Excellency,

I am herewith, as a Chair impartial to any position but partial to progress, providing guidance to Member States on the path to early reform of the Security Council.

In this regard, and with reference to my February 5 and March 11 letters, I am pleased to inform Member States that I have undertaken my responsibility as Chair, under the leadership of the President of the General Assembly, guided by consensus decisions 62/557 and 63/565, and facilitated by the overwhelming desire of Member States for text-based negotiations, to prepare the attached all-encompassing text, with annex, on the basis of the positions and proposals of Member States as submitted to the Chair ahead of the 5 March deadline.

In strict conformity with 62/557, which places the positions and proposals of Member States and the five key issues at the heart of negotiations, the negotiation text consists of excerpts from the positions in the submissions of Member States structured according to the five key issues. These submissions, which are also included in their entirety as an annex and available on the website of the President of the General Assembly, are listed in the order they were received.

I believe that this structure will allow the text to continue to evolve in a fair, balanced and comprehensive membership-driven way. In order for the process to continue along this track, I invite Member States to, ahead of the text-based negotiations, examine their positions and proposals as reflected in the negotiation text and, before close of business on May 20, notify my office, in writing and in language fit for negotiation purposes, of any concrete amendments needed for the sake of accuracy. These amendments can be communicated to Ms. Elisabeth Bosley at ebosley@afghanistan-un.org or faxed to the Permanent Mission at 212.972.1216.

After this confirmation period, a first revision (rev1) of the negotiation text will be distributed to Member States and presented at the first meeting of the fifth round, scheduled for June 1. To galvanize further open, comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent negotiations, the rest of the fifth round will be structured around concrete text-based negotiations on the five key issues, during which Member States are encouraged to undertake more informal drafting exercises, merging language to reduce
the obvious overlaps in the negotiation text and to address the outstanding differences, in the pursuit of a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council
1. Categories of membership

Decides that the Security Council shall consist of [...]:

1.1 [...] favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council.

This means the allocation no less than two permanent seats for Africa, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership to be extended to all permanent members, and of a total of 5 non-permanent seats; with the selection of all such representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election.

1.2 [Longer term seats

Alternative options for duration of terms:

(A) A term of from three to five years without possibility of immediate reelection; or

(B) A term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be eligible to run afresh, Member States will have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council.

[Regular non-permanent seats.

Seats for a two-year term without the possibility of immediate re-election...]

[Review after 10-12 years or after 15-16 years, taking into account the terms for the seats. Comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.]

1.3 [The Security Council shall consist of [...]

The Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America and eight others to be elected as herein set forth, shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect eighteen members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council...]

[The first new permanent members shall serve for a term of five years. After the expiration of such a term the regional groups shall decide among themselves which member states in their groups shall succeed the retiring member and which shall enjoy full permanent status. Should any group be unable to do so, the successor will serve for a term of five years, which shall be the scheme until the region shall have decided on the member states in the region to serve as full permanent member.]

[The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years.]

[A retiring non-member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.]

1.4 [...] enlargement is necessary both in the categories of permanent and non-permanent members.

[The General Assembly should elect a total of twelve members into the category of “non-permanent members with more frequent rotation”. The members thus elected would serve every second two-year term within a period of twelve years. This means that there would be six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation in any given composition of

1 African Group, see Annex pp1-5
2 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp55-58
3 Philippines, see Annex pp63-82
the Security Council. They would be eligible for re-election every twelve years. After
decade, the General Assembly would review the system and elect the next group of
members to serve within this category.]
[The total number of seats of the enlarged Security Council in any given term would be
twenty-five: Five current permanent members, six new permanent members, six non-
permanent members with more frequent rotation and eight other non-permanent members.]  
The amendment to the Charter related to the enlargement of the Security Council would
need to include a review clause allowing for a comprehensive review of the new system.
This review would be conducted twelve years after the entry force of the amendment.]

1.5 […]favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of
membership in the Security Council.]
[…]calls for the establishment of a category of non-permanent membership in the Security
Council explicitly for Small Island Developing States.]

1.6 […]enlarge the permanent and non permanent membership of the Security Council.]

1.7 […]favours the expansion, both in the category of permanent members and non-
permanent ones]
[…]will not support any partial or selective expansion, nor any increase in the Council’s
membership to the detriment of developing countries.]
[…]does not favour the creation of new categories of members.
[The new members of the Security Council, including the new permanent ones, should
enjoy the same rights and powers as current members of this organ.]  
[…]would not be opposed to the immediate re-election of non-permanent members.]  

1.8 [Expansion in both permanent and non-permanent membership.]  
[Provision for a review.]  

1.9 […] six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable
terms of [8/10] years…]
[Candidates for seats created pursuant to … above shall not be eligible to serve as non-
permanent members in accordance with article 23, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter for the
following [8/10] calendar years.]
[(16/20) years after the first elections held in accordance with paragraph 4 above, the
General Assembly shall review the situation created by the entry into force of the Charter
amendments contained in the Annex to the present resolution. The review shall include
consideration of the categories of seats, the creation of additional seats of any category,
including permanent seats, a review of the question of the veto as well as the
implementation of the measures to improve the working methods of the Council.]

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4 Slovenia, see Annex pp83-85
5 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), see Annex pp86-88
6 Uruguay, see Annex pp89-90
7 Cuba, see Annex pp95-101
8 L.69 Group, see Annex pp102-103
9 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middleground and would be subject to negotiation.
10 It is understood that the GA will simultaneously decide on a set of measures dealing with the working methods of the Council. This
can either be done in a separate part of the resolution or in a stand-alone resolution that is adopted at the same time as the resolution
dealing with the enlargement of the Council.
11 Liechtenstein, see Annex pp104-107
[In a situation when positions...remain polar, one can advance in the negotiation process only by searching for a compromise. In these circumstances we believe it possible to look closer at the “interim model” as one of the options."
[So far we only have some general understanding of what the “interim model” is. If Member States opt for this particular variant of the Security Council enlargement, they would have to agree on its modalities.]12

1.11 […supports the expansion of Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent membership.]
[Due to the lack of consensus on this point, we believe that there is a need for preliminary progress along an interim path with the aim of the increasing of new permanent members.]
[…a transitional interim formula … could be implemented for a period of fifteen years, with a subsequent mandatory new round of evaluations. These assessments would be carried out through a review clause process.]13

1.12 […support an expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of members.]
[With a view to breaking the deadlock in the negotiations, … support a pragmatic intermediate solution that could provide for a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the members currently elected. On completion of this intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into permanent seats.]14
[Issues we need to consider during this UNGA include: the duration of the intermediate period, the size and composition of the Council during this phase, and the modalities of entry into force.]14

1.13 [Decides that the Security Council shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term….]
[Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.]15

1.14 […adding six permanent and four non-permanent members.]
[Decides also to review the situation created by the amendments … fifteen years after their entry into force.]16

1.15 […support for the expansion of the Security Council in both categories on the premise that the members of the Security Council contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to the other purposes of our Organization and that the principle of equitable geographical distribution be respected in conformity with Article 23 of Chapter V of the United Nations Charter.]
[If our effort to reform were to lead us towards “the intermediate model”, … would support it, if it were the wish of the highest number of Member States. Since such a solution would de facto establish a third category of members with longer and renewable mandates along with a review clause to be determined in order to address among other

12 Russian Federation, see Annex pp108-111
13 Peru, see Annex pp112-114
14 United Kingdom and France, see Annex pp115-118
15 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
16 G-4, see Annex pp124-129
issues, the question of veto, it will be necessary to take into account the special interests of small States.

