G4S response to the Lou Pingeot report
‘Dangerous Partnership: Private Military Companies and the UN’
(24th July 2012)

G4S is the world’s leading provider of secure outsourcing solutions. We are committed to fulfilling our responsibilities on the issue of human rights in all of our companies operating around the world.

International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

As well as being a signatory to the UN Global Compact, G4S is at the forefront of the regulation of private security companies operating in complex environments – areas experiencing or recovering from disaster or unrest and where governments or the rule of law are weak. Having been one of the initial signatories and drivers behind the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (www.icoc-psp.org) we are now involved in turning those principles into a set of standards against which companies can be accredited and sanctioned if they do not live up to these standards.

The code, which has been developed by the industry and civil society representatives, as well as representatives from the Swiss, UK and US Governments covers issues including recruitment, vetting and training of staff, health and safety reporting and complaints handling. Early in 2012, the Temporary Steering Committee, of which we were a member, launched its draft charter for the oversight mechanism of the code as part of a consultation with the security industry, governments and NGO’s. It is now considering all comments received from the consultation before making additional changes.

We were also one of the drivers behind the development of the new Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), which is the UK Government’s chosen partner for introducing the regulation of UK private security companies working overseas. The SCEG, of which we are an Executive Member, involves us working with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, our competitors, industry trade bodies and a range of third sector and community organisations to develop a set of British standards for companies operating on land and at sea.

G4S Detention & Escorting Services

Between 2005 and April 2011, (at which point the contract to operate detention and escorting services transferred to another organisation) G4S employees provided security, care and welfare to immigration detainees on over one million occasions. Over that time our employees frequently worked in very challenging circumstances, dealing with distressed detainees who on some occasions resisted deportation.
Over the years we have been involved in custodial and immigration services, our training programmes have increasingly placed a large emphasis on de-escalation techniques and well-developed interpersonal skills: control and restraint techniques are only used as a last resort. As a contractor, our employees were trained only in, and authorised to use, Home Office-approved techniques: we could not legally deviate from this guidance or training method unless approved by the Home Office. On the rare occasions “use of force” was required, this was recorded and reported to UKBA within 24 hours and would be subject to review by external monitors to ensure it has been reasonable, proportionate, justified and necessary.

We have always operated to the highest possible standards of safety and welfare for those people in our care - while our contracts are strictly monitored by Home Office, our own internal auditors as well as independent third parties such as Independent Monitoring Boards and Her Majesty's Inspector of Prisons. Our employees are required to pass rigorous screening and vetting procedures and training programmes which are agreed and approved by the Home Office before working in immigration services. Any complaint against our employees or regarding the standard of our service is investigated thoroughly by both us and UKBA. On the very rare occasion where an employee is found to have acted inappropriately or outside of the guidelines, appropriate disciplinary action is taken.

The tragic death of Jimmy Mubenga in October 2010, was the first death in custody experienced by our immigration escorting business and resulted in the immediate suspension of the three custody officers involved. The officers involved transferred to the new service provider in April 2011 and are no longer employed by G4S. We can confirm that in July 2012, the Crown Prosecution Service notified us that it had decided not to bring charges against any former G4S personnel or the company in the death of Mr Mubenga. The care and welfare of those in our custody has always been our top priority and we are pleased that the CPS has concluded there is no basis on which to bring charges against either G4S or its former staff.

A death in custody is both tragic and unacceptable. It will be for the UK Border Agency, working with the current contractor to assess whether a review of the existing guidelines on control and restraint may be appropriate.

**G4S Care & Justice (Australia)**

On 27 January 2008, Mr Ward, a respected aboriginal elder, suffered a tragic death as a result of being transported in a custodial vehicle in conditions of grossly excessive heat over an extended period of time whilst being transported from Laverton to Kalgoorlie in Western Australia.

At the time of his death the custodial vehicle in which he was being transferred was being operated by GSL Custodial Service Pty Ltd (GSL) pursuant to a contract with the State of Western Australia (CSCS Contract). Subsequent to the death of Mr Ward but prior to the Coronial Inquest, GSL was acquired by G4S together with its
interest in the CSCS contract. Consequently GSL became part of the G4S group of companies and G4S became involved in this matter because it took over the existing and ongoing liabilities of GSL at the time of the acquisition.

