
I. Summary

1. The Security Council mission to Afghanistan was its second since 2003 in support of the Afghan people (see S/2003/1074). It found that the Afghan partnership, begun in Bonn, Germany, in late 2001, was largely on track. The first milestone of the Bonn Agreement (see S/2001/1154) was achieved with the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. This was followed by a Constitutional Loya Jirga in January 2004, presidential elections — won by Hâmid Karzai — in November 2004 and parliamentary and provincial council elections in 34 provinces in September 2005. The Bonn Agreement was successfully concluded in December 2005 with the opening of Afghanistan’s bicameral National Assembly. The following month, the Afghanistan Compact (S/2006/90, annex) — a new five-year blueprint for cooperation between the international community and the Government of Afghanistan — was launched at the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January and 1 February 2006. The successful establishment of functioning democratic institutions and efforts to improve the welfare of the population since 2001 now required consolidation to ensure that Afghanistan embarked on a period of genuine stability and development.

2. The mission noted the significant efforts undertaken by Afghans and the international community to achieve these goals. Among the major achievements in 2006, the mission noted: (a) the launch of a democratically elected National Assembly and provincial councils; (b) continuing high rates of economic growth and increasing per capita income; (c) expanding trade and investment, principally with regional partners; (d) significant infrastructure projects in road-building, power generation and transmission and watershed management; and (e) successful national programmes in education, health, rural development and the development of new Afghan security institutions.

3. Nevertheless, progress in 2006 towards realizing the vision of the Afghanistan Compact has not been as rapid as had been hoped. The past year has been characterized by uneven efforts to improve governance and establish the rule of law, intensification of the Taliban-led insurgency, an upsurge in illegal drug production and trafficking, widespread insecurity in the south and east of the country and continued impunity for criminals, corrupt officials and commanders of illegal armed groups. These factors — countered only partially by fragile State institutions —
have tempered the legitimate hopes of Afghans with signs of despondency and disillusionment. The mission noted that the confidence of the Afghan public in its new institutions and processes was being tested. Growing insecurity in parts of the south and south-east was disrupting rehabilitation and reconstruction work by Afghans, the United Nations and other international partners.

4. Faced with these realities, the mission stressed two cardinal messages: firstly, that the firm and unyielding commitment of the international community in support of the Government and people of Afghanistan and their country’s transition was unwavering; and secondly, the Afghanistan Compact, owned and led by Afghans, remains the central, strategic framework for cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. The Government of Afghanistan, with the support of the international community, must ensure its steady and faithful implementation.

II. Mission statement

5. In his letter dated 9 November 2006, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had decided to send a mission to Afghanistan (S/2006/875). The mission was conducted from 11 to 16 November 2006. The primary message of the mission was to give assurance of the continued commitment by the international community to the Afghan process and to underscore the Council’s support for the Afghan efforts for security, governance and development. The mission was directed to review progress on counter-narcotics, the disbandment of illegal armed groups, human rights protection, public sector reform, justice sector reform and rule of law issues. It was also tasked with reviewing the status of international assistance. The full terms of reference, composition and programme of the mission are set out in annexes I and II to the present report.

6. The mission left New York on 9 November and returned on 17 November. During that period, the mission visited Kabul, Qalat and Mazari Sharif. The mission met with the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Hâmid Karzai, the First Vice President, the Second Vice President, the Deputy Chairman of the Senate, the Attorney General, cabinet ministers, the National Security Council, governors, members of the Meshrano Jirga and the Wolesi Jirga as well as civil society, the non-governmental organization (NGO) coordinating body, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and United Nations agencies. It also received statements from Human Rights Watch (9 November) and Amnesty International (10 November). Owing to security concerns, the mission was advised not to visit Kandahar city. In Pakistan, the mission met with the Foreign Secretary, Riaz Mohammad Khan.

