STATEMENT

BY

H.E. AMBASSADOR CHRISTIAN WENAWESER,
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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Madame President

We welcome the report prepared by the five facilitators. This is a fine product resulting from very serious, lengthy and meticulous consultations. As is to be expected on a topic of this sensitivity and complexity, a report of such detail will give all those who have strong views on the topic cause to disagree with some parts of it. This is the case for us as well, but does not take away from our overall very positive assessment. While we all discuss Security Council reform extensively in corridors, over meals and in informal settings, this report is the first official product in a considerable period of time that also informs the wider public. Its most significant value lies in the fact that it accurately reflects where we find ourselves today: Almost two years after the tabling of three draft resolutions dealing with enlargement, it is clear that none of these approaches will find the necessary majority in the General Assembly. This leaves us with the following options:

- We could come to the conclusion that the time to enlarge the Security Council has not come yet. To our mind, this is not a viable option. First, it is contrary to the language of the outcome document which we have all agreed to. Second, after almost 15 years of deliberations on the topic, it essentially conveys the message that we are unable to enlarge the Council. Third, and most importantly, it is based on the misunderstanding that there is such a thing as the right moment for Security Council enlargement. Such a moment will never simply arise, it is a moment we need to create. The events in 2005 illustrate that quite clearly: Whatever one’s view is on the initiative launched by the G-4 at that time, it is a fact that without their proposal on the table, the membership never would have engaged in such a profound discussion and gotten so close to taking a decision on the matter. Granted, that discussion was enormously controversial and quite divisive, but it led to a serious attempt. The initiative also had the benefit of enabling us to conclude that the G-4 proposal does not work, a view quite clearly reflected in the report before us.

- The other option is for us to engage in a process that can lead to another serious attempt and, hopefully, this time to a conclusion. To our mind, the chances of having a proposal submitted by a State or a number of States are, at this moment, minimal. The task of moving the process forward falls therefore squarely within the responsibility of your office, Madame President. We strongly support you in your endeavors to move the process ahead and look forward to your continued leadership. Regarding format, we are quite open to different suggestions. However, given the strong call for negotiations from all quarters, it is essential that the process you choose allows for such negotiations on the basis of a discussion paper produced under your supervision by the persons you will entrust with this task. Everything that can possibly be said on SC reform has been said many times over. We do not want to engage in yet another round of general exchange of views, given how well we know all the views. Some elements of the report produced by the Facilitators can go into such a discussion paper, perhaps in an adapted and revised version. In addition, the paper should also draw from other sources that take a similar approach as the Facilitators’ report. The
paper should contain variables on some of the most difficult topics, but it should not bring everything back to the table that has proven not to be workable in the past. After well over a decade of discussions on SC reform, after the strong push for enlargement prior to the 2005 World Summit, and now in light of the report in front of us, it is quite clear that there is one option on enlargement whose viability has not been fully explored yet. To do so now is the logical course of action for us in the upcoming negotiations.

Madame President

As everybody else, we have expressed our views on enlargement in the course of the consultations we have just engaged in and will therefore focus our comments on process. At the same time, we wish to address the question of **working methods**, given our strong interest in this topic as a member of the S-5. We agree with the relevant parts of the report and believe that the facilitators have done a very good job in reflecting the views on this reform cluster. We continue to be flexible on the question whether enlargement and working methods should be treated together. Ideally, indeed they would be. But they are not inseparable and working methods are not an aside to enlargement. Much rather, the process of reforming working methods exists in its own right and merits our continued and increased attention. We are quite disappointed about the developments in the Security Council since the adoption of the Presidential Note 507 last July. The measures contained in that note – which were insufficient in the first place, while going into the right direction – have been implemented in a manner that is at best characterized as erratic, uneven and arbitrary. The Council members and the respective Presidents are treating these measures as a menu from which they can choose – or not – at will and according to what they perceive as convenient and expeditious. That, of course, is not satisfactory to the rest of the membership and – even worse – not in the interest of the Council itself. The often cited need to maintain the efficiency of the Council – a goal which the S-5 strongly support – has an increasingly hollow ring, since it is clear that even measures aimed at increasing efficiency are not implemented with any recognizable consistency. The S-5 are therefore in the process of preparing a set of proposed measures, both procedural and substantive, on working methods for the benefit of the discussions we are hopefully about to embark on.

I thank you.