In our current concerns over the future of the United Nations we often lose sight of the centuries-long traditions of thought that inspired the creation of the UN in 1945. The present" system" of the UN and its affiliated agencies embodies two approaches to the quest for peace that historically appear to conflict with each other and yet are necessary to each other in the long run. A brief overview of these two traditions of western thought may help us to appreciate both the fragility and the uniqueness of the UN system.

The first tradition may be labeled the "pacifist" ideal and includes the body of thought that gave rise to numerous peace projects of the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe. Scholars often trace this tradition back to the work of Desiderius Erasmus, the great humanist writer of the Renaissance, who in addition to giving the world the model for a "Renaissance man" wrote passionately (in his Querela Pacis [Complaint of Peace] and other writings) about the scourges of war and the need to settle disputes between Christian princes by means of arbitration undertaken by authorities of the Church. For Erasmus, war
should be avoided at all costs. Indeed, he stated, "one can hardly imagine an unfavorable peace which would not be preferable to the most favorable war."(1)

Consider [war's] instruments, I pray you: Murderers, profligates devoted to gambling and rape, and the vilest sort of mercenary soldier to whom pay is dearer than life. . . . Think, next, of all the crimes that are committed with war as a pretext . . . all the instances of sack and sacrilege, . . . and other shameful acts, such as one hesitates even to name.(2)

Although Erasmus' concern to eliminate war focused on relations between Christians, in his writings he also denounced Christian attacks on the Turks in his examples of the brutality of war.

A century after Erasmus, a French monk named Emeric Crucé envisioned a more specific means of bringing an end to international conflict. In 1623 Crucé published Le Nouveau Cynée ou Discours d'Estat (The New Cynæas, or a Discourse on the State) proposing a federation of states consisting of a permanent Council of Ambassadors that could enforce peace by arbitration amongst themselves, or, if necessary, by the use of force against any unruly member. An early precursor of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter, Crucé's plan aimed to include not only European rulers but the Emperor of the Turks, the Jews, the Kings of Persia and China, the Grand Duke of Moscovy (Russia) and monarchs from India and Africa. In responding to those who might ask how it was possible "to bring in accord peoples who are so different in wishes and affections," Crucé asserted that "such hostilities are only political, and cannot take away the connection that is and must be between men."

Why should I a Frenchman wish harm to an Englishman, a Spaniard, or a Hindoo? I cannot wish it when I consider that they are men like me, that I am subject like them to error and sin and that all nations are bound together by a natural and consequently indestructible tie.(3)

Another distinguishing feature of Crucé's vision for universal peace was the stimulus that such a plan would give to free trade. Anticipating the liberal internationalism of later centuries, Crucé made a strong case for the extension of commerce that would be possible once freedom of the seas could be guaranteed.

More widely read perhaps, though less disinterested and more narrow in its scope than Erasmus' and Crucé's proposals for peace, was Le Grand Dessein (The Grand Design) attributed to Henry IV, King of France, but which we now know to have actually been written by his talented minister, the Duc de Sully. Sully's Design was limited to Europe, and his proposal involved a forcible dissolution of the already weakened Austrian Empire and the redivision of Europe into fifteen states as nearly equal in territory and power as possible, to be
undertaken and supervised by Henry IV himself. The new configuration of states would constitute a "Christian Republic" presided over by a General Council of delegates from each state (four from each great power, two from each of the others) which would hold ultimate jurisdictional power over its member states.(4)

According to Sully's Memoires, the plan had the support of another great monarch of the time, Queen Elizabeth I of England. Given Henry IV's popularity and France's military strength, the plan might plausibly have been put into effect had not Henry IV's life been cut short by an assassin's bullet in 1610. Soon thereafter Europe was thrown into chaos by the series of religious and international conflicts now known as the Thirty Years War.