Since the acquisition G4S has accepted the Coroner’s findings (see below) and has publicly apologised to Mr Ward’s family and community for Mr Ward’s tragic death on several occasions.

GSL took immediate steps after the death of Mr Ward to minimise the risk of such an incident ever recurring.

The Coroner’s Report into his death was published in June 2009 and concluded that a ‘litany of errors’ culminated in the death of Mr Ward. The Coroner found that the Department of Corrective Services (which owned and was responsible for maintenance on the vehicle), GSL and the two escorting officers had each contributed to Mr Ward’s death. Two of the Coroner’s findings were specifically directed at GSL and these related to ensuring staff are provided with practical training in respect of duty of care obligations and ensuring more training was provided to staff in regional locations. Since the death of Mr Ward, G4S introduced various measures (including those recommended by the Coroner) to ensure a tragic incident such as this would never be repeated.

No criminal charges were subsequently brought against any of the parties but WorkSafe Western Australia laid charges against all the parties under the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Both the Department of Corrective Services and G4S entered an early guilty plea to these charges and were each fined A$285,000 in August 2011. Mr Ward’s family received an ex gratia compensation payment from the WA Government of A$3.2m in July 2010.

Members of the Ward family subsequently issued civil proceedings against the WA Government, G4S and the two drivers of the vehicle. They are seeking damages for psychiatric and psychological suffering from all the parties involved in the death of Mr Ward. They have been asked to provide medical evidence of this damage and the matter is ongoing. G4S ceased operating the CSCS Contract in June 2011.

G4S Risk Management

G4S Ordnance Management supports humanitarian and reconstruction programmes with bomb disposal, the removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance. Across all of our operations, we are committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards and affirm our commitment to the tenets of the G4S Code of Ethics. Community liaison plays an important part on all our mine action contracts and the majority of our teams are made up of G4S employees from the country of operation. All of our employees are extensively screened, vetted, trained, supervised and managed. They have excellent safety records and share a commitment to solving the problems of mines and explosive remnants of war.
When the September 2010 report was released, G4S was disappointed by the unfounded assertion of the US Senate Armed Services Committee that ArmorGroup, now G4S Risk Management, turned to Afghan “warlords” to serve as manpower providers during the duration of the UN contract. This was simply not true. In 2009, G4S and ArmorGroup had supported the Committee’s enquiry – voluntarily providing to the Committee 20,877 pages of documents, and 11 current and former personnel for interviews conducted by Committee staff.

Our personnel explained to the Committee the following:

1. In Shindand, ArmorGroup (jointly with US Special Forces) followed the time-proven approach of working with local nationals to the extent practicable – engaging local village/tribal elders in accordance with local custom to provide local solutions to local problems.

2. The US Special Forces team based at the Shindand Airbase specifically informed ArmorGroup personnel which local leaders were to be engaged to provide security to the airfield. It was our understanding that U.S. Special Forces had relationships with these local leaders and that, among other things, referring these leaders for this work was viewed as a means for U.S. Special Forces to compensate the local leaders for assistance provided to the US Special Forces.

3. Our team remained in close contact with US Special Forces personnel at all time to ensure that the company was constantly acting in harmony with, and in support of, US military interests and desires.

4. We had no information to the effect that these personnel were loyal to or supported the Taliban and, to the contrary, the engagement of these personnel was based upon the recommendation and encouragement of U.S. Special Forces.

In its report, the Committee essentially disregarded what our personnel had to say about the above and instead, asserted that the local leaders were supporters of the Taliban. The Republican members on the Committee criticised the report for not providing a balanced view of the advantages and disadvantages of using private security contractors. From our perspective the Committee’s failures were more egregious. At the expense of the reputations of G4S and its personnel, the Committee sensationalised a supposed link of our local personnel to the Taliban while working for us that, in fact, is not supported by evidence and did not exist.