to make the set of measurements in the annual *Human Development Report* (HDR) the analytical and operational frames for UN programs at the country level. Second, Ban should maintain the utility of the HDR by investing in the human resources that underlie the report’s intellectual quality and by protecting its independence.

2. **Acknowledge Regional Differences and Highlight Global Inequalities:** The SG should visit each region to make a detailed assessment of problems that recognizes the uniqueness of each region and then deliver a major speech...
defining an agenda with a range of possible solutions. Two regions in particular stand out: Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, Ban Ki-Moon should highlight disastrous gaps between North and South in terms of income, technology, and education – what Boutros Boutros-Ghali once called a “new Berlin Wall.” These disparities are centrifugal forces contributing to political instability, and the new SG should draw attention to the need for both national and international action. Spotlighting key global gaps will help focus debate.

3. Visit Development Agencies: The new SG should visit the UN system’s largest development agencies in order to better understand their work and raise their profile – that is, to indicate that development and environment are not second tier considerations for his administration. At UN headquarters, there is often a lack of knowledge of such activities and their net impacts, which are essential in and of themselves as well as directly linked to international peace and security and peacebuilding.

4. Connect with Civil Society: Ban Ki-Moon should give a major speech at Davos or at the World Social Forum on the role of civil society as contributing to the work of the United Nations. Pointing out that the recommendations of the Cardoso report have had little resonance so far, some participants believed that the SG should exercise leadership and work closely with the President of the General Assembly. A step in this direction would be to create a position in the Executive Office to be responsible for outreach to civil society and to strengthen the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) or other mechanisms. Another possible avenue to explore would be the establishment of a consultative group of NGOs from whom he can regularly seek counsel.

5. Organize Economic Conference in Asia: The SG should hold a conference on development that disseminates the knowledge accumulated by the “Asian drivers” – the policies that underpin the economic successes of China, India, Korea, etc. The private sector should be encouraged to participate.

It was agreed that these steps could be taken at the outset of the SG’s term without any cost and would pay dividends immediately. Other ideas presented in this session would require Ban to cajole and coordinate with member states.

Achievable:

1. Emphasize Development Solutions to Conflicts in the Middle East: Peace in the Middle East will not emerge overnight no matter how intense the diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is much Ban should do in this term to re-energize currently existing initiatives and propel overall progress. First, in addition to reviving the “road map” for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the SG should support economic and social advances in the region. The development agenda is a critical part of this work. In this regard, the SG should make special efforts to meet with Islamic representatives and other religious leaders. He should establish a council of religious advisers, as part of his links with civil society groups, which could supplement his exposure and provide a sounding board for work in the region.
2. **Galvanize International Responses to Climate Change:** The rapid ecological transformations ushered in by global warming have dramatic consequences, which include exacerbating violent conflicts such as Darfur as well as sharpening North-South cleavages. Although increased temperatures and rising seas are the most visible dimensions at hand, global warming is rooted in the question of energy production, and its effects engender profound long-term security problems.

Some participants pointed to the crosscutting aspects of climate change – or rather “climate chaos” – as an opportunity for multilateral cooperation. The overwhelming needs create a space for the UN to orchestrate management of the environment. Participants also suggested that Ban Ki-Moon should early on give a speech emphasizing the function of the UN as a rule-based mechanism for international action to protect such global public goods and the need for greater knowledge to evaluate and address the problem. Moreover, the SG should identify how climate change is a problem for today as well as future generations and should stress how it connects to questions of international peace and security.

Ban should announce the establishment of a working group of distinguished scientists and former political leaders (representatives from countries most seriously affected by global warming and from countries with new and cleaner technologies) to determine new practices and to increase public awareness and support. The primary challenge will be to incorporate the concerns of all sectors and the assembly of a working group would be the next step in finding common ground. Some Asian and Scandinavian countries would provide financial resources to underwrite the efforts of this group.

While unanimously considered pressing, many participants also had doubts whether this agenda item was “achievable.” A few lamented that the task was too enormous and that there was insufficient collective political will to tackle the problem in the near future.

**Untenable:**

1. **Do Not Establish New Panels on UN Reform:** Too little energy has been devoted to implementing the plethora of previously proposed reforms. The emphasis of the new SG should be to advocate and enable existing recommendations. There should be no new panels until states have caught their breath from the last several reports – in particular, reference was made to *Delivering as One* and its recommendations for the developmental and environmental, as well as humanitarian, activities of the world organization.

2. **Do Not Change Effective Parts of UN:** Change for the sake of change could be detrimental and worsen the delivery of development assistance if the result is to lower the common denominator – the likely outcome of consolidation in the view of many, but not all, participants. Effectiveness, including impact on the credibility on the organization, should be the primary consideration in instituting reform.
On October 19th, a second session explored the twin themes of human rights and humanitarian action. Iain Levine (Director of Programming, Human Rights Watch, and former senior UNICEF official) began by outlining what the outgoing SG has accomplished and pointing out what more his successor should do. Among Kofi Annan’s significant achievements was his outspoken use of the bully pulpit and emphasis on the role of human rights across the UN system. More than one participant mentioned that an overriding priority should be to consolidate gains and ensure that at least no lapses occur during Ban Ki-Moon’s term.

