Lessons UNlearned

How the UN and Member States must do more to end natural resource-fuelled conflicts

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Executive Summary

The will and the capacity of the United Nations (UN) and Member States to deal with natural resource-fuelled conflicts is weak. In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), civilians die on a daily basis because of a war that is stoked by the international trade in minerals. The conflict’s economic dimension and the identity of those fuelling it have been known for many years; yet increased awareness of the problem has not triggered effective action. When the UN Security Council passes resolutions concerning DRC – on targeted sanctions for example – Council members and other governments decline to implement them.

Global Witness believes that these failings on the DRC reflect the lack of a coherent and committed international approach to tackling natural resource-fuelled conflicts. For two decades, the UN, other intergovernmental bodies and individual governments have been forced to respond to these kinds of self-financing wars in countries such as Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Different policies have been tried, with varying degrees of success, but no serious attempt has been made to distil from these experiences a common understanding of the problem and a strategy for dealing with it.

Reviewing these cases, we find that the international peace and security system is poorly equipped to deal with the challenges they pose. When considered together, the four key entry points for international action – sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – should offer the basis for effective action. However, despite progress in some areas, the overall picture is one of ad hoc decision making and yawning gaps in institutional capacity and coordination.

Global Witness is calling on the UN to establish a High Level Panel to draw up a comprehensive strategy for tackling self-financing wars. This High Level Panel should review existing international experience of responding to such conflicts. It should also examine potential threats in countries such as Guinea, Somalia and Central African Republic.

We are also making a series of recommendations on how to improve the operational effectiveness of UN bodies and Member States with respect to sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These recommendations are focused on disrupting trade that fuels armed violence, demilitarising control of natural resources, and strengthening natural resource governance. They include:

- Establishment of a mechanism to support the monitoring of sanctions
- Creation of a system for reporting on due diligence measures undertaken by companies sourcing natural resources from conflict zones
- Establishment of operational guidelines for peacekeepers on how to address illicit natural resource exploitation
- Prioritisation of natural resource governance in international peacebuilding operations
Natural Resource-fuelled Conflicts: A Threat to International Peace and Security

Today in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission struggles to manage a conflict that has raged for more than a decade. Through back to back wars, multiple invasions, and a trail of broken peace agreements, two factors have remained constant: Congolese civilians dying in appalling numbers and warring parties looting the country’s natural wealth. The relationship between the killing and the plunder has been widely acknowledged, but the UN and its Member States have not come up with an effective response.

The DRC conflict — Africa’s ‘World War’ — is not the first in which natural resources have played a central role. Nor is it likely to be the last. Indeed, a recent UN report suggests that over the past sixty years at least forty percent of civil wars have been connected with natural resources; and that intrastate conflicts that have a link to natural resources are twice as likely to relapse within five years as those that do not.1

In the 1990s, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the timber trade controlled by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the diamond trade dominated by UNITA in Angola. Since the turn of the century, the Council has sought to contend with the natural resource dimensions of wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. In the past twenty years, just under one in three UN peacekeeping operations worldwide, and just over half of those in Africa, have concerned conflicts sustained by revenues from primary commodities such as oil, diamonds, minerals and timber.2
It has long been clear that this self-financing aspect of post-Cold War conflicts—and the central role of natural resources—has become a permanent feature on the international security landscape. In 2004 the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended that ‘the United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organisations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict.’ In 2007 the Security Council noted in a Presidential Statement that ‘...in specific armed conflict situations, the exploitation, trafficking and illicit trade of natural resources have played a role in areas where they have contributed to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict.’ The Council has authorised investigations and sanctions and, on three occasions, mandated peacekeeping missions to get involved in disrupting the illicit trade in natural resources.

In practice, these moves by the Council amount to less than the sum of their parts. Reform of sanctions and peacekeeping has improved the operational capabilities of the UN, but international efforts to counter the natural resource-conflict nexus remain fragmented and characterised by ad hoc policy measures. Earlier solutions have been overlooked, only to be rediscovered later, and few lessons have been learned. In fact, there has been no attempt at all to develop a comprehensive approach to the natural resource dimensions of self-financing wars.

As the situation in DRC shows, the need for such a comprehensive approach is urgent. Millions of people have died in wars sustained by natural resources; either from direct violence or from the widespread destruction of livelihood systems. Ineffective action by Member States and international organisations over the past two decades has left civilian populations at the mercy of abusive government and non-state armed groups financed through plunder.

As this report argues, there are some basic steps that could be taken to strengthen international responses, both within and outside the UN. For a start, Member States must recognise that natural resources can be central to the sustainability of contemporary armed conflicts and that addressing this factor must be part of the international conflict response. This is a question of political will. For UN Member States, regulating the natural resource dimensions of armed conflict is politically difficult. Natural resources are often strategic; control over them is often a tangible source of political power and can play a central role in effective state sovereignty. But Member States must recognise that this can be no excuse for inaction.

**Breaking the links**

Over the past two decades it has become increasingly clear that economic activity does not end when war begins. In parts of Central and West Africa, the Andean region of South America, the Balkans, and Central and Southeast Asia, the economic interests of armed groups and their political-military allies have...
helped sustain a series of brutal wars. As a result, the political economy of armed conflict has received considerable attention from academics and policy analysts in recent years. A consensus has emerged around two main conclusions.

The first conclusion is that the problem with natural resources is not so much the nature of resources themselves, their abundance or their scarcity, but how they are governed, who is able to access them and for what purposes. In many places, predatory natural resource exploitation has contributed to the loss of sovereign control over the resources, undermined social and economic development, enabled crippling levels of corruption and helped sustain armed violence. This dynamic of exploitation and violence is in reality a downward spiral in which the informalisation of the state — what is sometimes referred to as 'state fragility' — leaves people to fend for themselves while natural resource production falls under the control of those with access to coercive force. If the state is not an effective provider of services, security or legitimacy, armed groups will often claim those roles, reinforcing the strength of the latter vis-à-vis the state.

The second conclusion is that economic activity, in particular the extraction and trade in natural resources, can be a driver of conflict. The outward appearance of war zones as chaotic and violent masks the fact that commerce continues. Such activity can help to sustain households in the midst of crisis, but can also be used to fuel the fighting. In some cases, the political grievances that helped to galvanise the parties to the conflict may merge with economic agendas. In this way, natural resources become crucial to the sustainability of the fighting, as well as one site in which the struggle for power is played out.

These insights suggest that de-linking armed violence and natural resource exploitation is critical to resolving conflict and re-launching development and democracy. Taking the gun out of natural resource management is a prerequisite for taking the gun out of politics.

GLOBAL WITNESS

Since 1994, Global Witness has pioneered efforts to bring natural resource-fuelled conflicts to an end. In Cambodia, we investigated how the illegal timber trade was financing the Khmer Rouge, through the complicity of corrupt Thai and Cambodian officials. In Angola, we documented how the rebel group UNITA underwrote its operations via diamond trading, in defiance of UN sanctions. We also campaigned against conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and helped to establish the Kimberley Process to remove such diamonds from global markets. We were co-nominated for the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize for this work.

Global Witness successfully pressed for the imposition of timber sanctions by the UN Security Council which helped to end the war in Liberia, and exposed the role of the international cocoa trade in financing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Today, we continue to campaign to break the link between natural resources and armed violence in DRC, where competition for the country’s mineral wealth is fuelling conflict and serious crimes against civilians.

Global Witness was one of the earliest supporters of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international initiative to combat corruption in the oil, gas and mining sectors, and is an alternate member of the EITI board.

Soldier of the UNITA rebel movement in Angola. Between 1992 and 1998 UNITA marketed up to US$3.7 billion worth of diamonds and used the proceeds to bankroll its war against the government.
International Responses to Natural Resource-fuelled Conflicts

What options do the United Nations (UN), regional and other multilateral organisations and Member States have for grappling with the challenges posed by natural resources and armed conflict?

There are three broad regulatory responses to the natural resource-conflict nexus. One is an economic governance response, in which state or international development institutions attempt to set exploitation of natural resources on a trajectory to support social and economic development and pro-poor policies, rather than one which reinforces corruption and a negative cycle of exploitation and conflict. Regulatory measures which target economic behaviour are part of this category of responses and they aim primarily at restructuring the way natural resources are governed over the long term.

A second approach is framed around respect for human rights. It involves setting down rules in domestic and international law and seeking to hold states and non-state actors accountable. The human rights approach sets the standard for behaviour of people, companies, non-state armed groups and national armies involved in war zones, and deploys a range of tools to improve the human rights situation. The overarching goal is to end impunity for international crimes and other serious human rights abuses, and to promote human rights protection in general. In this sense, the human rights approach is normative, seeking to obtain justice for past violations associated with the production and trade in natural resources, as well as building the basis for fair resource exploitation in the future.

The third approach is concerned with threats to international peace and security. Working with, or alongside, the authorisation of the UN Security Council, peace and security approaches seek to deal with threats to states and people through a range of tools usually grouped under the categories of sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. These responses can target the use of natural resources to fuel conflict as part of a set of strategies to counter threats to peace and security.

The challenges posed by natural resources in armed conflict are first and foremost challenges within the policy domains of international peace and security and human rights. This is not to argue that economic governance is somehow less important. It is not. Regulatory responses are crucial to setting the governance of natural resources on a sound footing over the medium and long term. Economic governance may also be effective in addressing some aspects of the root causes and even the immediate incentive structures of conflict and human rights abuse. In this way it is an important form of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. However, because the immediate challenge in wars is to find ways of protecting people and dealing with threats to peace and security, we believe that economic governance approaches should be deployed in support of international peace and security and human rights protection rather than the other way round. Responses to conflict based around donor-driven development programmes that pre-suppose a minimum of ‘normality’ or order are of limited use.

In terms of international policy, human rights and security are often seen as qualitatively different problems; ones which sometimes work at odds to one another. The human rights problem is one in which internationally accepted values, or norms, are being
violated, while the peace and security problem is one in which a threat is being posed. States frequently prioritise security over human rights protection. Since security is in the eye of the beholder, there are often disputes over the legitimacy of states’ claims to be acting in the name of peace and security, not least when those activities result in human rights abuse.

Global Witness has sought to place the problem of natural resources in armed conflict above this political fray by setting out a definition of conflict resources based on universally accepted principles of human rights and international law. We have defined conflict resources as natural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit from, or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violation of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under international law.8

The definition applies equally to governments as well as rebels. It is intended to be a useful and usable formulation, the distillation of a complex and highly politicised problem into one term, conflict resources.

Global Witness has a long record of pursuing both peace and security and human rights approaches to natural resources and violent conflict.9 They are, in our view, complementary. In this report, however, we focus primarily on the international peace and security architecture’s response to resource-fuelled wars, the ways it can be strengthened, and how it can incorporate human rights and economic governance options. Looking at a range of cases that we have worked on over the past fifteen years, we recommend steps that should be taken within the four principal domains of the international conflict management system: sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In conflict-affected areas of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), many of the mines that produce cassiterite (tin ore), coltan (tantalum ore), wolframite (tungsten ore) and gold are controlled by units of Congolese army or non-state armed groups such as the Rwandan Hutu-led Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). This militarisation of the minerals sector poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region, and to the human rights of the people who live there.
Sanctions: Combating Illicit International Trade

This section looks at three issues: the types of sanctions at the United Nations’ (UN’s) disposal, the recent use of sanctions with regards to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – and their non-implementation – and the need to strengthen the means by which the implementation of sanctions can be monitored.

