The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)

April 1992 - March 1995
Foreword
by

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It is important to study the international community's efforts in Somalia in detail, for several reasons. Firstly, it was in many respects a bold experiment, testing the ability of the international community to help a people overwhelmed by famine and anarchy. Secondly, its size and complexity render it ideally suited for analytical study to bring out lessons and thirdly, the operations in Somalia, taken as a whole, had successes in many spheres, thanks in no small measure to the combined efforts of some governments, the United Nations and non governmental organisations. We can be proud of the fact that when we withdrew from Somalia, there was no more starvation, and district and regional councils had been established in parts of the country.

In addition, it was certainly another mission related success that the United Nations terminated the Somalia mission when it became apparent that some of its objectives were not within reach. Consequently, the withdrawal from Somalia was conducted in an exemplary way and can be considered an organisational masterpiece. It is important not to lose sight of these successes and to examine in some depth, the elements which made them possible.

While we can reflect upon the successes with gratification, it is imperative to analyze those aspects where success was not achieved, all the more so since the operations cost the lives of 154 peacekeepers, whose supreme sacrifice must never be forgotten. There were some controversial aspects of the mission which had an impact upon the credibility of United Nations peacekeeping and whose repercussions were felt in other peacekeeping operations.

The troops and civilian personnel on the ground are at the cutting end of peacekeeping. It is they who feel the direct effects of the Security Council's decisions; of the international community's political and material support; of the Secretariat's executive direction and management and of logistical and administrative support. Members of the Security Council, troop contributing governments and the Secretariat, therefore, have a special responsibility to learn from the experience of Somalia, so that we are better prepared to maximize opportunities for success in future operations.

In June 1995, we conducted the first seminar on lessons learned in Somalia at the strategic and operational levels, for senior UNOSOM staff and a broad spectrum of persons from the United Nations system who were directly involved with the operation. That was an important first step and was followed by the more comprehensive seminar in which members of the Security Council, troop contributing governments and non governmental organisations also participated.
The Somalia experience has highlighted and brought into focus some important and perennial aspects of peacekeeping that need to be addressed urgently - the importance of matching mandates with means, the requirement for the United Nations to explain its mission better to the local population as well as in the international media, the need for troop contributing governments to prepare their peoples psychologically for the risks inherent in peacekeeping operations, the importance of unified command, the circumstances under which the use of force may become unavoidable even in self defence, and those in which the use of force may be counterproductive.

To benefit from experience, we must not only learn lessons, but also act on them. This report highlights the lessons of Somalia and includes current information on aspects that have since been acted upon or where action is being undertaken/contemplated. There are some issues which are entirely within the authority of the Secretariat to correct; others which national governments can correct on their own; and still others requiring all of us to work in tandem to seek solutions. We in the Secretariat look forward to cooperating with all in endeavours to improve peacekeeping.
Introduction

1. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), established on 24 April 1992, was terminated on 5 March 1995. During that period, in addition to the many missions to Somalia by senior United Nations officials to review various aspects of the Operation, the Security Council sent a Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to its resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks against UNOSOM II personnel which had resulted in casualties among them as well as among Somali citizens. (A list of the members of the Commission appears in Annex I.) The Commission conducted its work from November 1993 to January 1994 and, thereafter, proposed recommendations from which it thought the Organization could learn lessons in establishing and managing future peacekeeping operations.

2. With the UNOSOM mandate terminated, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted an internal evaluation in a series of end-of-mission reports in which the problems that confronted the Operation from an administrative and logistics perspective were highlighted. This evaluation was followed, in June 1995, by a Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNOSOM at the strategic and operational levels, organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) with the sponsorship of DPKO. Attended by senior UNOSOM and UN officials who were involved in the Operation both in the field and at Headquarters (see Annex II), the seminar reached certain conclusions which its participants considered were lessons that could be learned.

3. Troop-contributing countries form the core of any peacekeeping operation in that they provide the much needed manpower and logistics. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for their part, help create a humanitarian environment in which a peacekeeping operation can function by ameliorating the human conditions that usually are found in countries in conflict. For that reason, their experiences are significant in drawing out some of the lessons that can be learned.

4. The views of troop-contributing countries to UNOSOM and of the NGOs who worked in Somalia during UNOSOM were solicited in two ways. First, a Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNOSOM, organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany, the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden and NUPI, with the sponsorship of DPKO and additional support from the Ford Foundation, was held from 13 to 15 September 1995. It was attended by representatives of troop-contributing countries, NGOs, Somali researchers and other experts as well as senior UNOSOM and United Nations officials. (See Annex III). Wide-ranging discussions were held, and analyses made, in plenary meetings and in four syndicates: Security Council Mandates; Political Aspects and Institution-building; Humanitarian Aspects and Information Management; and Military Aspects, Logistics and Intelligence. In addition to participating in the seminar, troop-contributing countries and NGOs were requested to provide DPKO with detailed notes of the experiences of their contingents and/or personnel, respectively, in Somalia which could contribute to a comprehensive evaluation
of this complicated Operation. Their responses have provided very valuable insights into UNOSOM.

5. Early this year, the DPKO established a Lessons-Learned Unit in the Office of Planning and Support to provide a greater capacity for in-depth study and analysis of experience in peacekeeping operations, so that the conclusions drawn could be applied to ongoing and future operations. The unit has coordinated the many evaluations of UNOSOM and analysed the conclusions reached at all levels of the process, with almost the same conclusions arrived at albeit from different perspectives. Part I of this report presents the lessons learned from UNOSOM.

6. The United Nations office responsible for peacekeeping operations, which was reorganized and renamed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1992, shortly after UNOSOM was established, responded swiftly to the lessons it learned early in that Operation and from past experiences. Many of the lessons described in the evaluations have already been applied to existing and new operations; others have been implemented partially and still others have yet to be applied. Part II of this report examines the extent to which the lessons learned have been applied. Some lessons can only be effected by Members States in general, and troop-contributing countries in particular, as well as by the Security Council; others can be applied by the United Nations Secretariat and by United Nations agencies; and some can be implemented by the NGO community.

7. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace", demonstrates the extent to which the Organization has learned from its experience in peacekeeping, including from UNOSOM. Acknowledging that the years after the cold war have confirmed that respect for certain basic principles of peacekeeping are essential to its success, he writes: "Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not".

8. A successful peacekeeping operation is one in which there is unity of purpose between troop-contributing countries; Member States, particularly Security Council members; the United Nations Secretariat; UN agencies; and the humanitarian community. Significant to an operation's success is the political will of the local population to assume responsibility in the settlement of a crisis for which a peacekeeping operation has been established.

9. UNOSOM, as a complex operation dealing with multidimensional problems, offered many lessons that, if accurately analysed and understood by all concerned, could only lead to improvements in the establishment and management of peacekeeping operations. This Comprehensive Report concludes the evaluation of UNOSOM that began as soon as the Operation was established and continued well after its termination.
Part I: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia

Mandate and Means

10. Evaluation of UNOSOM at all levels has concluded that the Operation's mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process and was open to myriad interpretations. The mandate changed from protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and assisting in political reconciliation, to establishing and maintaining a "secure environment", to capturing a leader of one of the factions at one stage and, later, to encouraging negotiations with that same leader. These mandates were, in many respects, contradictory, and most often the changes were decided upon with little explanation to Member States, troop-contributing countries, the humanitarian community operating in Somalia or the Somali people. As a consequence, UNOSOM was bedevilled with disagreements among the various players -- between troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, contingents and NGOs, senior UNOSOM officials and the humanitarian community, UNOSOM and UN agencies -- which, in the end, even led to clashes between UNOSOM and some elements of the Somali community.

11. The evaluation noted many troop contributors' complaint that they were not sufficiently consulted during the formulation stage of the mandate and, thus, had varying perceptions and interpretations during its execution. Many participants in the exercise considered that the original UNOSOM mandate was formulated on political, humanitarian and military assessments, and was prepared, using insufficient information, by officers borrowed for short periods from Member Governments and other peacekeeping operations. Some participants observed that although it was well known that a crisis was unfolding in Somalia, its seriousness and magnitude in humanitarian terms were not fully appreciated.