Beyond using his moral authority, the seventh SG also used his management authority to make human rights part and parcel of UN programming – that is, “mainstreaming” the issue and promoting its integration into planning and operations. Beyond the normative role, institutions of protection such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) grew, and NGOs found the world organization a more hospitable place to work on human rights than in earlier years. Although Annan can not be given sole credit for this development, the notion of human security has substantially advanced during his tenure.

Nonetheless, several key challenges remain. First, the dearth of global leadership led many participants to agree that the surge in terrorism and counter-terrorism has undermined national standards and protection systems and stalled progress on human rights. As a result of its “Global War on Terror,” the United States was no longer the standard bearer that it once was, and consequently other powerful states such as Russia and China have seemed empowered to ignore human rights standards. Furthermore, regional organizations also exhibit troubling signs; the European Union (EU) lacks coherence in its human rights policies, and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Africa Union (AU) have not adequately confronted violators.

Second, the Human Rights Council (HRC) is an important initiative – arguably one of the few significant results of the 2005 World Summit – not only to protect human rights but also to restore UN credibility. However, its early performance threatens to undermine the momentum generated by the formation of this new organ. Participants found it difficult to dismiss out of hand the harsh criticism posed in a recent *Washington Post* article: “The council, which completed its second formal session last week in Geneva, has turned out to be far worse than its predecessor – not just a ‘shadow’ but a travesty that the United Nations can ill afford.” Moreover, the U.S. distance from the HRC is disconcerting.

Third, “mainstreaming,” “integration,” “coherence,” and other efforts to elevate the role of human rights and humanitarian principles into all aspects of UN work have not been entirely successful. For instance, gender remains largely unfinished business. Several participants noted the ad hoc manner in which human rights
mainstreaming has occurred creates uncertainty and makes the organization appear hypocritical. Picking up the theme of inconsistency, other participants emphasized that the place accorded humanitarian action and goals in integration and coherence schemes was sometimes questionable, while many humanitarian practitioners remain ill at ease with human rights as the paramount priority during complex emergencies.

Fourth, the traditional humanitarian principle of universality – that access to relief is a right and such aid should serve no political master – is in jeopardy. Participants pointed to the extreme instrumentalization of humanitarian action in the context of counter-terrorism and nation-building, especially when donors are also belligerents. Moreover, the perception of humanitarian action as being a Northern enterprise was having severe consequences for the security of staff.

Participants examined how Ban Ki-Moon could proceed when the “human rights and humanitarian action” pillar of the agenda was overshadowed by states that flagrantly ignore key treaties. Even the most critical of participants – those who emphasized the implications of U.S. dereliction of responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions – suggested that there were possible management changes that could help improve the political atmosphere around, and perceptions of, the United Nations. Against this background, a number of ideas for the priority agenda emerged.

**Actionable:**

1. **Embrace Role as "Public Conscience":** The new SG should be adamant and bold as the “public conscience” of the organization. This means invoking UN mechanisms to protect human rights as well naming and shaming offenders when human rights abuses occur in order to reinforce the universal basis for human rights.

2. **Acknowledge Symbolism of Darfur:** This human rights disaster is a crucial symbolic test for the world organization. Ban Ki-Moon should lead the charge, or his inaction will tarnish the UN’s reputation and reduce the possibilities for efforts in other arenas as well. The SG should also work with the AU on the issue, exerting the moral and political influence of the office as necessary. He should only visit the country if the Government of Sudan is willing to agree to the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

3. **Expand the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights:** Given the larger demands on this body – due to both a surge in violations globally and increased institutional connections to other UN organs – the presence of the OHCHR should grow substantially, as agreed at the World Summit. The new SG should advocate for a stronger presence in New York.

4. **Strengthen Mainstreaming:** The SG should signal that human rights concerns are central to all of the organization’s activities. For instance, he should indicate early his intention to resist political pressures for weak or unqualified senior appointments that could dilute human rights and humanitarian action. He should consolidate field agencies’ capacities to provide protection and promote
the exchange and secondment of staff among these agencies. There should be no backsliding from the kind of leeway given to figures such as Jan Egeland and Louise Arbour to speak publicly. The new SG should ensure that human rights issues are raised in cabinet-level deliberations – including the executive committees dealing with humanitarian action and peace and security. He should explicitly reference abuses as obstacles to meeting the MDGs, thereby connecting human rights and development.

5. **Partner with NGOs:** Participants argued that Ban should work to strengthen the role of NGOs at the UN generally by making them more central and not leaving them relegated to the “public galleries.” The suggestion was made that NGO analyses of human rights in particular should be cited in speeches and reports as a concrete indication that they are meaningful partners in policy-making and implementation. Many present arrangements for consultations between the UN and NGOs are informal but should be institutionalized. The recommendations of the Cardoso report should be revisited and revived.

**Achievable:**

1. **Cultivate State Leadership on the Human Rights Council:** One of the achievements of the World Summit was the HRC, which is teetering on the edge of disaster. Currently the entity is more of an opportunity than an actuality in improving the protection of human rights. Vital to its success will be cultivating a strong and a credible core of leaders in the HRC among key states. Ban should target and develop a potential leadership cadre – the most likely candidates are from the European Union and sympathetic Asian, Latin American, and African countries – as well as urge the United States to return to its rightful place.