Commodity sanctions and targeted sanctions

UN sanctions aim to weaken their targets’ ability to resist the decisions of the Security Council, or at least to raise the costs of non-compliance. Their immediate objective is to curb those flows of resources that matter to the target.

Commodity sanctions are one of the most powerful instruments at the Security Council’s disposal. Their effectiveness in tackling conflict resource cases in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, has been widely recognised. By seeking to exclude particular commodities of a specific origin from global markets, they send a clear signal to governments, industry and consumers, about what not to buy. More broadly, they demonstrate how economic decisions can affect international peace and security and human rights.

However, experience has shown that embargoes on commodities can be blunt instruments. Some have been poorly targeted and badly timed, or insufficiently flexible to match the agility of their targets, who may have access to other sources of income. Other problems of design and implementation have arisen in cases like Iraq, where a system of exemptions to an oil trade embargo was abused to the benefit of the country’s political elite, while ordinary citizens were hit with the sanctions’ punitive impact.

The fact that commodity sanctions may punish people who are not associated with any illegal or violent activity means that they are not always an appropriate means of disrupting a war economy. With respect to the conflict in DRC, for example, a blanket embargo on exports of particular minerals would be neither feasible nor fair, as it would damage those parts of the trade which are not controlled by state or non-state armed groups.

Getting commodity sanctions right means asking some basic questions about the particular context: do the targets have alternative sources of revenue? Is the commodity production and trade largely dominated by abusive state or non-state armed groups? What would be the unintended impacts on those not involved in illicit trade? Are there reasonable expectations of enforcement; for example are neighbouring countries willing and able to control border crossings?

Sanctions can be aimed at groups and individuals, as well as commodity flows. Targeted sanctions – targeting particular actors with embargoes on their travel and their finances – are often more effective and appropriate than commodity bans and have fewer unintended side effects. Like commodity bans, targeted sanctions make it clear to the private sector who they should not be dealing with.

Commodity sanctions and targeted sanctions are not mutually exclusive and in some instances, such as the Angola and Liberia conflicts, both approaches have been used simultaneously. When it comes to dealing with trade in natural resources that fuels conflict, the UN’s use of commodity and targeted sanctions has often been slow-moving and inefficient, as the cases profiled in this chapter show.
For commodity sanctions to be effective, it is crucial that they are tightly targeted and implemented in a timely manner.

In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge turned to exports of timber to fund their operations after Cold War sponsorship from China, Thailand and the West came to an end. The UN Security Council’s response in 1992 was to endorse a Cambodian government-imposed ban on timber exports. This measure had structural flaws, however. It was not implemented straight away, thus prompting a rush of exports ahead of the date on which it officially came into force. In addition, it only banned exports of logs, not processed wood. This loophole spurred the construction of a string of sawmills near the Thai-Cambodian border, as a means of circumventing the embargo.

In 1995, in Global Witness’ first-ever campaign, we published evidence showing how corrupt Thai and Cambodian officials were helping the Khmer Rouge to flout the ban and make US$10-20 million per month in the process. The international pressure generated by this exposé embarrassed Thailand’s government into closing the border to further illegal timber imports from Cambodia.

In 2000, the Security Council imposed an embargo on rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, a high proportion of which emanated from zones controlled by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group supported by Liberian President Charles Taylor. The following year, the Council imposed a similar ban on Liberian diamonds to address the Taylor government’s role in laundering Sierra Leonean stones into the global supply chain. To compensate for the resultant loss of income, Charles Taylor shifted the focus of his revenue generating activities from diamonds to timber.

In 2001, Global Witness documented how Charles Taylor and his allies were purchasing arms using Liberian timber revenues, sometimes shipping in the guns on the same vessels used to export logs. The Security Council initially took no action – despite Taylor’s continued sponsorship of the RUF in Sierra Leone and the escalation of the civil war within Liberia – because of opposition from China and France, the main importers of Liberian timber. The eventual imposition of timber sanctions in 2003 helped to dry up Taylor’s financing. Three months later, his regime came to an end, as did fourteen years of civil war in Liberia.

Former President of Liberia Charles Taylor is on trial at the International Criminal Court in connection with his role in Sierra Leone’s diamond-fuelled war. After the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on diamonds from Liberia in 2001, Taylor used timber exports to continue funding his campaign of regional destabilisation. The Security Council took two years to catch up with this shift in Taylor’s conflict-financing strategy.
SANCTIONS ON CÔTE D’IVOIRE

The case of Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war illustrates the lack of a coherent international approach to the use of sanctions to tackle natural resource-fuelled conflict. After reports by the UN Panel of Experts and Global Witness in late 2005 highlighted how the Forces Nouvelles rebels had taken control of the country’s diamond mines, the UN Security Council imposed an embargo on Ivorian diamonds.18 Further investigations by Global Witness the following year revealed, however, that the Forces Nouvelles were deriving far more of their financing from the cocoa trade than from diamonds.19 To date the Security Council has taken no action to address this issue.

Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa and the rebels occupy an area which accounts for around 3-4% of global output. Global Witness calculated that the Forces Nouvelles were deriving approximately US$30 million per year through their ‘taxation’ of the cocoa trade.20 The movement’s continued reliance on cocoa as its number one revenue source was confirmed by the most recent UN Panel of Experts report, published in October 2009.21

Imposing blanket commodity sanctions on cocoa exports from Côte d’Ivoire would harm the three to four million people across the country whose livelihoods depend on the trade. However, the UN Security Council could be making far more effective use of targeted sanctions against individual commanders, their agents and companies whose transactions are enabling the Forces Nouvelles to maintain control of the northern half of Côte d’Ivoire.

The fact that the Council has so far failed to address the role of the international cocoa trade has benefited key rebel commanders and undermined Côte d’Ivoire’s peace process. Global Witness investigations in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2009 found evidence that the military chiefs of the ten Forces Nouvelles zones have recently tightened their control over revenues from cocoa and other natural resources.22 The Panel of Experts’ recent report, meanwhile, shows that some of these same commanders are at the forefront of Forces Nouvelles efforts to rearm, in defiance of a UN arms embargo. The Panel also presents evidence that ammunition may be being smuggled into rebel zones in the same sacks used to export cocoa beans.23

Security Council inaction has also discouraged the international cocoa and chocolate industry from facing up to its responsibilities. To date, multinational companies sourcing cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire have made no serious attempt to undertake due diligence on their supply chains to address their role in sustaining the country’s partition.24 The latest Panel of Experts report describes the continued activity of major cocoa firms in Forces Nouvelles-held zones and highlights ‘the risk that revenues from cocoa sales might fund the acquisition of arms and related material’.25
Targeted sanctions and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Recent resolutions on Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) suggest the UN Security Council may be willing to make greater use of targeted sanctions to address natural resource-fuelled conflicts.

In December 2008, the Council extended existing targeted sanctions to cover ‘individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of natural resources’.28

In order to complement this adjustment of the sanctions regime, the Security Council simultaneously mandated the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) peacekeeping operation, to ‘use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources’.27

The December 2008 sanctions resolution also included some significant language on due diligence. Taking up a suggestion of the UN Group of Experts on DRC, it encouraged Member States to take measures to ensure that ‘importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin of the minerals they purchase’. In other words, states should make sure that companies based in their jurisdictions are not violating the sanctions through their transactions or business relationships.

The follow-up resolution on sanctions and DRC, passed on 30 November 2009, reinforces these measures and goes further. The Council instructed the Group of Experts to ‘produce… recommendations to the (Sanctions) Committee for guidelines for the exercise of due diligence by the importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products regarding the purchase, sourcing (including steps to be taken to ascertain the origin of mineral products), acquisition and processing of mineral products from the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. It also ‘recommends that importers and processing industries adopt policies and practices, as well as codes of conduct, to prevent indirect support to armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the exploitation and trafficking of natural resources’.29

The Security Council’s linking of sanctions implementation and ‘due diligence’ by international companies recognises that private sector operators are one of the principal entry points for conflict resources to the global economy. By encouraging states to require companies to detect where their activities and relationships might negatively affect human rights or help to fuel conflict, the Council is reflecting and reinforcing the consensus reached at the UN Human Rights Council concerning the nature of business responsibility for human rights.29

Global Witness strongly supports the Security Council’s use of the ‘due diligence’ concept and is convinced it should be applied much more widely. Companies active in areas affected by conflict or controlled by repressive
regimes must take steps to investigate their supply chains and other business relationships. They should identify how, and by whom, the materials they purchase are produced and traded, and exclude from their supply chains materials that are financing or otherwise benefiting abusive state or non-state groups. For its part, the Security Council should establish a team to track companies’ implementation of due diligence measures. These recommendations are explained in more detail in the text box ‘Company due diligence for conflict resources: principles for policy implementation’.

The Council’s mandating of MONUC to play a role in the implementation of targeted sanctions (since reiterated in Resolution 1906 passed 23 December 2009, which is discussed below in the chapter on peacekeeping) is also a significant and positive step. Again, it deserves to be replicated in other situations in which the Council is using sanctions and peacekeeping to tackle natural resource-fuelled conflict.

Despite these encouraging developments in the Security Council’s resolutions on eastern DRC, there are significant obstacles to implementation. Firstly, and most seriously, Member States – not least Security Council members – have proved unwilling to comply with those provisions that concern individuals or entities based in their own jurisdictions. To date, none of the traders or companies that support armed groups in the DRC through illicit natural resource transactions have

COMPANY DUE DILIGENCE FOR CONFLICT RESOURCES: PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

- The purchase of minerals or other commodities from war zones or repressive regimes entails a responsibility to ensure that such purchases do not contribute to human rights abuse or fuel conflict. Fulfilling that responsibility requires due diligence.

- Due diligence is a form of internal investigation by companies, often as a requirement to meet compliance standards for corporate governance laid down by states.30

- Member States should ensure that companies domiciled or registered in their jurisdiction conduct due diligence against the purchase of conflict resources.

- Due diligence for conflict resources involves implementing an internal system to identify and analyse the origins and suppliers – the supply chain – of the materials purchased.

- Due diligence should be continuous, combining desk research, field investigation and spot checks, and should include an adequate paper trail for shipments.

- The due diligence process should focus in particular on the activities and relationships of the companies in the supply chain involved in production, handling and processing of the materials purchased. The objective should be to detect any association with abusive state or non-state armed groups.

- The due diligence system should entail taking steps to prevent problems and to mitigate problems should they be detected. This means excluding from the supply chain materials that are financing or otherwise benefiting abusive state or non-state groups. Other measures could include, for example, additional investigations by the company, or revised supplier contracts with specific clauses which prohibit forced labour and other abuses.

- Companies should commission regular third party audits of their due diligence systems.

- The UN Security Council should mandate a team to report on the implementation of due diligence measures by companies active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones. As a first step, the Council should task the Sanctions Committee with setting up such a team to report on implementation of the due diligence measures called for in Resolution 1896 on DRC (November 2009).
been placed on the targeted sanctions list. The text box ‘Non-implementation of sanctions by Member States — the case of DRC’ examines this problem.

Secondly, while the Council’s efforts to ensure coherence of sanctions and peacekeeping mandates are both laudable and necessary, and have resulted in good collaboration between the Group of Experts and MONUC’s Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), there remain limitations on MONUC’s capacity to interdict illicit natural resource trade. We will return to this below in the section on peacekeeping.

A third constraint, which extends beyond the particular case of DRC and requires reform at an institutional level, concerns the flows of information to the Council about the implementation of sanctions by governments and about the activities of the parties that are targeted. The remainder of this section focuses on this issue in particular.

