Global Policy Forum

By Georges Corm

President George Bush and his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, have made statements about Lebanon almost every day since the murder of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, on 14 February. European governments, led by the French, have joined the accusations, prompting sudden interest by international media.

Resolution 1559, adopted by the United Nations security council on 3 September, had gone almost unnoticed except in Lebanon. But the murder of a political leader, respected in the Middle East and internationally, plus French and US agitation and a plethora of Israeli statements, have caused turmoil in Lebanon, threatening its future.

The UN resolution had an impressive list of provisions questioning the status of Lebanon since its reorganisation under the Taif accord of 1989 (1) and subsequent transfer to Syrian control as reward for the cooperation of Damascus with the US-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf war. The resolution called on the Lebanese parliament to drop plans to amend the constitution to enable president Emile Lahoud's mandate to be extended from six to nine years. In 1995 neither Washington nor Paris reacted when the same privilege was granted to the previous incumbent, Elias Hrawi, a close friend of Damascus and Hariri.

This UN demand was surprising, given that its charter forbids any interference in the internal affairs of a member state. But the resolution went much further, calling for withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, deployment of the Lebanese army along the border with Israel, and disarmament of the Lebanese Hizbullah militia and Palestinian groups in refugee camps. The demands undermined Lebanon's stability, restoring it to the unhappy position of a buffer zone between opposing outside forces contending for control of the Middle East and manipulating Lebanon's communities and political leaders for their own ends (2).

From 1975 to 1990 the main conflicts affecting the region - the cold war; the conflict between Israel and the Arab world; between Arab states; and the Iran-Iraq war with its local and international repercussions - played out on a smaller scale in Lebanon. Rather than developing into a full confrontation they were shadow-played on Lebanese territory: local politicians agreed to act as pawns, funded and armed by regional and international powers. The religious communities they claimed to represent provided the pretext, and a source of cannon fodder for foreign causes. They also acted as a smokescreen for the Arab and international media, always hungry for stories to substantiate their claims of enduring hatred between the communities.

In 1988-90, in the last act of this awful play, General Michel Aoun, then commander-in-chief of the army, started a war of liberation against Syrian occupation forces. In doing so he yielded to pressure from the Arab League committee tasked with finding a way out of the crisis. But Iraq was supplying arms and France providing massive political and moral support (apparently backed by limited military assistance). The consequences were disastrous, particularly for Christian communities caught in the crossfire between Aoun and his powerful rival, Samir Geagea, the leader of the (Christian) Lebanese Forces militia. Fighting between the militia and Aoun's troops, combined with attacks by the Syrian army, undermined the status of the Christian community, leaving it only a marginal role in the emerging new order.

Pax syriana

The Pax Syriana in October 1990, with the blessing of the US, prompted widespread relief, and silence from the Israeli government. For 14 years Lebanon enjoyed unusual stability. The only major upsets were massive Israeli attacks in the south in 1993 and 1996 in an attempt to tame Hizbullah, which had been waging an effective guerrilla war against Israeli occupation of the southern Lebanon since 1978. In May 2000 the Israeli army gave up the struggle and withdrew. Working closely with the Lebanese army and intelligence service, Hizbullah managed to prevent Israel from fomenting further conflict between Christians and Muslims, as it had done after its invasion in 1982, and during its withdrawal from Chouf in 1983 and the Saida area in 1985.

In 1991 and 1992 the successive governments of Salim al-Hoss and Omar Karami managed to disarm active militia units and bring them into the army. They restored the unity of Beirut and Lebanon as a whole, and restored the apparatus of state. A third government, led by Rashid al-Solh, organised the first elections since 1972, unfortunately boycotted by many of the population, especially most of the Christians. The governments included representatives of all the factions (except the supporters of Aoun, who had been forcibly exiled to Paris) and there was a plan to ask Syria to redeploy its troops in the plain of Beka'a, in compliance with the Taif accord (3).

Hariri then appeared on the scene, helped by his image as a benefactor capable of rebuilding Lebanon, particularly Beirut's historic centre and business district, severely damaged by 15 years of fighting. Public euphoria greeted his appointment as prime minister. He became the focus of a remarkable personality cult, boosted by his legendary generosity. He could count on devoted, tightly controlled media, growing friendship with President Jacques Chirac of France, and Saudi Arabia's unfailing support. There was no further talk of redeploying Syrian troops, or of their departure, subject to agreement between the governments of Lebanon and Syria.

After being ousted by Lahoud at the end of 1998 Hariri made a triumphant comeback in October 2000 after a crushing victory in the general election in 2001. At the time no one complained that the elections had been rigged or that Syria had pulled strings. Reconstruction, despite its exorbitant cost and patchy results, greatly impressed visitors to Beirut from home and abroad.