7. The members of the mission express appreciation to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, ISAF and UNAMA for their support and assistance during the visit.
III. Key issues

General security situation

8. The mission took place against a backdrop of nine months of growing instability. Security was the dominant concern in Afghanistan. Many of the mission’s interlocutors expressed apprehension about the rise in violence in Afghanistan, especially in the south, south-east and east of the country. President Karzai contrasted the intensity of the fighting in 2006 — between Afghan and international security forces and insurgent and terrorist elements — with the relative calm of 2003 and 2004. The insurgency appeared more or less confined to one third of the country. The remaining two thirds of Afghanistan (west, north and central regions) were considered comparatively stable. However, limited factional tensions were emerging in the north and trends towards rearmament had been detected. The security situation in general remained precarious throughout the country, with the threat of suicide attacks and other forms of terrorism by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups posing a serious threat to the nation-building process.

9. After a worrying upsurge in the number of security-related incidents in the country throughout the spring and summer of 2006, there were signs that insurgent- and terrorist-related violence, which had plagued the country for much of the year, might be subsiding. The mission was told by ISAF and President Karzai’s National Security Council that armed clashes between insurgents and Afghan and international military forces had decreased in October and November. ISAF Commander General David J. Richards noted that Operation Medusa in Kandahar Province in September 2006 had dealt the Taliban-led insurgency a heavy blow. He predicted that this and other recent operations by Afghan and international military forces had set the stage for a more stable winter and 2007. On the last point, however, more cautious views were expressed by UNAMA, the United Nations country team and civil society members. In any case, if there are medium-term gains, they would be dependent on the swift delivery of reconstruction, development and improved governance in insurgent-affected areas.

10. The Afghan leadership observed that the growth of the insurgency had been fed by the failure of the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to provide basic services, governance and security to rural communities. A number of interlocutors highlighted the weakness of the Afghan National Police and the rule of law as major factors contributing to the rise in instability. The President drew attention to the continued presence of unqualified former commanders in several positions of authority as a source of significant popular frustration. The National Security Adviser, Zalmai Rassoul, said that the narcotics industry was the number one problem for national security.

11. The President, a number of his senior aides, as well as parliamentarians and representatives of civil society underscored that the failure of the international community to address the issue of Taliban sanctuaries had allowed the insurgency to re-emerge. The mission took note of the Afghan view that the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be brought to a halt with the existence of sanctuaries for insurgents in neighbouring countries. Minister for Foreign Affairs Rangin Dádfar Spantâ underscored the importance of providing a clear, unmistakable message to the population that the international community would stay the course in Afghanistan, as rumours to the contrary fuelled insecurity. To them and all other
interlocutors, the mission gave strong assurance of the continued commitment by the international community to the Afghan process and underscored the Council’s unchanged support.

12. UNAMA noted that the list established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) contained some inaccuracies and observed that an updated list would be an important tool in the international fight against terrorism and for stability in the region.

**International security forces**

13. The mission paid tribute to the leading role that ISAF, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had assumed in contributing to security in support of the Government of Afghanistan. On 5 October 2006, ISAF assumed command of international forces in eastern Afghanistan, completing the process of expanding the ISAF area of responsibility to the entire country. The mission welcomed this newly unified command structure and commended ISAF efforts and sacrifices in the face of challenging circumstances. The mission took note of the continuing need of ISAF for adequate forces and resources to ensure the continued success of the ISAF operations. ISAF would continue to maintain its current role until Afghan national security forces and Afghan ministries no longer required assistance to provide security throughout the country.

14. The National Security Adviser, Dr. Rassoul, noted that despite unfortunate incidents such as civilian casualties, culturally insensitive raids on houses and the arrest from time to time of innocent people, there was still overwhelming support for the presence of international security forces inside Afghanistan. The Deputy Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga, Sayed Hamed Gailani, said that international security forces would need to respect the culture and religion of Afghanistan in order to retain the support of the population. It would be critical to base all operations on solid, accurate information and ensure that trustworthy elders were adequately consulted. Afghan ministers and parliamentarians called for better coordination and increased information sharing between international security forces and the Government of Afghanistan.

**Security sector reform**

15. The mission saluted the performance of the Afghan National Army under exceptionally difficult circumstances and in the face of heavy losses. The Secretary of the Wolesi Jirga Defence Commission noted that despite commitments to develop an army of 70,000, the Afghan National Army remained poorly equipped and understaffed. President Karzai listed strengthening the Afghan National Army as his second highest national priority. ISAF Commander General Richards raised concerns about the pressure the war had placed on the development of the Afghan National Army and noted that only 14,143 combat troops were present and available for duty earlier this fall. At the same time, he praised the strong contributions of the Afghan National Army, especially to Operation Medusa.