Monitoring of sanctions implementation – reinforcements required

Increasingly, monitoring of sanctions implementation and the activities of the sanctioned parties is carried out for the UN Security Council by expert panels or groups: teams of independent specialists appointed on an ad hoc basis by Security Council sanctions committees.

Expert panels play a key role in identifying what kinds of sanctions are most appropriate, investigating violations once sanctions are in place, and publicly ‘naming and shaming’ those responsible. The publication of the panels’ findings is one of the few brakes on the tendency of UN Member States always to leave implementation to somebody else (although the lack of follow-up on successive DRC panels’ findings since 2002 is a reminder that this remains the default response of most governments). Expert panel reports are often the only way that the Security Council stays informed about sanctions-busting and, as such, are the basis for the Council to respond in a timely and coherent fashion. Expert panels are also an important source of information about the course of the conflict, human rights abuses and international crimes.

While the expert panels frequently do excellent work, the institutional framework for tracking sanctions implementation is weak. One of the reasons is its ad hoc nature. Expert panels are mandated to operate under a limited timeframe and, while their mandates can be renewed, there is often a lag-time between the end of one mandate and a panel’s re-deployment. The result is that months and years may pass with no investigation or monitoring.

The same ad hoc quality hampers the pooling of information that may be critical to more than one sanctions regime. Sanctions regimes and expert panels are configured on a country by country basis, but some sanctions violators are highly mobile and their operations trans-national in scope. Furthermore, the panels’ remits as fact-finders, rather than law enforcement investigators, means they have limited scope for cooperation with police and prosecutors at a national level. As a result, issues are often left unresolved from one year to the next and sanctions targets may go underground after one report simply to re-surface later.

Efforts to institutionalise support for the expert panels within the sanctions branch of the UN Secretariat have so far made limited headway. Some progress has been made, for example in the clarification of evidentiary standards, and a database is now in place. However, the number of sanctions panels has doubled in recent years, while staff levels in the Secretariat have remained the same. Most professional staff are thus overstretched, handling all political, diplomatic, communications and administrative support for two panels at a time. This has resulted in a severe under-utilisation of the panels’ work and a real risk to the effectiveness and the fairness of the sanctions themselves.
NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS BY MEMBER STATES – THE CASE OF DRC

Foot-dragging on sanctions implementation by governments that claim to be working to resolve DRC’s conflict poses a serious threat to the UN Security Council’s credibility.

In December 2008, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1857 on DRC concerning the embargo on arms shipments to non-state groups and individuals. For the first time, the resolution specified that ‘individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo through illicit trade of natural resources’ are among the categories of people who can be subject to targeted sanctions. It ‘encourages Members States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on its list of designees, names of individuals or entities who meet the criteria […] as well as any entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the submitted individuals or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of the submitted entities’. The resolution also ‘encourages Member States to take measures, as they deem appropriate, to ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin of the minerals they purchase.’

This resolution was innovative, both in its linkage of arms embargo breaches with the natural resource trade and in its emphasis on due diligence. One year later, however, not a single individual or company trading in natural resources in a way that supports the armed groups had been nominated for targeted sanctions. This was not for lack of information. Both the November 2008 Group of Experts’ report and Global Witness’ July 2009 publication, Faced With a Gun, What Can You Do?, presented evidence that many of the same Congolese exporters and international companies named in UN reports going back several years remained the key conduit for minerals traded out of areas held by the armed groups.

The international companies concerned include the world’s fifth largest tin processor, Thaisarco, a subsidiary of British firm Amalgamated Metal Corporation (AMC). The UK government has so far declined to nominate AMC’s directors for sanctions listing, citing the need for additional evidence, but has not conducted a thorough investigation of its own into the company’s activities.

The British government’s failure to implement a Security Council resolution that it helped to pass is particularly disappointing given that it previously investigated and upheld a complaint lodged by Global Witness – under the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – against Afrimex, another UK-based company active in eastern DRC. The UK Government’s OECD National Contact Point found that Afrimex had breached the Guidelines, concluding that the firm had initiated demand for minerals from a conflict zone, used suppliers who had made payments to the RCD-Goma rebel group, and had not exercised sufficient due diligence on its supply chain.

In its report to the Security Council in November 2009, the Group of Experts again found AMC, through Thaisarco, to be a buyer of cassiterite (tin ore) sourced from mines controlled by sanctioned armed group the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). That same month the Security Council passed a new sanctions resolution on DRC that reiterated the provisions of the previous year regarding targeted sanctions on individuals or entities involved in the illicit natural resource trade. The challenge now for the Council and for states such as the UK is to translate admirable rhetoric into meaningful implementation.
In addition, questions remain as to how to manage such tasks as listing and de-listing targeted individuals and organisations. Today, the idea of a permanent body dedicated to support and oversee the work of the panels is not even on the Security Council’s agenda. Despite the obvious hurdles to be overcome, the Council has shown little inclination to authorise or sufficiently support the Secretariat to perform these tasks properly.

Global Witness has long argued for increased support to expert panels which, we believe, play a crucial role in devising and enforcing sanctions and generating crucial information about the economic dimensions of threats to international peace and security. Without information and analysis on the financial and commodity flows and the parties targeted by sanctions, international efforts at peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding will be flying blind.

Without information and analysis of the nature and extent of sanctions implementation by states, there can be little confidence that the sanctions are achieving their objective. The text box, ‘Support to the monitoring of sanctions’, sets out Global Witness’ proposal for an institutional mechanism that could help tackle this problem by reinforcing the work of the expert panels.

**Recommendations on sanctions**

To address shortcomings in the sanctions regime, Global Witness recommends that the Security Council should:

- Develop a mechanism to provide analytical and information support to panels of experts in the monitoring of sanctions regimes.

- Require states to i) identify companies headquartered in, or operating from, their jurisdictions that are active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones; ii) compel these companies to carry out due diligence on their operations and their supply chains to ensure that they are not handling conflict resources; iii) report to the Security Council on the due diligence measures taken by these companies.

Martin Kouakou Fofié, a military commander for the Forces Nouvelles rebels in Côte d’Ivoire, is subject to UN targeted sanctions, including an asset freeze and travel ban. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire this has not prevented him using banking facilities in neighbouring Burkina Faso.
The UN Secretariat sanctions branch is under-staffed. Expert panels are poorly resourced. Information sharing between the different panels is ad hoc, and the information they obtain is not always collated, easily retrievable, properly archived or even secure. The need for increased institutional support for these efforts has been widely commented upon.  

Global Witness is proposing the establishment of a mechanism to provide data-gathering and analytical support to panels of experts in the monitoring of sanctions regimes. This mechanism could sit either within the UN Secretariat or outside it. It should meet the following criteria:

**Mandate:** a support mechanism should be mandated to provide analytical support, such as database management, exchanges of information with existing law enforcement databases, trend and network analysis.

**Competence:** it should include analysts with in-depth understanding of law enforcement intelligence, illicit financial flows, arms trafficking, sanctions violations, international crimes, and human rights-related issues.

**Independence:** it should be independent of individual Member States, industry, and civil society.

**Access:** a support mechanism should be able to cooperate with UN agencies and missions in the field, industry, domestic and international law enforcement bodies and other relevant sources of information.

**Capacity:** analysis and monitoring will require human and financial resources provided by Member States.

- Mandate a team to report on the implementation of due diligence measures by companies active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones. As a first step, the Council should task the Sanctions Committee with setting up such a team to report on implementation of the due diligence measures called for in Resolution 1896 on the Democratic Republic of Congo (November 2009).

- Adopt a definition of conflict resources based on universally accepted principles of international law to inform and guide the imposition of sanctions.

- Design commodity sanctions with a view to their effectiveness and unintended consequences.

- Require UN agencies and bodies with access to relevant information to cooperate with UN expert panels and peacekeeping mission analysis cells.

- Encourage industry associations, human rights organisations, and others with access to relevant information to cooperate with UN expert panels and peacekeeping mission analysis cells.

- Enforce sanctions; actively investigate reports of sanctions violations and, where appropriate, prosecute the parties responsible.

- Develop a mechanism to provide analytical and information support to panels of experts in the monitoring of sanctions regimes.

- Identify companies headquartered in or operating from their jurisdictions that are active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones. Compel these companies to carry out due diligence on their operations and their supply chains to ensure that they are not handling conflict resources. Report to the Security Council on due diligence measures undertaken by these companies.
Conflicts can be fought over natural resources, as well as financed by them. Natural resources are, in this sense, an important source of power for state and non-state armed groups. Strategies for shifting an armed conflict towards peaceful forms of political competition risk failure if they ignore how this source of power complements the warring parties’ political and military capabilities. Some peace accords, such as Sudan’s (profiled below), are built around agreements governing natural resources. Many more ignore the issue altogether. A recent UN report that reviews data on intrastate conflicts of the past sixty years, observes that ‘fewer than a quarter of peace negotiations aiming to resolve conflicts linked to natural resources have addressed resource management mechanisms’. 41

Where peacemaking strategies do not take account of the economic elements of a conflict, natural resources that previously financed the military campaigns of the warring parties may be used for re-arming. This can leave the movement towards democratic political process fraught with the risks of a return to armed violence. The current situation in Côte d’Ivoire illustrates this problem. Recent investigations by both the UN Panel of Experts and Global Witness suggest that the economic interests of key Forces Nouvelles rebel commanders are one of the main threats to a peaceful reintegration of the rebel-held north and the government-controlled south of the country. The peace process currently has no means of addressing this issue and Forces Nouvelles commanders are using their control over natural resources such as cocoa, diamonds and gold to finance renewed weapons purchases. 42

MISSING IN ACTION – NATURAL RESOURCES IN PEACE DEALS

Peace deals that do not effectively address the role of natural resources risk leaving warring parties with the economic means to resume fighting as soon as they decide peace no longer suits them. Agreements such as the Lusaka Protocol of 1994, which sought to end the Angolan civil war, and Cambodia’s 1991 Paris Peace Accords failed to dislodge the main insurgent groups from the resource-rich areas they controlled. When these accords broke down, UNITA was quick to harness diamonds to its war effort once more, and the Khmer Rouge began tapping the reserves of timber, rubies and sapphires under its control.

The 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement aimed at ending Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war makes no reference to natural resources. 43 Since the agreement was signed, Forces Nouvelles commanders in the north of the country have retained and, in some cases, expanded their capacity to profit from the trade in cocoa, diamonds and gold. 44 In a volatile situation, one of the few certainties is that if elements of the Forces Nouvelles do go back to war, they will look to finance their operations via Côte d’Ivoire’s natural resource wealth.

Despite being pivotal to the funding of the conflict in eastern DRC, natural resources appear to be a taboo subject in international mediation efforts. A number of Western diplomats admitted to Global Witness that they and others have been reluctant to discuss the issue of natural resources with the governments of DRC, Rwanda and other neighbouring countries because they judge it too sensitive. 45 One UN official stated that ‘Natural resources are not on the table of topics in peace talks. Almost every other issue is. Yet it’s one of the keys to resolution of the conflict. The peace talks discussed the framework for the army, brossage (intermingling, part of the integration process), demobilisation, etc but not natural resources. Yet the armed groups are not prepared to leave the resources behind.’ 46
On the other hand, peace agreements that formalise and consolidate particular elites’ control over natural resources bring their own risks. These include systemic corruption, which weakens governance, while giving a significant advantage to the corrupt parties in any electoral process. The short-term stability purchased via unaccountable elite control over natural resources may be a recipe for conflict in the medium to long term. At a minimum, as the record of Liberia’s post-peace agreement transitional administration shows, it can leave a toxic political and economic legacy for any democratic government that is subsequently elected.

**TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES**

Peace agreements have led to the installation of transitional governments in a number of countries. These governments frequently feature war leaders and sometimes suspected war criminals too. For example, two of the vice presidents of the transitional government in DRC between 2003 and 2006 were former rebel leaders whose armed groups had plundered natural resources in a systematic and violent manner. Peace agreements need to establish binding conditions that prevent transitional authorities looting valuable natural resources. This is imperative both from a security perspective – to prevent leaders of armed groups refilling their war chests – and in order to protect the country’s prospects for democracy and economic development.

The risks associated with transitional governments’ management of natural resources are exemplified by what happened in post-conflict Liberia. The 2003 Accra Peace Agreement that followed Charles Taylor’s overthrow installed the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), which brought together former allies of Taylor, as well as his enemies. Control of natural resources was divided up, with the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel group receiving ministerial portfolios controlling forest and mineral reserves. The NTGL wasted little time in selling off rights to the country’s key mineral assets, notably via a staggeringly inequitable contract for iron ore exploitation awarded to Mittal Steel (now Arcelor Mittal). This concession agreement gave Mittal the capacity to determine the amount of tax it would pay to the government, as well as control of some of Liberia’s most important infrastructure, such as a major railway line and the port at Buchanan.

This fire sale of some of Liberia’s most valuable public property ended only with the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006. The new government, already overstretched, was obliged to take on the politically risky task of reviewing, renegotiating and annulling contracts issued by the NTGL. In October 2006 Global Witness drew attention to the Mittal case by publishing an in-depth analysis of the company’s concession agreement. The following year, Mittal agreed to a renegotiation with the Liberian government, and this process resulted in the most harmful provisions of its contract with the NTGL being revised or removed.

Under DRC’s 2003 peace agreement, rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba was appointed Vice President of the transitional government, despite evidence of his Mouvement de la libération du Congo (MLC) group’s involvement in atrocities and looting of DRC’s natural resources. Now he is on trial in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
In some cases, a de facto ‘division of spoils’ has been attempted, such as the wealth-sharing provisions of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As the experience of Sierra Leone shows, such approaches are not always workable and may in fact be unpalatable to the population of the country concerned. Much depends on the legitimacy and track records of the parties in question.50 What is more generally applicable is the need for standards of behaviour and regulation, with respect to natural resource exploitation, to which the parties can hold each other accountable, with international backing. For this to work there must be explicit conflict resolution mechanisms built into the peace agreement to handle the inevitable disputes that will arise.

Global Witness believes that peacemakers must take proper account of the role that natural resource misuse can play in sustaining conflict. Far too often, international mediation focuses exclusively on the political and military dimensions of the relationships between the parties, without considering the economic resources at their disposal. Many of the attempts to resolve the conflict in eastern DRC have fallen into this category. In countries where control over natural resources is a significant element of political power, addressing this question of who gains, or who retains, control is likely to be fundamental to an agreement to take the gun out of political competition for good. Peacemaking efforts must pursue agreements over an end to armed violence in tandem with agreements over the terms for demilitarising natural resource exploitation and bringing it back into the formal economy. These agreements should set the ‘rules of the game’ for the transition from conflict.31

All of the usual tensions that exist for post-conflict political-military dimensions of peacemaking – for example the complex dynamics involved in transitional justice – will also apply to economic peacemaking. The ways in which these are handled must be context-specific. At a minimum, however, a strategy of formalising the illicit trade in natural resources should be targeted at achieving their transparent

THE DIVISION OF SPOILS AND RETURN TO CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE

The resumption of Sierra Leone’s conflict illustrates the risks of peace agreements consolidating peace ‘spoilers’ control over natural resources.52

By the late 1990s, the RUF was making US$25-125 million a year through its control of some of Sierra Leone’s key diamond-mining districts.53 These funds enabled the rebels to recruit more soldiers and buy arms, giving them the upper hand against the government and the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force.

The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, brokered by the United States Government, established a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, to exercise control over Sierra Leone’s diamond and gold mining.54 It also appointed the new Commission’s first Chairman – RUF leader Foday Sankoh. The Lomé accord thus served to legitimise the RUF’s militarised exploitation of the diamond fields.

The UN Panel of Experts characterised Foday Sankoh’s approach to his new responsibilities as ‘clutching at financial opportunities for personal and political gain, outside of the governmental framework in which he was ostensibly working. Much of this related to the diamond trade.’55 Less than a year after the Lomé agreement was signed, the RUF broke the accord and the conflict resumed; the rebels once again funding their operations courtesy of Sierra Leone’s diamond wealth.
Wealth-Sharing in Sudan

The challenges of implementing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) demonstrate the importance of incorporating verification and dispute resolution mechanisms into the wealth-sharing provisions of peace agreements.

In 2005, following many years of negotiations, Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a peace agreement to end 22 years of civil war between the north and the south. The inequitable distribution of oil revenues in Sudan had fuelled both southern grievances and northern atrocities. The CPA sought to settle the issue by specifying that oil revenues from southern oil wells would be divided equally between the two sides.\(^5^6\)

Since the signing of the CPA, more than US$6 billion in oil revenues has been transferred from the NCP-dominated Government of National Unity in Khartoum to the SPLM-led Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in Juba. This money comprises 98% of GOSS’ budget.\(^5^7\) The authorities in Khartoum retain sole control of information on how much oil has been produced, however. They also control sales of the two governments’ share of the oil. With the CPA lacking any provision for independent auditing of the country’s oil revenues, this arrangement has fuelled mistrust on the part of the south. In October 2007, the SPLM temporarily pulled out of the power-sharing government, citing as one of their main concerns the lack of transparency over the oil wealth-sharing.\(^5^8\)

Global Witness’ recent publication, Fuelling Mistrust: the Need for Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Industry, shows that the oil production figures declared by the Ministry of Finance in Khartoum are lower than the oil production figures published by the main oil company operating in Sudan, the Chinese state-owned CNPC. This suggests that the revenue-sharing may not be being carried out as specified in the CPA.\(^5^9\) In the absence of an independent verification mechanism, resolving such discrepancies in the data and the suspicions that they create has proved to be difficult.

A key element of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concerns Abyei, an oil-rich region in the centre of Sudan for which there is a slightly different wealth-sharing arrangement. The CPA specified that a commission, comprising northerners, southerners and international experts, should be set up to define Abyei’s long-disputed boundaries. The commission was duly established, but its findings were contested by the National Congress Party, which claimed that it had overstepped its mandate.

The disagreement between Khartoum and Juba that ensued lasted from 2005 until 2009, and had a very real effect on the people of Abyei. None of the revenues generated by sales of the region’s oil were received by GOSS or the local authorities, which struggled to provide even basic services.\(^6^0\) In May 2008 conflict broke out in Abyei between the northern and southern armies. Scores of people were killed and more than 50,000 displaced.\(^6^1\)

The month after the fighting, the two sides agreed to take the question of Abyei’s boundaries to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.\(^6^2\) In July 2009 the Court announced its ruling as the residents of Abyei held their breath. Both the National Congress Party and the SPLM accepted its decision and tensions were defused. The referral of this apparently intractable dispute to an independent third party holds possible lessons for other peace agreements. In particular, it highlights the importance of building dispute resolution mechanisms into the wealth-sharing provisions of peace accords from the outset.

UN peacekeepers in Sudan monitor clashes between northern and southern troops in the oil-rich Abyei region. An independent system for verifying implementation of the oil wealth-sharing provisions of Sudan’s peace agreement is needed to defuse tensions between the north and the south.
and accountable management over the medium term. (This we address below as part of the natural resource dimensions of peacebuilding.) To ensure that the economic dimensions of peace agreements are adhered to, it will be important that the Security Council or regional powers, or both, do not lift all sanctions measures without first seeing progress towards this key objective by whoever controls the resources.

**Recommendations on peacemaking**

Global Witness recommends that peacemakers should:

- Address the economic interests of warring parties as a central part of the overall approach to conflict resolution.
- Seek to demilitarise control of natural resources.
- Establish the ‘rules of the game’ for the transition of the war economy to a peacebuilding economy.
- Avoid deals which ‘lock in’ poor governance of natural resources. Limits should be placed on the ability of unelected transitional governments to allocate natural resource concession contracts.

- Build an independent monitoring mechanism into any natural resource wealth-sharing provisions of a peace agreement.
- Incorporate a dispute resolution mechanism into any natural resource wealth-sharing provisions of a peace agreement. This might consist of an agreement to refer disputes to an arbitration tribunal.
- Require international guarantors of a peace agreement to play a role in enforcing any provisions concerning natural resource management. The cost to the parties of a failure to adhere to these provisions should be clear, significant and enforceable by law.
- Ensure that any attempt to bring informal and illegal activities relating to natural resources into the formal economy should be based on clear and verifiable standards of behaviour backed by regulation.
- Draw on natural resource assessments by experts, such as those on the UN’s Mediation Support Unit roster, that provide a description of what resources are at issue, their potential values and their relevance to the negotiations.
Peacekeeping operations are traditionally deployed as part of international efforts to support peace agreements or cease-fires. However, peacekeepers have often found themselves faced with no peace to keep. Sierra Leone’s civil war continued for three years after UNAMSIL arrived. UNITA kept fighting in Angola for three years after MONUA left Angola, while the Khmer Rouge kept up their military operations for five years after the withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia. Today, the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo remains unresolved, ten years after MONUC was first deployed in 1999.

Natural resources – a driver of conflict in all of four countries mentioned above – are part of the reason why peacekeepers have faced an uphill struggle. Yet rarely do UN peacekeeping mandates acknowledge this. The first to do so was the mandate given to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in September 2003, which requested that the peacekeepers ‘assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources.’ Although its overall record in this regard was mixed, UNMIL’s experience (described below in the box ‘Peacekeeping and natural resources in Liberia’) suggests that peacekeepers can help prevent conflict recurring by denying warring parties access to natural resource revenues.

Global Witness believes that peacekeepers deployed to areas affected by conflicts that are related to natural resources must be mandated to deal with this economic dimension directly. This should not be viewed as an add-on to a long list of tasks, but rather recognised as integral to the mission’s overall purpose and operational framework. Why? Because in these kinds of settings, the threats to security and the abuses against civilians that peacekeepers are charged with countering, typically emanate from parties whose operational capacity is linked to their access to natural resource revenues.
PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOURCES IN SIERRA LEONE

The Security Council’s approach to peacekeeping in Sierra Leone represents a textbook case of how not to deal with conflict resources.

In 1999, the Council authorised the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to help implement the Lomé Peace Agreement between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. The peace accord addressed the illicit trade in natural resources; however the Security Council failed to include any reference to this issue in UNAMSIL’s mandate.65

Indeed, a Secretary-General’s report on Sierra Leone in 2000 framed natural resources as a concern of sovereign states only, arguing that responsibility for natural resource exploitation lay entirely with the government, in particular ‘the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, Reconstruction and Development… under (RUF leader) Mr Sankoh’. ‘It should be underlined’, said the report, ‘that UNAMSIL has neither the mandate nor the intention to stop or interfere with any economic activity’.66 The consequence was that the RUF continued to loot the diamond fields and commit trademark atrocities such as amputations.