The pacifist tradition was revived at the end of the 17th century by William Penn, the famous English Quaker and proponent of religious toleration who was active in the founding of Pennsylvania. In 1693 he wrote an Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe proposing the establishment of a European Diet or Parliament representing European states and the rulers of Russia and Turkey. Not dissimilar to proposals by Erasmus, Crucé, and Sully, Penn's Essay spells out more clearly than previous plans the need to give the international body powers of enforcement. Member states would unite their resources to form a military force that could "police the peace" against threats from unruly member states.(5)

While the "sovereigns' wars" of the 18th century were generally more limited in scope and destructiveness than the religious wars of the 16th and 17th century, it is the 18th century that gave the pacifist tradition its most influential and provocative texts. Especially with the works of Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, and Kant, we enter a familiar realm of discourse about peace. Interest in historical precedents has ebbed in recent years, but all three authors were read widely in the period leading up to the plans for a League of Nations, during the founding of the United Nations, and more recently at the height of the Cold War.(6)

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre was an early 18th century idealist and reformer who spent much of his life writing proposals for useful projects that no one at the time took seriously - although included among them were proposals for a graduated income tax, paved roads, and colleges for women. Part of the problem was undoubtedly the Abbé's pedantic writing style. His Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe (Project To Make Peace Perpetual in Europe) went through several drafts and ended up filling three substantial volumes plus a 227-page "Abridgement" and a "Supplement" to the Abridgement, and consisted of seven long "Discourses" containing "Propositions" to be proved, "Articles" to be established, and "Objections" to be refuted. (One volume included no less than seventy possible objections.)
His excessive verbiage notwithstanding, the Abbé's main point was that by agreeing to organize themselves into a permanent league or union and by agreeing to settle their differences by peaceful negotiations rather than by war, the sovereigns of Europe could become secure in their power and could gain mutual protection against invasions from without and uprisings from within. Such advantages, the Abbé makes clear, could only come through some measure of restraint; any sovereign who either attacked the union or refused to accept its judgments or held back from joining it once it had been established by fourteen other states would be forced to do so by an army maintained by contributions from each member state.(7)

The Abbé's plan might have been tossed into the dust-bin of history had not the boxes containing his various Projects been given to a friend of a friend of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who suggested that the eloquent philosopher undertake the job of selecting and editing the Abbé's writings so as to make them more useful to posterity. Motivated in part by curiosity, in part by a sense of indebtedness to his friend, and in part by a lack of any other specific project at the time (this being shortly after he had completed his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality but before he had begun working on the Social Contract), Rousseau agreed to take up the task.

What resulted from Rousseau's editing was two distinct works. The first was a twenty-one page "Summary" of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace analyzing the natural anarchy of the state "system" and affirming the need for an international body that might govern relations among states in the same way that a state governs relations among individuals. The second piece was a shorter but more pessimistic "Critique" of the Abbé's plan denying the possibility that ruling monarchs would ever agree to any limits on their power to make war. "If ever a moral truth has been demonstrated," Rousseau states at the beginning of the "Critique," "it is the general and the specific usefulness of this project." Indeed, he continues, "so much would the experience allow each individual to gain from the common good, that to realize the European Republic for one day would be enough to make it last forever." However, he then says, in an apparently sudden turnabout, these same princes who would defend the European Republic with all their might once it existed would now be opposed even to its being set up, and they would invariably prevent it from being established with just as much energy as they would prevent it from being destroyed.(8)

The double-edged nature of Rousseau's response to Saint-Pierre's Project has meant that Rousseau's assessments of the possibilities for peace have been (like other aspects of his political theory) the subject of widely differing interpretations. In the early years of the 20th century when hopes for an
effective League of Nations were high, students of Rousseau stressed his pacifism, whereas in mid-century during the Cold War his works were generally used to buttress the "realist" trend in international relations theory.(9)

One way to reconcile such divergent interpretations is to read Rousseau's writings on war and peace in the context of his other political writings. Given the Rousseauean belief that political associations derive their coherence and sense of purpose from a "general will," in other words from an awareness of the common good that can serve as the standard for the society's welfare, it is understandable why he would look positively on any peace plan that might allow states to find alternatives to war. But also given Rousseau's view that the people themselves are the true source of all sovereignty and that politics should be the responsibility of the whole nation, it is understandable why he would be skeptical about a plan for peace that relied solely on the benevolent self-interest of "princes." What prince, he asks sarcastically in the "Critique," "would support without indignation the idea of seeing himself forced to be just, not only toward foreigners but even toward his own subjects?"(10)