16. President Karzai and other Afghan interlocutors expressed frustration with the state of the Afghan National Police. The President faulted Afghanistan’s international partners for inadequate and belated efforts to develop the Afghan
National Police, a failure which he claimed was partly to blame for the insecurity on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Minister of Interior, Zarar Ahmad Muqbil, observed that the Afghan National Police had been designed to provide public order in peacetime and was no longer appropriately structured given current levels of conflict, insecurity and criminality. Proposals had been made to the international community to support expansion of the Afghan National Police to meet the latest challenges of insurgency and deteriorating security in some regions.

17. The mission visited the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Qalat, Zabul Province, where it was briefed on the importance of strong recruitment, vetting and monitoring procedures for the new Afghan National Auxiliary Police. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police was intended to provide both enhanced community policing and facilitate local job creation. The Minister of Interior emphasized the importance of creating an ethnically balanced force with no ties to former commanders or illegally armed groups.

Impunity and corruption: the need for the rule of law

18. Throughout the mission, interlocutors cited corruption and the perpetuation of a culture of impunity as the root causes of popular Afghan disaffection and unease. Several international interlocutors pointed to the weak and corrupt Ministry of Interior as a key reason for the failure of the Afghan National Police. Sima Samar, the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and others pointed to widespread corruption in law enforcement and judicial institutions as central to the population’s decreasing trust in the Government. Perceptions, however inaccurate, that the Taliban was less corrupt were undercutting government authority in some rural areas where access to formal justice remained limited. It was also pointed out that the continued tolerance of positions of authority given to the former commanders and warlords was contributing to instability.

19. The Afghan leadership acknowledged that the continued presence of warlords in government structures contributed to insecurity. The Government’s efforts to diminish the authority of those figures would require international support. As in the case of building an effective police force, this support had not been forthcoming, despite repeated warnings and demands by the Afghan people. UNAMA noted that the Government’s strategy to disband illegally armed groups was a key vehicle for dismantling the power base of those commanders who had retained the capability to have recourse to violence without official sanction. The continuing presence of some in public office with links to these groups had served to perpetuate a climate of impunity. Implementation of the programme had slowed in 2006 and a far-reaching review was now under way. It was recognized that high level international and Afghan political commitment would be the key to re-energizing the programme to disband illegally armed groups.

20. First Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud identified the fight against corruption as central to any effort to bring tangible improvements to the lives of people. In Mazari Sharif, a member of civil society cited corruption as a major source of insecurity in his region. In his presentation to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, Afghanistan’s Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi noted that corruption was pervasive throughout line ministries and Government departments. President Karzai had established an anti-corruption commission two months earlier, which was now
working to identify the nature and scope of the problem. Solutions, however, remained elusive. Support and expertise would be required from Afghanistan’s international partners. The report on the third meeting of the Board, attended by the mission, cited corruption at all levels of the public sector as increasing the general sense of dissatisfaction experienced by many Afghans.

21. Interlocutors stressed that any effort to confront the twin challenges of impunity and corruption would require robust rule of law institutions. The Attorney General recalled that when he had first assumed his job, tackling corruption had been his primary objective. However, he had soon discovered that the weakness, even absence, of rule of law in the provinces was the principal obstacle to change. Without functional, honest institutions or high-level political backing, the fight against corruption and impunity — no matter how popular — could not be won. He would continue his efforts to reform prosecutorial capacity in Afghanistan and to obtain convictions for corruption and other serious crimes in all parts of the country. The Chief Justice’s principal message to the mission was that, in the race to establish the rule of law, time was of the essence. Visible results were required to build momentum and gain the trust of the public. The Chief Justice had removed 21 corrupt or incompetent senior justice officials and his five-year reform plan had been approved by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. Funding for the latter, however, remained as yet unsecured. UNAMA underscored that international support for rule of law would be a long-term endeavour. Detailed reform strategies were under development even as progress on physical infrastructure continued to be made and legal aid expanded across the country.