12. The evaluation concluded, therefore, that the mandate of a peacekeeping operation should be as clear as possible to allow it to be translated into a detailed operational plan, leaving no room for ambiguity or differing perceptions as to the roles and tasks of various elements. Troop-contributing countries should be consulted during the formulation phase and have their responsibilities explained clearly, to remove the temptation for contingents to seek directives from their Governments during the execution of a mandate.

13. While it is the responsibility of the Security Council to formulate mandates, participants underscored that it is the duty of the Secretariat to provide comprehensive and professional political, military and humanitarian assessments of a situation. And only on the basis of accurate information should a practicable mandate be formulated or a determination made of whether the United Nations should even establish a peacekeeping operation to deal with a particular crisis. Mandates should reflect realities on the ground.

14. It was ironic -- and ill-boding -- that the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a multinational force set up under the direction of the Security Council and given wide power, ample resources and a limited mandate, handed over operational responsibility to
UNOSOM II, which was given far less authority but a much broader mandate. Moreover, UNITAF, with all its resources, covered only part of southern Somalia, while UNOSOM II, with more limited resources, was supposed to cover the entire country. If the resources necessary for the implementation of a mandate are not available, the Council should revise its objectives accordingly.

**Planning**

15. In the establishment of UNOSOM I and II, integrated planning was limited to two short visits to Somalia by interdepartmental technical teams. The evaluation of UNOSOM emphasized the need for integrated planning and coordination of all elements in peacekeeping operations as well as the need to provide those operations with the corresponding resources to implement a particular mandate. It is essential to enunciate a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action that integrate all the relevant dimensions, be they humanitarian, political, security, information or other.

16. The initial planning should presuppose nothing. In the case of UNOSOM I, it was assumed that peacekeepers were the right tool for the task. It was never asked whether the involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance programmes could be counterproductive to the long-term humanitarian strategy. Some participants felt that although the humanitarian NGOs were represented in the first technical team visit to Somalia, they were not fully consulted in the final preparation of the plan to deploy UNOSOM. Were there other ways to achieve the same objective with the same or less cost and risk? Probably not, but this is the very question that should be asked at the beginning of the planning for each operation.

17. A viable, integrated plan requires ample information and analysis in advance of an operation -- an understanding of what the Organization is getting into and the nature of the problem. For example, is it purely a humanitarian problem or a deeply rooted societal conflict? Who are the parties, what are their interests, who are their supporters, what are the sources of leverage? The United Nations Secretariat could elicit much of this information from external sources -- Member States, regional organizations, NGOs and academic experts. However, it was not until UNOSOM was well under way that United Nations officials met, under the auspices of an NGO, with a group of leading academic experts on Somalia. These discussions were very helpful but came too late to influence the planning of the mission. Such expertise should be consulted during the planning phase. And while the operation is in progress, it needs the capacity to gather, analyse and feed information to the responsible security, political or humanitarian officials. Such capacity was non-existent in UNOSOM I and did not begin to take shape until well into UNOSOM II.

18. It is essential to have an integrated mission plan covering political, humanitarian and military aspects, each dovetailed into and complementing the other. The plan should be sufficiently detailed and be based on reliable information and sound assessment. Operational plans should be prepared in consultation with contingents to ensure maximum execution. All operational and relevant intelligence should be shared between
contingents and Headquarters. All involved should recognize that different components will play the lead role at different stages of a mission.

**Coordination**

19. A coordinated overall plan -- to include but not be limited to clear mission statements, command relations, rules of engagement, coordination procedures, standard operating procedures, intelligence management, and administrative and logistics policy and procedures -- should be defined before the deployment of any operation. This was not done for UNOSOM and there were obvious and direct operational consequences. Prior coordinated planning is critical to success. Such coordinated planning, in consultation with troop-contributing countries, was not accomplished sufficiently before the under-manned, under-resourced, under-funded UNOSOM II assumed an expanded military mission from UNITAF. Had the opposite been true, perhaps the different national perceptions and agendas which resulted in unity of command problems during UNOSOM II would have been exposed sooner rather than during the operation itself. It bears emphasizing that peacekeeping operations, being multinational in character, are difficult under the best of circumstances.

20. Both UNOSOM I and II suffered from a lack of unity among the components of the operation. Because a complex emergency must be dealt with in its many dimensions, on the basis of a strategy involving different components, the operation in the field must be a fully developed, integrated structure in which all the players have a role. At the head of such a structure, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) should be not only an experienced negotiator with political skills but also an effective manager of a complex organization, namely, the UN operation as a whole. The central authority of the SRSG is crucial. One could ask whether frequent changing of the individuals serving as SRSG contributes to, or detracts from, developing an integrated structure in the field. UNOSOM I and II had a total of five SRSGs within a three-year period.

21. There were other structural impediments to integrated planning and operation in Somalia. First, at United Nations Headquarters, responsibility for different aspects of the operation was splintered across several departments within the Secretariat. The result was "stove-pipe" communication between the field and New York. For example, the Chief Administrative Officer would report to one department, the SRSG to a second and the Humanitarian Coordinator to a third. As such, one hand did not know what the other was doing. And even after regular interdepartmental communication and coordination was achieved at the desk-officer level, this group, when faced with issues they could not resolve among themselves, often found that policy guidance from the highest levels was not forthcoming. Thus, better vertical communication is an issue to be addressed. Under circumstances such as those which prevailed in Somalia, effective interdepartmental coordination is essential.

22. Secondly, the components in the field -- especially the humanitarian providers and the military -- had very little experience working with each other and began the undertaking with a considerable degree of mutual suspicion, even mutual stereotyping. This problem
became less acute as they developed professional relationships in the course of working together. Training in this area is essential if the same problem is to be minimized in future operations.

23. A third impediment was budgetary. While the security and political aspects of the operation were funded against assessed contributions, the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects were funded by agencies and NGOs dependent on voluntary contributions, which often arrived late or not at all. This is a problem which has not yet been addressed. Budgetary and financial procedures often impede the ability of an operation to quickly and nimbly respond to the needs of the people on the ground. Integrated plans and budgetary procedures (currently splintered between different functions) must be rationalized one with the other to ensure synchronization of implementation. Current budgetary procedures basically prevent the use of assessed contributions for humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and development assistance. This is an issue which must be aggressively tackled by Member States, because only they can change the rules. Civic action is essential during an operation for several reasons: to help the people; to ensure that they will support and work with the operation; and, in some cases, to provide incentives to the parties to cooperate with each other.

24. A fourth impediment was that the humanitarian providers, for reasons which are described below, resisted full integration with the rest of the operation. The agencies wanted to retain a certain amount of independence, on the grounds that political objectives might sometimes conflict with humanitarian ones. And with their own budgets, sources of funding and governing bodies to which they were answerable, humanitarian agencies were in a strong position to do so. They had priorities that differed from those of the SRSG on how to spend their money, and they preferred not to be used -- or to be perceived as being used -- for political purposes such as inducing peace. Therefore, aid that is to be used as leverage to foster political reconciliation must be funded from assessed contributions for the peace operation and its providers must be part of that operation.

25. While issues remain unresolved concerning the degree of integration of the agencies into overall strategy and operations, there is widespread agreement that close coordination between humanitarian providers and peacekeeping components is essential. A lack of clarity of the roles and responsibilities of UN departments and agencies involved in relief operations contributed to difficulties in relief management. Over the course of the UNOSOM mandate, progress was made in this area. A full-fledged humanitarian section, headed by a very senior Humanitarian Coordinator, reported to the SRSG, participated in the daily meetings of UNOSOM's senior staff and coordinated efforts not only with the agencies but also with the NGOs. In addition, the SRSG or his deputy chaired a weekly meeting with all the agencies. An important weakness in this system was that due to the security problem, the senior personnel of some of the agencies were based in Nairobi. As a result, only junior staff, sometimes with relatively little authority, were available for coordination in the field. This is an issue which remains to be addressed in the total context of the special challenges of delivering humanitarian assistance in a sometimes hostile environment.
At the same time, humanitarian operations in Somalia suffered from the frequent change of coordinators and relief personnel and the prolonged absence of key relief actors from Mogadishu. In three years, there were no less than five Humanitarian Coordinators or Acting Coordinators.