One of Rousseau's most significant readers was Immanuel Kant, who in 1795 published an essay entitled Zum ewigen Frieden -- literally To Eternal Peace but usually translated as Perpetual Peace to mark its connection to the works of Saint-Pierre and Rousseau. The most skeptical (some might say realistic) of texts in the pacifist canon, Kant opens his essay with a comment that the title - To Eternal Peace -- was taken from "a certain Dutch shopkeeper's sign, on which a graveyard was painted." Maintaining a similar sense of irony throughout his essay, Kant nevertheless conveys the hope that peace among nations can be achieved in the long run.

More schematically and logically laid out than previous plans for peace, Kant's exposition is divided into "preliminary" and "definitive" articles that together constitute a set of preconditions for perpetual peace among nations. Included among the first group are the assumptions that no treaty of peace that tacitly or secretly reserves materials for a future war shall be held valid; that mercenary armies shall be gradually abolished (since their existence actually provokes war and since "paying men to kill or be killed. . . is inconsistent with the rights of humanity"); that no nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of another; and finally that no nation at war with another shall permit such acts of war as shall make mutual trust impossible during some future time of peace.(11)

In this last Article Kant is touching on issues generally included in just war doctrine, which will be discussed below. One must note, however, that in his commentary on this Article Kant anticipates 20th century concerns by stating
that "a war of extermination where the destruction of both parties along with all rights is the result would permit perpetual peace to occur only in the vast graveyard of humanity as a whole. Thus, such a war, including all means used to wage it, must be absolutely prohibited." (Italics mine.)

The "definitive" articles are more general and include the following key conditions: that the civil constitution of every nation should be republican (i.e. based on a contract undertaken by free citizens, although Kant makes clear that the form of the government chosen by the people may not necessarily be a democratic one); that the right or law of nations (i.e. international law) shall be based on a federation of free states; and that "cosmopolitan right" (or world law) should be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. The federation of free states discussed in the second article would be called a "league of peace," and would not seek any power of the sort possessed by nations, "but only the maintenance and security of each nation's own freedom . . . [and] should eventually include all nations and thus lead to perpetual peace." (13)

In his "Supplement" to the above Articles Kant asserts that the present state of international anarchy would still be preferable to any kind of dictatorial world state, or "universal monarchy" but also that with growing understanding among different peoples and especially with the expansion of trade, relations among states would gradually improve. On this latter point, Kant markedly differentiates himself from Rousseau, who believed that economic competition actually increased the risks of war. In arguing that it is "free citizens" rather than kings who have an interest in promoting peace, however, Kant was clearly building upon Rousseauean thought.

One more 18th century peace plan deserves mention here, not because it had any influence on subsequent events but because of the unique circumstances of its composition. In the summer of 1782 a shabbily-dressed peasant from the south of France walked all the way to Paris to present the Ambassador from the newly-independent United States, Benjamin Franklin, with a "Project for Universal and Perpetual Peace" that he had written while in prison on a false charge of murder. Franklin took an interest in the man, whose name was Pierre-Andre Gargaz, and had several copies of the plan printed on his private press at Passy.

The text of Gargaz' Project for Universal and Perpetual Peace offers nothing new (except perhaps brevity) that had not been proposed earlier by either Sully or the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, but Franklin stated in letters to his friends that despite the "rustic and poor appearance" of its author, he found much "good sense" in the plan and honored "the character of this véritable philosophe." Needless to say, although Gargaz sent freshly-printed copies of the Project to the brother of
the King of France and to other dignitaries of the time, he never received any
response from them.(14)
Except for a posthumously-published "Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace"
by the Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (15), the trajectory of thought
that constitutes the pacifist tradition becomes more diffuse once one enters the
19th century. On the one hand are the plans for world order put forth by
ambitious rulers and military leaders: Napoleon I, Czar Alexander I, and Simon
Bolivar all made various proposals for international mechanisms to enforce
peace. On the other hand are more modest projects for international cooperation
by reformers such as Emma Willard, a pioneer in the education of women;
William Ladd, who furthered the idea of a world court, and Baroness Suttner,
who inspired Alfred Nobel to establish the Nobel Prizes. All are to be credited
with keeping alive the pacifist ideal while important groundwork was being
accomplished in the parallel tradition of just war theory and international law, to
which we now turn.