[... In the context of the “intermediate solution”, the States that will be candidates for the new seats, whose mandate would be longer (8 to 10 years) (third category of membership) should not be allowed to be candidates to a non permanent seat as currently defined in Article 23, with a two-year mandate.]^{17}

1.16. [Member States are still seriously divided on the issue of “category”, with no general agreement reached on any solution so far. Member States still need to engage in patient consultations to seek a solution that accommodates each other’s interests and concerns.]^{18}

1.17 [...] favors the enlargement of the permanent and non permanent membership of the Security Council...]^{19}

1.18 [...] open to the idea of enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent category.
[On the idea of an interim solution creating a third category of seats … ready to assess interim solutions that would allow for the testing of various models as long as they contain a clear review clause.]^{20}

1.19 [...] the only realistic way is to expand the non permanent category first.]^{21}

1.20 [...] the regular elections in the Security Council make it accountable and accessible where membership is earned as a privileged responsibility and not granted as a permanent right.]^{22}

1.21 [...] the Security Council will be composed of twenty-five (25) members of the United Nations chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable distribution of rotating character, with the same rights and obligations established by the Charter.
[The members of the Security Council will be chosen by a period of 4 years. The exiting members will not be eligible for the subsequent period.]^{23}

1.22 [...] reaffirms its commitment to the 2005 UfC platform as contained in A/59/L.68. In an effort to move the negotiation forward...presents the following as a possible compromise option...]
[Create longer-term seats^{24} and expand current two-year term seats. For instance, 7 longer-term seats and 3 two-year regular seats can be added to the current 15 seats.]
[Conduct comprehensive review on the reform 10 to 15 years after the entry into force of the reform including the composition and the working methods of the Security Council.]^{25}

1.23 [...] support to the G4 proposal...]

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^{17} Principality of Monaco, see Annex pp130-134
^{18} Peoples’ Republic of China, see Annex pp135-137
^{19} Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp138-143
^{20} Norway, see Annex pp144-147
^{21} Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Annex pp148-150
^{22} Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
^{23} Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp157-170
^{24} Regarding the longer-term seats, the length of the term is negotiable.
^{25} Republic of Korea, see Annex pp171-174
[…remains committed to an enlargement of the Council with both permanent and non-
permanent members.]
[… ready to look at other solutions that would allow for the testing of various models,
which could garner wide-spread support among members, provided they contain a clear
review-clause.]²⁶

1.24 […open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and non-permanent
members, though any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be
country-specific, rather than regionally-based.]
[For any new permanent members, the criteria for selection should begin with the same
criteria for non-permanent membership laid out in Article 23 of the Charter, namely that
due regard shall be specifically paid in the first instance to the contribution of Members
of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the
other purposes of the Organization.]²⁷

²⁶ Denmark, see Annex pp175-178
²⁷ United States of America, see Annex pp179-180
2. The question of the veto

Decides:

2.1 [...veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto as a matter of common justice;] 28

2.2 [A permanent member casting a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter should explain the reason for doing so at the time the relevant draft resolution is considered, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document.]

[Permanent Members should commit themselves to not casting a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law.]

[Permanent Members of the Security Council, when casting a negative vote, could state that this is not a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter.] 29

2.3 [Majority required for adoption of substantive decisions in an enlarged Security Council, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations:

- Present ratio, that is, 3/5 (60 per cent) of the total Security Council membership, or a greater ratio]

[Options on the question of the veto:

- Abolition of the veto.

- Limitations in respect of the scope of the veto: inter alia, application of the veto only on Chapter VII-related matters.] 30

2.4 [Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

[Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.]

[Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 or article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

The concurrence shall not, however, be required in matters involving genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, as well as on recommendations under Articles 4(2), 5, 6, 94(2) and 97 and on a matter under Article 96(1).

The negative vote of a permanent member in the exercise of its veto power must be explained.]

[A negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council, cast on decisions covered by the immediately preceding paragraph, maybe be overturned or set aside by a vote of an absolute majority of the General Assembly in regular or emergency special session, or by the Security Council itself by a vote of two-thirds of its members...]] 31

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28 African Group, see Annex pp1-5
29 S-5, see Annex pp16-47
30 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp55-58
31 Philippines, see Annex pp63-82
2.5 [The new permanent members elected to the Security Council following resolution…, will not be considered as part of the concurring majority of permanent members required in paragraph 3) of article 27 of the Charter.]
[The concurring vote of the permanent members required in para. 3 of article 27 of the Charter will only apply to the original permanent members of the Security Council. /the existing permanent members prior to resolution…]
[The newly elected permanent members of the Security Council (resolution…) will have no veto power and they will not be considered for the purpose of para. 3 of article 27 of the Charter.]

2.6 [The reform of the Security Council…should aim at limiting and curtailing the use of the veto with a view to its elimination.]

2.7 […]democratise the decision-making process of the Council, including by eliminating the undemocratic and anachronistic privilege of the veto.]
[Taking into account that it would not be realistic to achieve the elimination of the veto at this point, its use should at least be immediately limited and curtailed.]
[Additional actions regarding the veto should be implemented, inter alia:
- Overruling the veto within the Council by an affirmative vote of a certain number of Member States, commensurate with the size of an expanded Council,
- Overruling the veto by a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure and under progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24 (1) of the Charter.]
[The concept of voluntary “self-restraint” in the use of the veto is insufficient and should not be considered as an option.]
[As long as the veto is not eliminated, the new permanent members shall be entitled to exercise it on an equal footing as the current permanent members, without establishing selective or discriminatory criteria]

2.8 […in the course of the negotiations we should talk not about prohibiting or restricting the use of the veto right by the existing Permanent Members of the Security Council – their prerogatives should remain intact under any variant of the Council reform – but rather about extending this right to the possible new Permanent Members of Security Council…Therefore, a detailed discussion of the veto can begin at a later stage of negotiations, after a new composition of the Security Council is defined.]