Governance: the need to build capacity and institutions

22. President Karzai identified restructuring the civil service and strengthening its capacity as the top priority for Afghanistan and its international partners. The country was in desperate need of training for professionals — doctors, lawyers, accountants and engineers. The emergence of democratic systems had raised the expectations of the Afghan people. In the long term better primary and secondary education would be the key to strengthening both the public sector and society as a whole. Representatives of NGOs and major donors echoed the call for more resources and new strategies to build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan, in particular outside Kabul. A premium was placed on enhancing human capital at all levels as a precondition for an effective public sector and sustained progress towards development goals.

23. Many Afghan interlocutors emphasized the benefits of channelling a greater proportion of international assistance through Afghanistan’s core budget. Donor representatives in Kabul agreed in principle but pointed to the lack of capacity in Afghan public sector institutions to disburse funds effectively. During the mission’s meeting with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and later with Afghan development ministers, interlocutors observed that “parallel administrations” had emerged — one international and one Afghan. Each had its comparative advantage, but over the long term, the latter would have to succeed if the Afghan State was to retain legitimacy and accountability. A careful balance would need to be struck between international efforts to facilitate delivery of urgently needed assistance and the longer-term imperative to strengthen the capacity of central and local government, civil society and the private sector to meet the needs of Afghan people.
First Vice President Massoud urged the international community to invest in the Government of Afghanistan. At least one major donor called for a tough and thorough assessment and reappraisal of the international community’s technical assistance strategies to date.

**Human rights and protection of civilians in armed conflict**

24. The United Nations country team stated that following the ousting of the Taliban in 2001 space had opened for human rights and gender equality, including access to education and political posts. However, the country team was concerned that this space had recently begun to close: schools had been attacked and burned; conservative elements within the Government had failed to uphold equal rights in law; and public discourse had been restricted. The mission noted with concern suggestions that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs might be abolished. It was encouraged by the statement of Meshrano Jirga’s Deputy Speaker, Sayed Hamed Gailani, that any such attempt would be rejected by the parliament’s Upper House.

25. Sima Samar, the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, commended the Government for its endorsement of the Action Plan for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation and stressed the importance of reaffirming Governmental commitment to transitional justice by finally launching the Action Plan. The United Nations country team and NGOs expressed concern over the severe impact of the conflict on civilians who have been displaced, denied their right to education, wounded or killed. Dr. Samar observed that when civilians were killed as a result of the military operations by the Government or international forces it could encourage their relatives to join the Taliban. ISAF pointed out that 8 out of every 10 people killed by suicide bombers were Afghan civilians. Representatives of Afghan civil society, the country team and NGO representatives emphasized the importance of ensuring that all parties to the conflict uphold and promote international human rights law and international humanitarian law. An NGO representative stressed that human security should be an overriding concern for the Government of Afghanistan and the international community.

**Development and humanitarian assistance: the challenge of coordination**

26. The mission participated in the third meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board on 12 November. Afghan ministers and donor representatives noted that the Board enjoyed the trust and confidence of both the Government of Afghanistan and the international community as an oversight mechanism for the Afghanistan Compact. The Board had demonstrated a growing capacity to monitor progress and address bottlenecks hindering the implementation of Compact benchmarks. The mission welcomed the efforts of the Board and noted with encouragement that this mechanism had begun to move beyond questions of process into matters of substance. However, for the Compact to deliver visible change to the Afghan people, Government-led coordination efforts, including those of the military-led provincial reconstruction teams, would need to be strengthened and integrated under the overall Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Cabinet ministers and the United Nations country team alike emphasized the importance of
improving coordination between national level actors and those at a provincial and district level.

27. All members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board agreed that pervasive unemployment was one of the central factors contributing to instability. The first Vice President said that the creation of employment opportunities would further development and would help prevent disenchanted youth from joining the Taliban. He recognized the importance of attracting private sector investors, but noted that the lack of security deterred those whose investments were likely to generate jobs. While it was critical to accelerate the delivery of employment programmes and indeed all forms of assistance to the south and east of the country where youth are being drawn into the insurgency, interlocutors in the north noted that assistance should be extended to all 34 provinces in the country’s transition from conflict to development. The Minister of Education stressed the need for education, increased rural development and longer term employment opportunities, including the reintegration of fighters into civilian life, or where appropriate into Afghan security forces, notably the Afghan National Auxiliary Police.