26. For greater continuity of effective management, the United Nations system should ensure that key coordinators remain in post for longer periods of time. It should define more clearly the roles of its component parts in humanitarian relief operations, especially the chain of command. Respect for the mandates, expertise and accountability of the agencies to the donors involved must be assured.

27. Important lessons were learned and implemented with regard to coordination with NGOs. At UNOSOM headquarters in Mogadishu, the practice evolved whereby the Humanitarian Coordinator convened weekly meetings to which all providers of humanitarian assistance, including NGOs, were invited. The humanitarian operations centres throughout southern Somalia were also a useful mechanism for decentralizing the work of the Humanitarian Coordinator. From the experience of UNOSOM, it was recognized that the activities of NGOs go a long way to help or hinder a peacekeeping operation. Effective coordination with NGOs is therefore vital. It is also important to remember that at any given time the interests of some NGOs may be at variance with those of the operation. An important criterion in selecting senior staff for a peacekeeping operation, therefore, is their ability to manage such differences in a constructive manner.

28. As a corollary, military mission planning -- especially the coordinated military operations plan -- should be part of an integrated United Nations mission planning effort. Military operations are not an end unto themselves; they should be subordinate to, and support the goals and objectives of, the combined civilian/military operation. Military plans, prior to deployment and throughout the mission, must be coordinated and integrated with the political, humanitarian and other key aspects of a mission plan. Although considerable effort was expended throughout the various phases of UNOSOM towards this end, it began too late and fell victim to not only a lack of resources to execute plans, but a lack of unity of purpose compounded by varying national agendas.

29. The quality of civilian/military coordination and cooperation varied during the UNOSOM period. Coordination structures, procedures and policies were not uniform among the contingents and were often dependent on personalities. Moreover, the range and limitations of military support available to humanitarian operations were often unclear and at times inconsistent.

30. Standard operating procedures governing civilian/military relations need to be developed. These should include information on the role, function and organization of coordination mechanisms such as civilian/military operation centres. In addition, they should describe the range of military support services (e.g., transportation, engineering, logistics, security) available to humanitarian organizations. Mechanisms should also be established to resolve day-to-day management issues as well as urgent problems.
requiring the attention of top management. The lack of mutual knowledge between the military and humanitarian groups regarding organizational mandates, objectives, operating procedures and constraints led to friction and misunderstanding.

31. The Somalia operation was hampered by the lack of a clearly defined common goal which would have provided the humanitarian organizations and military forces with a single framework for their activities. Some participants in the evaluation felt that prior to launching future United Nations missions involving the military in humanitarian operations, the Secretary-General should receive the advice of all relevant organizations so that there is agreement on the goal, the resources required and the time-frame.
Reconciliation and Institution-building

32. An essential ingredient of a successful mission to promote reconciliation and institution-building is extensive coordination and cooperation with other international actors, including United Nations agencies and NGOs. Reconciliation and institution-building are greatly strengthened when information is shared, advice sought and programmes coordinated. In the case of UNOSOM, United Nations agencies and international organizations were not always adequately informed or consulted about reconciliation and institution-building programmes. Misunderstanding arose, which sometimes eroded support for UNOSOM initiatives. However, when they were properly informed, these agencies were frequently pivotal partners in successful reconciliation efforts.

33. Collapsed states are plagued by multiple crises, which collectively constitute a "vicious circle" reinforcing an environment of chaos. International intervention must therefore pursue a strategy aimed at concurrent progress in several key, interdependent areas. Because Somalia's political crisis was fuelled by mutually reinforcing political pathologies, UNOSOM officials were stymied by problems of "sequence" in pursuing reconciliation and the rebuilding of government in Somalia. For instance, a police force could not function without a judicial system, which in turn could not function without a secure environment guaranteed by a police force. Also, disarmament and demobilization were unrealistic in the absence of economic opportunity for ex-militiamen, but economic recovery in turn was stymied by banditry and chronic insecurity. Policies intended to support the revival of only one component of governance or the economy were thus immediately thwarted. In these circumstances, only simultaneous progress across the board can create the necessary synergy to break the "vicious circle" and transform it into a "virtuous circle". The United Nations must pursue an integrated strategy aimed at supporting the judiciary, police, local government, the economy, reconciliation, disarmament and demobilization. This presupposes the availability of adequate, front-loaded funding for the UN mission.

34. An integral part of any United Nations peacekeeping mission should be the promotion of "indirect peace-building", i.e., support for the revival of associational life. The resurrection of a web of civic, professional, business, athletic and other associations is a major component of the reconciliation process in war-torn societies, building multiple bridges across lines of conflict and improving lines of communication. Civil society is the backbone of a sustainable political system; though its resuscitation in a collapsed state is a long-term process and, ultimately, the responsibility of the people themselves, the international community has a potentially constructive role to play in catalysing these developments. Yet UNOSOM did little to foster this type of peace-building, due in part to the lack of funds and staffing for such programmes. Indeed, UNOSOM was unable to create a safe "political space" for elements of civil society to re-emerge without fear of intimidation or retaliation.

35. The United Nations must exercise caution and flexibility in identifying representative leadership in the context of a collapsed state. In such an environment, it is usually unclear
who possesses accepted and functional authority to represent communities and guarantee
the implementation of accords. UNOSOM learned that authority in Somalia was
situational and fluid, and often in dispute. Misjudgements regarding the authority or
legitimacy of various categories of leaders, be they faction leaders, elders or others, were
at the root of a number of reconciliation set-backs.

36. Peace initiatives must be closely tailored to indigenous practices of conflict
management. Specifically in Somalia, peace negotiations needed to be held in or near the
zone of conflict, and timetables should have accounted for the needs of the local
situation rather than being driven by budgetary or outside political considerations. In
addition, the UNOSOM experience illustrated the danger of committing too much
funding to repeated, large-scale peace conferences, a practice which yielded financial
rewards for participants yet threatened to corrupt the reconciliation process.

37. In its reconciliation and institution-building efforts, the United Nations should "build
on success". In the case of Somalia, this meant that a stronger and more consistent
commitment to local and regional-level peace initiatives and institution-building would
have been more productive. Over time, it became clear that UNOSOM's only successful
reconciliation initiatives took place at those levels. Likewise, the only examples of
revival of functional governmental structures occurred at the local level. Under
these circumstances, a bottom-up approach to reconciliation and state revival held greater
promise of tangible and enduring results.

38. Reconciliation and institution-building in a peace operation faces unique challenges
when the mission becomes involved in sustained peace enforcement actions against one
of the major local actors. UNOSOM offers unique lessons learned in this regard.

39. In collapsed states, there usually exist "conflict constituencies" with a vested interest
in continued instability, communal tension and an economy of plunder. An incremental
approach to this dilemma could aim at transforming the interests of these elements, which
necessitates adequate resources to fund demobilization, training and income-generating
activities for ex-militiamen. UNOSOM faced some significant conflict constituencies,
whose political and economic interests were threatened by the prospect of a return to
normalized political life and law and order. Their marginalization, whether intentional
or not, entailed the risk of a violent backlash. An alternative strategy would be to work
incrementally to enhance their stake in peace. It is recognized, however, that this is a
challenging and difficult proposition.
Humanitarian Imperatives

40. The descent into anarchy, with the concomitant lack of security, was the main reason why a large-scale and well-coordinated relief operation could not be mounted in Somalia in 1992. Although notable results were achieved on the humanitarian relief front, including the advocacy work of NGOs, the mass feeding kitchens operated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the opening of Mogadishu port by the World Food Programme, far too little was achieved too late and the lives of countless Somalis, mainly women and young children, were lost. Thus, adequate security arrangements are an imperative in order to safeguard the humanitarian space needed for successful relief operations.

