Razali Ismail (March 1, 1996)

Permanent Representative of Malaysia

"Decision Making and the Veto"

Working Group on the Security Council
New York
1 March 1996

Mr. Chairman,

The subject before us is not new. The overwhelming number of member states have consistently pointed out that the veto is antidemocratic and a vestige and symbol of power politics at the Security Council. Fifty years after the birth of this Organization, we must take steps, if not strides to veer away from practices which entrench power politics.

The question of veto is one of the cardinal issues, as it impinges directly on the decision-making process of the Council. Malaysia has consistently spoken out against the veto power. The veto power negates the principle of sovereign equality, and is anachronistic. While its explicit exercise has declined since the end of the Cold War, the threat of its use has often been exploited to prevent the Council from fulfilling its Charter mandate. There would seem to be a correlation between its non-use and the increasing number of informal meetings involving selected member states where decisions are often made. This was evident as recent as this week when the Council considered certain issues where the threat of veto served to promote national agenda more than providing or protecting basic needs of others.

At the same time it is evident that those with the veto power would not give their assent to its abolition. Notwithstanding this position, the international community must be relentless in this struggle. We fully support the proposal to define Article 27 of the Charter, which in its current state is ambiguous. Article 27 makes a distinction as to voting procedure between procedural and substantive questions without, however, defining these terms.

Based on a General Assembly resolution adopted in 1949, we believe that the time has come for a serious and in-depth examination on the application of Article 27. In this regard, my delegation endorses the following specific proposals:

to establish general criteria for the identification of what is to be considered actions for a procedural nature as stated in Article 27(2) of the Charter;

to identify the questions of "vital importance" as stated in the General Assembly resolution of 1949, where veto could be applied; and

to establish a mechanism that would modify the present voting system including ensuring that a single veto would not be sufficient to prohibit the overwhelming position within the Council to make a pronouncement or take a decision.

While recognizing the difficulties, we believe that the application of veto could be modified by procedures and understandings that could be developed in the course of discussions within this Open-ended Working Group. We hope that the permanent members would be forthcoming and not adopt a dogmatic approach, if substantive progress in all aspects is to be made.

One specific area requiring immediate attention pertains to consultations between the Security Council and the troop contributing countries. Although the Presidential Statement of the Security Council of November 4 1994 has facilitated some degree of consultations, the process remains ad hoc. The co-chairmanship of the meetings by the President of the Security Council and the Secretariat have been ineffective. It is time for the implementation of Article 44 which invites the member state ".... to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces".

I also wish to underline the following points:

On the process pertaining to deciding on successor states, we should determine a specific way to keep the General Membership informed through the convening of the General Assembly;

The Security Council should seek the judicial opinion of the ICJ on controversial decisions, especially those with legal implications. It is timely for a greater utilization or recourse to the ICJ, given the increasingly multidisciplinary nature of issues;

Need to review the role of the Security Council in the elections to the ICJ as well as the Secretary General. A related issue is to consider the so-called 'cascade' effect where even in the absence of Charter provisions, P5 Members have been Permanent Members of the principal organs of the UN. In this connection, I recall a letter from a P5 member to other Member States during the 50th UNGA, where it was stated that the rights and prerogatives of P5 should not be touched. I wish to know what is meant by prerogatives and as to why the P5 should insist on privileges beyond those stated in the Charter.

Mr. Chairman,

If and when we do eventually agree to expand the Security Council, my delegation reserves the right to raise the specifics pertaining to the voting procedures within the Council as some of these issues can only be considered when we arrive at agreement on the numbers.

Thank you.

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