By Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti
Mr. Chairman,
I thank you for convening this negotiating meeting on the question of the veto and for your letter dated 13 March.
On the matter before us today, Brazil continues to hold the view that it took in 2005: 1. New permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members; and 2. New permanent members should not exercise the right of veto until the question of its extension to new permanent members has been decided in the framework of a review, which would consider the situation created by the reform.
Such position takes into account the following aspects:
a. As a matter of principle, all permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations, thus reflecting a balanced and equitable representation on the Council. That is why Brazil fully understands and respects the position of the African Union regarding the question of the veto.
b. However, given the difficulties in this most sensitive issue, addressing the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members could benefit from the actual experience accumulated with the addition of new permanent members.
c. In light of such experience, in a number of years, conditions may be met for the membership to make a final decision on the issue.
d. Such process would be made easier if the new permanent members accepted not to exercise the right of veto until a final decision is made in a review conference.
Therefore, the G-4 proposal is both realistic, because it recognizes that we cannot make a decision on the question of the veto at this stage, and pragmatic, since it allows a much needed reform to proceed.
I should note that such realism and pragmatism do not come at the expense of the necessary ambition of the reform. This is so because our position on the question of the veto is coupled with the expansion of the Security Council in both categories. Actually, the only way of eventually reforming the right of veto - including through measures which we will comment when we discuss the working methods - is through the addition of new permanent members committed to a more transparent and accountable Security Council. As history demonstrates, the addition of non-permanent members alone - be it for regular two-year mandates, be it for long-term seats - is not likely to lead to substantive change in the exercise of the veto.
In reaction to comments made earlier, I should add that the capacity of new permanent members to bring change to the Council would not derive from their legal authority to block action in the Council but rather from their continued presence in the organ and their fundamental commitment to change. Attaining our collective objectives for Security Council reform as set forth in the 2005 Outcome Document is perfectly possible without the immediate extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.
Mr. Chairman,
By combining the possibility of full exercise of the right of veto to new permanent members while letting experience with permanency of new members accumulate, we are proposing a balanced and constructive approach that we hope will gather support among the membership. It is the best way of reconciling the decisiveness and flexibility needed to have a meaningful and politically viable reform of the Security Council.
Thank you.