In its December 2000 report, the UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone drew attention to Sierra Leonean NGOs’ criticisms of UNAMSIL’s approach. The Panel noted that UNAMSIL was perceived to be ‘actually complicit in dividing the country and in ensuring that the RUF can mine diamonds with impunity’ and that the local NGOs believed that ‘UNAMSIL [should] be deployed to the diamond areas to protect them from future incursions and from illicit mining’.67

It was not until 2004, two years after the disarmament of the RUF, that UNAMSIL was finally authorised to assist Sierra Leone’s security forces in patrolling borders and diamond-mining areas.68

Alluvial diamond mining in Sierra Leone. UN peacekeepers had no mandate to deal with the economic dimensions of Sierra Leone’s civil war. This undermined their effectiveness, and also their credibility.
Securing natural resources

The question then, is how, in practice, should peacekeepers go about addressing the links between natural resources and conflict? One approach is for peacekeepers to get involved in efforts to secure valuable resources, either by wresting control of them from armed groups or via a more politically-oriented process in which deployment of troops is one component. An indication of what the first of these options can look like, and the risks entailed, is provided by the recent experiences of MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC.

In December 2008, the Security Council mandated MONUC to support the operations of the Congolese government army. One of the Council’s objectives was ‘Preventing the provision of support to illegal armed groups, including support derived from illicit economic activities’. In 2009, the peacekeepers assisted in the Congolese military offensive ‘Kimia II’ against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). This operation was intended, in part, to dislodge the armed group from mining sites, in order to diminish its resource base.

However, ‘Kimia II’ soon became mired in controversy. MONUC ended up engaging in – and then partially withdrawing from – operations which resulted in severe human rights abuses and large-scale population displacement. Moreover, soldiers of the Congolese army involved in the offensive took over mining sites previously occupied by the FDLR and began exploiting them themselves, in defiance of Congolese law. This simply recast the existing conflict resources scenario; the only differences being that the armed group in question wore a different uniform and claimed allegiance to the state, as well as the support of the UN. MONUC has been unable to respond, because its mandate on natural resources is limited to action against ‘illegal’ armed groups.

Natural resource-fuelled wars have necessitated some of the most expensive peacekeeping operations in the UN’s history. As of the end of 2009, the combined cost of UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), UNMIL (Liberia), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire) and MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) exceeded US$17 billion.69

Sven Torfinn/Pathos
REBELS, ARMIES AND ILLICIT EXPLOITATION

When it comes to illicit exploitation of natural resources, the UN tends to focus its attention on non-state armed groups. In 2001, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme which defined conflict diamonds as ‘rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments’. Rebels hold no monopoly on conflict resource trafficking, however. The assumption that such activities only ever involve insurgents can create serious problems for peacekeepers seeking to bring natural resources under a legal, and civilian-led, system of management.

In the DRC, for example, civilians living in mining areas under army control have faced similar patterns of human rights abuse to those in zones occupied by non-state armed groups. Global Witness research carried out in 2008 and 2009 indicates that the army is becoming increasingly involved in mineral production in the name of ‘restoring state control’ over areas previously occupied by rebels and militia, despite this being illegal under Congolese law.

Many of the Congolese army troops spearheading the recent MONUC-supported operations against the FDLR are themselves recently defected members of the Rwandan government-backed Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), who retain their own command structures and political agenda. By switching uniforms, the CNDP has greatly increased its access to eastern DRC’s mineral resources.

There is a strong likelihood of this kind of scenario occurring where agreements are reached on the hasty integration of insurgents into state military structures.

The risk is that former rebels continue their systematic theft of the country’s natural resources, only now with the seal of state – and sometimes UN – approval.

CNDP soldier, March 2008. Less than a year later, the rebel group underwent a hasty ‘integration’ into the Congolese government army. By changing sides, the CNDP has greatly increased its control over eastern DRC’s mineral resources.
In recognition of some of the negative impacts of ‘Kimia II’, the revised mandate for MONUC set out in Security Council Resolution 1906, passed on 23 December 2009, imposes tighter conditions on the peacekeepers’ support for Congolese army operations. MONUC is explicitly required to suspend its cooperation with army units that are suspected of breaching international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. The mandate also tightens the focus of MONUC’s cooperation with Congolese armed forces operations against illicit economic activities.

It requests that MONUC coordinate with the army ‘with a view to... carrying out enhanced efforts to prevent the provision of support to armed groups; including support derived from illicit economic activities and illicit trade in natural resources’; and also to help the government restore its authority over ‘key mining areas’.

The Security Council’s reiteration of MONUC’s role in countering the threat posed by conflict resources and its efforts to prevent a recurrence of some of the problems...
associated with ‘Kimia II’ is encouraging. The key challenge of implementation remains, however: how to ensure that MONUC’s execution of its mandate results in a genuine demilitarisation of the mining sector in eastern DRC, rather than simply a ‘changing of the guard’.

Global Witness recommends that MONUC should set out ways of dealing with this challenge in the policy paper it is developing on conditions under which it can provide support for Congolese army units. The same issue should be addressed in the UN Secretary-General’s strategic review of MONUC, requested by the Security Council in Resolution 1906. This assessment, due to be submitted to the Council by 1 April 2010, is aimed at determining ‘critical tasks that need to be accomplished before MONUC can envisage its drawdown without triggering a relapse into instability’. Demilitarisation of mining areas in the east of DRC should be high on the strategic review’s list of ‘critical tasks’.

MONUC’s experiences are a reminder that when peacekeepers are authorised by the Security Council to help government armies take control of natural resources, the latter may prove to be just as corrupt and abusive as their opponents. Peacekeepers may not be above temptation themselves, moreover, as the text box ‘Peacekeepers as conflict resource traffickers’ shows. More generally, taking and holding territory in a manner akin to fighting an insurgency is always likely to be a risky strategy for a peacekeeping operation. Where such operations challenge the strategic position of armed groups in the area – militarily or in terms of control of populations or resources – they may prompt a rise in violence. The violence may be directed not only at the mission, but also against civilians, as a means of undermining the population’s confidence in the peacekeepers’ capacity to protect them.

It need not always turn out this way, however. Peacekeepers can sometimes play a crucial role in helping governments secure valuable natural resources. One positive example is the action taken by UNMIL forces in Liberia to dislodge former combatants from rubber plantations. A key element of the success in this case was that the physical occupation of the plantations was the culmination of an incremental, politically-led process, rather than a full-frontal military assault.

Global Witness believes that the Security Council should clarify the conditions under which it will authorise peacekeepers to secure sites of natural resource production from exploitation by abusive state or non-state
PEACEKEEPERS AS CONFLICT RESOURCE TRAFFICKERS

After the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched its war in Sierra Leone in 1991, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed its Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to protect the Freetown government. During the course of the mission, reports emerged of certain ECOMOG officers trading and exporting diamonds; in effect participating in the very trade which shored up the RUF’s ability to fund its operations. The peacekeepers involved carried out their activities with impunity.85

In Liberia, concerns that UN peacekeepers might behave in a similar manner constrained UNMIL’s willingness to secure high value resources that had been used by armed groups to fund their military campaigns and continued to pose a security risk.86 In an interview with Global Witness, one senior UNMIL official stated that the mission had not deployed peacekeepers to secure the country’s diamond fields for fear they would be tempted into the diamond trade themselves.87

Following separate investigations in the eastern DRC province of Ituri, Human Rights Watch and the BBC both reported evidence of gold smuggling by members of MONUC. These activities were said to have occurred at a time when Ituri’s gold trade was financing a range of armed groups. The BBC also published accounts of peacekeepers providing arms to members of these militias.88 If the reports of trafficking of conflict resources are true, the implication is that peacekeepers may have served to fuel the very violence, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, that their deployment was intended to prevent. For its part, the UN has denied both the charges of gold and weapons dealing and of a subsequent cover-up.89

In all these cases, it is evident that the peacekeeping missions concerned lacked robust oversight mechanisms to address conflict resource trafficking and, when evidence of wrongdoing emerged, the efforts to hold perpetrators accountable were limited or non-existent. Global Witness is calling on the UN Secretary-General to agree a memorandum of understanding by troop-contributing countries to clarify their legal obligation to investigate and prosecute peacekeepers if they are involved in the exploitation and trading of natural resources. UN personnel under investigation for such offences should immediately be suspended and removed from duty.
army groups. Such conditions should include: i) a high probability of tactical success; ii) an overall political strategy that supports the sustainability of the deployment; iii) commitment by the government and relevant businesses to manage the resource well and iv) capacity for verifying those commitments via international monitoring.

Monitoring and law enforcement

An alternative, or a complement, to peacekeepers taking and holding the territory where valuable natural resources are located, is to monitor the trafficking of these resources and support law enforcement officials in their efforts to combat it. Again, DRC provides a good illustration of recent attempts to put this approach into practice, based on MONUC’s mandate to ‘use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources’.

In 2008 and 2009, MONUC’s Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) began monitoring and inspecting the trade in natural resources in eastern DRC. This involved using joint military and civilian teams working with DRC government counterparts to carry out random inspections of mineral cargoes, notably at the airports in Goma and Bukavu in North and South Kivu. The focus of these inspections has been ascertaining the origins of the materials and the identity of the parties involved in transacting and transporting them. The JMAC teams have sought to build up a picture of which traders are regularly sourcing minerals from areas held by non-state armed groups. These JMAC operations have added substantially to the data available on the illicit natural resource trade. The random inspections element may also have some utility as a deterrent to traders who purchase minerals from zones controlled by armed groups. Alongside these initiatives by JMAC, MONUC’s human rights teams have also placed a greater focus on natural resource-related issues. This has built on work carried out on a less systematic basis by some UN human rights observers in the east of the country over the previous two years.

However, these positive steps forward by JMAC have been constrained somewhat by a lack of resources for its teams, which do not have sufficient staff to maintain a robust ‘on the ground’ presence. The failure of DRC’s main international donors to provide the relatively small sums needed to boost these efforts is especially unimpressive given the formation, in early 2009, of an international taskforce on the illicit mineral trade in the Great Lakes region, which is led by these same donor governments.

The problem of resources is compounded by limits in technical capacity: peacekeeping missions like MONUC are staffed with military peacekeepers and observers, or civilian protection officers, not with specialised sanctions monitors or customs officials. Simply put, they may not know what to look for when seeking to interdict illicit commodities. In addition, there is a significant analytical task involved in tracking and monitoring the minerals trade and the teams assigned to do this must have expertise that the average peacekeeper lacks.

MONUC has begun to compensate for this by conducting training of observers and by developing cooperation between the JMAC teams and the Group of Experts monitoring the sanctions regime. This marks a necessary step towards the mission fulfilling its mandate with respect to preventing support to illegal armed groups and curtailing the trade in conflict resources. The next step should be to integrate to this cooperation the Congolese civilian law enforcement officials in eastern provinces — for example the Police des Mines, a branch of the national police force responsible for security in mining areas — and to build their capacity.

Another potentially useful development of MONUC’s role concerns new trading centres being established by the Congolese authorities, as a means of centralising mineral trading and subjecting it to greater government oversight. Security Council Resolution 1906, adopted in December 2009, urges MONUC, in accordance with its monitoring and inspection remit, to ‘consolidate and assess, jointly with the Government… its pilot project of bringing together all State services in five trading counters in North and South
Kivu in order to improve the traceability of mineral products. This paves the way for MONUC to help provide security for these trading centres, while ensuring that they do not simply launder minerals sourced from areas controlled by armed groups.

The Secretary-General's forthcoming review of MONUC for the Security Council should emphasise the importance of MONUC's work in monitoring, inspecting, and supporting civilian authorities' efforts to control the mineral trade. It should identify ways of reinforcing these activities. For its part, the Security Council should be drawing on the lessons of MONUC's work in a wider context. Global Witness' view is that the Council should authorise any peacekeeping operations deployed in areas where natural resource exploitation undermines security, to work with customs and law enforcement officials and panels of experts in combating this threat. Specifically, the Council should task such missions with investigating, monitoring trade routes and border crossings, and carrying out inspections. Peacekeepers should also be authorised to intercept illicit trade that supports armed groups, while recognising that doing so will depend on the capacities of the mission and the tactical situation on the ground.