2.9 […eliminate the use of veto…]
[ …in order not to paralyze the negotiation process…a commitment should be made to initial evaluation of limiting the use of veto, beginning with recognition of a rule that that has already been established within the organization’s Charter…The third paragraph of Article 27 imposes limitations upon permanent members whereby they are unable to vote when they are parties to a dispute pertaining to decisions associated with Chapter Six of the Charter, which concerns to pacific settlement of disputes, and decisions in relation to the third paragraph of Article 52, which also pertains to pacific settlement of disputes.]

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32 Uruguay, see Annex pp89-90
33 Non-Aligned Movement, see Annex pp91-94
34 Cuba, see Annex pp95-101
35 Russian Federation, see Annex pp108-111
[…it is also important to reach consensuses whereby precise limits upon use of veto can be established, with elimination of the possibility of applying veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in situations of gross human rights violations.]
[…establish new working methods for voting formulas so that the number of votes needed to approve Council resolutions shall be changed. Under the third paragraph of Article 27, nine votes are currently needed, and the five permanent members should be included among those votes.]
[…one formula that could be evaluated is that, during the voting and in order for a veto to be effective, there should be a requirement for two permanent members to be making use of the veto simultaneously, and, in this way, an interpretation that the use of the veto reflects national interests should be avoided.]36

2.10 […to amend also Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 109, paragraph 1, of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Security Council,37] [Restraint on the use of the veto.]38

2.11 […the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members;] […the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon in the framework of the review….]39

2.12 […favor putting an end to the undemocratic privileges derived from the use of veto. However and while we reach the necessary conditions for the elimination of the veto power…supports the extension of it to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent), regulating and limiting its use to specific cases under Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, we favor the requirement of two concurrent negative votes to prevent the adoption of a Council decision.]40

2.13 […encouraged permanent members of the Council to restrict their use of the veto and abstain from using it in certain situations. We have also called for greater accountability by members using their veto powers. We remain open to proposals limiting the scope and application of the veto based on voluntary commitment by permanent members.] […the right of the veto should not be extended to new members regardless of category.] 41

2.14 [The decisions of the Security Council on all other questions will be made by the affirmative vote of fifteen (15) members: but in decisions made by virtue of Chapter VI and of paragraph 3 of Article 52, the party in a controversy will abstain from voting.] [Regarding the articles relating to reform to the United Nations Charter, it is proposed that all forms of veto be eliminated, and that be an sovereign attribution under equal conditions for all Member States of the United Nations:]42

2.15 [Limit the use of veto.]43

36 Peru, see Annex pp112-114
37 Regarding paragraph 3 of Article 27, the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent members is not amended.
38 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
39 G-4, see Annex pp124-129
40 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp138-143
41 Norway, see Annex pp144-147
42 Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp157-170
2.16 [...not extending veto powers to additional members – regardless of category....]
[...the veto should be restrained and permanent members should abstain from using it in
certain situations – not least R2P situations.]\textsuperscript{44}

2.17 [We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure. In view of
the Charter requirements, it is unlikely that a Charter amendment extending the veto to
new permanent members could be adopted.]\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Republic of Korea, see Annex pp171-174
\textsuperscript{44} Denmark, see Annex pp175-178
\textsuperscript{45} United States of America, see Annex pp179-180
3. Regional representation

Decides that the members of the Security Council shall be elected accordingly:

3.1 […] a reform that will ensure Africa’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council, taking into account the principles, objectives and ideals of the UN Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance within the UN system;
 […]selection of all … representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election;
 […]allocation of no less than two permanent seats for Africa…
 […]allocation…of a total of five non-permanent seats [for Africa]]

3.2 […]any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of the OIC Member States in any category of membership of the expanded Security Council.
 […]any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic World.
 […] increased role of regional groups in determining their representation on the Security Council.
 […] increase the representation of developing countries…]

3.3 […]the Arab States…demanded a permanent Arab representation in any future expansion in the category of permanent membership of the Security Council…]

3.4 [Longer-term …seats allocated to the regional groups, as follows:
 Africa,
 Asia,
 Asia/Africa (on a rotational basis),
 Group of Latin America and Caribbean States,
 Western European and Others Group/Eastern European Group (on a rotational basis)]
 [Regular non-permanent seats…as follows:
 Small States, Medium-sized States, Africa,
 Asia,
 Group of Latin American and Caribbean States,
 Eastern European Group.]
 [Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.] 

3.5 […]emphasize that existing regional groups should be maintained.]

[ `%d` African Group, see Annex pp1–5
`47` Organization of the Islamic Conference, see Annex pp6-15
`48` Arab Group, see Annex pp48-52
`49` Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa; 11 are from Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from Eastern European Group; 6 are from Western European and Others Group.
`50` Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council.
`51` Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp55-58]
[…any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Eastern European Group by the allocation to the said Group of at least one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council.] 52

3.6 […The General Assembly shall elect … non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical or balanced regional distribution.

The new permanent members of the Security Council shall be composed of two each for the African, the Asian, and the Latin American and the Caribbean Groups of States and one each for the Eastern European Group and the Western European and Other States group of states…

The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. The additional eight non-permanent members shall be composed of two each for the Africa, the Asian and the Latin American and Caribbean Groups of States, and one each for the Eastern European and Western European and other States group…

The regional groups, through consultations, must ensure that the additional seats for non-permanent members of the Security Council allotted to them shall be fairly, justly and equitably rotated among the member states in each group…] 53

3.7 […the following distribution of additional permanent seats: Two for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin American and Caribbean and one for Western European and Others Group.]

[Six among these [non-permanent] members [with more frequent rotation] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Eastern European group and three from the Western European and others group. The sequence of rotation would need to be determined by the General Assembly.]

[Four among these [non-permanent] members [elected on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical distribution] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Western European and Others Group and one from Eastern European Group.] 54

3.8 […supports the legitimate aspirations of the African Group of countries in this regard.] 55

3.9 […support for the increased and enhanced representation for Africa in the reformed Security Council.] 56

3.10 [The main objective of the expansion of the Council should be to rectify the current insufficient representation in that organ of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.]