41. Although the humanitarian goals were clear from the outset of the Somalia crisis, the strategy adopted to achieve them suffered from inadequate resources and disagreement among the humanitarian fraternity. Additionally, there was a lack of guidelines for the implementation of the humanitarian relief operation by the numerous actors involved. A relief strategy should be developed and backed up by specific operational plans, including guidelines for the UN system, international organizations and NGOs. The implementation of these plans should be monitored regularly, evaluated periodically and revised as conditions in a country change.

42. For similar situations, inter-agency assessment missions should be mounted promptly and plans developed to address the problem. This information should form part of the Secretary-General's efforts to mobilize and energize an early response from Member States. The involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance must be coordinated with the relevant parts of the United Nations system, international organizations and the NGO community in order to ensure the technical soundness of the interventions and their compatibility with ongoing programmes.

43. The inadequacy of resources for rehabilitation and reconstruction which were needed concurrently with humanitarian relief and security arrangements resulted in the progressive degradation of the physical infrastructure and environment and considerably hampered the effectiveness of the recovery effort in Somalia. In order to implement large-scale humanitarian relief operations requiring military support, it is crucial that the necessary resources be provided up front by contributing nations. Furthermore, UN system entities, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, must be encouraged to promptly initiate reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in the aftermath of a conflict, even in countries where there is no government. The rapid injection of this type of assistance is crucial to speed up recovery.
Command and Control

44. Unity of command and purpose is a critical element if coalition operations such as UNOSOM are to succeed. With regard to the military component, there were at least two types of difficulties related to unity of command. First off, not all the national contingents operating in the area were placed under UNOSOM command, and this led to tragic consequences. Secondly, some contingents that were ostensibly part of UNOSOM were in fact following orders from their respective capitals; this made them unreliable in the mission area and reduced the mission's effectiveness. To overcome this problem, it is essential to provide an effective channel in New York through which troop-contributing countries can articulate their concerns. If they are not consulted in advance of major decisions by the Security Council, their contingents on the ground may not be responsive. This places too great a burden on the SRSG and Force Commander. Particularly in operations which are humanitarian rather than strategic in nature, and in which few if any States feel their vital interests to be at stake, troop-contributing countries must be more involved in decision-making, so that they will stay with the operation in good times and bad.

45. A fundamental cause of the failure of UNOSOM II's coalition force to maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu after the departure of UNITAF, was the failure of individual contingents to respond consistently to the direction of the Force Commander except where that direction fitted national imperatives and agendas. In effect, as the mission became embroiled in peace enforcement and coercive disarmament, many troop-contributing countries decided independently what actions their national contingents could and could not undertake, and, in some cases, where.

46. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently detailed to eliminate doubt as to individual and unit behaviour, and should include guidance concerning mutual support by personnel and units of the coalition force. The rules of engagement of UNOSOM were more than adequate in that regard. Nevertheless, at various times under UNOSOM II, the extent to which individual contingents chose to implement those rules fully was driven by the manner in which their Governments or commanders elected to interpret their contingents' mission.

Logistics and Administration

47. Detailed standard operating procedures are a valuable tool in the execution of planning, operational and administrative/logistic activities. They can measurably enhance not only the smooth functioning of a military force in crisis but its interoperability as well.
48. Staffing deficiencies, both in numbers and experience, were a severe problem in virtually every component of UNOSOM I and II, especially during the initial deployment phase. In a volatile situation like Somalia, time is of the essence; the operation's relationships with the parties and local population are defined early on. Thus, delays in staffing UNOSOM with experienced personnel translated into important missed opportunities. It is essential to develop a reliable system of civilian stand-by personnel in key categories, such as administration, political, public information and legal. The setting up of "start-up" teams and the identification of staff for senior core posts would help avoid the recruitment problems that plagued the Somalia operation, particularly in the early stages. Another possibility, perhaps complementary, would be the establishment of open-ended system contracts with commercial contractors to provide specified staff on an urgent-as-required basis. To get the best out of civilian staff requires greater levels of support from New York. Considerable delays in the payment of salaries, for example, caused resentment in the field in Somalia.

49. The timely deployment of military contingents, which are provided by Governments, was another severe problem for UNOSOM. Some national contingents arrived months later than promised, which greatly complicated the efforts of the SRSG and Force Commander to make rational plans and carry them out. Carefully constructed timetables were completely thrown awry. Efforts are needed, therefore, to ensure greater compliance by Member States with commitments made. Before an operation is initiated on the ground, it might be useful, to the extent feasible, to bring together national contingent commanders.

50. A third priority problem was the shortage of critical operational matériel, in particular vehicles, communication equipment, tentage, water purification kits and engineering equipment, during the initial deployment phase. Guidelines to troop contributors stress that military contingents are expected to be self-sufficient for the first 60-90 days in the mission area, until the operation's logistical supply line is up and running. However, recent experience indicates that there are often numerous equipment deficiencies. If equipment is contributed for use by other contingents, the receiving contingent may require some time for familiarization training. This is a problem which remains to be addressed. In addition to military equipment, there was also a shortage of materials required by other components of UNOSOM.

51. Participants in the June 1995 seminar expressed different views on whether military logisticians or civilian contractors were preferable. However, because logistical support units remain a scarce commodity and are, therefore, hard to obtain from troop-contributing countries, there is no doubt that service support will continue to be contracted out in some instances. That being so, the UN must strengthen its ability to administer these contracts. In the case of Somalia, the delay in providing contract administrators to the mission before services were initiated on the ground made it difficult to establish proper standards and controls.
52. To ensure an essential level of professionalism and competence, there is need for training of all personnel in UN peace operations, particularly operations which can be expected to involve units and staff personnel with varying levels of training and experience. The level of training and experience of units serving in UNOSOM II had a direct bearing on the effectiveness which could be expected in executing assigned missions. Moreover, the lack of adequate training and experience of many individuals assigned to specific staff or functional areas seriously impacted the effectiveness of the coalition force in those areas. Solutions might include unit training by troop-contributing countries before deployment, with assistance from UN training teams when requested. Staff training could be accomplished by either a UN-sponsored staff college or special UN training teams organized as required.

53. In-depth knowledge of a situation is required during the planning phase. This information should also form the basis of briefings for the SRSG and senior staff. Such briefings should be far more extensive than was the case for Somalia. Personnel joining the operation at mid-stream should also receive a thorough briefing before deployment, including lessons learned in the operation to date. This is especially important if one operation (in this case, UNITAF) is handing off to another one. Many times UNOSOM was sent senior staff members who, upon arrival in the field, did not know the names of the political factions and leaders with whom they were to deal. And by the time they became conversant with the Somali environment, their contracts had expired. Thus, it is essential that staff receive full briefings before being dispatched to mission areas.

54. Standardized training for civilian staff is crucial. The Secretariat should be resourced to offer a standard course on peace operations. Persons completing the programme would be recognized as mission ready. In addition to the other aspects of peacekeeping, such a course should include instruction in basic management skills, which in UNOSOM were often lacking, as well as training in the essentials of personal security.

55. Mission-specific training should be provided for civilian personnel and for contingents, and resources for such training should be part of an operation's budget. Many contingents arrived in the mission area without the slightest knowledge of Somalia, its history and culture, or the conditions on the ground.

