Security Council Reform by Mr. HWANG Joon Kook,
First Secretary at the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform
THE VETO
2 May 1997
My delegation believes the Charter should be amended to limit the scope of veto power. As we see it, individual, voluntary and unilateral declarations by Permanent Members to that effect are insufficient.
We note in this Working Group that a large majority of member states are now eager, after 50 years of UN history, to curtail the potential overuse of the veto. In particular, they support the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) proposal to circumscribe the scope of the veto to Council actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Under the current system, even entry into UN membership and the appointment of the Secretary-General are subject to blockage by just one Permanent Member of the Security Council.
In our view, the large majority's call to rectify that situation is reasonable, constructive and not to the detriment of the current Permanent Members' vital interests.
Therefore, we sincerely hope that the Permanent Members will be more flexible on this crucial question. If they see no room for compromise, it could be more difficult to advance the important elements of this reform process.
ISSUE-BY-ISSUE APPROACH AND SIZE OF THE COUNCIL
5 May 1997
We have no objection to an "issue-by-issue" approach and see merit in the Bureau's attempt to determine the mainstream views on each of the specific issues. It could provide us with a deeper understanding of the whole picture. Having said that, I should like to make two points in that regard.
First, the sum of each mainstream view on each issue does not necessarily enjoy the support of the majority. That is because those who comprise the mainstream view will differ from issue to issue, and different countries have different priorities among the issues. Therefore, even if we succeed in determining a clear majority view on each issue, the simple sum of those majority views, supposedly the mainstream view of the whole picture of Security Council reform, is not necessarily so.
Second, as the Bureau noted, all of these issues are inter-connected in various degrees and have to be taken as an integrated whole. It is for precisely that reason that it could be difficult for some delegations to finalize their position on certain issues.
For instance, in terms of the size of the Security Council, we have no fixed number in mind. We understand the argument of some Permanent Members who favour only a small increase up to 21. On the other hand, we fully appreciate the NAM's position supporting expansion of the Security Council by no less than 11. Essentially, as far as we are concerned, the size depends upon, among others, several key questions related to composition; namely, whether both Permanent Membership and Non-Permanent Membership will be increased. If Permanent Membership is increased, which countries will be the ultimate beneficiaries of that decision? If only NPM is increased at this time, should some room be left for future discussions on the possible addition of new Permanent Members. All of these elements are related.
Therefore, in terms of issue-by-issue discussions, it may be worthwhile to carefully consider the inter-connected nature of those elements and deliberate in a broad context.
COMPOSITION: INCREASE IN PERMANENT OR NON-PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP
6 May 1997
Allow me to reiterate my delegation's position on the composition of the Security Council. We have some reservations on the proposed increase in Permanent Membership. Our disagreement is a conceptual one and therefore should not be construed as disfavor toward any specific country who aspires to Permanent Membership. That increase in Permanent Membership is not something we envision for the future United Nations on the eve of the 21st century.
The inscription of several additional country names in the Charter as Permanent Members of the Security Council who are not subject to future elections, is like going against the stream of modern history. The concept is undemocratic. If the United Nations is to remain viable in a continually evolving global environment, then the number of Member States whose status cannot adapt to the passage of time should not be extended. Some system or mechanism should be established which allows those Member States willing and able to actively contribute to international peace and security to serve in the Security Council at any given point in time by way of democratic process.
Some may argue that the present composition of the Permanent Membership is outdated and that by adding some new Permanent Members, Permanent Membership would be modernized. This position is understandable but hardly the point in our view. The real question is not whether Permanent Membership is balanced or has a modern look, but whether the Security Council as a whole aptly represents the entire UN membership with fair and extended opportunities for every Member State to serve in the Council, and is so organized as to discharge its paramount responsibilities.
We consider it desirable at this point to expand membership in the Non-Permanent category only, provided the reform of Permanent Membership is further discussed in an open-minded manner. As far as any concrete formula or modality for the expansion of non-permanent membership is concerned, including the number of non-permanent members, the tenure of non-permanent members, and whether non-permanent members will be re-electable, etc., we remain flexible.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "REVIEW" AND "ELECTIONS"
6 May 1997
I feel obliged to respond to the remarks just made by the distinguished representative of Germany on the proposed periodic review for new permanent members. The important question is whether periodic review affords a degree of accountability for new permanent members. Let us be clear and candid on this. Review is not tantamount to elections. Review maintains permanent status only if successful in blocking an opposed 2/3 majority. In other words, securing just 1/3 support. Hence, this could degrade the concept of review to a mere rubber stamp by which to legitimize their de facto eternal status. It is difficult for us to accept the possibility that a one-time decision will hold sway for all-time.