28. Insecurity, drought, flooding and combat operations have all combined to displace larger population groups inside Afghanistan in 2006, generating fresh vulnerabilities and new humanitarian needs. Government officials, development actors and military stakeholders all agreed that increased efforts would be needed to ensure the delivery of assistance to people living in more remote areas of Afghanistan. NGOs requested an increase in the capacity of civilian actors to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in 2007. They argued that civilian-led delivery mechanisms would allow for assistance to be better aligned to the needs and priorities of the communities affected. While accepting the need to protect humanitarian space and aid neutrality, the mission noted that insecurity or other adverse conditions meant that the military might be better placed at times to deliver basic assistance.

**Counter-narcotics efforts**

29. Afghanistan’s burgeoning narco-economy was identified by the vast majority of the mission’s interlocutors as a primary threat to stability. National Security Adviser Rassoul stressed that the narcotics industry was fast becoming the number one problem in Afghanistan. One interlocutor described it as a “cancer” that would spread and kill Afghan society over the long term. President Karzai acknowledged the severity of the threat, indicating that he would consider the use of ground spraying, but not aerial spraying, to eradicate the next poppy crop providing that international military forces provided security. The Minister for Counter-Narcotics, Habibullah Qaderi, informed the mission that in 2006 cultivation of opium poppy represented 60 per cent of the gross domestic product and that although eradication would help, poppy could only truly be countered by increased assistance to farmers and improved governance. Together with Foreign Minister Spantâ, he underscored the importance of regional and international cooperation in combating drug trafficking. President Karzai characterized the spectacular growth of poppy cultivation as a sign of desperation in the Afghan people, which would only be remedied through stronger governance as well as reconstruction and economic development.
Regional cooperation

30. A number of interlocutors underscored the importance of regional cooperation in resolving Afghanistan’s challenges. At the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the mission received briefings from neighbouring States on their contributions to Afghanistan, as well as reassurances of their commitment to the Afghanistan Compact. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that his Government had invested $200 million in road construction and power supply but voiced concern over the regional drug trade. India had provided $650 million in economic assistance. Pakistan highlighted its $250 million in assistance to Afghanistan and noted that it continued to host over 2.6 million Afghan refugees. The mission welcomed the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, subsequently held in New Delhi on 18 and 19 November, as a means of facilitating development and integration.

31. Issues of security were similarly dependent on regional cooperation. Many interlocutors stressed that the existence of sanctuaries in Pakistan for the Taliban, the Hezb-I-Islami party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other insurgent groups must be addressed by law enforcement and other means. The cross-border dimension to the insurgency was also emphasized by ISAF, which cited the impact of the recent peace deal in North Waziristan, Pakistan. Over the past few months, ISAF had detected a 70 per cent and 50 per cent increase, respectively, in security incidents in the Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost, which neighbour North Waziristan.

32. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Khan, pointing out his country’s burden of accepting a large number of refugees, stressed that a stable Afghanistan was essential to his country’s security. He said that Pakistan was doing its best to improve the security in the border area through the deployment of 80,000 troops having suffered casualties in the operations, while admitting the difficulties in placing effective control over the long-stretched border with many crossing-points. He stressed that the cooperation among his country, Afghanistan and international forces was ongoing at various levels, including through the tripartite commission. As regards the impact of the peace deal in North Waziristan on border security, the Foreign Secretary pointed out that the assertion that the peace deal had resulted in increase in incidents did not reflect the fact on the ground. The mission encouraged Pakistan to monitor the North Waziristan agreement with a view to ensuring that the cross-border impact of this or any future agreements are positive for security and stability. The mission was encouraged by the Foreign Secretary’s briefing on Pakistan’s attempts to tackle terrorism and prevent Talibanization, including recent arrests in Baluchistan and plans to reinforce border security. The mission expressed concern regarding the humanitarian implications of possible contingencies to employ, even if selectively, landmines along the border to control cross-border movement.