**Recommendations on peacekeeping**

Global Witness is recommending that the UN Security Council should:

- Mandate peacekeeping operations to respond to the natural resource dimensions of conflicts.

- Request that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations establish operational guidelines for peacekeepers on how to respond to the problem of illicit natural resource exploitation and trade in the theatre of operations.

- Authorise peacekeeping missions to enforce sanctions and laws governing the exploitation and trading of natural resources, including the interdiction and confiscation of shipments, where operational considerations allow.

- Authorise peacekeepers to deploy to sites of natural resource production, where operational considerations allow, to protect these sites from exploitation by abusive state or non-state armed groups, and to protect people living and working at these sites.

- Require cooperation between joint mission analysis cells, expert panels, and local and regional customs and law enforcement agencies to track and intercept shipments of conflict resources.

- Authorise peacekeepers to deploy to protect those international and local officials seeking to police the exploitation and trading of natural resources.

The UN Secretary-General should:

- Agree a memorandum of understanding with troop-contributing countries to clarify their legal obligation to investigate and prosecute peacekeepers if they are involved in the exploitation and trading of natural resources. UN personnel under investigation for such offences should immediately be suspended.

- Establish a professional monitoring body to investigate cases of peacekeepers' involvement in the exploitation and trading of natural resources. Such a mandate could be integrated to the Office of Internal Oversight or to the mandate of an independent third party monitoring mechanism.

Member States should:

- Provide financial and technical assistance in support of increased cooperation between joint mission analysis cells, expert panels and local and regional law enforcement agencies tasked with curtailing the trafficking of conflict resources.
Peacebuilding is the set of activities which, first and foremost, are directed at preventing a return to armed violence. It aims to find incentives and build structures which divert the conflict dynamic onto a peaceful, political and sustainable track. The functions of peacebuilding often overlap with what might otherwise be termed peacekeeping on the one hand and development on the other. Consequently, the cast of international actors engaged in peacebuilding efforts typically extends beyond the UN to include international financial institutions and bilateral donor governments, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

In many cases, the overwhelming preoccupation of peacebuilders is staging set-piece political events such as elections. When it comes to economic issues, meanwhile, efforts are typically concentrated on generating an immediate ‘peace dividend’: kick-starting economic growth to build popular support for the peace process. Few economic peacebuilding programmes have any strategy to deal with the illicit exploitation of natural resources or the war economy more generally. This is a potentially fatal flaw. In conflicts with a significant natural resource dimension, the economic interests of parties can threaten stability long after the signing of a peace agreement. The recurring crises in eastern DRC are a case in point. There is also a risk that, without such a strategy, attempts to provide a ‘peace dividend’ through the provision of development assistance may strengthen the structures of conflict, through corruption of aid flows, rather than undermine them.

THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION

In December 2005 the UN General Assembly and the Security Council created a new intergovernmental forum called the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The PBC aims to act as a convening body for governments and other international actors, to channel financial assistance and to provide input on peacebuilding strategies and ‘lessons learned’. One of the first states on the PBC’s agenda was Sierra Leone, a country emerging from an atrocious diamond-fuelled war in which tens of thousands of people died. Yet despite the importance of natural resource management to maintaining peace and protecting human rights, the PBC’s draft plan for its work in Sierra Leone made no mention of this issue. Following a written submission – ‘Peacebuilding Omission’ – by Global Witness in October 2007, references to strengthening natural resource governance were belatedly introduced to the final Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. To date, the PBC appears to have taken few steps to implement these components of its strategy, however. Research by Global Witness in 2009 into Sierra Leone’s diamond trade, minerals sector and forest management suggests that weak management of natural resources continues to pose major challenges to Sierra Leone’s democratic and economic development.

Panning for diamonds in Sierra Leone. Natural resources played a pivotal role in Sierra Leone’s civil war. Why has the Peacebuilding Commission not given them higher priority?
Rather than pursuing an approach that hinges on immediate delivery of an economic ‘peace dividend’, peacebuilding strategies should instead focus on managing the transformation of economic activities which fuel armed violence into ones which build stability. Such a strategy should pursue two principal objectives. The first of these is demilitarisation of natural resource production. The second is overarching governance reforms, particularly in relation to the allocation of these resources, wealth-sharing, and fiscal transparency. This strategic focus should be the basis for coordinating peacebuilding activities with other interventions, such as sanctions, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

**Demilitarising natural resource exploitation**

The militarisation of natural resource exploitation and trade is a common legacy of self-financing wars. As cases in Liberia and now Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate, it is a problem that can get worse after peace agreements have been signed. Militarisation poses the risk of peace ‘spoilers’ using control of natural resources to finance renewed conflict, as happened in Sierra Leone. Even when peace deals seem robust, and peacebuilding processes on track, failure to tackle warring parties’ access to natural resources can derail the political process, not to mention the exit strategy of the international peacebuilders themselves.

Elections, for example, are often seen as the climax to peacebuilding efforts and the point at which peacekeepers can start packing their bags. But experience from countries such as Liberia and DRC demonstrates that unless illicit exploitation of natural resources is addressed before the polls, it can provide politicians and warlords with the means to manipulate the process or resume fighting if they do not like the outcome.

Beyond the immediate danger it poses to security and human rights, militarisation of natural resources also represents a longer term threat. This is the retrenchment of a criminalised economy which stunts development via the systematic theft of public assets and the loss of potential...
In 1993 the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was mandated to help the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in the implementation of the Cotonou Accord. UNOMIL’s final task was to oversee Liberia’s 1997 elections, but it lacked the mandate to address the candidates’ efforts to tap Liberia’s natural resources. Relying on an election war chest filled courtesy of looted export commodities such as diamonds, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) leader Charles Taylor won the presidency. Afterwards, he used this office to consolidate his control of Liberia’s natural resources, notably the timber sector. Faced with growing insurgencies from 1999 onwards, Taylor drew on timber revenues to fund military operations characterised by atrocities against civilians.

In DRC in 2006, the UN organised the largest electoral assistance mission in its history, a joint initiative between MONUC and UNDP costing over US$500 million. The Security Council also authorised the temporary deployment of a European Union reserve force known as EUFOR RD Congo to support MONUC during this period. “We all thought we’d be able to withdraw MONUC after the elections,” a Western diplomat told Global Witness two years later, as armed conflict again erupted in the Kivus. But, as in Liberia, the holding of elections did not in itself guarantee a durable peace in DRC. Armed groups and government forces continued fighting in the east of the country, particularly in areas rich in metals and minerals such as gold, cassiterite (tin ore) and coltan (tantalum ore).

In the period leading up to the elections, the DRC’s main donors, as well as the UN, missed a strategic opportunity to exert pressure on Congolese political leaders to institute reforms in the natural resource sectors. The international consensus, however, was that the political process culminating in elections had to be prioritised, at almost any cost, and that raising sensitive issues such as high level political and military involvement in illicit trade was likely to derail that process. The consequence was that Congolese leaders remained completely unaccountable throughout (and since) the transition period and continue plundering the country’s resources with impunity.

Counting the votes at a polling station in Kinshasa during the 2006 elections. The experience of Liberia and DRC shows that unless the illicit exploitation of natural resources is dealt with ahead of elections, it can provide politicians and warlords with the means to manipulate the process or resume fighting if they do not like the outcome.
Peacebuilding efforts to tackle the militarisation of natural resources require a particular emphasis on strengthening relevant law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. This is not just about building institutional capacity, however. As argued in the previous chapter, law enforcement agencies may require operational support from peacekeepers to protect them as they go about doing their job. This protection may not only be about assuring physical security, but also deterring the less direct forms of coercion or inducement that officials may encounter.

Security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts must also address the militarisation of natural resources. Security sector reform is unlikely to succeed if it fails to consider the financial resources available to ‘spoilers’. For their part, DDR programmes will not be sustainable if they do not take into account the realities of the local labour market. As the experience of Liberia shows, ex-combatants often continue illicit resource exploitation after the fighting has ended, particularly if there are no alternative sources of employment. Commanders will not want to curtail these activities for nothing, and their ranks may not easily be satisfied with lower wages and a sense of diminished (civilian) status.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND DRC – THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION

During the run-up to DRC's first post-peace agreement elections in 2006, the UN and the European Union (EU) assisted the government in efforts to create a unified army that could provide security on a nationwide level.102 However, the programme of ‘unification’ has been fraught with problems, and three years later, the Congolese national army is little more than a collection of untrained and ill-disciplined members of former armed groups, many of them still retaining their old allegiances and command structures. Moreover, a significant proportion of the former rebel combatants incorporated into the army, including their commanders, have been responsible for serious human rights violations.

Some units have still not undergone the mandated integration process known as brassage (or intermingling). Brassage requires troops to be retrained for 45 days, then deployed to a part of the country where they have not previously fought. Many units have resisted this redeployment, preferring to remain in their area of origin. This is a particular problem in the east of DRC, where former fighters know they can retain easy access to mining sites.

In 2004 two units of former Mai-Mai militia were integrated into the national army as the 84th and 85th Brigades. They declined to undergo brassage despite being ordered to do so. By 2006 the 85th Brigade had established a monopoly over Bisie, the largest cassiterite (tin ore) mine in North Kivu, and was making huge profits. Despite serious human rights abuses by members of the unit against Congolese civilians in the area, neither MONUC nor the national army, of which the brigade was now nominally a part, took any action to address its illegal activities.103

In early 2009, the Congolese government embarked on an ‘accelerated integration’ into the national army of Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) rebel soldiers and officers. The CNDP had previously occupied only a small number of mineral-rich territories in North Kivu. Through their defection they gained far greater access to mining sites in both North and South Kivu, however. When the 85th brigade was eventually moved away from Bisie mine in 2009, it was replaced by the 1st brigade, headed by ex-CNDP officer. The new arrivals quickly picked up where the previous incumbents left off. The 1st Brigade now controls much of the mining at Bisie, the trade in the cassiterite extracted, and the extortion rackets which operate in the mine’s vicinity.104

Sacks of cassiterite (tin ore) from the Bisie mine awaiting transportation by plane to Goma, from where the minerals are exported. Bisie accounts for around 80% of the cassiterite produced in North Kivu Province, but the profits are creamed off by the military units that control the area. Global Witness is calling on DRC’s donors to make their continued financial support of the government conditional upon it ending the involvement of its armed forces in the minerals trade.
SSR and DDR programmes should therefore be formulated with an eye to the particular role of illicit exploitation in the organisation of the fighting units they are engaging. For instance, the type of resource concerned will affect peacebuilders’ ability to forestall ‘spoilers’ on the one hand and offer incentives, such as employment opportunities, on the other. It matters, for example whether the resource commodity is easily trafficked, like diamonds, or less so, like timber or oil; whether it is found in concentrations or is diffused over a large area; whether its extraction is labour intensive and whether there is a ready labour supply. As the cases of Cambodia and DRC show, the militarisation of natural resource production involves not only non-state armed groups, but also the armies of national governments. In eastern DRC, the militarisation of mines is increasingly driven by the Kinshasa government’s own armed forces. Removing government units from the mines will require some of the more technical elements of peacebuilding – such as improved law enforcement, SSR and DDR – mentioned above. Much more than that, however, its success will stand or fall on the willingness of the international donors that bankroll DRC’s government, and underwrite the national army, to insist on demilitarisation of the mines as a condition of their continued support. And this takes us to the crux of the matter: that demilitarising natural resource production – and, indeed, reforming natural resource governance – is a process that requires peacebuilders to engage first and foremost at a political, rather than a technical level.