2. **Integrate Human Rights at the Security Council:** While considerable headway has been made in bringing human rights and humanitarian issues to the Security Council, the SG has precious little influence there. Nonetheless, many believed that he could leverage his position as moral authority and chief administrative officer to push for a more systematic integration of human rights, the protection of civilians, and the human security framework in all country-level work of the world organization.

3. **Operationalize the Responsibility to Protect:** Although the SG is constrained in organizing and deploying military forces, many participants stressed that he could help shape and flesh out the guidelines for the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). In the wake of the “Global War on Terror” and especially the U.S. invasion of Iraq, serious concerns have once again surfaced about “humanitarian intervention” – indeed, some participants commented that in the last few years the rhetoric of human rights and humanitarianism has been used more to disguise power politics than to inspire universal enforcement. Consequently, the moment appears ripe for Ban Ki-Moon to clarify triggers, indicators, and a range of responses. Indeed, the unlikelihood of military enforcement in most cases requires thinking through the operational implications of non-military steps to foster R2P. The SG can also promote an understanding of R2P as part of the broader continuum of actions by the UN – specifically, that the world
organization takes enforcement measures only when other solutions fail and that beyond the immediate military and humanitarian components of intervention, long-term assistance will be rendered to rebuild war-torn states. There also is room to foster R2P through such mechanisms as the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

4. **Avert P-5 Veto Threats for Humanitarian Responses:** Selling the idea that permanent members of the Security Council should not use their veto in a genuine humanitarian disaster seemed a tough but less formidable challenge than reform of the principal organ. Ban can use his moral authority to reframe debates and break through political resistance in the council.

5. **Engage Islamic Countries:** The terrorist attacks of September 11 heightened tensions between the West and Islamic countries, and relations have further deteriorated in the wake of the war in Iraq. The UN has become one of the last legitimate sites for dialogue. Nothing is more central than human rights to this conversation, and the SG should emphasize the role of human rights in promoting peace and economic development especially in the Middle East.

**Untenable:**

For proponents of human rights and humanitarian action, it was extremely difficult to admit that any issues should be off the table. In spite of this reluctance, a few items found their way into this category:

1. **Do Not Seek a UN Rapid Reaction Capability:** Beginning with Trygve Lie, there have been calls to establish a rapid military response capacity, and the issue has taken on greater urgency and gained wider support in recent years due the rise of dramatic humanitarian crises and the growing prominence of R2P. While more enthusiasm was expressed for other types of readily available capacities – namely those intended to cope with natural disasters; especially civilian observers and police rather than soldiers – assembling a rapid reaction military force in advance of crises still faces fatal political hurdles. Participants recognized the obvious merits of such a capability but begrudgingly admitted its infeasibility for the foreseeable future.

2. **Do Not Pursue New International Legal Instruments:** There is plenty of work to do in enforcing existing hard law and in securing additional ratifications for international legal mechanisms already in place. Hence, the implementation of international agreements and treaties should be favored over efforts to formulate new ones.

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Priorities for International Peace & Security

On October 26th, a third session focused on international peace and security. Edward C. Luck (Professor and Director Center for International Organization, Columbia University, and long-time and respected analyst of UN affairs) first reflected on the contacts that he has had with the incoming SG so as to frame an analysis of what was possible and when. Before unpacking and setting priorities for the international peace and security agenda, participants conceded that the SG often can exert only the most limited control over the agenda in this area – the worst events easily overwhelm and undermine the best plans. Two current impediments act as a drag on this agenda area, namely profound disillusionment with the Security Council and institutional overstretch of peacekeeping. The lack of confidence in the Security Council is partially based on its structure, which many feel favors the major powers; but this skepticism is also the consequence of a poor record of enforcement when decisions have been reached. Record numbers of UN peacekeepers are presently in the field; but if all authorized operations were fully staffed and deployed, the result would be an unsustainable increase in personnel and funding. Moreover, the threat of a nuclear North Korea may be a potential diplomatic “black hole” – enveloping and obscuring other priorities – even if some participants viewed engaging the country as a logical first task. With these caveats in mind, participants identified early (i.e., actionable) and enduring (i.e., achievable) priorities as well as untenable ideas that should not be acted upon.

**Actionable:**

Because success in peace and security is so visible in the media, it affects the world organization’s profile in general. In addition, it is the focus of any SG’s efforts, which led participants to discuss specific as well as general priorities here:

1. **Establish Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms:** The high visibility and stakes of the international peace and security agenda demand that the SG establish strict oversight of and accountability for relevant organs. In light of the Volcker Commission’s findings on the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), a top priority should be to improve management performance as well as the perception thereof. A residue of the scandal is found in the form of a disheartened administration, especially with regards to peace and security. Ban Ki-Moon should move quickly to bring management practices up to the standards now commonly found in government and industry or risk lowering an already depleted morale among staff members. There is a great need for a “new culture of management reform,” especially for international peace and security because probity and performance in this arena have repercussions far beyond. Indeed some proponents, such as the U.S permanent representative, advocate a hard-line and coercive approach. Undoubtedly, part of the challenge will be to attract not repel Third World interest in meaningful change. Leadership in the administration by someone from the global South would also be helpful.
2. **Assess Peacekeeping Capacities:** Increasingly, the Security Council is authorizing peacekeeping missions with broader and more robust mandates. Three critical gaps must be evaluated: military, accountability, and coordination. As to military capabilities, the issue is whether the forces being deployed are potent enough to deter or defeat adversaries. In regards to accountability, forces must respect human rights provisions and international humanitarian law, and failure to do so must lead to vigorous corrective action. With reference to coordination, the SG should clarify the division of labor in inter-governmental arrangements and work with member states to ensure that proper back-stopping occurs between the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

**Achievable:**

1. **Save the Peacebuilding Commission:** Aside from the HRC, the other widely recognized innovation resulting from the World Summit, the Peacebuilding Commission, has been hamstrung by bureaucratic politics and general inertia. Ban Ki-Moon should work to revive it before it becomes irrelevant. Furthermore, the SG can also help clarify the role of the PBC in order to limit “forum shopping” for another fledgling body key to future international peace and security. Breathing new life into these virtually stillborn initiatives is essential for future operations in this area.

2. **Promote Mediation, Prevention, and Policy Planning:** Ban’s widely acknowledged experience in diplomacy can help put renewed vitality in mediation, prevention, and policy planning in his own office and in the DPA.

3. **Recast Sovereignty to Include Responsibility:** The UN was designed to address instances of international aggression (i.e., interstate war) but many recent threats to international peace and security are products of a state’s poor treatment of its own population (especially internal war). The growing salience of R2P represents an opportunity to recast the UN’s affirmation of sovereignty but in a way that heeds the need for states to respect human rights, and leads to international approval of humanitarian intervention only in the direst of situations. Ban Ki-Moon’s acceptance speech indicated that he would like this item to be at the forefront of his efforts.

4. **Build Credibility in Less Demanding Cases:** The new SG should build UN credibility on international peace and security issues by acting on those crises that by scale and international politics are more readily addressed than other larger, more intractable ones. For example, northern Uganda, Nepal, and other “low-hanging fruit” are challenging to be sure; but they are better candidates to mobilize action and witness measures of success in a shorter span of time than attempting to handle the unmanageable needs of a country such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UN has a better chance of mustering political consensus and assembling sufficient resources where international rivalries and demands for material, manpower, and money are not so extreme. Some participants noted that this route provides quantitatively more successes but may not have the desired dramatic qualitative effect of burnishing the UN’s image. All, however, agreed that Ban Ki-Moon should seek to have the organization notch a few victories as soon as possible at the outset of his term.

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5. **Act on Darfur:** The credibility of the UN may depend on the outcome in Darfur – the world organization should protect civilians from atrocities and foster a sustainable long-term peace in the region. The SG should maintain public pressure in support of a UN force as stipulated by Security Council Resolution 1706. A continued inability to respond will brand the institution as a failure in the eyes of many observers – and the expulsion of the SRSG was a discouraging sign. That China may change its policy and contribute to the success of a new Asian SG was mentioned as a possibility.

6. **Address Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation:** This set of issues is highly fraught. The major powers, led by the United States, seek to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in addition to technology that can be used to manufacture them. This cause assumed great urgency following the September 11 attacks and a spate of other terrorist activities – the fear of weapons transfers to terrorist groups weighs especially heavily on the P-5. By contrast, other states, albeit a minority for the moment, are eager to develop WMD as they hope to achieve a degree of military parity with major powers and regional rivals as well as enhance their political prestige. A final group of states seeks worldwide nuclear disarmament. The intertwined issues of proliferation of WMD and terrorism – which were not addressed by the 2005 World Summit – are arguably the principal threats to contemporary international peace and security. Ban Ki-Moon should tackle this area and look to existing norms and structures for ways to stop the spread of WMD, especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is on the verge of being overtaken by events. The SG should dedicate greater financial and human resources to UN instruments that monitor and suppress these weapons. Furthermore, he should articulate a commitment to go beyond proliferation controls and revive the idea of disarmament, still a priority for many states in the North and South.

**Untenable:**

Participants reiterated that the international peace and security agenda was highly susceptible to being altered by unforeseen, quickly-developing threats and crises over which the SG could exert no control as the top civil servant of member states. Accordingly, they also agreed on a few items that should be discarded from his agenda:

1. **Do Not Seek Role in Security Council Reform:** Although Ban Ki-Moon will hear endless demands for substantially restructuring the Security Council, this item is entirely within the purview of member states. The SG should thus not be seen as publicly pushing for change because the General Assembly should be the focal point for advancing this issue – which came up at every discussion no matter what the thematic focus. While not closely related to development, for instance, setting Security Council reform aside was seen as an example of the kind of strategic triage that had too rarely occurred, resulting in too much energy being dissipated on what was a non-starter, yet nevertheless having the effect of poisoning the atmosphere and displacing attention from issues where progress was possible.
2. *Do Not Formulate Grand Theories or Promise Grand Bargains:* There is no monolithic idea that speaks to all countries, nor is there a single fulcrum of power to energize member states – that is, constituents vary greatly in their preferences. Ban cannot credibly devise one notion of international peace and security in the hopes that it effectively encompasses all the different interests among member states. The SG should refrain from formulating grand theories and grand bargains that may unravel commitments to, and splinter support for, the United Nations more generally. Past use of the bully pulpit to proselytize has alienated member states as often as it has inspired them.