Two years ago, with the end of Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, Beirut regained its former place in Middle Eastern politics, culture and tourism. Who could have imagined that it would witness such spectacular, dangerous events as we have just seen? In 2000 it hosted a meeting of the Arab League's foreign ministers. In 2001 it welcomed a summit of the same organisation for the first time in several decades. In 2002 it was the venue for the summit of French-speaking nations.

To mark the occasion, Chirac made a speech to parliament in which he implicitly confirmed Lebanon's status as a Syrian protectorate until the Israeli-Arab conflict was settled. "Of course lasting, just and comprehensive peace [in the Middle East] can only be achieved if it includes Lebanon and Syria and if it brings a fair solution to the question of Palestinian refugees, taking into account Lebanese interests," he said. "France has constantly defended this position. At the same time progress towards long-desired peace will enable Lebanon and Syria to harmonise their relations and complete full withdrawal of Syrian forces from your country, in conformity with the Taif accord" (4). The speech was in tune with the policy statement made by Hariri on return to office in 2000, in which he confirmed the need for Syrian troops to remain in Lebanon (5).

All this happened before the US invasion of Iraq and the Greater Middle East initiative to establish order and democracy and eradicate terrorist violence - just a rehash of themes and slogans produced by US diplomacy in the early 1990s: President Bush Sr had just won the first Gulf war and promised a new world order. A few months later Shimon Peres published The New Middle East (6) announcing a new era of peace, prosperity and economic cooperation between the peoples of the region. Only the irrational forces of Islamic fundamentalism might upset the happy prospect. The process gained further credibility with the Oslo accords in 1993 and big economic conferences (Casablanca, Amman, Cairo, Doha) attended by officials and business people from Israel, the US, Europe and the Arab world.

Failure of Oslo

But the spread of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza made a nonsense of the Oslo peace process. After the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000, Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, the third most sacred place in the Muslim world, sparked an explosion. The second intifada and its military escalation in response to violent Israeli incursions were of little concern to Bush Jnr, who was in no hurry to settle the Palestinian question. His attention was once more focused on Iraq. As early as 1998, the Clinton administration had said that, since UN inspections had failed to achieve their goals, the Baghdad regime represented a major threat to world peace.

After 9/11 Bush decided, against the evidence, that Saddam Hussein was implicated and that he had again started developing weapons of mass destruction. The stage was set for the invasion of Iraq, of vital importance to the balance of the Middle East (7). The arguments justifying the invasion having lost all credibility, the US administration set about convincing the world that it intended to bring freedom and democracy to the Middle East, and liberating the people of Iraq from Saddam's dictatorship was the first step towards widespread democratic reform.

When armed resistance grew in Iraq, the US accused Syria, another Ba'athist regime dating from an era that everyone wanted to forget. Bashar al-Assad, the young president of Syria who had succeeded his father, Hafez, on his death in June 2000, promised reforms. But the new regime had difficulty finding the impetus to liberalise politics and encourage free-market economics along the same lines as the countries of central Europe. Only minor political changes actually happened in Damascus and in some cases they were short-lived. Market deregulation opened the way for private banking in which Lebanese banks had a key role. But reform of the public sector and measures to halt steeply rising unemployment have had to wait.

In fairness, the Syrian regime is no longer a repressive machine crushing dissidence. But the US invasion of Iraq and Washington's accusations have put the regime on the defensive and made it difficult to continue reform. In December 2003 the US introduced some sanctions under the Syrian Accountability Act, passed by Congress. The act is a powerful tool to put pressure on Damascus. It called on Syria to restore full independence to Lebanon (8). On 11 May 2004 Bush issued instructions, based on the act, to tighten the economic blockade. The sanctions and UN resolution 1559 delighted Aoun and his Lebanese lobby in Washington and Paris, who preach Christian secession or transformation of the country into a federal republic. His supporters now take credit for having rekindled US enthusiasm for restoring Lebanese sovereignty (9).

In Lebanon Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze Muslim community and a longstanding ally of the Syrian regime, used the election campaign in 2000 to open hostilities, denouncing Syrian control. Some commentators assumed this was merely an electoral manoeuvre to pick up Christian votes, particularly as he went quiet once the elections were over. But in September the bishops of the Christian Maronite community issued an outspoken statement blaming Damascus for all Lebanon's ills: widespread corruption, national debt, social unrest, and disregard for political forces.

For the first time in the history of the Christian community a bishop was appointed to take part in meetings of the Kornet Chehwan, a motley collection of public figures, including representatives of Aoun and the disbanded Lebanese Forces, several Maronite MPs and Amin Gemayel, the Falangist leader and former president. The group presented itself as an opposition force, not directed against the Hariri government but against Lahoud and Syria. It advocated sending the army to south Lebanon to replace Hizbullah forces. It also called for the release of Geagea, arrested in 1993 and sentenced for several attacks. It demanded withdrawal of the Syrian army under the terms of the Taif accord.