II
The tradition of thought that evolved into secular just war theory and eventually
into the acceptance of the concept of international law has a textual history that
is in some ways older than that of pacifism. The notion that war is sometimes
necessary to political life but that it should at least be limited goes back to the
early Church fathers who found themselves having to reconcile Christ's
exhortation to "love thy neighbor" with the need to defend a political institution
from external threats. In the decades preceding the fall of the Roman Empire,
Saint Augustine put forth arguments about a Christian's right to go to war that
would later become the core of one branch of what is known as Christian just
war doctrine (to be distinguished from secular just war doctrine which evolved
later on).

Augustine's main teachings (some of which derived from Roman law and
practice) were that while war may be necessary and even useful - particularly
war against non-Christians -- the war thus undertaken must not be entered into
lightly. War must arise from a justifiable cause and be authorized by a proper
authority; its overall purpose should be to promote peace, its means should be
proportionate to its ends, and it should be motivated by the right "intentions."

With the fall of Rome and the disintegration of the Empire into warring fiefdoms,
Augustine's writings on the limitations of war disappeared from people's minds
and from military practice. Seven centuries later, however, they were taken up
once again by thinkers such as Gratian and Saint Thomas Aquinas, and, over a
period of time, combined with concepts drawn from canon law, theology, secular
law, chivalry, and the habits of relations among princes to form the "classic"
Christian just war theory of the high middle ages and beyond.(16)
By the 15th century Christian just war theory had crystallized into a single doctrine consisting of two parts, one referring to permissible reasons for going to war (jus ad bellum) and the other to permissible actions during war (jus in bello).

Classical jus ad bellum required that there be 1) just cause (e.g. to retake something wrongfully taken, to punish evil, or to defend against an attack either planned or in progress); 2) a right authority for initiating the use of force; 3) a right intention on the part of those employing such force; 4) that the force used be proportional (not doing more harm than good); 5) that it be a last resort; 6) that it be undertaken with peace as its goal, and 7) that there be a reasonable hope of success.

Jus in bello was limited to two general precepts: 1) the principle of proportionality of means (requiring that forms of force be avoided that cause gratuitous or otherwise unnecessary destruction, and 2) the principle of noncombatant immunity, requiring that noncombatants should be protected so far as possible from the ravages of war.(17)

While the standards of classical just war theory still retain their usefulness (one might ask, for example, if they would serve to justify the recent NATO bombing of Serbia), the transformations in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries soon brought to the fore new theories on the limitation of war. With the Protestant Reformation, the ensuing religious wars, and the appearance of states based on secular rather than religious ideologies, the Christian just war theory of earlier centuries gradually gave way to more secular views. The Spanish theologians Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez initiated this new movement with their attempts to ground just war doctrine in natural law rather than divine law, but the main figure at this point in the trajectory is the Dutch jurist and philosopher, Hugo Grotius, whose pathbreaking De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Rights of War and Peace) has earned him the title "father of international law."(18)

There is much in Grotius' Rights of War and Peace(1625) that might alienate the modern reader. Grotius' writing is cluttered with now-obscure references to classical and Biblical sources; he often seems ambiguous about specific rulings on the right to go to war; and, worst of all, he blatantly justifies the practice of enslaving a defeated enemy (even including noncombatants), a "right" that later could be used to justify absolutism and the institution of slavery.(19)

Grotius' work is still appreciated, however, for the limits it set on religious wars and for its pragmatic attempt to find sources of law that do not depend upon Christian doctrine. His main contribution in this area was to recognize two primary alternatives to divine law, which he referred to as the law of nature and
the law of nations. The law of nature points to the existence of certain universals that derive from our innate sociability and our desire for self-preservation. The law of nations, in contrast, comes out of the customary practices and relationships of actual states (like the mutual agreements to give honorable treatment to ambassadors). Any attempt to formulate international law, Grotius suggests, must somehow make prudent use of both sets of norms.

