By Jim Wurst *
Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsSeptember/October, 1996
When the delegates negotiating new controls on the use of land mines concluded their work on May 3 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the diplomats and legal and military experts applauded themselves. But in the back of the conference room, several dozen representatives of movements advocating a complete ban on mines--some of them missing body parts--sat in stony silence. It was the clearest indication of the differing realities between those who write the law and those who live with its consequences. Ignoring the growing demand for a total ban on anti-personnel mines, governments had reached an agreement that not only fell short of the goal, but opened the door to the increased use of some types of mines.
In an open letter to the delegates, mine survivors and de-miners said they were "outraged" at the result. "We were warned that this conference would not address our desire for an immediate and total ban. But we had no idea that the conference would settle for such a reprehensible agreement. We have no choice but to denounce [it]." The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a coalition of 500 grassroots movements, called the agreement "a complete failure" that "will not make a significant difference in stemming the global land mines crisis." The United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other international agencies also criticized the decision.
The object of their wrath was the revised version of Protocol II of the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention, the only international agreement regulating land mines. The original version was widely seen as containing so many loopholes as to make it worthless. In the new version, the delegates closed some, but not all, of those loopholes.
One source of conflict was the desire of nations at both ends of the technological scale to protect their stockpiles of mines. Those who produce sophisticated mines wanted to restrict cheap ones; those who rely on cheap mines wanted to control sophisticated devices. The West won this struggle, although the agreement did set some standards for the more sophisticated "smart mines"--mines with self-destruct or self-deactivating devices. The delegates decreed that such mines must self-neutralize or self-destruct within 30 days, with 90 percent reliability.
The major users and exporters of dumb mines, China, Pakistan, and Russia, lost their battle to preserve their preferred mines. But they won a nine-year delay to give them time to bring their stocks up to the new standard, a time frame most experts consider unnecessarily long.
The new protocol also specifies that:
All mines, whether in existing stockpiles or yet to be produced, must contain at least eight grams of iron to make them detectable;
The use and transfer of non-detectable mines that do not self-destruct or self-neutralize are banned after nine years; meanwhile, all minefields containing these devices must be marked;
The use of "remotely delivered" smart mines (those dropped from the air or fired from cannon-like devices) is permitted, and their use is not restricted to marked minefields;
Restrictions apply to internal as well as to international conflicts; and,
For the first time in international law, states pledge to protect those engaged in humanitarian mine-clearing operations. This last provision is a direct result of the anti-mine campaign. Until a few years ago, the only people who cleared mines were opposing soldiers. Today most de-mining is conducted as humanitarian operations, and governments have recognized this new reality.
The primary targets of the activists' rage were those diplomats who in effect legitimized the production and use of smart mines. In addition, critics said that an accepted self-destruct failure rate of 10 percent was too high, that it would be impossible to verify that mines met the proposed specifications, and that, knowing mines would not be effective for long, combatants would be tempted to lay more of them.
Activists have been able to argue that banning mines would not undermine anyone's economy. But as mines become more sophisticated (expensive), this economic argument for banning them could be threatened. The current trade in mines is about $200 million a year--small change in a world with annual military expenditures of $800 billion. But smart and scatterable mines and their delivery vehicles are expensive. A shift from $3- to $30-dollar devices could create a more lucrative market.
Technological advances are also leading to other problems. "Hybrid" mines--those with both anti-personnel and anti-tank characteristics--are a looming threat. Attempts to reduce the dangers of mine-clearing by banning anti-handling booby-trapped mines were defeated, largely by the argument that these devices are also on anti-personnel mines attached to anti-tank mines. But the distinction between anti-personnel and anti-tank mines is blurring, and governments did not want to risk placing any restrictions on anti-tank mines. Protocol II dealt only with anti-personnel mines, but anti-tank mines may soon be small enough to scatter and will be triggered by less weight. These mines are being fitted with "a preformed frangible case, optimized to attack personnel"--in other words, they are anti-personnel devices as well.
These hybrids led the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to question the protocol's definition of an anti-personnel mine as one that is "primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons." The ICRC argued that "if a munition is designed so as to be capable of use as an anti-personnel mine and for some other purpose, it should clearly be considered an anti-personnel mine and regulated as such."
In addition, the ICRC said the conference's "woefully inadequate" decisions on anti-personnel mines "will encourage the production, transfer, and use of a new generation of mines while not prohibiting any existing types other than, eventually, non-detectable anti-personnel mines. Taken together with the absence of verification measures . . . these measures are unlikely to significantly reduce the level of civilian land mine casualties."