52 Eastern European Group, see Annex pp59-62
53 Philippines, see Annex pp63-82
54 Slovenia, see Annex pp83-85
55 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), see Annex pp86-88
56 Non-Aligned Movement, see Annex pp91-94
[Among the new permanent members, at least two countries from Africa, two developing countries from Asia, and two countries from Latin America and the Caribbean must be included.] 57

3.11 [The distribution of seats must reflect the change in composition of the UN membership, and address the non-representation of some regions in the permanent membership category and the under-representation of developing countries in both membership categories.] 58

3.12 [The following six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable terms of [8 / 10] 59 years:
- two from African States,
- two from Asian States,
- one from Latin American and Caribbean States,
- one from western European and Other States.]. 60

3.13 […promoting options for equitable geographic distribution that can increase possibilities of presence for our region, as well as contributing to the objective of achieving more frequent participation in the Council…believes that geographic distribution reflects the spirit of the Charter, which takes individual and sovereign states into consideration under the principle of the sovereign equality of all members.]. 61

3.14 […reaffirm the support…for the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for new permanent seats, along with representation for Africa among the permanent members of the Security Council.] 62

3.15 […the twenty non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and Other States; two from Eastern European States.]
[…each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified…above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair subregional representation;] 63

3.16 [Insofar as regional representation is concerned, our position is that this concept signifies equitable geographical distribution.]
[…the six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: Two from African States; Two from Asian States; One from Latin American and Caribbean States; One from Western European and Other States;]

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57 Cuba, see Annex pp95-101
58 L.69 Group, see Annex pp.102-103
59 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middleground and would be subject to negotiation.
60 Liechtenstein, see Annex p104-107
61 Peru, see Annex pp112-114
62 United Kingdom and France, see Annex pp115-118
63 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp119-123 and Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
…the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:
One from African States;
One from Asian States;
One from Eastern European States;
One from Latin American and Caribbean States;]

3.17 [Security Council reform should give top priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, especially that of African countries… The reform should be conducive to give more countries, small and medium-sized countries in particular, more opportunities to serve in the Security Council on a rotating basis to participate in its decision making process.]
[New seats of the Security Council should be reasonably distributed. The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different civilizations and cultures taken into consideration.]

3.18 [… support an expansion that addresses the under-representation of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the Security Council, with members in both categories.]

3.19 [The composition of the Council should better reflect the current configuration of the membership of the United Nations, including developing states and smaller states…]
[While equitable geographic representation remains an important principle in the distribution of non-elected seats among regional groups, we should not forget that the Charter pays special regard to the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organization…]
[We maintain that only States can be members of the Security Council. We encourage States to consult with other members of their regional group and to ensure broad respect for the decisions of the Council. But it remains an open question how States could represent entire groups…]
[The under-representation of African and Latin-American and Caribbean countries must be redressed. An enlargement should also take into account smaller states…]

3.20 [The composition of the Security Council should be expanded on the basis of a principle of ensuring full representation of the Non-Aligned and developing countries.]
[If the permanent category were expanded, new seats should be given to African region and other developing countries as the first priority. A country like Japan refusing the settlement of extra-large past crimes by all means should be off the list.]

3.21 […the equitable geographical distribution should be ensured by addressing the historical injustice with certain regions.]
[…the opportunity for Member States to serve on the Security Council must be enhanced, particularly for groups which have been traditionally under-represented, such as small and medium States and Africa.]

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64 G-4, see Annex pp124-129
65 People’s Republic of China, see Annex pp135-137
66 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp138-143
67 Norway, see Annex pp144-147
68 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Annex pp148-150
69 Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
3.22 [...]chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable distribution of rotating character...\textsuperscript{70}

3.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Longer-Term*</th>
<th>Two-Year Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Regarding the longer-term seats, the length of the term is negotiable.
[Maintain existing five regional groups.\textsuperscript{71}]

3.24 [...]including both developing and developed countries as new permanent members]
[It is important to ensure that any reform takes full account of the need to give small states an opportunity to participate in the work of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{72}]

3.25 [Decisions about new permanent members will be made primarily on the basis of a member's country-specific qualifications.\textsuperscript{73}]

\textsuperscript{70} Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp157-170
\textsuperscript{71} Republic of Korea, see Annex pp171-174
\textsuperscript{72} Denmark, see Annex pp175-178
\textsuperscript{73} United States of America, see Annex pp179-180
4. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods

Decides that the membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to:

4.1 [...] a more representative and inclusive Council should consist of a total of 26;]74

4.2 [The exact number of seats will depend on the total size of the expansion and the distribution of those seats among various regions, taking into account equitable geographical distribution.]75

4.3 [...] shall consist of [fifteen] thirty one Members of the United Nations]76

4.4 [The total number of seats of the enlarged Security Council in any given term would be twenty-five....]77

4.5 [...] not less than 26 members.]78

4.6 [...] shall be increased from fifteen to [xx79],]80

4.7 [...] should not exceed a reasonable level of low twenties.]81

4.8 [...] increasing the number of Security Council members to a “mid-twenties” level....]82

4.9 [...] shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term...]83

4.10 [...] increased from 15 to 25...]84

4.11 [...] supports a Council expanded into the twenties at most.]85

4.12 [The Council should be enlarged to an extent that will enable it to fully redress the imbalance in its structure and increase the representation of developing countries.]86

4.13 [...] bring the size of the Council to approximately 26 members.]87

4.14 [...] supports a balanced enlargement with a total number of members in the mid-20s.]88

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74 African Group, see Annex pp1-5
75 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp55-58
76 Philippines, see Annex pp63-82
77 Slovenia, see Annex pp83-85
78 Cuba, see Annex pp95-101
79 The question of creation of new non-permanent seats in the sense of article 23 of the UN charter is not addressed in these elements, cf. OP 3, which serves as a placeholder for the scenario where additional two-year seats are created.
80 Liechtenstein, see Annex pp104-107
81 Russian Federation, see Annex pp108-111
82 Peru, see Annex pp112-114
83 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
84 G-4, see Annex pp124-129
85 Principality of Monaco, see Annex pp130-134
86 People’s Republic of China, see Annex pp135-137
87 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp138-143
88 Norway, see Annex pp144-147
4.15  […]a total number of the enlarged council members should be no less than 26.\textsuperscript{89}

4.16  […]propose an increase to 25 members…\textsuperscript{90}

4.17  [Increase the size of the Security Council from 15 to around 25 states.\textsuperscript{91}

4.18  […]a number of members somewhere in the mid-twenties would be suitable.\textsuperscript{92}

4.19  […]we are prepared to support only a modest expansion.\textsuperscript{93}

Calls for improving the working methods of the Security Council through:

4.20  [To increase the number of public meetings, in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the
Charter, and that these meetings should provide real opportunities to take into account the
views and contributions of the wider membership of the UN, particularly non-Council
members whose affairs are under discussion of the Council;]
[To allow for briefings by the Special Envoys or Representatives of the Secretary-
General and the UN Secretariat to take place in public meetings, unless in exceptional
circumstances;]
[To enhance its relationship with the UN Secretariat and troop contributing countries
(TCC), including through a sustained, regular and timely interaction. Meetings with
TCCs should be held not only in the drawing up of mandates, but also in their
implementation, when considering a change in, or renewal of, or completion of a mission
mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. In this
context, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations should
involve TCCs more frequently and intensively in its deliberations, especially in the very
early stages of mission planning;]
[To uphold the primacy of and respect for the Charter in connection with its functions
and powers and in that regard to desist from the practice of engaging and initiating formal
or informal discussions on the situation in any Member State of the United Nations or on
any issue that does not constitute a threat to international peace and security, and contrary
to the provisions of Article 24 of the Charter;]
[To establish its subsidiary organs in accordance with the letter and spirit of the UN
Charter, and that these organs should function in a manner that would provide adequate
and timely information on their activities to the general UN membership;]
[To avoid any attempts to use the Security Council to pursue national political agendas
and to ensure the necessity of non-selectivity and impartiality in the work of the Council,
and the need for the Council to strictly keep within the powers and functions accorded to
it by the Member States under the UN Charter;]
[To refrain from resorting to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing
issues that do not necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security, and to fully
utilize the provisions of other relevant Chapters, where appropriate, including Chapters
VI and VIII, before invoking Chapter VII which should be a measure of last resort, if
necessary;]
[To avoid any recourse to the imposition or prolongation of sanctions or their extension
by the Security Council against any State under the pretext or with the aim of achieving