Unlike many of the pacifist theorists discussed in Part I above, Grotius did not see the system of sovereign states as leading necessarily to a state of war. There was, in his view, a potential for trust and reciprocity in international affairs without the need for a supervisory power such as that envisioned by his fellow Dutchman, Erasmus. Grotius' flexible and open-ended approach to the challenge of limiting war and in particular his understanding of the need to build on precedent and humane practice in the relations among states provided the theoretical grounding for much of the contextual evolution of international law that took place in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Before moving ahead to more recent thinking about international law three more early theorists need to be recognized. The first is John Locke, who is well known for the influence he had on Thomas Jefferson's "Declaration of Independence" but who is not so well known for his limitations on the rights of war. Countering the rather extensive rights of conquest put forth by Grotius, Locke argued that even in a just war, the conqueror may not kill or enslave anyone but the actual combatants, nor may he take over the defeated enemy's lands or possessions: [The victor] has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it.(20)

Property may be taken to provide for war reparations, but even this right is to be limited if such reparations would mean that the wives and children of the defeated were left without subsistence. And if a new government is forced upon the defeated peoples, they have the right to rebel, either immediately or in the future. Nowhere else in just war theory do we find such extensive jus in bello limitations on what rights a victor, even in a war of self-defense, may have over the defeated.(21)

At this point we again encounter Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who perhaps contributed as significantly to the just war tradition as he did to the pacifist ideal, though in a less systematic way. In an unpublished fragment generally referred to as "L'Etat de guerre" ("The State of War"), Rousseau drafted principles that he later condensed into Chapter 4 of On Social Contract concerning the nature of war and limitations on the rights of conquest.
More explicitly than any other theorist, Rousseau asserts that war is never a relationship between human beings but only between states. Human beings may quarrel or fight, but the rational planning and sustained purpose implied by war is something undertaken only by artificial political bodies. The logical consequence of this assumption is that killing is permissible only by actual combatants (a point made by Locke) and that once hostilities have ended, the victors have no rights over the lives of the defeated; they cannot even enslave them (a point that counters Grotius and Locke, both of whom had justified enslavement of the defeated as an alternative to killing them). "The right of slavery is invalid," Rousseau asserts unequivocally. "These words, slavery and right, are contradictory; they are mutually exclusive."(22) Rousseau's forceful denunciation of slavery and his focus on states rather than peoples as the source of war were frequently cited in international relations theory at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.(23)

The final figure in the history of the just war canon is Emeric Vattel, a Swiss jurist of the late 18th century. His work Le Droit des gens (The Law of Nations) was subtitled "Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns," which gives an idea of general aims of his complex and elaborate theory. In contrast to the "perpetual peace' theorists of the 18th century, Vattel explicitly rejected the idea of a commonwealth of nations that would have authority over its component members; instead he argues for the observance of rights and obligations derived from the law of nature.

In Vattel's hands natural law becomes the secular ground from which many of the classical just war precepts reemerge. In terms of jus ad bellum his principle "prohibits all nations every evil practice tending to create disturbance in another state," including fomenting discord, corrupting its citizens, and depriving it of its natural advantages. A state's right to wage war is thus limited to self preservation. In terms of jus in bello, the strong argument Vattel makes for non-combatant immunity is also rooted in self-interest and common sense: by preserving the enemy's civilian population and land the victorious armies will gain more in the long run. Included in his wide condemnation of needless violence is even the exhortation against bombing, burning, or defacing "fine edifices" that "do honour to human society, and do not contribute to the enemy's power."(24) III

Needless to say, none of the theorists covered in this survey ever saw any of their plans for peace or limitations on war put into practice. Every thinker from Erasmus to Ladd and from Augustine to Vattel died not knowing whether his dreams would ever be realized or even if his writings would ever be read.