56. Staff across the operation, whether international civil servants, mission recruits or personnel contributed by Governments, must be trained to understand the concept of synergy -- that all the elements of a strategy work together, and that all the components of a UN operation rise or fall together.
Accountability

57. For the United Nations to successfully promote respect for human rights and good governance in collapsed states, as well as gain some measure of credibility, it must demonstrate a commitment to the principles of accountability and transparency in its own work. In UNOSOM, no independent oversight existed which could serve as an ombudsman to consider grievances registered by the local population against the United Nations. Without such a mechanism, the United Nations was perceived by many in Somalia to be "above the law", which undercut its efforts to promote human rights. Likewise, UNOSOM's attempts to promote an open and free political process in the country was partially handicapped by an apparent lack of transparency in its own political operations. It was suggested that consideration could be given to appointing an ombudsman to some peacekeeping operations. It was further suggested that, in an environment of state collapse, the Fourth Geneva Convention could supply adequate guidelines for regulating relations between peacekeeping troops and the local population.

58. The existence and application of International Humanitarian Law in the conduct of military operations involving the use of force was not fully understood by some military forces deployed to Somalia. Troops must be made aware, in advance, of International Humanitarian Law and abide by these provisions during the exercise of their duty.

Public Information

59. A successful information campaign requires a comprehensive strategy. It must be part and parcel of the overall operational planning and coordination, so that the SRSG and all elements of the operation are conveying a consistent message. To implement this strategy successfully, public information specialists must be part of a mission from its inception. Seminar participants concluded that there was no integrated information strategy in UNOSOM or inadequate emphasis on information related to the long-term aspects of United Nations involvement in Somalia. Whatever information mechanism that was attempted was not given adequate resources.

60. Media relations is a long-term proposition, not an overnight miracle or an on-off initiative. The press wants to know the whole story, and the UN should provide the information so that it gets disseminated in the international media. The role of the media in catalysing international involvement in Somalia and, at a later stage, in spurring withdrawal, was enormous.

61. When something goes wrong in an operation, it is generally best to acknowledge the problem, explain why it occurred and tell what is being done to avoid it in the future. Giving journalists the whole story includes providing them with basic information. Many of the briefing materials prepared for an operation's staff and national contingents could be shared with journalists to very good effect. Most journalists covering UNOSOM had no background in Somalia's economic, political or social conditions; no knowledge of the country's history; no understanding of the UN structure or how the operation was
funded. This lack of understanding led the media to define for themselves what they thought was important.

62. Journalists' safety concerns may also colour their coverage. In Somalia, the fact that they lived in a neighbourhood controlled by one of the major faction leaders may have prompted them to give him more favourable coverage than they would otherwise have done. However, providing housing for journalists inside a UN compound was not recommended. After such an arrangement was attempted in Somalia, the conclusion was that having reporters in such close and constant proximity was counter-productive.

63. In UNOSOM, the three target areas for information were: a worldwide distribution, the Somali people and the UN staff. Effective international distribution depended on television. Making optimal use of this medium would have required the UN to use its own resources to make available compelling images of the Organization's humanitarian efforts. This was attempted too late in the operation, and with too few resources. For such an effort to be effective, it must be part of the original strategy and be resourced accordingly.

64. Whenever military operations are involved, this aspect tends to dominate in the media's coverage. For example, while one faction leader was being pursued in South Mogadishu, it was impossible to persuade journalists to go to the countryside and report on the progress being made in normalizing Somali life, as when farmers were able to sow their crops again or when district and regional councils were being formed. Responding to directives from their editors to look for something dramatic, reporters remained firmly planted in Mogadishu just in case the hunted leader was captured.

65. In major operations in countries with widespread illiteracy and an emphasis on the oral tradition, as in Somalia, radio is often the most effective medium. However, the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) turned down a request to establish a UNOSOM radio station. The alternatives that were used -- newspapers and leaflets -- had only a marginal impact since few people could read them. As a result, UNOSOM's communication with the Somali people, whose support the Operation clearly needed in order to achieve its objective, was ineffective. UNOSOM lacked the proper machinery to explain why it was in Somalia, what the mandates were and why they were being changed, what was expected of the Somali people themselves and what they could expect from the UN. At the local level, therefore, an early and comprehensive strategy emphasizing the appropriate media is required, as is staff on the ground to ensure effective implementation.

66. Among the third target audience, UNOSOM staff, rumours and misinformation were a problem throughout the operation. This was exacerbated by the fact that, during certain periods, information from the SRSG's office was infrequent and inconsistent. At other times, morning briefing sessions and a periodic newsletter helped mitigate this problem. The establishment of the Special Representative's Information Centre (SIOC) went a long way towards alleviating the situation. SIOC held daily briefings for the staff and was available around the clock to answer staff queries.
67. A fourth audience that should be targeted is the diplomatic community in the mission area and in neighbouring countries. For most Governments, developments in Somalia were monitored by their embassies in Nairobi, which depended for information on sporadic visits of the SRSG, on their own occasional trips to Somalia whenever the security situation allowed, or on the accounts of other travellers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the level of ignorance about UNOSOM, its purpose and activities among foreign diplomats serving in the region was appalling. This also included diplomats from countries that were contributing troops to the operation. The diplomatic community's understanding of an operation is important for several reasons: their ability to support the operation by their exercise of political influence on the parties; to ensure that their respective capitals are accurately informed; and because journalists contact them when researching a story. 68. Participants at the Seminar felt that at the first sign of an incipient crisis, the relevant UN Departments -- DPA, DPKO, DHA and DPI -- should consult immediately to ensure an adequately staffed public information unit is incorporated into the plans for deployment of a peacekeeping mission at the earliest stages of mission planning.

69. It was recommended that the United Nations look into the feasibility of a central broadcasting facility or mobile radio unit that could be deployed in the field. This recommendation was made in an effort to achieve greater cost-effectiveness and also to avoid the problems experienced by some missions, especially with regard to obtaining the necessary broadcast licenses and frequencies from the host government.

**Intelligence**

70. A well-managed intelligence programme can have a dramatic effect on the success of any military mission, especially missions such as Somalia. The United Nations must continue to move beyond its earlier attitude and reluctance with respect to the propriety of "intelligence" and its role in United Nations peace operations.

71. Just as other aspects of a comprehensive mission operation plan should be completed in advance of deployment, so too should a comprehensive intelligence management plan be devised. Such a plan should cover the mission area, collection efforts, analysis and fusion of information, dissemination and sharing procedures, counter-intelligence, operational security, detainee processing and interrogation and the acquisition/maintenance of intelligence products, including maps. Although some facets improved over time during UNOSOM II, there was never an overarching concept of intelligence management or an exact plan that adequately addressed all aspects.

72. Standard procedures must be in place to assure the timely sharing of intelligence information, both between contingents and between the field and United Nations Headquarters, in New York. When UNOSOM II began, the United Nations system was not yet ready for a major undertaking such as Somalia, and the in-country situation of deteriorated unity of command and purpose led to a marginal degree of success in processing and disseminating needed intelligence.
73. Greater attention must be paid to the guidelines for processing and interrogating detainees. During UNOSOM, United Nations guidelines for detainees were confused, and proper processing and interrogation was for the most part non-existent due to a lack of clear procedures as well as trained personnel to carry them out. The absence of United Nations guidance was a recipe for potential criticism, and the failure of processing and interrogation negated what might have been a valuable source of human intelligence.

74. While the Security Council determines a UN peacekeeping mandate, the Secretariat has a responsibility to inform Member States of the means needed to carry it out. This requires professional judgements to be made in several fields, including political, military and humanitarian. At the outset of the Somalia operation, the Secretariat had very scant military expertise to make such an assessment. When a technical team visited the country to determine the needs of UNOSOM I, officers were borrowed on a short-term basis from Member States or from other peacekeeping operations. They returned to their regular duties immediately upon completing their report and were no longer available for consultation in the planning stages of the operation.
Part II: Application of Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia

General Framework

79. Shortly after the establishment of UNOSOM in 1992, the United Nations office responsible for peacekeeping operations was reorganized and renamed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Its objective was to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage peacekeeping operations. The reorganization brought the political, operational, logistics, civil police, demining, training, personnel and administrative aspects of peacekeeping operations under one umbrella.

80. Within DPKO, efforts have been under way to apply some of the lessons learned from UNOSOM as well as other past operations to the peacekeeping operations established since 1992. The objective of Part II of this report is to identify those lessons which have been, or are in the process of being, applied. As stated above, some of these lessons can be implemented by the Secretariat; others fall within matters that only Member States can consider and decide to apply.