33. The mission was encouraged by President Karzai’s commitment to improving relations with Pakistan and by reassurances from Pakistani Foreign Secretary Khan that a stable Afghanistan was essential to his country’s security. It was briefed on plans by Presidents Karzai and Musharraf to hold cross-border jirgas on security. These were presented as an opportunity to engage tribal leaders and build confidence and stability in the region through “people to people” contact. For his part, President Karzai expressed his hope that the entirety of Afghanistan’s ethnic
and geographic diversity be represented in the jirgas. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Khan observed that the jirgas should remain “workable” in size and put a premium on the participation of communities living in regions neighbouring the border shared by the two countries.

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**

34. In Kabul, Zabul and Balkh Provinces, Afghan interlocutors strongly praised the work of UNAMA. This was particularly notable in Zabul, where the Governor and others welcomed the recent opening of the UNAMA sub-office in the provincial capital, Qalat. Donors similarly welcomed the expanded UNAMA presence, describing it as a “huge plus”. NGOs and United Nations agencies called for UNAMA to play a greater coordination role between them and the military. The mission was briefed on the difficult circumstances under which UNAMA and the rest of the United Nations family operate in Afghanistan. Of particular note was the challenging security environment in which national and international staff members operated. Finally, the members of the mission highly commended the tireless efforts and leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Tom Koenigs, and the dedication of UNAMA and other United Nations personnel, especially those international and national staff who serve in highly insecure environments.

**IV. Findings and recommendations**

**International commitment to Afghanistan in the face of renewed challenges**

35. The mission found that the spread of insurgency, and terrorist activity by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, linked with the illegal drug trade, coupled with corruption and failures of governance and the rule of law, collectively pose a grave threat to reconstruction and nation-building in Afghanistan. However, the mission is convinced that the Government of Afghanistan and the international community have established a sound strategy to overcome these challenges. The Security Council will undertake to ensure that the international community’s support for Afghanistan and its commitment to this shared strategy remain firm and enduring.

**Afghanistan Compact**

36. The mission welcomes the achievements of the Bonn process and reaffirms its support for the Afghanistan Compact as the best framework for cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. The Compact should now move to serious action and consistent implementation efforts under the overall guidance of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. The mission applauds the Government’s ownership of the political and development process and encourages it to transform its ownership into further action with a view to striving towards the benchmarks laid out in the Compact. At the same time, Afghanistan needs additional and sustained support from the international community, both for
quick gains and for sustained progress over the long term. The mission strongly urges the international community — especially the participants in the London Conference on Afghanistan — to continue their financial and political underpinning in support of the Compact’s benchmarks and the overall goals of security, good governance and economic development.

**International military forces**

37. The mission urges NATO and other countries to maintain and, where possible, increase their commitment to ISAF to meet the challenge of the current security environment in Afghanistan. International military forces should enhance their cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, remain committed to respecting international human rights law and international humanitarian law, avoid civilian casualties and respect local culture and traditions.

**Afghan security forces and security sector reform**

38. The mission affirms the importance of establishing a strong and sustainable Afghan National Army and urges donors and the Government of Afghanistan to redouble their collective efforts to establish a trusted and effective Afghan National Police throughout the country. The mission also noted the central importance of reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior. The mission concluded that considerable investment would be required before the security benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact could be achieved. In addition, the deployment of the new Afghan National Auxiliary Police must be properly funded and monitored to ensure that the new forces are fully representative of the relevant communities, responsibly led, accountable to central authorities and capable of upholding human rights. The mission calls upon the international community to revitalize its support to the increased efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to implement the programme to disband illegally armed groups.

**The rule of law and good governance**

39. As a matter of highest priority, the mission urges the Government of Afghanistan with the support of its international partners to establish rule of law and good governance throughout the country. To this end, the mission encourages the Government to take immediate steps to strengthen justice sector institutions and provincial government, including through the replacement of corrupt officials and local power brokers. In these efforts, the Government must enjoy the united support of the international community and adequate resources. More effective mechanisms for strategic planning, funding and coordination of rule of law programmes among international donors and agencies at the national and provincial levels are required. There is also a need to address the problem of endemic corruption within the judiciary and for a comprehensive review of judicial service. The mission calls upon donors to increase the coherence and scale of assistance in the development of Afghanistan’s human capital, with special priority to be given to the reform of the country’s civil service. An assessment of technical assistance efforts should be undertaken with a view to the realization of maximum use of such assistance.
Human rights and protection of civilians