\textsuperscript{89} Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Annex pp148-150
\textsuperscript{90} Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp157-170
\textsuperscript{91} Republic of Korea, see Annex pp171-174
\textsuperscript{92} Denmark, see Annex pp175-178
\textsuperscript{93} United States of America, see Annex pp179-180
the political objectives of one or a few States, rather than in the general interest of the international community;"
[To formalize the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, which have remained provisional for more than 60 years, in order to improve on its transparency and accountability.] 94

4.21 [...stressed that the UN Security Council should act in full transparency and accountability and expressed grave concern over the policies that have prevented this body from performing its main duty based on justice and thus undermined its credibility.] 95

4.22 [Briefings by UN officials to the Security Council should as far as possible be made accessible to all member states, while consultations thereafter may be held in a private setting.] [Consultations with non-members should take place as part of the standard operating procedures (cf. articles 31 and 32 of the Charter). On matters discussed in private meetings, frequent, timely and substantive briefings should be offered to non-members.] [Draft resolutions and presidential statements should be made available to non-members of the Council as soon as they are introduced in informal consultations.] [The tentative forecast of the programme of work should be shared with the larger membership as soon as it is available followed by a briefing by the incoming Presidency. Regular updates of the programme of work should be offered on the website of the Council.] [Best practices of consultations between the Council and non-members should be incorporated in briefings given to newly elected members of the Council.] [The quality and frequency of formal and informal reports on the work of subsidiary bodies should be improved.] [Non-members should be offered opportunities, upon their request, to provide substantive input to the work of subsidiary bodies.] [If non-members participate in a meeting of the Council, the Presidency should ensure the right to be heard by letting those with a direct interest in the outcome speak prior to members.] [“Arria-formula” meetings should be used more frequently in a more flexible manner for informal exchanges with member states, organizations or individuals.] [The Council should report to non-members in a timely manner and in detail on its missions, including their budgetary aspects.] [A lessons-learned group should be established with the mandate to: -Assess whether Security Council decisions have been implemented; -Analyze obstacles to implementation and reasons for non-implementation; -Suggest mechanisms or measures to enhance implementation.] [Where decisions of the Security Council require implementation by all member states, the Council should ensure that the ability of member states to implement decisions is taken into account in the decision-making process.] [Key provisions of thematic resolutions should be incorporated into country specific resolutions, where applicable.] [Standards of due process and rule of law should be fully taken into account in the decision-making.]

94 African Group, see Annex pp1-5
95 Organization of the Islamic Conference, see Annex pp6-15
Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish fair and clear procedures for listing and delisting, reflecting standards of due process. These procedures should be shared with non-members.

Regular and timely consultations should be held at all stages and on all aspects of decision-making with countries contributing civilian or military personnel or substantive financial resources, as well as other countries that are directly affected by a peacekeeping operation.

Regular strategic joint briefings, both cross-cutting and on individual PKOs, should involve the DPKO/DFS, political-military experts of the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries.

Best practices for authorising new missions should be developed, including a set of principles based on the Brahimi report, as well as drafting guidelines for resolutions.

A thorough lessons-learned study on a peacekeeping operation after its termination (eg UNMEE) should be commissioned.

Mandates should have clear strategic political objectives and key benchmarks which the Secretary General can report against and which the Council can base its evaluations on.

Regular and timely dialogue with the Secretariat and TCCs on the evaluation of operations should be held to improve implementation thereof.

Smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding should be facilitated through early and continued cooperation with the Peace Building Commission.

The Security Council, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, should enhance its cooperation and consultations on matters affecting the maintenance of international peace and security with the relevant regional arrangements and agencies, as appropriate.96

4.23 Better access to information through open briefings.

Holding of Security Council meetings in an open format and keeping to a minimum closed meetings and informal consultations as the exception that they were meant to be.

Timely availability to non-Security Council members of draft resolutions and presidential statements.

Frequent, timely and qualitative briefings for non-Security Council members on the matters discussed in Council informal consultations and in the subsidiary bodies.

Full and more vigorous implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of the United Nations within the context of the work of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies.

Interaction of the Security Council with all interested and concerned parties, particularly in the decision-making process.

Timely decision on the format of meetings to allow the membership sufficient preparation.

Establishing mechanisms to ensure that views and interests of Member States affected or concerned by any matter in the agenda, including troop-contributing countries and host countries, are heard and taken into account.

Expansion of consultation and cooperation of the Security Council with regional organizations and countries in the region concerned.

Adoption of formal rules of procedure of the Security Council, after appropriate consultation with the general membership.

Review of the implementation of decisions of the Security Council.97

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96 S-5, see Annex pp16-47
97 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp55-58
Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council shall be invited to participate, without a vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are especially or directly affected.

 […] request the Security Council to favorably consider the following amendments to the current Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, thus:

Deleting of the word provisional in the title of its current Rules of Procedure

By adding new paragraphs to the following rules:

Rule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in Rule 4, be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days.

Open debates on Security Council issues of utmost importance must be held as often as possible, with adequate prior notice to the members of the United Nations which are not members of the Security Council.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary General to the representatives of the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances, it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

This provisional agenda shall likewise be communicated through the Security Council website to the members of the United Nations which are not members of the Security Council.

Rule 11

The Secretary General shall communicate each week to the representatives of the Security Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

The Security Council shall also provide through its website the members of the United Nations which are not members of the Security Council with copies of such summary statements.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting. Copies of the provisional agenda shall be communicated to the members of the United Nations which are not members of the Security Council through the Security Council website at least two days before the meeting.

Rule 37

Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council shall be invited, as a result of a decision of the Security Council or Article 31(1) of the Charter.

Rule 38

Any member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in the application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. The proposals and draft
resolutions [may] shall be put to a vote only at the request of the representative on the Security Council.