Lesson 1. There is need for a clear and practicable mandate.

81. An effective peacekeeping operation commences with a clearly defined and practicable mandate. This lesson has been well learned in the United Nations, resulting in some successes in subsequent peacekeeping operations as well as some tragedies. In Haiti, this lesson was partially applied. The United Nations did not get involved in the operation there until it was made very clear what exactly it was required to do. This contributed in part to the effective manner in which the operation has been conducted.

82. It is also argued that the United Nations learned this lesson all too well because it withdrew some of its contingents from Rwanda at a time when civil war erupted there, on the grounds that the situation had developed beyond the original mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). And even as the war intensified, the United Nations delayed strengthening the remaining contingents until a new, clear mandate had been agreed and the situation clarified.

83. The formulation of a clear and practicable mandate for a peacekeeping operation remains the responsibility of the Security Council. The Secretariat regularly provides the Council with information on situations under consideration. In addition, the Council has increased the number of its own fact-finding missions to areas of conflict to assist it in determining its action.

84. These missions have enabled the Council to determine new mandates or adjust existing ones. For example, it was after the Council mission to Somalia in October 1994 that the members determined that the UNOSOM mandate must be terminated. It was also after its mission to Burundi that the Council determined that no peacekeeping operation
or even preventive peacekeeping deployment should be considered for that country, and that other means were better suited for the situation.

Lesson 2: Chapter VII and Chapter VI operations should not co-exist, and transition from Chapter VII to Chapter VI must be smooth.

85. It has been acknowledged that the United Nations is not yet capable of launching a large-scale enforcement action and that whenever in the foreseeable future it is necessary to launch such an operation under a Chapter VII, it should be done by either a single State, as occurred in Rwanda in France's Operation Turquoise, or by a coalition of States, as was done early in Haiti.

86. There is wide agreement that it was a mistake in Somalia for a Chapter VII operation (UNITAF) to co-exist with a Chapter VI operation (UNOSOM I). This lesson was well applied in Haiti, where a multinational force with Chapter VII powers was phased out before a Chapter VI operation, UNMIH, was deployed.

87. It was evident from Haiti that a peacekeeping operation should only follow a peace enforcement operation when conditions are secure, and that it should be granted robust rules of engagement to ensure that no party takes advantage of the change-over. Transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping should be closely coordinated with the Secretariat to avoid the chaotic situations which developed in the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. This seems to have been done in the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH.

Lesson 3: Peacekeeping forces should not enter a conflict area if there is no political will among the parties towards reconciliation.

88. Since a peacekeeping force has no enforcement powers, it should only be deployed when the parties to a conflict have consented, as occurred with the deployment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). There is a need to enhance the capacity of the United Nations for sustained negotiations in reaching a comprehensive peace agreement that would allow the deployment of a peacekeeping operation.

89. When an operation is established in a failed state, it may often be necessary to undertake civic activities and assist in repairing or developing political and economic infrastructures. This may require, as was done in Mozambique, funding for political parties to make them viable and encourage them to move from the use of arms to reconciliation.

Lesson 4: Mandates must be matched with the means to implement them.
90. It is the responsibility of the Security Council, the General Assembly -- especially its Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) -- and Member States in their individual capacity to provide peacekeeping operations with sufficient resources. Unfortunately, this lesson has still not been well learned. Much has depended on the political will of Member States to act. Where such will existed, the resources were found, and where it was lacking, the resources were not made available. Examples are UNMIH, which was well provided for, and UNAVEM III, which has so far been well funded. By contrast, UNAMIR never received the resources needed, even when the decision was taken to expand the operation.

91. Attempts are being made to sensitize Member States to the need to provide peacekeeping operations with the required resources. Before the renewal of each peacekeeping mandate, troop-contributing countries, Security Council members and Secretariat officials now meet to review the operation. The visit by ACABQ members to Haiti enabled them to clearly understand UNMIH's needs. As a result, the operation received the resources it needed. Such visits should be encouraged.

Lesson 5: Integrated planning is essential in order to deal with the multidimensional problems in peacekeeping operations.

92. Recognizing the need for detailed planning and coordination in the context of present-day complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the DPKO in early 1994 established the Mission Planning Service (MPS). The result has been a qualitative improvement in mission planning. Important improvements instituted in the planning process are being constantly refined in the light of experience. This was reflected in the well-planned and executed withdrawal of UNOSOM and in the establishment of UNMIH and UNAVEM III.

93. MPS has become the focal point for all planning in connection with peacekeeping operations. It works in close cooperation with other units of DPKO, specialists from other departments and specialized agencies to design carefully integrated plans for complex multidimensional operations. MPS activities include: generic guidelines and procedures to streamline the process of mission planning; generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries, from which mission-specific guidelines are formulated; the preparation of standard operating procedures for essential functions; and in-house studies pertaining to important issues such as command and control, coordination, rules of engagement, structure of mission headquarters, etc.

94. Present-day peacekeeping operations are multidimensional, and besides the military, they could have humanitarian, civilian police, civil affairs, electoral, rehabilitation and repatriation components, each intimately linked to the other. In order to promote an integrated approach to planning, a Framework for Coordination between the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs and Humanitarian Affairs has been designed, covering all planning and preparation activities at Headquarters, from the early warning signals to close-down of a peacekeeping operation. Under this framework, which is being introduced
and is presently under trial, a "concept of operations" is first formulated for each mission, from which a "logistics concept" is developed. Thereafter, a comprehensive operational plan is prepared for execution of the mandate, together with a logistics plan to support it.

95. Close cooperation between planners and troop-contributing countries is envisaged throughout the integrated planning process. Mission-specific guidelines for troop contributors are prepared and disseminated at an early stage, and a continuous dialogue with those countries is maintained throughout the operation.

96. The importance of involving senior mission staff from the outset of the planning process has been recognized. This aspect was successfully implemented during the planning for UNMIH and UNAVEM III, and provided the necessary continuity between planners and executors.

97. Once mandated, a peacekeeping mission needs to be operational at the earliest date. To facilitate this, a proposal is under consideration to dispatch a team of experienced officials familiar with the plan and UN procedures to the mission area during the "setting-up" phase, to assist in establishing the mission. The team would establish administrative and other procedures and guide mission officials during the initial stages. They would in due course be replaced by mission staff. This concept was successfully tried in UNAVEM III.

98. It has been recognized that as part of integrated planning, as much information as possible should be gathered from external sources in areas where a peacekeeping operation is to be established. There have been some improvements in the extent to which the Secretariat acquires information from external experts. Nowadays, DPKO, DPA and DHA very often invite experts to exchange views with their staff on situations and operations.

99. While the UN has vast experience in peacekeeping, the Organization, unfortunately, has not been able to benefit fully from this experience due to a lack of capacity for analysis and institutional memory. The Lessons-Learned Unit, in the Office of Planning and Support, was established early in 1995 and is presently undertaking this function, extracting relevant lessons for application through the study of completed and ongoing missions, as well as establishing a data processing system to serve as the institutional memory of peacekeeping.

Lesson 6: Operation in the field should be based on a fully developed, integrated structure headed by the SRSG.

100. The Secretary-General has issued directives that his Special Representative in a peacekeeping operation has authority to coordinate all United Nations activities in the mission area. However, for the SRSG to be effective, he needs to be provided with his own discretionary funds for peace-building. This would enhance his/her leverage both with the parties and with the
humanitarian agencies. In the ONUMOZ mission, for example, the authority of the SRSG was enhanced because he controlled a trust fund. Even so, some elements of the UN system were not always very willing to operate under his direct authority. In the Rwanda and Haiti operations, serious efforts are being made to have the SRSG coordinate all activities, be they humanitarian, political or military, in the mission area.

101. When peacekeeping operations go hand in hand with peace-building efforts, the operation is likely to be more acceptable to the local population. A lack of funds for peace-building in Rwanda went a long way to undercut UNAMIR.