Reform of natural resource governance

Bad natural resource governance is rarely the sole cause of armed conflict. However, it has been an important precursor to the wars profiled in this report, and should be recognised by peacebuilders as a potential source of instability. Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee identified ‘years of bad governance, endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights,’ as root causes of the civil war. Some of the most rapacious manifestations of this endemic corruption were to be found in the country’s diamond sector. An approach to natural resource governance based around elites’ seizure of state assets likewise prefigured the conflicts in Liberia and DRC. In Côte d’Ivoire, competition over productive land was an underlying cause of the civil war.

As already noted with reference to Cambodia, even when poor natural resource governance may not pose an immediate threat of renewed violence, it undermines development and democracy in a way that poses risks to stability over the medium to long-term.

In post-conflict countries the damage is often done early on, with peacebuilders over-eager to ‘kick-start’ the economy via the extractive industries and inclined to relegate natural resource governance reforms several years down their list of priorities.

This opens the door to military and political leaders capturing valuable state assets and harnessing them to their own agendas. This pattern can be seen not only in Cambodia (profiled in the text box ‘From Conflict to Kleptocracy’), but also in Angola, in relation to oil and diamonds, and DRC with respect to forests and minerals.

Global Witness believes that peacebuilders should give natural resource governance a high priority from the outset; tackling issues that have traditionally been associated with later stages of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. A main focus should be ensuring transparent and accountable allocation of natural resource concessions and transparent management of the revenues derived from their exploitation. This will involve supporting assessments of what natural resources the country has and their best possible usage; assisting in the creation of laws and regulations that require transparency and accountability; and building institutional capacity to manage natural resources wisely and enforce the law effectively.

Part of that institution-building should be fostering the government’s capacity to negotiate equitable contracts governing the exploitation of natural resources with private sector operators. In recent years DRC, Liberia and now Sierra Leone have undertaken processes of
renegotiating concession contracts and allocating new ones. The conduct and outcome of these processes can be critical to post-conflict countries’ development, not least given the fact that natural resource concession contracts typically bind the parties for quarter of a century or even longer.

Crucial to ensuring accountability is the early establishment of monitoring mechanisms and support to enable local civil society to play a watchdog role. Again, leaving these kinds of initiatives until some years into peacebuilding programmes can be disastrous. If they start to bear fruit only after most of the critical decisions have already been taken – on how and by whom natural resources will be allocated, managed and regulated – it may be too late for them to have much of an impact.

While there is a wealth of recent examples of how to get post-conflict natural resource governance wrong, peacebuilders can nonetheless draw on a range of international initiatives and precedents which provide some clues as to how to get it right, or at least do better. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an international mechanism aimed at increasing transparency in the management of oil, gas and mining revenues. It involves governments, industry and civil society. For governments to be fully compliant with EITI criteria, they must ensure the full engagement of independent civil society organisations. While EITI helps build accountability in the management of payments made by companies to governments, it does not address the way in which exploitation rights are allocated. The Kimberley Process – the international scheme set to combat the trade in conflict diamonds – has the same tripartite quality as EITI. It is less effective at a national level as an accountability mechanism, but does have value as a means of standardising and strengthening controls on the trade in rough diamonds.

There are other policy frameworks that can be useful points of reference for peacebuilders too. One example is the IMF’s 2005 Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency. Another is the Natural Resource Charter, an initiative launched by a high-profile panel in 2009 which sets out principles of sound resource governance and emphasises the need for public oversight and transparency.

The Government of Sierra Leone has been renegotiating the contract for this industrial-scale diamond mine in Kono District with the current concession holder, Koidu Holdings SA. Like other post-conflict countries undertaking concession contract review processes, the Government of Sierra Leone has drawn on the assistance of international experts to help it obtain a fair deal.
FROM CONFLICT TO KLEPTOCRACY – THE CASE OF CAMBODIA

Cambodia provides a particularly vivid illustration of what can happen when post-conflict peacebuilding efforts do not give adequate attention to natural resource governance.

Cambodia’s civil war officially ended with the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, paving the way for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), at that time the most expensive peacekeeping operation in the UN’s history. However, the peace did not hold and the fighting continued for another seven years. During this last phase of the war, both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government used logging to fund military campaigns and then used military campaigns as a pretext for more logging.

In 1996 Global Witness investigations revealed how the battlefield enemies were collaborating to loot the state. Under the terms of what became known as the ‘million metre deal’, Cambodia’s co-prime ministers sought to facilitate illegal log export deals worth US$35 million to themselves and US$35-90 million to the Khmer Rouge who controlled the timber. The deal collapsed after it was exposed.112

Peacebuilding efforts did not initially prioritise natural resource governance in Cambodia. Indeed, support for the creation of the requisite institutions, regulations and accountability mechanisms did not begin in earnest until several years into the international reconstruction efforts that commenced with UNTAC. The consequence was highly abusive patterns of natural resource management becoming so entrenched as to be almost irreversible, with ordinary citizens unable to hold their leaders to account.

The initial focus of this asset-stripping process was the country’s forests, which were parcelled out as logging concessions to opportunistic foreign companies and cronies of senior officials. Many of these simply sub-contracted to military units that were already engaged in their own illegal logging operations. The concessionaires all broke the law or the terms of their contracts and were responsible for much of the plunder of the forests which ensued. What the World Bank had described as ‘Cambodia’s most developmentally important natural resource’ was seriously degraded, destroying the livelihoods of rural communities, while generating minimal returns to government coffers.

After international pressure forced the government to suspend the concessions at the end of 2001, illegal logging operations re-emerged under the guise of government-mandated ‘plantation developments’. The most rapacious of these schemes were undertaken by a syndicate comprising relatives of the prime minister and other senior officials, as well as elite military units. In 2007 Global Witness revealed how this group undertook a massive illegal logging operation involving attempted murder, kidnapping, bribery and tax evasion.113

In the meantime, Cambodia’s political leaders and their friends diversified their range of illicit income streams through the seizure of land, mineral deposits and fisheries. Global Witness documented this process in its 2009 report Country for Sale, which also presents evidence of high level corruption in Cambodia’s nascent oil and gas sector.114

For many years Cambodia has received international aid equivalent to half its national budget. However, donors have consistently failed to use their leverage to ensure that the country’s natural wealth is managed for the benefit of all Cambodians, with the result that it is devoured by a corrupt minority.
Peacebuilding approaches to natural resources will be most successful when they can build on sound ‘rules of the game’ set by peace agreements and be integrated with sanctions and peacekeeping as part of an overall strategy. A positive example of this kind of integration is provided by post-conflict Liberia. After the civil war ended, the UN Security Council kept timber sanctions in place for almost three years, and maintained the diamonds embargo for the better part of four. This retention of sanctions was not a punitive measure, but rather a protective framework within which natural resource management systems could be reformed without coming under immediate pressure to generate cash returns. During this period, management of the diamonds sector was overhauled to a point at which Liberia became eligible to apply for membership of the Kimberley Process. In the forest sector, meanwhile, existing logging concession contracts were reviewed and annulled and substantive new legal and regulatory frameworks were put in place.

In the case of Liberia, the maintenance of sanctions demanded a political commitment to natural resource governance reform not only from the Liberian government, but also from the UN and other international actors. This political commitment was ultimately much more significant than the technical inputs that came with it. While Liberia is relatively speaking a success story in this regard, it is striking how quickly the level of international interest fell away after sanctions were lifted. Recent violations of Liberian law in the allocation of new logging contracts suggest that absent a high level of international engagement – much of the important work of the past few years may now be undone, with serious consequences for the country’s rural population in particular.

In summary, the twin objectives of demilitarising the exploitation of natural resources and reforming governance structures can go a long way to reducing the risk of a relapse into conflict, particularly when they form part of an integrated international strategy. However, most cases are not ‘best’ cases. In practice, sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding do not happen in a phased manner, but often run on parallel tracks without adequate coordination. Monitoring, protection, law enforcement, and negotiation of rules governing the exploitation of natural resources should all be happening in concert with one another.
But peacebuilders should operate on the assumption that the likelihood of a coherent strategy on the part of states and international institutions is very low.

Global Witness believes that the best way for peacebuilders to improve their leverage with the parties to the conflict is by placing governance of natural resources at the centre of the political (peacebuilding) process. By doing so, peacebuilders signal to the parties that the international community will play a role in deciding who has access to these important sources of political and economic power.

**Recommendations on peacebuilding**

In the aftermath of conflicts where natural resources have played a key role, peacebuilding donors should:

- Pursue a strategy of demilitarising and reforming the governance of natural resource exploitation and trade.

- Support the establishment of institutions and laws that ensure transparent allocation of natural resource concessions and transparent management of the revenues derived from their exploitation; make lifting of sanctions and provision of financial support conditional on these reforms.

- Make financial support to a government conditional on it removing its armed forces from any involvement in natural resource exploitation and trade.

- Provide support to law enforcement agencies policing natural resource exploitation and trade.

- Address natural resource-related issues in the context of security sector reform.

- Build capacity to govern natural resource production and trade, including capacity to negotiate natural resource concession contracts with international companies, monitor borders and manage customs.

- Build civil society capacity to monitor natural resource allocation, exploitation and trade and the management of the revenues generated by these activities.

Congoese army soldiers: ending army units’ occupation of mining sites is critical to peacebuilding in eastern DRC.
Conclusion

Many wars today are in large measure self-financing. Exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth to fund conflict is endemic and results in serious human rights abuses. Natural resource exploitation by belligerents will invariably prolong a war and make it more resistant to international conflict resolution efforts. If the problem is left untouched by peacemakers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders, continued fighting or a resumption of armed conflict becomes more likely. Conversely, constraining the economic resources of the parties to a conflict can increase the effectiveness of international efforts to end violence and prevent relapse.

As this report has shown, in its overview of existing international approaches to natural resource-fuelled conflict, there are some good practice examples and innovations that can be built upon. But many years after the UN first began to recognise the links between natural resources and conflict, international capacity to deal with them remains weak and fragmented. There is no more troubling illustration of these weaknesses than the collective failure to deal with the role of the international minerals trade in stoking an incredibly violent war in eastern DRC. In short, lessons have not been learned.

Some of the problems this report has identified relate to serious deficiencies in institutional capacity – in the realms of sanctions, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – and, where this capacity does exist, the willingness to use it. Ultimately, however, most emanate from the underlying absence of a coherent approach to ending natural resource-fuelled wars on the part of the UN and its Member States. What is required is not only specific adjustments to existing policies and practices, but the formulation of an over-arching international strategy and a commitment, at the highest political levels, to implement it.
Recommendations in Full

A UN High Level Panel

Global Witness is calling on the UN to establish a High Level Panel to review international experience of responding to self-financing wars and draw up a comprehensive strategy for tackling them.

Sanctions

Sanctions play a crucial role in international responses to self-financing wars in general, and those involving illicit trade in natural resources in particular. They are one of the few coercive measures at the disposal of the UN Security Council. Without information and analysis of the flows and actors targeted by sanctions, however, international efforts at peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding will be flying blind. Without information and analysis of the nature and extent of sanctions implementation by states, there can be little confidence that the sanctions are achieving their objective.