40. The mission urges the Government and international community to sharpen their focus on human rights and protection of civilians, including through increased monitoring of adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law. The mission encourages the Government to reinforce its commitment to human rights and reconciliation through increased support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the implementation of the Action Plan for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Afghanistan as required by the Compact, without prejudice to the fulfilment of the measures introduced by the Security Council in its relevant resolutions. The mission urges the Government and donors to make the empowerment of women a true cross-cutting priority and to actively defend the provisions for the rights of women that are enshrined in the Constitution of Afghanistan.

Coordination and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance

41. The mission recognizes that, where possible, humanitarian and development assistance should be delivered by skilled and experienced civilian actors and notes that the capacity for civilian coordination of humanitarian assistance should be strengthened in 2007. It also recognizes that given the prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan, assistance will need to be provided by those best placed to deliver in the framework of their respective mandates. The focus should be to extend development to the provinces, strengthen accountability and reduce impunity at the community level, and achieve tangible and visible results. The international community and the Government of Afghanistan are particularly encouraged to implement programmes that generate employment given that the dearth of such opportunities contributes significantly to recruitment of insurgents. To promote such coordination, the coordination mechanism of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board should be further improved and focused on delivery.

42. Government-led coordination efforts need to be strengthened and streamlined, in particular among national Afghan institutions and all actors at the provincial and district level, with the help of UNAMA and United Nations country teams. Coordination among the Afghan leadership in government departments, the international development community and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should be enhanced and local mechanisms strengthened to ensure that Provincial Reconstruction Team assistance programmes can be led by the Government and are delivered in line with community priorities and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

Counter-narcotics

43. The mission urges the Government and the international community to further their efforts to strengthen and diversify legal livelihoods so that rural communities are able to move away from the illegal cultivation of opium poppy and pursue legitimate economic opportunities. The mission underlines the importance of the enhanced fight against the illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors within
Afghanistan and in neighbouring States and countries along trafficking routes, including increased cooperation among them to strengthen anti-narcotic controls to curb the drug flow. The Government, with support from the international community, is also called upon to step up activity to arrest and prosecute major drug traffickers regardless of their position or status, and to proceed with energetic implementation of all elements of the National Drug Control Strategy.

**Regional cooperation**

44. The mission reaffirms that fostering trust and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbouring and regional partners is of crucial importance for peace, security and development in the region. The mission welcomes efforts made by the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against terrorism and to reinforce border security. The mission urges both Governments to increase dialogue and collaboration in the face of a growing threat to their shared security. This will continue to require political commitment and sustained practical cooperation at all levels. The mission looks forward to the outcome of plans by the two countries to hold jirgas to improve security and stability.

**Terrorism and stability**

45. The mission recommends that the list established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) continue to be updated as necessary and on the basis of the most up-to-date information, as envisaged by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**

46. The mission reaffirms the central and impartial role of the United Nations in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. The mission supports the ongoing expansion of UNAMA into the provinces with a view to strengthening Government and donor coordination of assistance at the provincial and local levels. In this context, the mission encourages the Secretary-General to consider measures to promote the coordination role of UNAMA both in the capital and in the country and to make recommendations in his next report. The mission recognizes the extremely difficult circumstances under which UNAMA and the rest of the United Nations family operate in Afghanistan and calls on Member States to provide all the necessary support to allow the United Nations to carry out its mandate in such a challenging environment.
Annex I

Terms of reference and composition of the Security Council visit to Afghanistan

1. The members of the Security Council have decided to send a mission to Afghanistan. The visit will take place from 9 to 17 November 2006.