Lesson 7: Secretariat communication with the field must be clear.

102. Interdepartmental coordination has improved greatly since the establishment of UNOSOM, with working groups of desk officers responsible for the different areas in the substantive departments meeting regularly. The Secretary-General has directed that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the operational arm of the Secretary General for the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations. In this capacity, the Department acts as the main channel of communication between United Nations Headquarters and the field. However, the Department of Political Affairs on strictly political matters, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs on Humanitarian policy matters and the department of Administration and Management are also in regular contact with the field. Each head of department is copied communication for which he/she is not the primary recipient, and the information is shared and discussed in the working groups.

103. The Secretary-General's Task Force, which consists of the Under-Secretaries-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General of the relevant departments, meets often to coordinate Secretariat directives and action. However, vertical communication between desk officers and the Task Force, which deals with policy matters at Headquarters, still needs to be improved. Many times desk officers are unaware of policy matters developed in the Task Force. It might be helpful if sanitized minutes of the Task Force's meeting were distributed to the desk officers.

104. The incorporation of the Field Administration and Logistics Division into DPKO has streamlined reporting in administrative and logistics matters both at Headquarters and with the field.

105. The Situation Centre, which was established in DPKO in May 1993 to maintain round-the-clock communications with the field, provides near real-time information about activities in the mission areas, and collates and disseminates incoming information to all concerned. It provides daily briefings, analysis of events and statistics on peacekeeping operations and brings the operation in the field close to Headquarters. The Situation Centre has also been useful to Member States by serving as the focal point for Governments seeking information about missions.

Lesson 8: The timely deployment of well-trained personnel is essential.
106. Despite the lessons learned from UNOSOM, United Nations peacekeeping operations have continued to suffer from delays in the timely deployment of military, police and civilian personnel. However, improvements have been made to expedite the deployment of essential personnel to all mission areas.

107. An important function of the Mission Planning Service has been the establishment and management of the Stand-by Arrangements System designed to improve the Organization's capacity for rapid deployment. Under the system, participating Member States provide the Organization with information about their possible contributions (military, civilian police and civilian specialists) to peacekeeping operations, and about maintaining them in an agreed state of readiness. To date, 47 countries have officially expressed their willingness to participate in the system; of that number, 14 have agreed in principle and are in the process of finalizing their contribution. The efficacy of the system is largely dependent on detailed information provided by participating Member States, as to the availability of resources specified in each of the stand-by arrangements, to enable advance planning. Currently, commitments made do not adequately cover the entire spectrum of resources required to mount and execute peacekeeping missions. Deficiencies exist in the areas of communications, logistics, medical, engineering and transportation.

108. The availability of trained personnel, military and civilian, would enhance the timely deployment of personnel to peacekeeping operations. In June 1993, a Training Unit was established in DPKO. This unit has written training guidelines, manuals and other materials to assist Member States in preparing their military, police and civilian personnel for peacekeeping assignments. The unit has contributed substantially towards improving and standardizing peacekeeping training through publications, seminars and workshops, and special training activities. Among its publications which are made available to Member States are the following: Standard Operating Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations; UN Peacekeeping Training Manual; UN Peacekeeping Handbook for Junior Ranks; English Language Course for UN Civilian Police; Peacekeeping Bibliography; UN Military Observer Course; UN Members' Peacekeeping Training; UN Civilian Police Course; and UN Module for National and Regional Staff Colleges.

109. The unit also organizes training seminars/workshops to assist Member States in their own training programmes. Regional peacekeeping training workshops have been held in Denmark and Argentina. Other training seminars are being planned in India and Egypt. Seminars are also arranged for UN training teams.

110. The unit completed the coordination of the technical conversion training of the battalions from Pakistan and Bangladesh prior to their deployment in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). It also arranged for in-mission training to develop a cohesive staff for UNMIH, and for UNAVEM III prior to deployment.

111. The deployment of civilian police has remained a serious problem. Some Member States have dispatched for peacekeeping duties police who were not well trained for the
assigned duties and who did not meet the minimum standards set in the DPKO's police manuals. A number of these police have had to be returned, at enormous cost and embarrassment. Arrangements are being made to ascertain before deployment that the personnel provided for police duties meet the minimum standards.

112. The Civilian Police Unit (CIVPOL), in the Office of Planning and Support of DPKO, was established in May 1993 and is now responsible for all matters affecting civilian police in peacekeeping operations. Previously, there were no guidelines for civilian police monitors/observers to help them perform their police functions. They were dependent on guidelines prepared for military observers, which did not adequately cover CIVPOL functions in the mission areas. Separate and exhaustive guidelines for CIVPOL personnel deputed to peacekeeping missions have since been prepared. The training of civilian police personnel deputed for duty in peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of contributing Member States. However, in order to standardize special aspects of CIVPOL functions, the Training Unit, in close collaboration with the CIVPOL Unit, has developed a peacekeeping training curriculum for CIVPOL.

113. A handbook entitled "UN Criminal Justice Standards for Peacekeeping Police" has been prepared with the assistance of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch. This publication is intended to provide civilian police personnel with an overview of the relevant international standards and norms concerning monitoring functions in the field of criminal justice.

114. In order to efficiently monitor and/or observe the conditions of civil rights of citizens in a mission area, it is important to provide CIVPOL observers with basic human rights concepts. To this end, the CIVPOL Unit requested the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva to train the civilian police component of ONUMOZ regarding these aspects in the mission area. In light of the success of this training, the unit is currently liaising with the centre to develop a basic training curriculum on human rights for CIVPOL observers.

115. The deployment of civilian personnel to peacekeeping missions could perhaps be expedited if stand-by arrangements for civilian personnel were established and training conducted to create a core of personnel who could be called upon for deployment early when required in all areas of peacekeeping. Since a number of peacekeeping operations have been terminated or will soon complete their mandates, a roster of the civilian personnel who have performed well in peace operations is being maintained. The deployment of civilian personnel to peacekeeping operations has since been substantially expedited by the recent delegation of recruitment authority to DPKO. Member States should also be prepared to second some of their best personnel to missions on short notice.

Lesson 9: Command and control must be unified, and channel of command and directives clear.
116. The Secretary-General has addressed this issue in his Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". The need for a unified command has become more apparent in the light of the UNOSOM experience. Effective command and control in peacekeeping operations demands that parallel command structures should be vigorously discouraged and that the normal unified command and control system should always apply. In order to discourage troop contingents from seeking direction from their home Governments, rules of engagement should be made as clear as possible and all operations should be within the Security Council mandate that establishes an operation.

117. Troop-contributing countries should be provided with as much information as possible and given an effective channel at the UN Headquarters to express their views. The newly developed system of regular consultation between the Secretariat and troop contributors at United Nations Headquarters is enhancing the flow of information. The meetings offer an opportunity for an exchange of views between countries that provide troops to operations and those represented in the Security Council who decide the mandates. Further, Force Commanders and SRSGs consult regularly with contingents' commanders in the field.

Lesson 10: Logistics problems incapacitate an operation.

118. Structural improvements to bring logistics personnel and administrative elements within the ambit of one department have been devised by the incorporation of the Field Administrative and Logistics Division into DPKO. With that, steps have been taken to improve the logistics situation of a peacekeeping operation, especially during the start-up phase. The Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, will serve as a centre for the management of peacekeeping assets. It maintains the master inventory and oversees the receipt and delivery of equipment and supplies for missions. Mission Start-up Kits are assembled at the base from surplus assets of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UNOSOM and ONUMOZ. The base is currently functioning under the auspices of UNPROFOR, for which it provides essential rear logistics support, and will be budgeted for as an independent entity by 1996. A further recommendation on the establishment and costing of Mission Start-up Kits is being considered for presentation to the General Assembly. The recommendation proposes to utilize assets from closed missions to produce the kits. This would entail virtually no initial costs; thereafter, replacements for kits used would be paid for by the missions which receive them.

