October 29, 1996
Statement by the Permanent Representative of Italy Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci On Item 47: "The Question of Equitable Representation On and Increase In the Membership of the Security Council"
Mr. President,
Allow me to start with a brief sketch of where we stand after three years of deliberations on the question of the expansion of the Security Council. First of all, there will be no "quick fix." Everyone, including its potential beneficiaries, agrees that the quick fix has no future. As for the "2 + 3" proposal, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to select one African, one Asian, and one Latin American or Caribbean Country for a permanent seat. Moreover, one of the permanent members has already made it abundantly clear that it would block any Charter amendment granting the veto to developing Countries. This leaves us with three main options: 1. The "2 + 3 permanent regional rotating seats" and its variants;
2. The Italian proposal to establish 10 new non-permanent seats, for the more frequent rotation
of 30 Countries to be chosen by the General Assembly;
3. The "fall-back position" of the Non-Aligned Movement to increase only the non-permanent seats, for the time being, in case no agreement is reached on other categories of membership. Let us look at these options one-by-one.
The first formula, "2 + 3 regional permanent rotating," ran into some lively opposition when it was discussed last Spring in the Open-Ended Working Group. Some delegates dubbed it "the quick fix by the back door." To me it looked like a Trojan Horse: Open it up, and out jump two new permanent members, Germany and Japan. We were also called to logic on this by our distinguished Brazilian colleague, who said, "We are the United Nations, not the United Regions." We thought that the sun had set on this proposal, but to our surprise it was reincarnated this September in the form of a draft resolution circulated to an Asian capital and through the corridors of the UN. This latest version carries the proviso that it would be up to the three continents, Africa, Asia and Latin America, to decide how often, how many and which of their Countries would be the beneficiaries of the "regional permanent seats." In fact, this draft would immediately grant permanent seats to two large industrialized Countries. The under-represented continents, meanwhile, would be led into an endless, intractable dispute over the criteria and modalities for utilizing the seats assigned to them (only on paper, of course!).
Frankly, Mr. President, we do not see how such a plan could be accepted. No one is so naive as to buy a compromise that would give immediate advantages to two Countries, and only a long-term credit to their counterparts. Furthermore, the establishment of regional rotating seats would introduce two double standards. The first vis-a-vis two regional groups, WEOG and Eastern Europe, who would be excluded from the rotation. The second double standard would be vis-a-vis all of us, since the hypothetical "global" superiority of certain Countries would be treated as a foregone conclusion. But where do we draw the line between Countries that are economic global powers and Countries that are not?
Let's face another fact of life. Veto power will not be granted to 2 or more self-appointed "global powers" unless it is simultaneously accorded to developing Countries - a possibility that, as I have already said, has been ruled out by one permanent member. Therefore, if this scenario prevails, the Member States of the United Nations would be divided into 4 categories:
- Category A: the five current permanent members, with veto power;
- Category B: two new permanent members, Germany and Japan, but without veto power, at least for the time being;
- Category C: a certain number of Countries (depending on how many are eventually chosen from the three developing continents), also without the veto, of course, who would sit or rotate on the three regional permanent seats, and probably forego the test of democratic elections;
- Category D: the rest of us, who would have to compete fiercely for the non-permanent seats, which would be slightly increased in number. I am referring here to 165-170 Countries, large and small, major and minor contributors to the budget, active participants and non-participants in peace-keeping operations, etc.
As I said, we would end up with four categories of membership. Now what kind of equality is that, Mr. President?
Many of us have already said that the expression "permanent rotating," semantically speaking, is a contradiction in terms. Yet its authors have touted it as "constructive ambiguity." With all due respect, to us it sounds more like "destructive ambiguity." It would destroy democracy, since it would violate the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in our Charter. It would destroy justice, making the Security Council even more elitist than it is now. It would curtail one of the General Assembly's main powers: the right to democratically elect by secret ballot no fewer than two-thirds of the Security Council members.
Let us learn from history: in 1926, the decline of the League of Nations was set into motion, at least in part, by the increase in permanent members.
Turning now to the second option--the Italian proposal--first I would like to sincerely thank the Countries who have manifested their interest or support. We are heartened by the growing momentum that is building behind it. During the recent general debate alone, 29 Countries expressly mentioned the Italian proposal, many of them for the first time. This number is on a par with the number of delegations who mentioned granting permanent seats to Germany and Japan. All in all, since the beginning of the exercise on Security Council reform, 77 Countries have publicly supported the Italian formula or shown interest in it per se or as a fall-back position.