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Priorities for the Secretariat and its Management

On November 16, a fourth and final session was devoted to an analysis of administrative aspects of the United Nations, concentrating on the Secretariat and its management. James O.C. Jonah (former UN Under-Secretary-General and Minister and Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone and currently a Senior Fellow at RBIIS) started the discussion by targeting the international civil service as the linchpin of the organization. As has been highlighted in *Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide*, getting the right personnel in the right job can be difficult but is essential to the UN’s actual performance as well as its public image. Quality personnel who represent the world’s diversity are the key to improving the UN’s effectiveness and heightening its popularity. Participants were unequivocal in stressing the importance of human resources and staff morale in realizing any of the UN’s goals.

**Actionable:**

1. **Reinvigorate the International Civil Service:** The SG has considerable power to influence the viability of the international civil service. This pool of human resources has suffered in recent years from overwork in the face of the UN’s taking on more, as well as more complex, functions and operations; and its morale has also been deflated by the intense scrutiny that followed charges of corruption and more politically-driven investigations surrounding the Oil-for-Food Program. Consequently, the international civil service is at a critical stage. Dag Hammarskjöld once said, “if you destroy the international civil service, you destroy the UN.” And many participants confirmed that human resources remain keystones – the performance of the UN has fluctuated greatly in relation to the skills and credibility of this component, producing poor results when staff are weak and resented though capable of flourishing when the proper personnel are in place. The SG himself has managerial responsibilities that can set the desired tone to reinvigorate the international service. First and foremost, Ban Ki-Moon should embrace his role as the most prominent international civil servant, showcasing his honesty and openness. The SG should, furthermore, stand behind high-profile and outspoken senior personnel who take unpopular or controversial public stances. As one participant explained, “integrity is the glue of the organization.” Second, the SG should lobby member states to ensure suitable financial support for the Secretariat, not only for administrative staff but also for those with technological skills to upgrade the communications infrastructure of the UN. Third, he should continue to explore how best to simplify the contract process, including the proposal before the Fifth Committee to establish “short,” “fixed,” and “continuous” contracts.

2. **Improve the Transparency of Senior Appointments:** Kofi Annan introduced new procedures for making the selection process for the heads of UN funds and programs more open. This approach could be expanded to other appoint-
ments at the Under-Secretary-General level. Ban Ki-Moon should resist pressures to appoint personnel proposed by member states – indeed, several participants noted the crucial importance of “just saying no” early to establish the SG’s autonomy. Others noted that allocating positions to nationals of big powers as part of an electoral campaign worked against the required independence of the world organization. In this regard, there was a related and heated discussion about allocating specific posts for women, most notably an Under-Secretary General to head UNIFEM and the consolidated agencies with mandates relating to the condition of women as proposed in Delivering as One. But others felt that such earmarking was demeaning to women and damaging to the organization.

3. **Invest in Analytical Capabilities:** Many assessments of the UN system, including anecdotal appraisals, have concluded that a lack of knowledge has undermined the ability of the organization to recognize markers of instability and deploy suitable responses – primarily diplomacy, but in some cases economic tools (aid versus sanctions), or military enforcement. Independent research over the last several years by the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP) has documented the lasting legacy of the UN’s contribution to both principled and operational ideas and norms. Ban Ki-Moon should invest in analytic capabilities for three reasons. First, evaluations that indicate what has been successful are a prerequisite to planning, developing measurements of performance, and holding personnel accountable. Second, up-to-date, well-grounded analysis is critical to addressing the critical shortfalls in strategic planning during times of crises that have produced incoherent approaches and, worse yet, undesirable outcomes. Third, investing in analytic capabilities to produce, refine, and disseminate digestible research better prepares the United Nations at both individual and organizational levels for future challenges.

4. **Employ Transparency as Media Strategy:** To combat the perception that the UN has its own agenda, a bureaucratic or political interest beyond those of member states, Ban Ki-Moon should remove “spin doctors” from the organization. Communication with constituents – from diplomatic missions of member states to NGOs and to global public spaces – should be informed and direct. Hollow rhetorical flourishes and dodging duties and responsibilities in the past had sometimes contributed to a dwindling of support for the UN, and therefore the new SG should have a media strategy based on transparency.

**Achievable:**

Although the SG has discretion in regards to some administrative matters, he will be obliged to work with a host of other parties in order to achieve other important parts of this agenda area:

1. **Caucus on Debts to UN:** The organization simply cannot meaningfully function without adequate financial support; erratic funding hampers day-to-day operations and endangers swift reactions to crises. A large number of participants noted the distorting role of money and power resulting from the fact that a few Western states pay such a huge proportion of the UN’s expenses. Ban Ki-Moon should resist pressures to appoint personnel proposed by member states.

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The new SG should organize a conference with donors to remind them of the benefits of good global citizenship and the means of making the most of their investment in the world organization.

