Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN
Statement to the General Assembly Working Group on the Security Council
New York
April 22, 1996
I want to make some comments on item 1 of our Programme of Work, namely the composition and size of the Security Council. The composition must remain as set forth in the Charter, that is, permanent and non permanent members. We believe that it is impossible to get rid of the permanent members. Those five have been enshrined as such in the Charter and this situation cannot be changed.
As to the size, we believe that it is important to ensure that the Security Council continue to work effectively. That is why our proposal is in favour of an increase in non permanent members: five additional countries would become non permanent members of the Council.
Principles Governing the Possible Expansion of Permanent Leadership
Our position regarding the possible increase of permanent members has been crystal clear from the very beginning of our deliberations: we believe that the five permanent members are already too many, they are more than enough. We are firmly against the expansion in that category. So, our unequivocal answer to the number of possible new permanent members is simple: zero.
The principles that should govern our negotiations are stated in the Charter. First and foremost among them is the sovereign equality of States. An increase in the number of permanent members does not go along with the principle of sovereign equality of States. Furthermore, another important guideline, the principle of equitable geographical distribution, would simply be buried by adding one more permanent member from Europe, as has been suggested, to the three we currently have from that continent, bringing the total to four European states.
In addition, in the conclusions of our Report to the last session of the General Assembly, we referred to some criteria that ought to guide our endeavors. We spoke of "efficiency", "effectiveness", "transparency" and "democracy". Ambassador Butler has added the concept of "modernity". We must take all of them into account and attempt to bring into the 21st century our organization, so that it will be in tune with present day realities. How could the Security Council be more effective or efficient if instead of the current five permanent members we end up with eleven permanent members?
Why eleven? Because, while the number "ten" was the one mentioned before, now that we have heard of the African Group's desire for two permanent members from that continent, the new proposed total of permanent members becomes "eleven".
The same logic applies to the term "efficiency", which is in the report that our Working Group adopted by consensus. As to "transparency", what is missing in the current Security Council is precisely a little more transparency, a little more interaction between the permanent and nonpermanent members. Some are trying to convince us that a Security Council having eleven permanent members would, by some sort of miracle, be more transparent that the current one.
Finally, the report also refers to the need of a more democratic Council. Nobody can dispute that the Security Council is the least democratic organ at the United Nations. How then could we turn this already undemocratic body into a democratic organ by adding six new permanent members and thus extending inequalities and disparities? The best way to modernize the Security Council is by avoiding an increase in the number of privileged States, that is the permanent members. We must move on to the 21st century, not back to the 13th century.
In conclusion, we do not see how the principles of the Charter and the objectives we have set for ourselves can be achieved by increasing the number of permanent members.
As to the proposal of having permanent members from developing regions, it entails a further complication: how is one to expect that a given region will reach agreement on the country which will occupy the permanent seat? To prove my point, I will refer to the various pretenders as they appear in the paragraph 69 of our report.
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil does not enjoy the support of the region. And, as far as I know, the pretenders from all the other regions are in a similar situation: the Asian Group does not unanimously support India or Japan; there is no consensus in Europe to have Germany as a permanent member, and the African Group does not favour either Nigeria or Egypt.
Criteria for the Selection of New Permanent Members
Much has been said about the criteria for the selection of new permanent members, and it is no secret that several delegations have been working on them.
Before embarking on such an exercise, we should first agree on three important aspects regarding criteria:
1.- The question itself of whether or not to use criteria for the selection.
2.- Decide by consensus which criteria are to be used.
3.- The sources from which the data would be drawn.
I would like to point out, however, that when working with four, eight, or even twelve criteria, my delegation has found great surprises. Our results place countries such as Canada, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Mexico, none of which are pretenders to a permanent seat, in a better position than many who have such pretensions.
Rotational Arrangements
Referring to the proposals on "rotational arrangements", we first see in them a discriminatory element. What is suggested is a rotation of seats among African, Asian and Latin American and Caribbean countries. As far as the two pretenders from the developed world are concerned, namely Germany and Japan, there is no rotation. I would like to know who would be rotating with Germany and Japan? If we were to agree on a rotational scheme, rotation should apply to everyone.
We will carefully study the Tunisian statement we just heard. But I must say that rotation still causes doubts. How would the rotation system be applied? Tunisia has told us that a region could allocate the seat for six years to a given country with the possibility of reelection. If, for example, Africa decides to allocate its rotating seat following an alphabetical order, the first country to occupy it would then be Algeria. Since Algeria is a very respectable and respected country, it would undoubtedly be possible for it to be reelected for another six years, bringing its tenure to twelve years. In this hypothesis, and considering that the African Group has 53 members, when would the permanent membership go to Zimbabwe? 53 multiplied by 12 gives an awesome total: Zimbabwe would come up for membership approximately in six hundred years, or at least every three hundred if reelection is not possible ...
We could, of course, devise other ways of determining rotation. For example, the Asian countries could decide in a very democratic way: by drawing lots, and convene on no reelection. Let us suppose that the draw favours India for six years; that country then will be followed by Indonesia, then Iran, and then Iraq, and so on and so forth until they come back to the letter pulled out. I think this would also raise any possible imaginable problems, and it would take a very large number of years for a country to become again a so-called permanent member.
The other problem we are having with these rotational schemes is which countries can participate. I assume, but it is not clear, that all countries are entitled to participate in the rotation if they so wish. Since I believe we are trying to democratize the United Nations, I believe that, for instance, each and every one of the Latin American and Caribbean countries will have an opportunity of being permanent member with veto power, not excluding anyone if we truly want to act in a democratic fashion.
What is not mentioned in any proposal is the financial implications of being a permanent member of the Security Council. But maybe the financial and economic situation of the entire international community will be better in 25 or 30 years from now when we conclude this exercise, which is not leading us anywhere.
Finally, do the countries holding a regional permanent seat represent their region or their respective countries? When Mexico, as we calculated, would be a permanent member roughly in the year 2200, do we represent Mexico or will we be acting on behalf of Latin America and the Caribbean? We are not clear on that at all.
Extension of the Veto
We do not want an extension of the veto to any other country. We have even attempted through our proposed amendments to seven Articles of the Charter to limit the existing veto, following the line of the Non Aligned Movement, limiting the veto only to matters related to measures under Chapter VII. Consistent with that position, we are categorically opposed to making this privilege extensive in any way, and we definitely do not favour granting it to any new country.
Cascade Effect
We are grateful to Argentina and Spain for having brought this delicate problem to our attention. Adding new permanent members would entail studying whether or not we would grant them, not only the written privileges provided for in the Charter, but also the unwritten ones that have arisen from custom.
We would have to see, for instance, how to amend other articles of the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice in order to increase the membership of other organs to continue to retain the possibility for members to be elected to them.