With the 19th century the focus shifted -- both in pacifist thought and in secular just war theory -- from grand theories to organizational efforts. The century saw
the growth of peace societies and peace "churches," and a growing sense of cosmopolitanism, at least in Europe. At the same time, an effort was made to codify or formalize the rights of war by means of military manuals on the conduct of war (most notably the General Orders No. 100 of the United States Army during the Civil war), at the first Geneva Convention in 1864 defining a "humanitarian" law of war, and at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1909 limiting the use of certain weapons and means of war. Such scattered efforts failed to prevent the outbreak of World War I, and after the demise of the well-intended League of Nations, World War II followed closely in its wake.

At this point one might do well to reflect upon the differences between the two paths in the quest for peace traced above. Pacifists generally argued that war is evil, that the greed of sovereign "princes" or the state system in general perpetuate war, and that the world thus needs a supra-national political body that could encourage peaceful alternatives to war and when necessary take active measures to enforce peace. In contrast, just war theorists and international lawyers generally argued that war is sometimes necessary, that states are the only viable unit of governance, and that the hope for peace lies in finding conventional limits to war within the system of sovereign states that currently exists.

Although the two traditions of thought evolved along quite separate paths, a logical tie unites them. For without an overarching governing body, international law becomes unenforceable; and without a mandate to develop and enforce international law, any institution set up to promote peace remains ineffective. The challenge for the future is thus to realize in practice the underlying unity of the two ideals. Pacifism and legalism are complementary rather than contradictory aims; political history teaches that peace can be achieved only when the rule of force is replaced by the rule of law.

With the establishment of the United Nations and international legal institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity, we finally have in place institutions that past visionaries could only hope would eventually evolve. A sobering question that remains is whether all of us who constitute the "free citizens" of the world are willing to take the responsibility for peace that Kant and other early theorists gave us.

Part of the rational for trying to keep alive the memory of the literature on pacifism and just war theory has been to suggest that we in the present have a responsibility to make the UN and its legal affiliates survive and flourish -- not only for the sake of ourselves and future generations, but also for the sake of the idealists in centuries past who were able to imagine the potentiality for peace that we actually possess today.
Endnotes

A Preliminary Note on Sources

The traditions of thought that I attempt to resurrect and reaffirm in this paper are in the process of disappearing from the scholarly record. Despite a heroic effort by Blanche W. Cooke, Charles Chatfield, and Sandi Cooper in the early 1970's to put together The Garland Library of War and Peace that would bring back into print the key texts from the whole canon of pacifist and just war thought, many of the seminal texts in the series can no longer be found, even in large academic libraries such as those at Columbia University and New York University. Especially unfortunate is their absence from the United Nations Library, which contains the Woodrow Wilson collection that originally contained many of the titles mentioned in this paper. Today, however, key works in the collection are mis-catalogued or have been lost and never replaced. A worthy project for a reader with patience and computer skills would be to create an on-line archive of the history of the idea of peace.
(2) Quoted from Johnson, p. 158.
(5) For Penn's plan, see Ibid. See also Johnson, p. 180, and Elizabeth V. Souleyman, The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1941.
(9) Ibid., p. 109.
(10) Ibid., p. 223.
(12) Ibid., p. 107-110.
(13) Ibid., pp. 115-119.
(15) Peace Plans of the Eighteenth Century, op. cit. Bentham's plan was part of a four-part work on the Principles of International Law that proposed disarmament, the institution of an International Court, and the principle of "publicity" for all international agreements.
(16) Johnson, Chapters 1 and 2; see especially pp. 67-68 and p. 58.
(19) See Rousseau's criticism of Grotius on just this point in chapter 4 of Book I of Rousseau's On Social Contract.
(23) For bibliographic sources see Roosevelt, pp. 62 and n42 p. 242.
(24) Quoted in Johnson, The Quest for Peace, pp., 203-206.