After Israel pulled out of south Lebanon in 2000 the US and many European countries pressed the Lebanese government to deploy its army along the southern border, suggesting that Hizbullah forces should occupy less strategic positions and perhaps even be disarmed. But the funds promised by the West to rebuild the area occupied for 22 years never materialised. With the war on Iraq, this sensitive issue was forgotten. US threats against Syria and Hizbullah prompted a wave of protest in Lebanon, even attracting the support of the Maronite patriarch. This helped to reduce the tension.

Again a pawn

Hariri's murder has triggered a major crisis, at a time when both regimes, in Lebanon and Syria, are in difficulty. Lebanon is once again a pawn in Middle East politics and its worst nightmares have surfaced. Only a few months after the attack on Marwan Hamade, an MP close to Hariri and Jumblatt, Hariri's death reopens wounds never properly healed. Many Lebanese feel they have lost a key symbol of stability and prosperity.

Hariri was the target of much criticism, because of the close links he had with the Syrian nomenklatura. But he embodied hopes of a return to normality and an end to involvement in the Israeli-Arab conflict that has caused so much suffering.

That is why Bush and Chirac's repeated calls for Syrian withdrawal and full, prompt application of resolution 1559 resonated. They coalesced around Jumblatt, now the undisputed opposition leader, and Hariri's "family". This group includes all the MPs faithful to Hariri, several political groups, and NGOs and students, many of them, though not all, from the Christian middle classes.

Bush and some European leaders want to turn Lebanon into a laboratory for democracy. They are convinced that, with elections in occupied Iraq and Palestine, a local council poll in Saudi Arabia and the prospect of a multiparty presidential election in Egypt, a vote in Lebanon would give impetus to the "tide of freedom" sweeping the Middle East.

But their optimism makes no allowance for the complexity of Lebanon, or for the importance Arab public opinion still attaches to Damascus, despite its distaste for the regime. Syria is one of the last remaining obstacles to US domination of the Middle East and to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict detrimental to the interests of the Palestinians - and Syrians (the Golan Heights have been occupied by Israel since 1967 and were annexed in 1981).

Jumblatt's opposition may be representative of central Lebanon, but in the north, south and east it must compete with "loyalist" parties keen to maintain close links with Syria. Several opposition leaders were steadfast supporters of Syrian control until recently, or were responsible for massacres and forced movements of population from 1975 to 1990. The opposition is deeply divided, with widely differing political agendas. Some are determined to overthrow the existing regime. Others advocate a more moderate approach.

The loyalists include several pro-government, pro-Syrian parties regrouped around Hizbullah, which is still regarded by the US as a terrorist organisation, and its charismatic leader, Hassan Nasrallah. It has suddenly become the pivotal unifying force in a movement rooted in traditions of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, shared by many others in the Middle East. A third force, led by the respected former prime minister, Salim al-Hoss, is trying hard to restore peace and calm. It is a struggle, since feelings run high.

Demonstrations and counter-demonstr-ations have paralysed Lebanon since Hariri's death. How long can it survive a crisis on this scale, inflicted by Washington and Paris, before its fragile economy collapses or professional agitators spark an explosion? In practice UN resolution 1559 has restored Lebanon to its former status as a buffer zone. The political arena once more reflects all the tensions in the Middle East, played out by Lebanese factions without any restraint.

(2) See Georges Corm, Le Liban contemporain: Histoire et société, La Découverte, Paris, 2003.

(3) For a discussion of the reasons preventing redeployment of Syrian troops and application of the constitutional provisions of the Taif accord, see the book by Albert Mansour, former minister of defence and then information, under the governments in power at reunification and the end of the war (1989-92): Al-Inqilab ala al-Ta'if, Dar al-Jadid, Beirut, 1992. This book highlights the overwhelming responsibility of former president Hrawi and his manoeuvres; he paved the way for Hariri to take office in 1992, after an artificial run on the Lebanese pound that brought down the Karami government. The other decisive factor was the lack of any regional power to counter-balance Syria.

(4) L'Orient-Le Jour, Beirut, 18 October 2002.

(5) In an answer to an opposition MP who protested at this statement, Hariri said that "blaming Syria for Lebanon's problems was unrealistic". He added that without Syria "it would have been impossible to achieve stability" (full text in An-Nahar, 3 November 2000). Hariri stuck to this position from his first period in office in 1992 until his death.

(6) Shimon Peres, The New Middle East, Holt, New York, 1993.

(7) See Ignacio Ramonet, Irak, Histoire d'un désastre, Galilée, Paris, 2005.

(8) The US Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 on 12 December 2003.

(9) See the provocative report in An-Nahar, Beirut, on 3 February 2005.

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