Ban Ki-Moon should use his administrative authority to make quality, not political connections, the baseline for appointment and advancement in the organization.

is well placed to call attention to the embarrassingly small contributions by so many developing countries that are supposedly so committed to and invested in multilateral cooperation. This reality is a substantial problem, as is the gap between assessments and contributions on the one hand and delinquency on the other – including the fact that the United States accounts for 80 percent of total arrears. The SG should speak out publicly about the impact and constraints of these financial shackles. Furthermore, he should articulate that financing is at the crux of empowering the organization’s capabilities. The new SG should organize a conference with donors to remind them of the benefits of good global citizenship and the means of making the most of their investment in the world organization so as to facilitate the payment of debts and the establishment of a budgetary process that allows for planning.

2. Enhance International Civil Service Career Tracks and Tap the Global Human Resources Market: As noted earlier, the competence of personnel is crucial to effective and credible action, and Ban Ki-Moon should use his administrative authority to make quality, not political connections, the baseline for appointment and advancement in the organization. One impediment to attracting talented, qualified personnel has been the uncertainty of career development. The new SG should bolster recruitment by outlining career trajectories in the international civil service. In particular he should look to human resources from the global South to expand the diversity of UN ranks, especially at the higher levels – at present over 75 percent of managerial positions are filled by individuals from the North. Developing human resources to this skill level and scale will require the SG to work with member states to identify professional standards for employment and with institutions that produce potential personnel (universities, non-governmental organizations, civil service bureaucracies, and professional groups). At present, he cannot easily find seasoned professionals in all the areas of expertise that the UN requires except in well-publicized Western labor markets and those of the largest developing countries. Ban Ki-Moon should expend substantial time and energy in exploring the international labor market for the most appropriate human resources from everywhere.

3. Build and Preserve Institutional Memory: The UN is plagued by a knowledge crisis; on the occasions when the organization has succeeded in learning lessons, it has often been unsuccessful in conveying them to other partners. In-coming staff require a deeper and more comprehensive orientation consisting of information and time to get up to speed on the responsibilities of their position, their predecessor’s work, and such other relevant information as the differences between employment in the international civil service rather than in government or the private sector. Managers should periodically document their experiences in a reflective exercise; which can serve as the basis for information sharing between existing staff and instructing new staff. A similar procedure should be followed for all of those transitioning out of the UN system – a “departure memo” to review what worked, what failed, and what the options of the present moment are. Even such obvious measures as reinstating the oath of office and mid-career sabbaticals should be re-examined in this light.
4. **Strengthen Accountability Standards for Staff:** The UN has drawn much fire over a lack of accountability, and thus Ban Ki-Moon should institute standards and procedures to ease concerns about corruption. Financial disclosures have become routine in many government and business circles, and the new SG should make them commonplace in the world organization.

5. **Establish Protocols for the Next Secretary-General Election:** Efforts to alter the election process usually emerge during the campaign when they are impossible to discuss reasonably without inflaming political rifts. But given the symbolic as well as substantive importance of this position, it would be desirable to discuss a host of proposals on the table for the next election for the position. Some participants expressed their unease with the entire notion of “campaigning” for the office.

**Untenable:**

As compared to other agenda areas, staffing and structural issues of the Secretariat were deemed the most hospitable to change – while politics continue to be debilitating and decisive, there is greater latitude afforded to the SG in shaping this aspect of the organization. Nevertheless, participants expressed a major qualifier regarding reform of the Secretariat and the betterment of its management, centered on the rate at which administrative changes can meaningfully alter outputs. Two bottlenecks, in particular, were thought to hold low potential for successfully contributing to the organization’s move forward in the immediate future:

1. **Do Not Focus on “Deadwood”**: The UN was founded on several political compromises – the two most important being the inviolability of sovereignty, and recognition of the largest military powers embedded in the Security Council – and a custom regarding financial support and appointments has coalesced around the contours of political power. The most visible representation of the glacial pace for organizational reforms is the existence of substantial “deadwood.” Despite the persistent nature of this issue – and its figuring prominently in recent reports and the World Summit – putting great effort into this at the expense of less contested and more important changes was seen by participants as not worth the payoff. Most suggested that realistically Ban Ki-Moon cannot reverse past patronage. And given the likely retirement of so many senior staff in the next half decade, the most effective approach would be to instill a new professional culture for the future.

2. **Do Not Seek Secondments from Member States:** With fears and accusations that most decisions to lend personnel are based more on political rather than professional criteria, many participants pointed to the experience with Eastern European nationals during the Cold War and with Western ones during the monitoring of Iraq’s arsenal as sufficient evidence that secondments do not work – practically or politically. They should be avoided because they undermine independence and often tarnish the UN’s reputation.

Financial disclosures have become routine in many government and business circles, and the new SG should make them commonplace in the world organization.
Several participants reflected on the unique role of the SG in international politics and priority setting. Although Kofi Annan has joked that the real meaning of SG is “scapegoat,” the comment underscores the scrutiny that the position bears and the necessity for the new SG to articulate a vision that incorporates the perspectives and aspirations of all people. As Annan has written, “I think anyone in this job has a unique opportunity and has a voice that should be used to assist those without voice and to lead in areas that are sometimes neglected … You need to break that silence and wake people up and steer things in the right directions.”