Rule 40
Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It shall, however, be understood that in the elections of members of the International Court of Justice, the members of the Security Council shall, each have one vote in both its capacity as member of the Security Council and as member of the General Assembly which, upon resolution by the Security Council made at least two months before the election and communicated forthwith to the General Assembly, may be cast during the election in the General Assembly, or in a separate election in the Security Council simultaneously done with that in the General Assembly the results of which shall forthwith be reported to the latter. 98

4.25
[...] Instead of excessive and quick use of Chapter VII, efforts should be made to fully utilize the provisions of Chapters VI and VIII for the pacific settlement of disputes. Chapter VII should be invoked, as intended, as a measure of last resort.]
[...] The objectives of sanctions are not to punish or otherwise exact retribution on the populace. In this regard, the objectives of sanctions regimes should be clearly defined, and that its imposition should be for a specified timeframe and be based on tenable legal grounds, and that it should be lifted as soon as the objectives are achieved. The conditions demanded of the State or party on which sanctions are imposed should be clearly defined and subject to periodic review. Sanctions should be imposed only when there exists a threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression, in accordance with the UN Charter, and that it is not applicable “preventively” in instances of mere violation of international law, norms or standards.]
[Transparency, openness and consistency are key elements that the Security Council should observe in all its activities, approaches and procedures... The Council must comply with the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter, which allow any non-Council member to participate in discussions on matters affecting it. Rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Council should be thoroughly observed. Closed meetings and informal consultations should be kept to a minimum and as the exception they were meant to be.]
[The reform of the Security Council...should ensure that the agenda of the Council reflects the needs and interests of both developing and developed countries, in an objective, rational, non-selective and non-arbitrary manner.]
[The Rules of Procedures of the Security Council, which have remained provisional for more than 60 years, should be formalized in order to improve its transparency and accountability.]
[Call on the Council to increase the number of public meetings, in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, and that these meetings should provide real opportunities to take into account the views and contributions of the wider membership of the UN, particularly non-Council members whose affairs are under the discussion of the Council;]
[Call on the Security Council to allow briefings by the Special Envoys or Representatives of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat to take place in public meetings, unless in exceptional circumstances;]
[Call on the Security Council to further enhance its relationship with the UN Secretariat and troop contributing countries (TCC), including through a sustained regular and timely]

98 Philippines, see Annex pp63-82
interaction. Meetings with TCCs should be held not only in the drawing up of mandates, but also in their implementation, when considering a change in, or renewal of, or completion of a mission mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. In this context, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations should involve TCCs more frequently and intensively in its deliberations, especially in the very early stages of mission planning.

[Call upon the Security Council to uphold the primacy of and respect for the Charter in connection with its functions and powers and stresses once again that the decision by the Security Council to initiate formal or informal discussion on the situation in any Member State of the United Nations or any issue that does not constitute a threat to international peace and security is contrary to Article 24 of the Charter.]

[Call on the Council to establish its subsidiary organs in accordance with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, and that these organs should function in a manner that would provide adequate and timely information on their activities to the general UN membership:]

[Call on the Council to avoid resorting to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that do not necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security, and to fully utilize the provisions of other relevant Chapters, where appropriate, including Chapter VI and VIII, before invoking Chapter VII which should be a measure of last resort, if necessary;]99

4.26 [There will not be a true reform of the working methods while there is a Security Council that is not expanded in both categories of members and developing countries are not adequately represented there.]

[Transparency, openness and consistency are key elements that the Security Council should observe in all its activities, approaches and procedures.]

[In accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, the Security Council should, as a general rule, meet in a public format open to all Member States of the United Nations. To ensure that these meetings provide real opportunities to take into account the views and contributions of the wider membership of the UN, particularly non-Council members whose affairs are under the discussion of the Council. Closed meetings and informal consultations should be kept to a minimum and as the exception they were meant to be.]

[The Security Council should, in a timely fashion and whenever appropriate, hold substantive orientation debates open to all Member States on matters under its consideration.]

[Briefings by the Special Envoys or Representatives of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat should take place in public meetings, unless in exceptional circumstances.]

[When a non-Council member requests a meeting of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 of the Charter, the requested meeting should be promptly convened by the Council.]

[The Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, which have remained provisional for more than 60 years, should be formalised in order to improve their transparency and accountability.]

[The Security Council should ensure that its monthly assessments are comprehensive and analytical, and issued in a timely fashion.]

[The State in question should be allowed to participate in the discussions of the Council on matters directly affecting such State, under Article 31 of the Charter.]

[To ensure that the views of Member States, obtained through Public Debates on cross-cutting thematic issues, are reflected in relevant resolutions and presidential statements

99 Non-Aligned Movement, see Annex pp91-94
adopted thereafter, instead of the current practice of adopting resolutions and presidential statements without reference to such discussions.]

[Subsidiary organs of the Council should function in a manner that would provide adequate and timely information on their activities to the general UN membership. In this context, to ensure that non-Members are given access to subsidiary organs of the Council, including the right to participate as appropriate.]

[The agenda of the Council should reflect the needs and interests of both developing and developed countries, in an objective, rational, non-selective and non-arbitrary manner.]

[Sanctions should be considered to be imposed only after all means of peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted and a thorough consideration undertaken of the short-term and long-term effects of such sanctions. The imposition of sanctions should be for a specified timeframe and be based on tenable legal grounds, and that it should be lifted as soon as the objectives are achieved. The conditions demanded of the State or party on which sanctions are imposed should be clearly defined and subject to periodic review. Sanctions should be imposed only when there is a threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression, in accordance with the Charter.]

[Security Council should further enhance its relationship with the UN Secretariat and troop contributing countries (TCC), including through a sustained, regular and timely interaction. Meetings with TCCs should be held not only in the drawing up of mandates, but also in their implementation, when considering a change in, or renewal of, or completion of a mission mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground.]

[The Security Council can not resort to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that do not pose a threat to international peace and security, and should fully utilize the provisions of other relevant Chapters, where appropriate, including Chapters VI and VIII, before invoking Chapter VII which should be a measure of last resort, if necessary;]

4.27 [Comprehensive improvement in the working methods of the UNSC. This should, inter alia, address the issue of enhanced access and transparency to non-members, full implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, and involvement of Troop Contributing Countries in decision making on all aspects of peacekeeping operations.]

4.28 [Working methods of the Security Council have to be improved. It should be done in a transparent way based on the opinions of the Member States. However, the prerogative in this process should belong to the Security Council itself. Thus…it would be appropriate to withdraw the Security Council working methods from the list of key issues subject to a possible review of the Security Council reform after the Member States come in the course of the intergovernmental talks to a package arrangement on the Council reform issue. Both the Security Council working methods and the current Security Council Permanent Members’ veto right issue should not be among the topics subject to the Security Council review process.]

