Global Policy Forum

By Joanna Slater, Ahmed Rashid and Murray Hiebert

Trust and Reconciliation aren't words that normally spring to mind when describing India's relationship with Pakistan. As of last week, however, they were back in circulation, mentioned by the Indian prime minister himself in a brief note on May 25 to Pakistani leader Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf. And after touching on the need for more cooperation and confidence, Atal Behari Vajpayee courteously invited Musharraf to visit India "at his early convenience."

Like the note itself, India's move leaves room for hope - but also many unanswered questions. A summit looks likely to take place in July, the first such high-level contact between the two countries since early 1999. However, it's doubtful the meeting will bear much fruit. Kashmir remains the bloody heart of the conflict between the two countries, and neither leader is in a position to deviate much from his dogma. That's particularly true for Chief Executive Musharraf, who has to contend with hardliners in his ruling junta as well as Islamic militant groups based in Pakistan.

Rather than a breakthrough, the Indian invitation is a surprise opening gambit in what is likely to be a slow process. Still, the meeting is enormously important for both countries. For Musharraf, who seized power in October 1999, it's a chance to legitimize his embattled military regime at home and abroad. For Vajpayee, it's an opportunity to shift attention away from domestic political squabbles and burnish his legacy as a statesman. When Vajpayee visited Lahore two years ago, it kicked off a thaw in India-Pakistan relations. That warmth, however, was short-lived--only months later the countries were engaged in a war over the Kargil region high in the Himalayas that claimed over 1,000 lives.

Violence has become part of life in Kashmir. Nearly every day brings new civilian casualties and recriminations. India tried various tactics to reduce the killing, while refusing to talk to Pakistan. So long as attacks by Islamic militants - aided and abetted by Pakistan, said India - continued, there would be no talks. That condition, however, has now vanished - to many observers' surprise. "One day we won't even play cricket with Pakistan," says one expert wryly. "The next its leader is welcome to come here at the time of his choosing."

That shift has several possible explanations. As the larger, more stable country, India has long been under pressure from the United States and others to open a dialogue with its fellow nuclear-armed neighbour. At the same time, there was a sense India had run out of options over Kashmir. Last autumn, promising discussions with Kashmiri separatists collapsed. In November, India declared a ceasefire. At first the mood was euphoric, but before long violence resumed in earnest.

India combined its invitation with an end to its ceasefire, an acknowledgment that it had done little to curb the violence and had served mainly to demoralize Indian forces. The onset of summer in the mountain passes was also a reason why the ceasefire had to be called off, says Commodore Uday Bhaskar, deputy director of the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. When the snow melts, the number of militants slipping from the Pakistan-controlled portion of Kashmir into the Indian-controlled portion increases, making for the deadliest season of the year.

With the ceasefire over, India moved to address Pakistan directly. The step bears "all the hallmarks of being a personal Vajpayee decision," says Teresita Shaffer, a South Asia specialist at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Not everyone in his government is as enthusiastic." In theory, it could be a good time for talks: A military regime calls the shots in Pakistan, while the rightist party ruling India can hardly be accused of softness over national security. In reality, though, both governments come to the table with their own weaknesses.

Wounded by a bribery scandal in March, Vajpayee's government rests on an increasingly fractious coalition of parties. There is constant speculation about the 76-year-old prime minister's health (one reason why the summit is in July is to give him time to recover from knee surgery in early June).

The situation is even more tense for Musharraf. While he had called for talks with India "any time, anywhere" during the past 20 months of his rule, Vajpayee's invitation still comes at an awkward time. The regime is under intense pressure from diverse forces: Domestic Islamic parties are pushing for a Islamic legal system, mainstream secular parties and human-rights groups are agitating for rapid elections and the international community wants it to end its support of the Taliban. A severe economic recession is also stirring up unrest.

Against this uncertainty, Musharraf appears to have little leeway in talks with India, especially on an issue as emotive as Kashmir. Nevertheless, a positive summit could help improve Pakistan's image on the world stage, furthering Musharraf's ambition to become president and enshrining a permanent political role for the military in the constitution.

Whether Musharraf can succeed at this balancing act remains to be seen. All major Pakistani political parties welcomed the talks, but Musharraf has ignored or belittled party politicians. Meanwhile, his junta includes several generals who may oppose any bid to rein in militant groups operating in Kashmir, a basic Indian demand. Keeping up military pressure on Indian forces in the disputed territory has long been a basic tenet of Pakistani policy.

Predictably, the strongest reaction to the meeting came from Pakistan-based Islamic militants, who rejected talks as a trap. "This invitation is a fraud against the people of Kashmir and Pakistan," says Yahya Mujahid, spokesman for the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba - the largest group fighting in Kashmir. "India is preparing for even more military pressure on Pakistan, and Pakistan should strengthen its defences rather than go to India for talks." Ominously, Mujahid threatens increased bloodshed: "You will now see a big escalation in the fighting, and it will signal that the Kashmiri people reject this offer."

Reducing violence by militants in Kashmir--a steady rhythm of attacks against both soldiers and civilians--will be one of India's main goals at the meeting. It's not clear to what extent Musharraf is willing or able to control the militants, but India will look for some kind of commitment from Pakistan to reduce the material support it gives them, perhaps in exchange for a reduced military presence in Kashmir.

However, many observers in India warn not to expect that much. "The talks will not yield anything--at the most, they can help to improve the atmosphere," says Brahma Chellaney, a foreign-policy expert at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research. There's a depressing sense of déjˆ vu about the situation, he adds. The diplomatic arc that started with Vajpayee's visit to Lahore and ended in Kargil began in much the same way--with invitations and optimism.

One effect of India's direct contact with Pakistan has been to temporarily sideline the All-Party Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri political groups that advocates independence. But more moderate Kashmiris may also feel pushed aside, warns political commentator Prem Shankar Jha. "By talking to Pakistan, it's like saying, 'We will decide your future over your heads,'" he says. Very little, however, is likely to be decided in July. But in this dangerous neighbourhood, even ineffective discussion is a welcome alternative to silence.