Terms of reference

2. The mission has the following objectives:

- To give assurance to the Afghan society of the continued commitment by the international community to the Afghan process based on the Afghanistan Compact and Security Council resolution 1662 (2006) under Afghan leadership
- To demonstrate the Council’s support for the Afghan efforts for security, governance and development by the Government, Parliament, local governments, civil society and other Afghan parties
- To review the progress in the Afghan efforts in the above areas, with particular emphasis on counter-narcotics, security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the disbandment of illegal armed groups, human rights protection, public sector reform, justice sector reform and rule of law issues in the efforts to foster regional cooperation as well as in the Afghan and international efforts in combating terrorism in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions
- To review the status of international assistance, in particular the activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, including United Nations provincial offices and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and the operation of the International Security Assistance Force, including its cooperation with the Afghan Security Forces and the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition

Composition

Kenzo Oshima (Japan), Head of mission
Martín García Moritán (Argentina)
Lars Faaborg-Andersen (Denmark)
Jean-Pierre Lacroix (France)
Adamantios Th. Vassilakis (Greece)
Abdulla Al-Sulaiti (Qatar)
Vadim Smirnov (Russian Federation)
Peter Burian (Slovakia)
Nicholas Williams (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Jackie Wolcott Sanders (United States of America)
Annex II

Programme of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan
(11 to 16 November 2006)

Saturday, 11 November
1745-1810 Security briefing by the Department of Safety and Security
1945-2130 Dinner with United Nations heads of agencies and senior staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

Sunday, 12 November
0815-0915 Meeting with the Head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
1000-1030 Meeting with President Hâmid Karzai, at the Presidential Palace
1130-1300 Participation in the morning meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1315-1410 Lunch with members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1415-1445 Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rangin Dâdfar Spantâ, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1450-1550 Joint press conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1600-1655 Meeting with the First Vice President and Cabinet Ministers on development and finance, at the Sedarat, Office of the First Vice President
1700-1730 Meeting with the Second Vice President, at the Sedarat
1745-1830 Briefing with Commander General David Richards of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Senior Civilian Representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan, Dan Everts, at ISAF headquarters
2000-2130 Dinner in honour of the members of the Security Council hosted by General Richards at ISAF headquarters

Monday, 13 November
0800-0900 Meeting with the security management team, at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conference room, UNDP compound
0900-1000 Meeting with the United Nations country team, at the United Nations Development Programme conference room, UNDP compound
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1030-1115</td>
<td>Meeting with the Deputy Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga, Sayed Hamed Gailani, at Parliament House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1345-1430</td>
<td>Meeting with Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet, at the Serena Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1445-1600</td>
<td>Meeting with Cabinet Ministers on security, at the Presidential Palace, Office of the National Security Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1800</td>
<td>Meeting with representatives of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief at the UNAMA Office of Communications and Public Information conference room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-2100</td>
<td>Reception in honour of the Security Council members hosted by Minister for Foreign Affairs Spantâ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tuesday, 14 November**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830-0850</td>
<td>Greetings by the United Nations regional team and move to ISAF headquarters, at Kandahar Airfield</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900-0930</td>
<td>Regional Command South briefing to Security Council members and the media, at Kandahar Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0945-1035</td>
<td>Flight from Kandahar to the Provincial Reconstruction Team compound, at Qalat, Zabul Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1040-1120</td>
<td>Tour for Security Council members of Qalat Provincial Reconstruction Team compound, and the Afghan National Auxiliary Police Training Centre, including computer training, medical training facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1120-1220</td>
<td>Meeting with the Governor of Zabul Province and the Council of Elders, at the Governor’s guest house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1340</td>
<td>Flight from the Qalat Provincial Reconstruction Team to Kandahar Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715-1900</td>
<td>Meeting with UNAMA staff, at the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-2130</td>
<td>Reception in honour of the Security Council members hosted by the Japanese Ambassador to Afghanistan at the Serena Hotel</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Wednesday, 15 November**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0900</td>
<td>Meeting with the Wolesi Jirga, Professor Burhanudin Rabani, Chairman of the Legislative Committee, at Parliament House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1100</td>
<td>Flight to Mazari Sharif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1230</td>
<td>Meeting with civil society, at the UNAMA office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1245-1345</td>
<td>Working lunch hosted by Governor Mohammad Atta, at the Governor’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1630</td>
<td>Flight to Kabul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1715-1815 Press Conference in the Office of Communications and Public Information conference room
1830-1945 Meeting with Ambassadors, Palace 7
2000-2130 Informal dinner, Palace 7

Thursday, 16 November
1500-1700 Meeting with the Foreign Secretary, in Islamabad