The Italian proposal is the only formula that addresses and reconciles the two major changes in the international scenario since the end of World War II, namely:
- the emergence of a group of Countries with considerable economic and political capacities, including Italy;
- the emergence of developing Countries, far more numerous and important today than they were when the Security Council was enlarged in 1965.
It is a fact that over the past 50 years, several mid- to large-size Countries have been elected to the Council more frequently. It is also a fact that 77 other Countries, including some founding members, have never been elected to the Council, while 44 have been elected only once: in other words, for two-thirds of the general membership, participation in the Security Council has either been completely blocked or severely limited. Under the Italian proposal, these States would have a far more concrete chance of being elected to the Security Council, since they would be shielded from the competition of the "big brothers" in their regional groups. As for the mid- to large-size Countries, whose rivalry for seats has grown more heated and divisive with each passing year, as we just witnessed last week, our proposal aims to bring more harmony and less bitterness to the elections. Last but not least, the Italian proposal aims to strengthen the role of the General Assembly, which must remain the bedrock of our Organization. Since all non-permanent members, both frequently and regularly rotating, would have to stand for democratic elections, the General Assembly's power within the UN system would be maintained and even strengthened.
As for the impact of Security Council reform on the financial situation, time and again we have heard that the reward for handing over two permanent seats to two big economic powers would be an influx of fresh cash to the UN coffers. But wait a moment: the financial situation could also be improved through the Italian proposal - and not at the immense cost of granting perpetual, irreversible seats to two nations! Look at the financing of peace-keeping operations. Currently the permanent members pay the same share for peace-keeping that they do for the regular budget, plus a surcharge of approximately 20%. One argument that has been made in favor of granting permanent seats to Germany and Japan is that by paying just such a surcharge, they would increase the resources available for the peace-keeping budget. But the Italian proposal has a notable advantage in this respect. It would spread the burden to a larger number of countries, thirty countries rather than two, since more frequently rotating states would also have to pay a surcharge, of 10%, half the ratio paid by permanent members. This would also decrease the Organization's dependence on the contributions and whims of two or three countries, and help to reduce the contribution of less developed countries. In the long term, it might even lead to a reassessment of the surcharge paid by permanent members.
The third proposal on the table is the position of the Non-Aligned Movement. I quote: "If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category." This proposal follows in the footsteps of the first and only successful reform of the Security Council in 1965, when four non-permanent seats were added. I have a very simple question,
Mr. President: If it worked then, why shouldn't it work now?
Recent voting results have led to speculations that NAM is losing its traditional unity and clout. In my opinion this is a serious miscalculation. Those of us who were invited to Cartagena witnessed in person the impressive solidarity of the NAM Countries, on general and specific issues. The NAM fall-back position for the enlargement of the Security Council can count on a huge base: 113 members in the General Assembly, almost the exact majority needed to approve a proposal. Italy remains convinced of the validity of its own proposal. But as Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini said to the General Assembly one month ago, we are also ready to accept another formula consistent with the fundamental principles of our proposal: that is to say, the principles of democracy, equitable geographic representation, effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. We remain firmly opposed to the creation of new permanent members in any way, style or form.
The NAM position is animated by the same spirit and moves in the same direction as the Italian proposal. It would represent a first step toward future solutions, while instantly making available additional elective seats for which we all could freely compete. The new seats should be allotted to every regional group. It will not be hard to reach an agreement on the exact number, since we all want a manageable, effective and efficient Security Council. As to procedure, we would simply have to follow in the footsteps of the 1963 enlargement, when only two small amendments were made to the Charter: one to the number of non-permanent seats; the other to the new majority needed to approve a resolution.
Mr. President,
After three years of intense work, our inability to reach an agreement on the enlargement of the Security Council could damage the image of our Organization--and this at a time when the UN is already under criticism. But we simply cannot and should not accept the status quo. This is why we must proceed with full respect for the principles of openness and transparency. Our best guarantee of success in this endeavor, Mr. President, is your determination and experience, but first and foremost your objectivity and impartiality.
We are at a fork in the road. One path leads to new permanent seats, the other to new elective seats. One brings us back to more discrimination, elitism and inequity. The other takes us forward to greater democracy, participation and justice. It is up to us and us alone to decide. But whether we like it or not, even as we speak the future is laying down the path we must follow. Indeed, it is to the future of the UN that we must dedicate our efforts. One-hundred fifty years ago, that great political scientist, Alexis de Tocqueville, wrote, "Democracy, which shuts the past against us, opens the future before us."
Thank you, Mr. President.