Thus, while it is the role of the SG to speak out in this manner, it is critical that his public statements not be dismissed as preaching or idle philosophizing. Ban Ki-Moon clearly should work hard at being articulate, but it is imperative that he choose his moments carefully. His role as a respected mediator should not be at the cost of being overly outspoken when there is little pay-off other than in rhetoric. However, there is a difference between proselytizing and being persuasive in times of crisis; and many participants reiterated that the practice of outspoken statements by senior UN officials is essential and should continue.

Moreover, participants commented that the image of the UN is under siege and that the next SG must be adept at presenting an organization that is responsive and effective in addressing global problems. In this regard, many called for identifying specific areas in which the UN had a “comparative advantage” in taking the lead and thus selecting a few “signature” items that would constitute a possible legacy for Ban Ki-Moon. Several also remarked that it is critical that his approach not be, or even appear to be, a tool of U.S. foreign policy.

Throughout the sessions participants maintained that the SG can and must make a difference on core agenda items. For the UN to make progress in the fields of development and the environment, it will need to rehabilitate its image in the global South. One participant went so far as to argue that the world organization will have to confront the U.S. on development and other issues in order to make it credible to other countries, and another chimed in to stress that if the West monopolizes devising development strategies, there will be an absence of democracy in development that will unhinge the process.

Regarding the human rights and humanitarian action agenda, participants also concentrated on the need to re-build the reputation of the United Nations and how the Ban Ki-Moon could contribute. Many expressed deep concerns about the prospects for a meaningful human rights and humanitarian action agenda in the context of the “Global War on Terror” and pointed to the need to alter underlying structural power before truly corrective measures could be taken. However, they also held out the possibility that the SG could help to restore confidence in the UN’s work in this area. For human rights and humanitarian action, as well as for other issues, the world organization will always be buffeted by the tides of international politics, but good management and performance help provide safe harbor.
In terms of the international peace and security agenda, participants stressed that the high stakes essentially render the role of the SG as reactive – spoilers and other disruptive actors set the agenda, not he. Consequently, participants raised more questions than provided definitive answers. All remarked that the fate of the UN is contingent upon rebuilding its credibility among staff, member states, and the world at large. Relations with the global South were in desperate need of repair. Participants pleaded for the UN to look to creatively engage and foster ties with Islam and especially the Organization for Islamic Countries (OIC). Many pointed to the situation in the Middle East as a barometer of attitudes toward the UN; widespread frustration that the world organization was unable to stop wars in Iraq and Lebanon has diminished the UN’s standing. Ban Ki-Moon is positioned to fill “the vacuum of ideas and the vacuum of leadership” that characterized international approaches to acute political divides in the Middle East. But it is also an occasion for the SG to steer an autonomous course – distinct from the whims of the major powers. With peace and security at the top of all agendas and the Middle East being particularly high-profile in recent years, the SG undoubtedly will have to earn his credentials on this terrain. In short, making a breakthrough on this agenda area will require Ban to depart from “business as usual” if he is to successfully retool peacekeeping mechanisms and a reconstitution of the trustworthiness of the UN as the primary guardian of international peace and security. As noted at several junctures, success here seemed a prerequisite for improving its image and pressing for more decisive action in other sectors.

Regarding the Secretariat and its management, discussions arose within every substantive discussion. Participants found common ground in emphasizing the SG’s leadership role as “the indispensable cog” in this area. In international peace and security, development and environment, and human rights and humanitarian affairs, the SG is often consigned to mere coordinator or functionary of member states. But in terms of management of the Secretariat, Ban Ki-Moon could be more a “general” than a “secretary.” In this area, he has an opportunity to showcase his administrative style and performance-based reforms. Certain management practices can be implemented without delay – information resources can be re-organized and narratives can be shaped through better media relations. Yet others will require long-term follow through, including nurturing analytic capabilities and institutional memory and increasing the flow of credible, qualified human resources in the UN staff pipeline. To shape the power and possibilities of the world organization, Ban must invest in this less glamorous but equally vital agenda area because ideas and people matter.

The inaccurate caricature of the UN as uniformly lazy, corrupt, incoherent, and inefficient should be debunked. One participant quipped that 50 percent of the grant provided by Ted Turner to the UN should be allocated to media – promulgating information and, ultimately, improving public opinion of the organization, in the United States and elsewhere. However, others cautioned that a legitimate product must be delivered, and pushing fanciful promises and “snake oil” would merely call further into question the credibility of the organization. Hence, the SG must make substantial progress on concrete issues quickly in order to change the dominant impressions in many media. The greatest strength of the UN is its legitimating power – using its moral stature to persuade states to abide international norms – but it is contingent upon the organization being widely respected. Solid performance will always be the bottom line in the field but in an increasingly image-driven world, whatever the content of the agenda ahead, a clear and persuasive presentation is a prerequisite. The SG must win the battle of images and define global perceptions of the UN if it is to maintain, let alone grow, its political power.
ANNEX 1:

Priority Agenda Items and Recommendations for Ban Ki-Moon, by Session

- **Actionable**: Issues for which progress can be made relatively easily (mainly Track II issues for which no governmental decisions are required).
- **Achievable**: Issues that require strong diplomacy and bold action to achieve objectives but are politically and operationally at least within reach or able to move up on the international agenda.
- **Untenable**: Issues that should not be addressed because they are so divisive or impossible that action would be counterproductive.