The ambiguities of land-mine policy were quickly demonstrated after the conference ended. On May 16, President Bill Clinton announced that the United States would immediately ban the use of non-self-destruct anti-personnel land mines (except in Korea), and that it would destroy its stock of such mines by 1999. However, he added that the United States "will reserve the right to use . . . self-destructing mines as necessary" until a global ban is negotiated.
Although Clinton added that the United States would "urg[e] the nations of the world to support a worldwide ban on land mines" at the next U.N. General Assembly meeting, advocates of the ban criticized his announcement as nothing new--and maybe even a step backwards.
Vermont Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy, the leading congressional proponent of the ban, said the new Clinton policy "simply reaffirms the Pentagon's old policy: they support a ban, but not now, not any time soon. . . . Worse yet, it would actually reverse U.S. law and allow greater use of land mines" by permitting the use of dumb mines in Korea. A Leahy-sponsored moratorium, signed into law by Clinton in February, commits the United States to a moratorium on both smart and dumb anti-personnel land mine use for at least one year starting in 1999.
According to some reports, Clinton did not even realize that he was articulating a policy that undercut the moratorium. Robert Muller, the president of the Vietnam Veterans Association Foundation, one of the founding members of the international campaign to ban land mines, said Clinton's announcement "marks a retreat in our nation's effort to ban these insidious weapons. In 1994, President Clinton called for 'the eventual elimination' of land mines. Now we know that 'eventual' means never." Still, the battle over land mines will continue. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) specializing in arms control, human rights, development, health, and refugees have found a common enemy and a common cause. These activists conducted a vigorous campaign, lobbying delegates to the review conference to write the strongest protocol possible. A mock minefield was laid out near the entrance to the conference room, and a "Wall of Remembrance" commemorated the 791 who had been killed or injured in a single Cambodian province since the conference had adjourned the previous October. Next to that display, a clock ticked off the number of worldwide victims since October; it hit 14,650 as the conference approved the new land-mines protocol.
Nearly 40 of the 57 countries that have signed the convention have now joined in support of a total ban on anti-personnel mines. Canada has asked the pro-ban nations and NGOs to attend a conference in October to discuss the next steps in the campaign to eliminate these weapons. Canada plans to offer a draft resolution in the General Assembly, based on the results of this meeting.
At a meeting in Managua at the end of May, the six Central American nations and Mexico also expressed their "determination to promote policies in favor of a total and immediate ban on the production, possession, transfer, and use of anti-personnel land mines" and they declared their "desire . . . to establish a zone free from anti-personnel land mines on their territories." This initiative could result in the creation of the first land mines-free-zone in the world.
The United Nations, which is not known for forging ahead on controversial issues or taking a stand contrary to its most powerful members, has made an exception in the case of land-mines policy. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has advocated a ban since 1993, voiced regret after the review conference: "I must register my deep disappointment that the progress achieved falls so far short of what I had hoped. . . . The impact which land mines are having, both on the civilian population and on the economy as a whole in affected countries, is so appalling, so devastating, that a total ban on all anti-personnel mines is the only solution." Boutros-Ghali said the United Nations would continue to work with non-governmental agencies "to ensure that humanitarian considerations, that are all too often subordinated to military and geopolitical considerations, remain in the forefront of the minds of governments."
Even military leaders have spoken out, questioning the conventional wisdom that anti-personnel mines are an effective military tool. A Red Cross study written primarily by retired British Brig. Paddy Blagden, the former head of the U.N.'s mine clearance operation, found anti-personnel mines to be of "questionable" value, a finding that was endorsed by 44 retired officers from 18 countries. Independent of this report, 15 former high-ranking U.S. officers, including former Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. David Jones and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, called a ban "not only humane, but also militarily responsible." Amb. Johan Molander, a Swedish diplomat who served as president of the review conference, argues that the only question before the next review conference "should be a yes or no proposition."
Protocol II may be a disappointment, but the moral battle appears to be won. Anti-mine forces have the high ground and the momentum, and they say they will continue to fight, no matter what the new law permits. Mines became a plague because no one paid attention--they could be manufactured, sold, and laid with impunity. But the weapon that has been labeled the "hidden killer" no longer has a place to hide.
About the Author: Jim Wurst is the editor of Disarmament Times.
More Information on NGOs
More Information on Major NGO Campaigns
FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