PERMANENT REGIONAL ROTATION
7 May 1997
Just a follow-up to the current interesting debate on Permanent Regional Rotation (PRR). Although the distinguished representative of Malaysia just responded to several questions raised by India, my delegation believes it is still valid to ask additional questions, despite some possible overlapping.
"Permanent" and "rotational" do not go hand in hand, as several delegations already noted. Therefore, we conclude that this may be meaningful only if it carries the prerogatives which Permanent Members have, such as veto power. Then, several questions naturally arise. As other delegations have pointed out, is it feasible given the prevailing atmosphere in this Working Group, to empower rotational seats with the right of veto? Moreover, is it desirable or constructive to do so? If they have veto power, are they supposed to use it only on behalf of the region they represent? If so, should some new, special decision-making mechanism be devised to ensure that those who assume a PRR seat use the veto power to the benefit of the entire region? If those who take on these seats do not reflect the will of the region as a whole, assuming there is a unified will of the region, then how do we deal with that scenario? Here, we assumed there exists such a thing as a common position of the region on specific issues the SC deals with, but, does it really exist? From our experience in the Council, it is sometimes not easy to establish even a national position on a given issue. Just imagine 48 Asian countries trying to forge a consensus position.
In this regard, another fundamental question comes to mind. Is PRR really supposed to represent the interests of the region? To my delegation's understanding, the Charter never intended for the interests of geographical sectors to be represented by one or two regional countries. The five current regional groups were established in the UN for the practical purpose of elections to ensure equitable geographical distribution. Here, I emphasize the word distribution, not representation of the regional common interests.
All in all, the notion of PRR seems to us interesting and creative, as all oxymoron's do. But frankly, it gives my delegation a headache when we think of all the possible questions and problems that might arise from any attempt to materialize this idea. Who will resolve these questions? We might simply end up risking an unnecessary confrontation in the region. Especially in Asia, I see little prospect of reaching an agreement on such issues as who will assume the seats, their tenure, and the establishment of some mechanism to ensure that the so-called "common regional interests" are suitably represented.
I may be wrong, but it could take a long time to reach agreement among the Asian countries on these issues. And thus, my final question: How does this entire reform process move forward in the interim? Do we have to wait until a possible outcome emerges among the 48 Asian countries?
PERIODIC REVIEW
8 May 1997
Yesterday's discussion on periodic review was quite interesting and important, but somewhat confusing in the end. My delegation noted with particular interest what the distinguished representative of Germany had to say on the subject of review. I very much appreciate the German delegation's direct response to the question we raised two days ago. He said yesterday, and I quote: "All new permanent members would become removable and therefore accountable to the general membership. Of course, future permanent members would also have to prove that they have the necessary support of the membership, e.g.: a two-thirds majority," end quote.
This statement gives the impression that new permanent members would be subject to standard elections requiring a 2/3 majority in their favor, after perhaps 10, 15 or 20 years. As the Latvian and Mexican Ambassadors said yesterday, it is as though the German delegation envisages the creation of a new category of re-electable, longer-tenure non-permanent members. This seems to represent a sudden departure from their original position.
But when we continue reading yesterday's German statement, we realize that the initial impression may have been wrong. The last paragraph of the same statement reads, and I quote, "We continue to believe that the legal base for review should be Article 108," end quote. At the same time, the German working paper distributed yesterday also states, and once again I quote: "New permanent members who are not the original five permanent members are subject to a periodic review in accordance with Article 108," end quote. As every delegation in this room knows, Article 108 deals specifically with Charter amendment. Charter amendment is possible only when the amendment is supported by a 2/3 majority. In other words, any change or replacement of permanent members can occur only if that initiative is supported by a 2/3 majority. This means that new permanent members can maintain their status only if successful in blocking a 2/3 majority. In other words, by simply securing 1/3 support in their favor.
Therefore, our initial concern about the lack of accountability persists. If my interpretation of Germany's working paper and its statement yesterday is mistaken, please correct me. I believe clarification on this issue is very important for two reasons. First, the difference between 1/3 support and 2/3 support is substantial and qualitative. Second, the conceptual difference between the longer tenure non-permanent membership subject to standard elections and permanent membership subject to a periodic review based on the provisions of Charter amendment, is quite significant.