119. Plans are under way to develop a framework for reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment. Member States participated in working sessions to discuss these mechanisms, following a project time-line included in Assembly resolution 49/233. The basic framework has been agreed, and in the next phase actual standard figures are being determined for presentation. The concept of wet/dry leasing, using standard rates and useful life determination, is being applied. If national equipment contributions are for use by other contingents, the receiving contingent may require some time for familiarization training. This is a problem which remains to be addressed.
120. A practical handbook for logistics planning and conducting a preliminary technical survey for missions is under preparation. This document will be distributed to Member States. A first step, now under way, is the development of a Standard Equipment Load Table, which will list the equipment that may be required for the various military units. In addition, the Secretariat has recently been able in some cases to visit national contingents before deployment, to assist them in preparing and to ensure that they have the equipment necessary to function effectively in theatre.

Lesson 11: There is a need for early budgetary allocations and proper management of funds.

121. The Secretary-General is authorized (with ACABQ approval) to enter into commitments up to $50 million, per Security Council decision, with a cumulative total of $150 million outstanding at any one time. This allows a more realistic initial commitment authority to enable new operations to start immediately, because sufficient funds for the initial procurement and deployment of equipment and troops will be available.

122. The General Assembly has decided not to increase the amount of the reserve fund and instead urged Member States to fulfil their obligations to the fund so that it reaches the currently approved level. Although the increase in commitment authority improves the capacity of the Organization to respond to urgent needs, failure to back this authority with actual cash reserves could compromise the ability to act.

123. The introduction of a new annual peacekeeping budgetary cycle -- one that presents budgets for the period 1 July to 30 June, with annual review/approval for stable missions and six-month review/approval for other missions -- will greatly reduce the number of budgets/financial implications which must be prepared by the Secretariat, and should ensure a more timely availability of an approved budget for ongoing operations regardless of mandate periods. As against 101 separate budgets for field operations prepared in 1994 for various mandate periods, under the new system the DPKO would be required to prepare only 24 budgets (and perhaps a dozen additional mid-year reviews).

124. The General Assembly endorsed recommendations contained in a report of the Secretary-General (A/48/945) for a revised format stressing standard costs and comparative analysis. The new process/format will improve both the timely preparation and analytical review of peacekeeping budgets. The ACABQ will have before it for review a Standard Cost Manual.

125. It may also be necessary to consider the allocation of some funds from assessed contributions to support humanitarian efforts during a peacekeeping operation, as is now the case for the budgets for the military and political components. Effective humanitarian efforts can help promote the local population's acceptance of an operation.

126. A report being prepared for the Assembly's consideration explains the concepts of resident auditors, management review officers and roving finance officers to improve financial control in peacekeeping missions. To a limited extent, these concepts
are already being implemented in the larger missions. Special attention is being given to the safekeeping of funds in mission areas in view of the loss of $3.9 million in UNOSOM. It is recognized that an operation cannot incur such losses and still retain the confidence of Member States in how peacekeeping resources are managed.

127. In UNOSOM, 154 UN personnel lost their lives and 422 were wounded. The policy on death and disability compensation has been of great concern to troop-contributing countries. A report of the Secretary-General, prepared with input from Member States, will be published shortly. New standard, simplified mechanisms for determining reimbursements are included.

Lesson 12: There is need for a public information strategy.

128. The goal of an information programme in a peacekeeping operation is to enhance its effectiveness, both in the area of the mission and internationally, by fostering a better understanding of the United Nations mandate. The information aspect should consist of an internal programme within the area of the mission, and an external programme for the international community at large, particularly troop-contributing and donor nations.

129. Setting up a mission-specific public information component, fully staffed and equipped, is a time-consuming exercise. Hence, plans are being considered to establish a roster from which experienced staff could be identified and selected to serve in the information component of a mission as soon as an operation is established. To highlight the problem, UNOSOM did not have an official spokesman until almost 10 months into the mission. There is agreement that a spokesperson should be designated as soon as an SRSG is appointed.

130. The DPKO has made it mandatory for every peacekeeping operation to have a radio station as part of its information programme, although the ACABQ has very often not approved the necessary funding. However, UN radio stations operate in Rwanda and Angola; both Governments had resisted, but the UN insisted upon a radio station as an element of its operation. There is a need to sensitize the ACABQ on the need for UN radio in the mission area of peacekeeping operations.

131. An interdepartmental working group with representation from all the relevant departments is currently reviewing the public information needs of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the working group has developed a set of guidelines for addressing the public information needs of peacekeeping missions in a systematic way, and is developing a roster of qualified information personnel for field missions.

Lesson 13: There must be clear guidelines for disarmament and demobilization, and these activities must be carried out with the agreement of the parties.

132. A peacekeeping force is not suited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilization. It is always better to have disarmament and demobilization requirements incorporated into the agreements between the parties prior to the establishment of
peacekeeping operations, as was done in the Mozambique agreement preceding ONUMOZ. Further, in Mozambique, disarmament and demobilization were carried out in close coordination between the military, political and humanitarian components, and NGO concerns were taken into account and accommodated where possible. However, demobilization is an expensive exercise, and Member States need to provide resources that will enable the demobilized personnel to be reintegrated into the community.

Lesson 14: The diplomatic community in the mission area is an essential part of the operation.

133. During ONUMOZ, the diplomatic community assisted the SRSG in carrying out his tasks, applying its influence to resolve difficulties he faced from time to time. A regular, informal exchange of information with diplomats in the area of a peacekeeping operation would assist the SRSG in his work.

Lesson 15: The humanitarian component is essential to the success of peacekeeping operations.

134. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has created a Policy Analysis Division whose function, inter alia, is to learn from experience and make recommendations to improve ongoing and future operations. This division will work very closely with DPKO's Lessons-Learned Unit.

135. DHA has established the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence (M/CD) Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations. This task force has, for instance, elaborated guiding and operating principles for the use of M/CD assets by humanitarian agencies and studied the impact of such use. The task force has set up the Military and Civil Defence Support Unit (MCDU) within DHA-Geneva. This unit serves as a focal point to support collective preparedness measures and to provide a point of access for Governments and organizations interested in planning and providing support to humanitarian operations.

136. Humanitarian coordination has also been strengthened through various inter-agency mechanisms: (a) the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and other inter-agency forums bring together the key humanitarian actors, and serve an important function in identifying and responding in a timely, coordinated and, if possible, preventive manner to emerging crises. These mechanisms have gained increasing importance; (b) the use of inter-agency assessment missions has also increased and has become an important way of responding rapidly, appropriately and in a coordinated manner to complex emergencies; (c) humanitarian coordinators have been given clear terms of reference. Progress has also been made in speeding up the appointment of such coordinators. For example, humanitarian coordination mechanisms in Rwanda were a significant step forward compared to previous crises; (d) the process of allocating resources through the Consolidated Appeal Process and the use of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund have also seen important improvements; and (e) enhancing the department capacity to provide
administrative and financial backstopping for field coordination, particularly in facilitating the rapid contracting of humanitarian coordination personnel.

137. DHA has signed stand-by agreements with various Nordic emergency and rescue agencies, providing for a rapid infusion of resources and qualified coordination personnel.

138. Once a complex emergency is emerging or in the immediate aftermath of sudden onset crises, DHA now fields experienced personnel from or by means of its Rapid Response Unit to initiate and coordinate an immediate response to the emergency. The unit maintains a roster of qualified personnel with the necessary coordination and technical support skills. This is a key function in ensuring timely action. In this context, DHA has established a 24-hour-duty system.

139. Mine clearance has become an important aspect of peacekeeping, both as an operational necessity and, in the long term, as part of the comprehensive peace plan. In 1992 DPKO established the Demining Unit and DHA also established the Mine Clearance Policy Unit to provide effective Headquarters management of demining activities. The two units work in close collaboration in providing technical support and operational planning for demining activities in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. All planning and direction of demining activity in Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique and Angola was done by these two units.
Annex I


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