To address shortcomings in the sanctions regime, Global Witness recommends that the Security Council should:

- Develop a mechanism to provide analytical and information support to panels of experts in the monitoring of sanctions regimes.
- Require states to i) identify companies headquartered in, or operating from, their jurisdictions that are active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones; ii) compel these companies to carry out due diligence on their operations and their supply chains to ensure that they are not handling conflict resources; iii) report to the Security Council on the due diligence measures taken by these companies.
- Mandate a team to report on the implementation of due diligence measures by companies active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones. As a first step, the Council should task the Sanctions Committee with setting up such a team to report on implementation of the due diligence measures called for in Resolution 1896 on the Democratic Republic of Congo (November 2009).
- Adopt a definition of conflict resources based on universally accepted principles of international law to inform and guide the imposition of sanctions.
- Design commodity sanctions with a view to their effectiveness and unintended consequences.
- Require UN agencies and bodies with access to relevant information to cooperate with UN expert panels and peacekeeping mission analysis cells.
- Encourage industry associations, human rights organisations, and others with access to relevant information to cooperate with UN expert panels and peacekeeping mission analysis cells.

Member States should:

- Develop a mechanism to provide analytical and information support to panels of experts in the monitoring of sanctions regimes.
- Identify companies headquartered in or operating from their jurisdictions that are active in, or sourcing materials from, conflict zones. Compel these companies to carry out due diligence on their operations and their supply chains to ensure that they are not handling conflict resources. Report to
the Security Council on due diligence measures undertaken by these companies.

- Enforce sanctions; actively investigate reports of sanctions violations and, where appropriate, prosecute the parties responsible.

**Peacemaking**

Peacemakers should approach the natural resource dimensions of conflict resolution with a view to setting ‘the rules of the game’ governing the parties’ economic activities during the peace process. This is an important foundation for both peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Global Witness recommends that peacemakers should:

- Address the economic interests of warring parties as a central part of the overall approach to conflict resolution.
- Seek to demilitarise control of natural resources.
- Establish the ‘rules of the game’ for the transition of the war economy to a peacebuilding economy.
- Avoid deals which ‘lock in’ poor governance of natural resources. Limits should be placed on the ability of unelected transitional governments to allocate natural resource concession contracts.
- Build an independent monitoring mechanism into any natural resource wealth-sharing provisions of a peace agreement.
- Incorporate a dispute resolution mechanism into any natural resource wealth-sharing provisions of a peace agreement. This might consist of an agreement to refer disputes to an arbitration tribunal.
- Require international guarantors of a peace agreement to play a role in enforcing any provisions concerning natural resource management. The cost to the parties of a failure to adhere to these provisions should be clear, significant and enforceable by law.

- Ensure that any attempt to bring informal and illegal activities relating to natural resources into the formal economy should be based on clear and verifiable standards of behaviour backed by regulation.
- Draw on natural resource assessments by experts, such as those on the UN’s Mediation Support Unit roster, that provide a description of what resources are at issue, their potential values and their relevance to the negotiations.

**Peacekeeping**

Global Witness believes that peacekeepers intervening in conflicts that have a natural resource dimension must be mandated to deal with it directly. Peacekeepers should be authorised to work with local, national and regional customs and law enforcement officials, and international monitors or panels of experts, to investigate, to monitor trade routes and border crossings, and to assist in inspections by customs and other government officials. Peacekeeping operations should also be authorised to intercept illicit trade that supports armed groups, while recognising that doing so will depend on the capacities of the mission and the tactical situation on the ground.

Global Witness is recommending that the UN Security Council should:

- Mandate peacekeeping operations to respond to the natural resource dimensions of conflicts.
- Request that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations establish operational guidelines for peackeepers on how to respond to the problem of illicit natural resource exploitation and trade in the theatre of operations.
The UN Secretary-General should:

- Agree a memorandum of understanding with troop-contributing countries to clarify their legal obligation to investigate and prosecute peacekeepers if they are involved in the exploitation and trading of natural resources. UN personnel under investigation for such offences should immediately be suspended.

The UN General Assembly should:

- Establish a professional monitoring body to investigate cases of peacekeepers’ involvement in the exploitation and trading of natural resources. Such a mandate could be integrated to the Office of Internal Oversight or to the mandate of an independent third party monitoring mechanism.

Member States should:

- Provide financial and technical assistance in support of increased cooperation between joint

- Authorise peacekeeping missions to enforce sanctions and laws governing the exploitation and trading of natural resources, including the interdiction and confiscation of shipments, where operational considerations allow.

- Authorise peacekeepers to deploy to sites of natural resource production, where operational considerations allow, to protect these sites from exploitation by abusive state or non-state armed groups, and to protect people living and working at these sites.

- Require cooperation between joint mission analysis cells, expert panels, and local and regional customs and law enforcement agencies to track and intercept shipments of conflict resources.

- Authorise peacekeepers to deploy to protect those international and local officials seeking to police the exploitation and trading of natural resources.
mission analysis cells, expert panels and local and regional law enforcement agencies tasked with curtailing the trafficking of conflict resources.

**Peacebuilding**

The challenge of peacebuilding is to design, negotiate and help manage a transition from conflict which both demilitarises natural resource production and transforms that production into value creation for the economy, decent work for people, and revenues for the state (as opposed to a source of loot for rebels and dictators). In the aftermath of conflicts where natural resources have played a key role, peacebuilding donors should:

- Pursue a strategy of demilitarising and reforming the governance of natural resource exploitation and trade.

- Support the establishment of institutions and laws that ensure transparent allocation of natural resource concessions and transparent management of the revenues derived from their exploitation;

- Make lifting of sanctions and provision of financial support conditional on these reforms.

- Make financial support to a government conditional on it removing its armed forces from any involvement in natural resource exploitation and trade.

- Provide support to law enforcement agencies policing natural resource exploitation and trade.

- Address natural resource-related issues in the context of security sector reform.

- Build capacity to govern natural resource production and trade, including capacity to negotiate natural resource concession contracts with international companies, monitor borders and manage customs.

- Build civil society capacity to monitor natural resource allocation, exploitation and trade and the management of the revenues generated by these activities.
Endnotes


2 According to the UN website http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml, there have been 44 peacekeeping operations initiated since 1990, of which 22 have been deployed in Africa. Out of the 44 missions, 14 have concerned conflicts sustained by revenues from primary commodities: Angola (x3), Cambodia (x2), Somalia (x2), Liberia (x2), Sierra Leone (x2), Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan.


4 Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/22); since 2002, Member States such as Belgium, Canada, Germany and Norway have taken the opportunity of their presence on the Security Council to raise awareness about the issue or attempt to improve implementation.

5 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (S/Res/1559), adopted 19 September 2003. authorised UNMIL in Liberia ‘to assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources’, UN Security Council Resolution 1562 (S/RES/1562), adopted 17 September 2004, authorised UNAMISIL in Sierra Leone, to ‘support the Sierra Leone armed forces and police in patrolling the border and diamond-mining areas’, UN Security Council Resolution 1858 (S/Res/2008), adopted 22 December 2008, authorised MONUC in DRC to use ‘its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources’.


9 For a recent example of Global Witness’ work on natural resources and conflict that pursues a more human rights-focused approach, see legal complaint by Global Witness, Sherpa, Greenpeace France and Alfred Brownell against Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman (DLH), one of the world’s main international timber and wood products wholesalers. The basis of the complaint is evidence that, from 2000-2003, during the civil war in Liberia, DLH bought timber from Liberian companies that provided support to Charles Taylor’s brutal regime. Further information can be found in ‘International timber company DLH accused of funding Liberian war’, a briefing paper published 18 November 2009, available from www.globalwitness.org.

10 UN sanctions have evolved over the past two decades towards a more targeted and functional approach than previously. See, for example, David Cortright and George A Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, Lynne Reiner, 2000.

11 In addition to these functional qualifications of the usefulness of commodity sanctions, there are also political and diplomatic issues: commodity sanctions are contentious for many states and require difficult and lengthy negotiation at the Security Council, time which might be better spent in coordinating the work of actually targeting the parties to the conflict.


20 ibid.


22 Global Witness interview with Forces Nouvelles representative, November 2009.


24 In recent years, the cocoa industry has come under pressure from international initiatives, notably the US Congress-driven Harkin-Engel Protocol, to end child labour in the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere. These initiatives, while extremely laudable, are neither intended to, nor capable of, addressing the cocoa industry’s role in sustaining the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.

Information about sanctions violations is one of the few elements in the 
See, for example, Mark B Taylor, Luc Zandvliet and Mitra Forouhar, 
UN Security Council Resolution 1896 (S/Res/1896), adopted 30 
27 UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (S/Res/1856), adopted 22 
26 UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (S/Res/1857), adopted 22 
24 UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (S/Res/1856), adopted 30 
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7 UN Security Council Resolution 1850 (S/Res/1850), adopted 22 
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1849 (S/Res/1849), adopted 22 
5 UN Security Council Resolution 1848 (S/Res/1848), adopted 22 
4 UN Security Council Resolution 1847 (S/Res/1847), adopted 22 
3 UN Security Council Resolution 1846 (S/Res/1846), adopted 22 
2 UN Security Council Resolution 1845 (S/Res/1845), adopted 22 
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1844 (S/Res/1844), adopted 22 
31 Information about sanctions violations is one of the few elements in the 
30 See, for example, Mark B Taylor, Luc Zandvliet and Mitra Forouhar, 
38 George A Lopez, David Cortright, Alistair Millar and Linda Gerber- 
37 UN Security Council Resolution 1896 (S/Res/1896), adopted 30 
34 Interviews with representatives of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 2009. 
31 Information about sanctions violations is one of the few elements in the 
30 See, for example, Mark B Taylor, Luc Zandvliet and Mitra Forouhar, 
29 John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/8/5, 2008. On due diligence investigation, Ruggie notes in paragraph 57 that: ‘Companies should consider three sets of factors. The first is the country contexts in which their business activities take place, to highlight any specific human rights challenges they may pose. The second is what human rights impacts their own activities may have within that context - for example, in their capacity as producers, service providers, employers, and neighbours. The third is whether they might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activities, such as with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State actors. How far or how deep this process must go will depend on circumstances.’ 
28 UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (S/Res/1856), adopted 22 
27 UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (S/Res/1856), adopted 22 
26 UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (S/Res/1857), adopted 22 
24 UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (S/Res/1856), adopted 30 
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Spoilers have been defined as political or armed groups which intentionally undermine signed peace agreements or similar efforts to halt the fighting, even where they are not parties to those agreements. See, for example, John Stephen, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security, Vol 22 (2), 1997.


Government of Southern Sudan 2009 budget speech, presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly by Kuol Athian Mawien, who was at the time Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 10 December 2008; and Sudan Tribune, “South Sudan Cabinet Passes Final Draft for 2010 Budget”, 29 November 2009.


Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, 8 June 2008.


In December 2009 Global Witness requested figures from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for the total expenditure of MONUC, UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI, since these operations’ inception. DPKO was unable to provide these figures, but suggested that Global Witness could calculate them using the missions’ annual budgets. The figure provided here is therefore a rough estimate, based on data derived from the annual budgets of the four missions, as published in UN annual review reports and Security Council resolutions, as well as information from the DPKO website. It assumes that the sums budgeted for MONUC, UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI are an accurate reflection of the amounts actually spent. It also assumes that the three missions currently active – MONUC, UNMIL and UNOCI – have spent approximately half of their annual budgets for the financial year 2009-2010.


Global Witness exposes the corrupt exploitation of natural resources and international trade systems, to drive campaigns that end impunity, resource-linked conflict, and human rights and environmental abuses.

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