4.29 […]recognizes that, in recent years, the Security Council has adopted measures with the purpose of achieving greater transparency in its work. Nevertheless, it believes that self-
evaluation still needs to be completed so as to allow identification of new measures that should be implemented in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its work. [It is important to provide greater access to information along with ways for non-members of the Council to participate in its work, as well as to ensure not only that the flow of information shall be fast but that its content shall be substantive, instead of merely being referential.]\textsuperscript{103}

4.30 [Procedures to guarantee transparency in decision-making, accountability in performance and access to information, including open briefings and interaction with all interested parties;]
[Access and better participation of non-member States of the Security Council in the work of the Security Council;]
[Adoption and circulation of formal rules of procedure;]
[Underlines, in addition to the provisions…above, the need to elaborate further provisions through consultations among Member States.]\textsuperscript{104}

4.31 [As a general rule, meet in a public forum open to all Member States of the United Nations. Exceptionally, the Security Council may decide to meet in private;]
[Implement Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter by consulting with non-Security Council members on a regular basis, especially members with a special interest in the substantive matter under consideration by the Council;]
[Grant non-members access to subsidiary organs of the Council, including the right to participate, as appropriate;]
[Make available to non-members of the Council draft resolutions and presidential statements, as well as other draft documents that are tabled at informal consultations of the whole of the Council for action on its agenda items, as soon as such documents are tabled, or earlier, if so authorized by the author of the draft;]
[Hold frequent, timely and qualitative briefings for non-members on the matters discussed in the Security Council and its subsidiary organs, including briefings on its ad hoc missions, their terms of reference and the findings of such missions;]
[Hold regular and timely consultations with troop-contributing countries and countries that contribute financial resources, as well as other countries that are directly concerned or affected by a peacekeeping operation, as appropriate, before and during the decision-making process for the establishment, conduct, review and termination of peacekeeping operations, including the extension and change of mandates, as well as for specific operational issues;]\textsuperscript{105}

4.32 [Indubitably, the members of the Security Council have been improving its working methods since the establishment of the Working Group and they have the capacity to adopt its own rules of procedure. Nevertheless, the undertaking of the reform justifies the participation of all Members of the General Assembly.]\textsuperscript{106}

4.33 [It is necessary for the Council to continue to take stock of its experience and best practices, increase transparency of its work, and heed and respect the views of Member States.]\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{103} Peru, see Annex pp112-114
\textsuperscript{104} Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
\textsuperscript{105} G-4, see Annex pp124-129
\textsuperscript{106} Principality of Monaco, see Annex pp130-134
\textsuperscript{107} People’s Republic of China, see Annex pp135-137
4.34 [...]we support the efforts to make open format meetings the rule and not the exception and to promote the participation of non-permanent members in all its deliberations and consultations.\textsuperscript{108}

4.35 [Simply enlarging the Council without making it more efficient will undermine the legitimacy of the Council]
[...supports the concrete proposals put forward by the Group of Five Small States to improve the working methods of the Council: Better access for non-Members based on consultation, increased transparency in the workings of the Council, and accountability through substantive dialogue with the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{109}]

4.36 [For a genuine Security Council reform, we should set it as the ultimate reform goal to ensure fairness and transparency in the Security Council activities.\textsuperscript{110}]

4.37 [We require a Security Council that is agile and authoritative, but most importantly one that is open to the scrutiny of all members of the United Nations. The issue is not only that, with few exceptions, the majority of its meetings be open, but also that the principal decisions not be negotiated “behind the scene” without recordkeeping or minutes.\textsuperscript{111}]

4.38 [Enhance transparency and access of non-members of the Security Council to the work of the Security Council, including through
- more frequently holding Security Council meetings in an open format and keeping closed meetings to a minimum;
- providing frequent, timely and quality briefings for non-members on the matters discussed in the informal consultations and in the subsidiary bodies;
- fully implementing Articles 31 and 32 of the UN Charter in the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.\textsuperscript{112}]

4.39 [...improving the working methods of the Council should be an integral part of a comprehensive reform. It is of utmost importance that the Council, when acting on the behalf of all the UN members, takes all possible steps to ensure maximum transparency and interaction with members outside the Council. Transparency should make it easier for non-Members who have a real interest in or knowledge of a matter to make a contribution.\textsuperscript{113}]

4.40 [We are not open to a change to Article 30 of the Charter. The Council's working methods should be determined by the Council.\textsuperscript{114}]

\textsuperscript{108} Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp138-143
\textsuperscript{109} Norway, see Annex pp144-147
\textsuperscript{110} Democratic People's Republic of Korea, see Annex pp148-150
\textsuperscript{111} Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp157-150
\textsuperscript{112} Republic of Korea, see Annex pp171-174
\textsuperscript{113} Denmark, see Annex pp175-178
\textsuperscript{114} United States of America, see Annex pp179-180
5. Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly

Calls for improving the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly through:

5.1 [To address the growing concerns by Member States of the gradual encroachment by the Security Council on and the erosion of the authority and mandate of the General Assembly by fully and speedily implementing the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 51/193, 58/126 and 59/313;]
[Council’s submission in keeping with Article 24(3) of the United Nations Charter, more comprehensive and analytical reports to the General Assembly, consisting among other things, of assessment of the work of the Council, views expressed by its members as well as the rationale for taking or not taking action on all issues before it;]
[Council’s submission in accordance with Articles 15 and 24 of the United Nations Charter, special subject-oriented reports to the General Assembly for its consideration and on issues of current international concern;]
[Ensuring that members are fully informed of the nature and scope of Council’s activities not only through full and informative press releases, but also by effectively communicating their views on issues of concern taken by Council in its informal consultations. Convening more formal meetings and informal consultations involving the interested parties prior to the adoption of decisions to allow for wider participation;]
[The provision of effective and timely flow and exchange of information between the two organs particularly through frequent and regular consultations between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council to review work plans and consult on specific issues of mutual concern. Such meetings can enhance more direct and dynamic exchanges between the two organs;]
[Ensuring that the role and authority of the General Assembly including on questions relating to international peace and security be respected and to also guarantee the unfettered application of Articles 10-14 and 35 of the Charter and where appropriate Rules 7 to 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which enable the Assembly to take urgent action; all of which provide a strong basis for the General Assembly to assert itself and prevent the erosion of its powers by the Security Council.]

5.2 […]agreed that the General Assembly representing universal membership in accordance with the United Nations Charter, must be enabled to exercise its authority in addressing all major issues, including peace and security, development and human rights…further called for halting and reversing the encroachment by the Security Council on the Assembly’s prerogatives and functions.]

5.3 [The President of the Security Council should hold regular consultations with the President of the General Assembly, and the latter should ensure the timely provision of notice and updates of such meetings to the membership.]
[The annual report of the Security Council should provide an evaluation of the work of the Council pursuant to articles 15, paragraph 1 and article 24, paragraph 3 of the Charter.]
[Informal ways to engage with non-members in an interaction on the annual report, in addition to the debate held by the General Assembly, should be established.]

115 African Group, see Annex pp1-5
116 Organization of the Islamic Conference, see Annex pp6-15
Special subject-oriented reports should be submitted to the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations, including following consultations between the Presidents of the two organs.]