DEVELOPMENT & ENVIRONMENT

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<td>1. Employ MDGs as Benchmarks of Progress</td>
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<td>2. Acknowledge Regional Differences and Highlight Global Inequalities</td>
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<td>3. Visit Development Agencies</td>
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<td>4. Connect with Civil Society</td>
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<td>5. Organize Economic Conference in Asia</td>
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<td>2. Galvanize International Responses to Climate Change</td>
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### HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN ACTION

**ACTIONABLE**

1. Embrace Role as “Public Conscience”
2. Acknowledge Symbolism of Darfur
3. Expand the OHCHR
4. Strengthen Mainstreaming
5. Partner with NGOs

**ACHIEVABLE**

1. Cultivate State Leadership on the HRC
2. Integrate Human Rights at the Security Council
3. Operationalize R2P
4. Avert P-5 Veto Threats for Humanitarian Responses
5. Engage Islamic Countries

**UNTENABLE**

1. Do Not Seek a UN Rapid Reaction Capability
2. Do Not Pursue New International Legal Instruments

### INTERNATIONAL PEACE & SECURITY

**ACTIONABLE**

1. Establish Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms
2. Assess Peacekeeping Capacities

**ACHIEVABLE**

1. Save PBC
2. Promote Mediation, Prevention, and Policy Planning
3. Recast Sovereignty to Include Responsibility
4. Build Credibility In Less Demanding Cases
5. Act on Darfur
6. Address WMD and Proliferation

**UNTENABLE**

1. Do Not Seek Role in Security Council Reform
2. Do Not Formulate Grand Theories or Promise Grand Bargains
# SECRETARIAT & ITS MANAGEMENT

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ANNEX 2:

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The following persons attended at least one session, and many attended several.

Robert J. Berg, *International Consultant*
Jane Boulden, *Royal Military College*
Mark Bowden, *United Nations*
Graciana del Castillo, *United Nations (ret.)*
Tatiana Carayannis, *Social Science Research Council*
Christopher Coleman, *United Nations*
Elizabeth Cousens, *International Peace Academy*
Louis Emmerij, *Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
Hazem Fahmy, *United Nations*
Sally Fegan-Wyles, *United Nations Development Programme*
Felice Gaer, *Jacob Blaustein Institute, The American Jewish Federation*
Catharina Goldschmidt, *UNITAR*
Leon Gordenker, *Princeton University*
Michele Griffin, *United Nations*
Catherine Guicherd, *International Peace Academy*
Christina Hackmann, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*
Peter J. Hoffman (rapporteur), *Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
Kathleen Hunt, *CARE International*
Rob Jenkins, *University of London and Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
LiangXiang Jin, *Shanghai Institute for International Studies*
Richard Jolly (presenter, session 1), *University of Sussex and Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
James O.C. Jonah (presenter, session 3), *Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
Inge Kaul, *United Nations Development Programme*
Jeffrey Laurenti, *The Century Foundation*
Volker Lehmann, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*
Robert Lenton, *Columbia University*
Iain Levine (presenter, session 2), *Human Rights Watch*
Elizabeth Lindenmayer, *Columbia University*
Edward C. Luck (presenter, session 3), *Columbia University*
Carolyn Makinson, *Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children*
Kamal Malhotra, *United Nations Development Programme*
John Mathiason, *Syracuse University*
Richard Morgan, *UNICEF*
Lawrence C. Moss, *Human Rights Watch*
Tim Murithi, *University of Cape Town*
Thant Myint-U, *International Peace Academy*
William R. Pace, *World Federalist Movement*
Bertrand Ramcharan, *Geneva Graduate Institute and Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
Dirk Salomons, *Columbia University*
Juergen Stetten, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*
Lydia Swart, *Center for UN Reform*
Yvonne Terlingen, *Amnesty International*
Hilary Tikum, *UN University*
Sebastian von Einsiedel, *International Peace Academy*
Thomas G. Weiss (moderator), *Bunche Institute, CUNY Graduate Center*
Joanna Weschler, *Security Council Report*
H. Roy Williams, *Center for Humanitarian Cooperation*
Christine Wing, *New York University*
Lawrence Woocher, *Columbia University*
June Zeitlin, *Women’s Environment and Development Organization*
Christoph Zoepel, *United Nations Association of Germany*
One major problem here is the high rate of infection among soldiers – the data vary between 17 and 60% – a problem that also has ramifications for the development of regional peacekeeping facilities in the SADC framework.
On the author:


**Peter J. Hoffman** is Research Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies and adjunct professor of Political Science at Hunter College. He has written on the dynamics of war and international responses, including contributions to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s analytic volume, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, and Background*, various resources for the Humanitarianism and War Project based at Tufts University, the Stanley Foundation’s UN on the Ground Project, and the Fund for Peace’s Regional Responses to Internal War Project. His most recent publication is *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises* (2006). At present he is writing his doctoral dissertation at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on the intertwining of humanitarian action and military contractors.

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