5.4 [Enhancement of the accountability of the Security Council to the general membership.] [Submission of substantive and analytical annual reports and, when necessary, of special reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly, pursuant to Articles 15 (1) and 24 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations.] [Strengthening of the interrelationship among the Security Council and other United Nations principal organs, including through regular and institutionalized consultations, cooperation and adequate exchange of information.]

5.5 [[Amends]:

Article 4
The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly [upon the recommendation of] in consultation with the Security Council.

Article 10
…deleting therefrom the clause “except as provided in Article 12.”

Article 11
…deleting therefrom the clause in the second paragraph “and, except as provided in Article 12.”

Article 12
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly may, if it so decides, [shall not] make [any] a recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation [unless the Security Council so requests].

Article 27
…adding thereto a paragraph 4 to read thus:
A negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council, cast on decisions covered by the immediately preceding paragraph, may be overturned or set aside by a vote of an absolute majority of the General Assembly in regular or emergency special session, or by the Security Council itself by a vote of two-thirds of its members.

Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise of a Secretary General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly [upon the recommendation of] in consultation with the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer in the Organization.

Article 18
Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote. In the election of the Judges of the International Court of Justice such vote may be cast in the Security Council if such member is also a member of the Security Council or in the General Assembly under such procedure as may be prescribed by the Security Council.]

[Article 24
The Security Council shall submit annual and when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly. The report must be in such format as to provide faithful substantive information on or arising from the proceedings or action taken by the

\[117\] S-5, see Annex pp16-47
\[118\] Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp55-58
Council on its agenda items and shall include the summary of the explanation of votes given by members of the Council.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Security Council shall release to the General Assembly periodic reports or substantive summaries on matters of which the Council is seized during the course of the year.]\(^{119}\)

5.6 [The President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly should hold regular monthly consultations. If a certain situation arises, such consultations should be held more frequently.]

[The Security Council should submit a more comprehensive and analytical annual report to the General Assembly, assessing the work of the Council, including such cases in which the Council has failed to act, as well as the views expressed by its members during the consideration of the agenda items under its consideration;]

[The Security Council, pursuant to Articles 15 (1) and 24 (3) of the UN Charter, should submit special reports for the consideration of the General Assembly;]

[The Security Council must fully observe all Charter provisions as well as all General Assembly resolutions, which clarify its relationship with the latter organ and other principal organs. Article 24 of the Charter does not provide the Security Council with the competence to address issues which fall within the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the ECOSOC, including in the areas of norm-setting, legislation, administrative and budgetary matters, and establishing definitions.]\(^{120}\)

5.7 [Improved relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA. This should, inter alia, address improved reporting by the UNSC, regular consultations between the UNSC and the UNGA bodies, and strict adherence to their respective mandates.]\(^{121}\)

5.8 […supports reasonable and realistic proposals aimed at increasing the authority and effectiveness of the General Assembly. We suppose that any reform innovations should be based on strict observance of the distribution of prerogatives between the United Nations principal bodies as enshrined in the UN Charter.]

[We are against any attempts to redistribute the powers of the main bodies of the Organization to the advantage of the General Assembly thus compromising the prerogatives of the UN Security Council. The UN Charter defines the Security Council and General Assembly as the two main bodies of the Organization.]\(^{122}\)

5.9 […it is essential to strengthen the institutional mechanisms of interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly, especially those which are set out in the organization’s Charter, such as indicated in the first paragraph of Article 15, which refers to the General Assembly’s authority to obtain and to consider special and annual reports from the Security Council, and as indicated in the third paragraph of Article 24, which unequivocally mentions that the Security Council shall submit special and annual reports to the General Assembly for its consideration, if necessary.]\(^{123}\)

5.10 [Consultation, cooperation and adequate exchange of information with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council:]\(^{124}\)

\(^{119}\) Philippines, see Annex pp63-82

\(^{120}\) Cuba, see Annex pp95-101

\(^{121}\) L.69 Group, see Annex pp102-103

\(^{122}\) Russian Federation, see Annex 108-111

\(^{123}\) Peru, see Annex pp112-114

\(^{124}\) Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp151-156
5.11 [We believe that these two organs should respect each other’s distinct roles, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, and strive to secure the effective functioning of the United Nations as a whole.]

[Hold regular consultations with the Presidents of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council;]

[Submit an annual report to the General Assembly providing a detailed substantive and comprehensive evaluation of the work of the Council pursuant to Articles 15 (1) and 24 (3) of the Charter;]

[Submit, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter, for the consideration of the Assembly in accordance with Article 15 (1) of the Charter.]125

5.12 […supports strengthening coordination and cooperation between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations clearly defines the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council. These two principal organs should discharge their respective responsibilities entrusted by the Charter of the United Nations and complement each other.]126

5.13 […this relationship should be developed under the provisions of the Charter, upon recognition of the deliberative and universal nature and broad competence of the General Assembly on matters or issues relating to the powers and functions of other UN bodies, including the Security Council. These provisions underline the superior status of the General Assembly in relation to the principal organs of the Organization. In that order: a) the President of the Security Council shall submit for consideration by the plenary of the General Assembly special and annual reports, b) the President of the Council shall submit to the General Assembly, in a plenary meeting, a detailed report on the implementation of the recommendations that the Assembly has issued and on situations likely to endanger international peace and security that the Assembly has addressed, c) the General Assembly should develop the unrestricted provisions in Article 12 of the Charter on the theme of peace and security; d) the Security Council shall delimit its agenda to the powers and functions clearly regulated in the UN Charter, e) the Security Council should prepare a final version of its rules and regulations, making specific mention of articles of the UN Charter which set out its powers and functions.]127

5.14 [When, in a matter of great importance, the Security Council fails to adopt a determination, the General Assembly must have the power to review and decide on the topic.]128

5.15 [Enhance accountability of the Security Council to the general membership, including through

- submitting substantive and quality reports, both annual and special, of the Security Council to the General Assembly.]129

5.16 [Improving the working methods of the Council through better access, more transparency and openness will have a positive effect on the relationship between the Security Council

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125 G-4, see Annex pp124-129
126 China, see Annex pp135-137
127 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp138-143
128 Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp157-170
129 Republic of Korea, see Annex pp171-174
and the General Assembly. In this regard the annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly should be made as substantial and analytical as possible. Also the Council could hold an interactive discussion on the annual report when it is considered by General Assembly.]\textsuperscript{130}

5.17 [Article 7 of the Charter lists the principal organs of the United Nations. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council are co-equal principal organs, and the existing Charter provisions adequately set out their respective complementary functions. We do not support subordination of either organ to the other.]\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{130} Denmark, see Annex pp175-178

\textsuperscript{131} United States of America, see Annex pp179-180